pointed out, the question of women's political emancipation is really res judicala, and from the Throne down to the Parish Council it is open to women to sit except in the House of Lords. The suggestion that the right of peeresses to sit and vote should await the reform of the Upper Chamber would be postponing the day to the Greek Calends. Public opinion has pronounced favourably on sex equality, and no good reason whatever exists why ladies who are peeresses in their own right should not be entitled to take part in deliberations of the House of Lords, for the majority of the peers who have that right possess it solely because they are the sons of their fathers.

Criminal Justice

WE desire to call our readers' attention to the new rules concerning indictments and the Order in Council made under sect. 14 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1925. Under that section power is given to justices to commit to, and to the court to direct the re-trial at, convenient assizes or quarter sessions, and the Order in Council makes provision for carrying out that section. Sect. 19 gives power to dispense with grand juries at quarter sessions where all persons committed have pleaded guilty, and the new rules Ideal with the Indictable Offences Act 1848, and the Indictments Act 1915 for the purpose of carrying that section into effect.

Sale of Goods and International Law

AT the forthcoming conference of the International Law Association at Vienna two reports will be considered, one dealing with c.i.f. contracts and the other with the conflict of laws in relation to contracts for sale in general. On the first subject

the committee that has been investigating the matter has managed to reach certain conclusions embodied in rules as follow:

(1) The risk passes as soon as the goods are in the custody of the sea-carrier, who issues the bill of lading.

(2) In the case of a sale of goods in transit the risk falls on the buyer, unless the buyer can prove that at the time of the sale the seller knew, or ought to have known, that the goods had suffered loss or damage, or that the vessel carrying the goods had met with an accident of such a nature as to cause loss, damage, or a charge for general average.

(3) If the seller does not deliver the insurance policy, the buyer shall have the right to insure the goods and deduct the premium from the amount of the invoice.

and it will be interesting to see if these prove acceptable to the nations represented. The report of the other committee is more elaborate and the rules put forward for discussion are suggested where the parties have been unable to agree to the law applicable and are confined to contracts for sale, work, and services. Even if no definite conclusions can be reached on these matters, at any rate the exchange of ideas on matters of private international law is all to the good.

AUTHORITY OF A RECEIVER

THE determination of the authority of a receiver was the subject of an important decision in the recent case of Thomas v. Todd (ante, p. 392). The facts of that case were briefly as follow: The plaintiff, who was the proprietor of a band, contracted on the 15th Aug. 1924 with the Grafton Galleries Club Limited (hereinafter called the company) that his band should play daily at the company's club, the engagement to commence on the 8th Sept. 1924, and to continue for three

months at a weekly salary. Under the terms of a debenture deed, which was in the common form, the company had charged its undertaking and all its property in favour of the debenture-holders; the charge was to be a first charge on the assets of the company. The above deed further provided that the creditor might at any time appoint a receiver who might also carry on the company's business, and was to be deemed the agent of the company which was to be solely responsible for his acts or faults and for his remuneration. Subsequently the company got into financial difficulties, and on the 11th Oct. 1924 the defendant was duly appointed receiver of the company by a debenture holder. On the 15th Oct. 1924 a new arrangement was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant, acting as agent for the company, under which the plaintiff agreed that his band should continue to perform daily at the company's club on a weekto-week engagement, there being no stipulation about notice. On the 27th Oct. 1924 the company went into voluntary liquidation, and eventually closed its club on the 1st Nov. 1924. The plaintiff's band played at the club on the night of the 1st Nov. 1924, which was a Saturday and the first day of a new week according to the agreement between the parties made on the 15th Oct. 1924. The plaintiff then claimed a week's salary for the week commencing the 1st Nov. and ending on the 7th Nov. 1924. On the facts of the case the court (Mr. Justice Wright) held that the plaintiff was entitled to such week's salary and entered judgment for him accordingly. The legal question then arose as to

whether the defendant was liable at all in this action in view of the fact that he was only the receiver of the company.

Before answering the above question it may be useful to pause and examine the position of a receiver in connection with the winding-up of a company.

Debentures and trust deeds commonly give power to appoint a receiver. In such a case the receiver derives his appointment and authority from the parties themselves in pursuance of the powers of the contract. A receiver appointed under the terms of a debenture or trust deed is in a different position from a receiver appointed by the court in the following ways:

(1) He is not an officer of the court. Hence interference with his possession does not constitute contempt. Nevertheless, the parties interested can bring an action to restrain interference with the possession of the receiver, and the court may grant an injunction.

(2) While the company is a going-concern, he is the agent of the company and not of the debenture holders or their trustees. But if the company goes into liquidation after the receiver's appointment, he thereupon ceases to be the agent of the company. Thus, in Gosling v. Gaskell and Grocott (77 L. T. Rep. 314; (1897) A. C. 575), a limited company mortgaged all its assets to trustees for debenture holders to secure payment of the debentures. The mortgage deed provided, inter alia, that the trustees might appoint a receiver to enter into possession of the assets of the company and to carry on the business of the company, and that any receiver so appointed should be the agent of the company who alone should be liable for his acts and defaults. The trustees, being of opinion that the security was endangered, appointed a receiver under the above deed; the company thereupon put the receiver into possession of the assets and transferred the conduct of the business to him. Subsequently, on a petition being presented, the court ordered that the company should be wound up, and a liquidator was duly appointed. After the liquidation order the receiver was not given any new authority by the trustees, and he continued to carry on the company's business without any interference from the liquidator or the debenture holders, in precisely the same way as before. The respondents brought an action against the trustees for the price of goods supplied to the receiver in his capacity as such after the compulsory winding-up of the company. It was argued on behalf of the respondents that the making of the order to wind up the company had the effect of converting the receiver from being the agent of the company into the agent of the trustees, and that, therefore, the trustees were liable. It was held by the House of Lords, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal, that, though the winding-up order determined the authority of the receiver as agent of the company, the receiver did not thereby become by implication the agent of the trustees, and that as the trustees had not given the receiver any express authority

they were not liable for the price of the goods supplied by the respondents.

(3) On a winding-up of the company, the court will not, in the ordinary course of events, displace the debenture holders' receiver in favour of the liquidator. On the contrary, the court will order a liquidator in possession to give up his possession to the receiver appointed by the debenture holders. Thus, in Re Henry Pound, Son, and Hutchings (1889, 42 Ch. Div. 402, C. A.) an order was made for the winding-up of the company, and an official liquidator was appointed. The debenture holders, in pursuance of the powers conferred by their deed, then appointed a receiver and applied to the court that he might be at liberty forthwith to take possession of the company's undertaking and property. The official liquidator in his evidence expressed a fear that if the appliIcation succeeded the receiver would sell the whole assets for a sum sufficient only to satisfy the debenture debt and so leave nothing whatever for the general body of creditors. The Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of Mr. Justice Kay, held that the court ought not to interfere with the right of the debenture holders to a receiver under their deed, and leave was given to the receiver appointed by them to take possession notwithstanding the appointment of the official liquidator. In Willmott v. London Celluloid Company (1885, 52 L. T. Rep. 642) Vice-Chancellor Bacon, on making a winding-up order, declined to appoint a receiver on the ground that the appointment of a liquidator would be sufficient protection to the debenture holders. The Court of Appeal, however, held that the debenture holders were entitled to special protection, and unless a receiver was appointed, the debenture holders would have no greater protection than any other creditors of the company. The liquidator not objecting to act, the Court of Appeal accordingly appointed him receiver.

(4) A receiver appointed by a debenture holder under the powers of the debenture may be displaced by the court in a proper case by its own receiver on the application of another debenture holder. The power to appoint a receiver, vested in some or one of a body of debenture holders ranking pari passu must be exercised bond fide in the interests of all the debenture holders. If it is not so exercised the court has jurisdiction to interfere and appoint its own receiver. Thus, in Re" Slogger Automatic Feeder Company Limited; Hoare v. The Company (112 L. T. Rep. 579; (1915) 1 Ch. 478), the defendant company made a debenture issue of £20,000 in 200 first mortgage debentures of £100 each. There was no trust deed. A condition endorsed on each debenture provided that the registered holder might, with the written consent of the majority of the debenture holders, appoint a receiver to take possession of, and sell, the property charged by the debenture. Subsequently the debentures matured and remained unpaid. At that time the registered holders of the debentures were four parties, three of whom were shareholders of the company and one of those three had parted with all his immediate beneficial interest in sixty-four debentures by depositing them as a security for the company's overdraft with the bank which happened also to be the fourth registered debenture holder. The first three above-mentioned parties, who formed the majority of the registered debenture holders, without notice to the bank, duly appointed a receiver under the powers of their debentures. The bank thereupon applied to the court to appoint a receiver, and on the evidence it appeared likely that the action of the three registered debenture holders in appointing the individual in question to be receiver of the company was not done on behalf of the debenture holders, but on behalf of other interests. The court (Mr. Justice Neville) held that, notwithstanding the bargain between the debenture holders, the court had jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case to appoint its own officer to be receiver to realise the security under the control of the court. Again, in Re Maskelyne British Typewriter Limited (77 L. T. Rep. 579; (1898) 1 Ch. 133), the company issued a series of debentures to several persons, including the L. Corporation, and it was a condition endorsed on each debenture of the series that the above-named corporation might appoint a receiver of all or any part of the property thereby charged. The L. Corporation, who were also shareholders in the company, duly appointed a receiver on the company being wound up. Some of the other registered debenture holders then brought an action against the company to enforce their security. The Court of Appeal, affirming the order of Mr. Justice North, held that the L. Corporation had exercised their power of appointing a receiver, not bonâ

fide for the purpose of protecting the interest of their codebenture holders, but for a purpose which was adverse to their interest. In such a case the court had jurisdiction to appoint its own receiver, and this was accordingly done.

(5) The debenture holders' receiver is accountable to the debenture holders or trustees, and not to the court.

(6) The powers of a debenture holders' receiver are limited by the deed.

So much for the various ways in which the position of a receiver appointed by a debenture holder under the powers of his debenture differs from that of a receiver appointed by the court. There are several other points concerning a receiver appointed by a debenture holder which may be usefully noted. In the first place, it must be remembered that a receiver is not a new tenant, but merely the caretaker of the company to which he is appointed. He cannot, therefore, demand a supply of gas to be continued until payment has been made in respect of arrears. Thus in Paterson v. Gas Light and Coke Company (74 L. T. Rep. 640; (1896) 2 Ch. 476) a limited company was supplied with gas by the defendants. The plaintiff, having been duly appointed receiver and manager by the debenture holders, entered and carried on the business of the limited company. At the time of the plaintiff's appointment there was due to the defendants the sum of £90 for gas supplied by them to the limited company. The defendants threatened to cut off the supply of gas unless the £90 arrears were paid, and the plaintiff brought an action to restrain them from doing so. The Court of Appeal, discharging the injunction granted by Mr. Justice Kekewich held that the receiver was not a new tenant but merely a caretaker of the limited company, and that, therefore, he could not claim a supply of gas except on payment of the arrears. In Re Adolphe Crosbie Limited; Johnson v. Crosbie (1910, 74 J. P. 25) the debentures were not secured by a trust deed and merely operated as an equitable charge on the company's property and assets. At the date when a receiver was appointed in a debenture holders' action the company owed a sum of money to a gas company for gas supplied, which the receiver refused to pay. The gas company obtained, under sect. 23 of the Gasworks Clauses Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 41), and sect. 74 of their special Act, an order and warrant for distress on the company's goods and chattels for the amount of the debt. The gas company then applied in the debenture holders' action for leave to proceed with the distress, and the court (Mr. Justice Neville) held that the statutory rights of the gas company overrode the equitable rights of the debenture holders, and accordingly granted the gas company leave to proceed. In regard to the supply of electric light, sect. 19 of the Electric Lighting Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 56) provides that no person is entitled to a supply of current by the electric lighting company unless he has entered into a contract with the company for that purpose. It follows, therefore, that upon a change in the occupation of premises to which current is supplied, the company are entitled to discontinue the supply until the new occupier has entered into a contract with them for a supply to him. In Husey v. London Electric Supply Corporation (86 L. T. Rep. 166; (1902) 1 Ch. 411) the debenture holders of an hotel company obtained the appointment of the plaintiff as receiver of the undertaking and property of the company, and the plaintiff at once took possession of the hotel. At the time of the plaintiff's appointment there was due from the company to the defendants a sum for electric current supplied by them to the hotel. On an application by the receiver to restrain the defendants from cutting off the supply of electric light, the Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of Mr. Justice Kekewich, held that the defendants were entitled to discontinue the current until the plaintiff had entered into a new contract with them for its supply.

In Thomas v. Todd (sup.) the court (Mr. Justice Wright), on consideration of the terms of the debenture deed and the nature of the voluntary liquidation, came to the conclusion that the right of the receiver to bind the company terminated on the commencement of the voluntary liquidation. The defendant had made the contract with the plaintiff when the former had no principal at his back and, therefore, the defendant was personally liable for the week's salary which was due to the plaintiff in respect of the week ending the 7th Nov. 1924. The above decision is of considerable importance as it relates to the determination of the authority of a receiver after a voluntary winding-up, whereas Gosling v. Gaskell and Grocott (sup.) had merely decided the same point in connection with a compulsory winding-up.

STAMP ON APPOINTMENT OF NEW

TRUSTEES

It has been asked with reference to sect. 40 (1) of the Trustee Act of 1925, which came into operation on the 1st Jan. 1926, whether, in the absence of a declaration vesting such part of the trust property as can be vested without conveyance or assignment, the appointment is liable to two stamps of 10s. each, or only one. The sub-section is shortly as follows: "Where by a deed a new trustee is appointed to perform any trust, then (a) if a vesting declaration is therein contained the trust property shall vest without any conveyance or assignment in the trustees; and (b) If the deed is made after 1925 and does not contain such a declaration, the deed shall, subject to any express provisions to the contrary therein contained, operate as if it had contained such a declaration, extending to all estates, &c., with respect to which a declaration could have been made.' Sub-sect. 4 of the section provides that the above shall not extend to mortgages of land for securing the trust money, to land held on lease which contains a condition against assigning without consent unless the consent is obtained or to any share, &c., which is transferable only in the books of a company or in manner directed by Act of Parlia

ment.

The Stamp Act of 1891, s. 1, says that "from and after the commencement of this Act the stamp duties to be charged for the use of Her Majesty upon the several instruments specified in the First Schedule to this Act shall be the several duties in the said schedule specified. ." The First Schedule contains the following item: "Appointment of a new trustee and appointment in execution of a power of any property or of any use, share, or interest in any property, by any instrument not being a will 10s." And see sect. 62. Sect. 4 says: 66 Except where express provision to the contrary is made by this and any other Act: (a) An instrument containing or relating to several distinct matters is to be separately and distinctly charged, as if it were a separate instrument with duty in respect of each of the matters." Sect. 62: "Every instrument and every decree or order of any court or of any commissioners whereby any property on any occasion, except a sale or mortgage, is transferred to or vested in any person is to be charged with duty as a conveyance or transfer of property: Provided that a conveyance or transfer made for effectuating the appointment of a new trustee is not to be charged with any higher duty than 10s." The Stamp Act of 1870 contained provisions to precisely the same effect, viz., sects. 3, 8 (1), and 78, and upon these the case of Hadgett and others v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (37 L. T. Rep. 612; 1878, 3 Ex. Div. 46) was decided in the year 1877, to the effect that two 10s. stamps were requisite.

Sect. 12 (1) of the Trustee Act 1893 (replacing sect. 34 of Conveyancing Act 1881) enacts that "where a deed by which a new trustee is appointed to perform any trust contains a declaration by the appointor to the effect that any estate or interest in any land subject to the trust, or in any chattel so subject, or the right to recover and receive any debt or other thing in action so subject, shall vest in the persons who by virtue of the deed become and are the trustees for performing the trust, that declaration shall, without any conveyance or assignment, operate to vest in those persons, as joint tenants, and for the purposes of the trust, that estate interest or right." The instrument under consideration in the case of Hadgett referred to, after ordering the appointment of new trustees, contained the following, viz. : That the aforesaid chapel with the appurtenance, &c., and all terms and estate therein and all other lands and hereditaments (if any) held in trust for the benefit of or purposes of the said charity do vest in the person who by virtue hereof are constituted the trustees of the same charity their heirs executors administrators and assigns, according to the legal nature of the same premises upon and for the subsisting trust thereof." Chief Baron Kelly in his judgment said that the language of the statute was clear. There might be some cases in which the mere appointment of the trustee did transfer the property, but that was not so here. The board had to appoint the trustees, and they had to make a vesting order transferring the property into the hands of the new trustees. There were, in fact, two distinct acts done. The trustees were appointed and the property was vested in them, and the section said where an instrument contains or relates to several distinct matters, it is to be charged in respect of each of them. The proviso contained in sect. 78 (sect. 62 of the Act of 1891) did not

apply, for that conveyance was not made merely for effectuating the appointment of the new trustees.

Taxing statutes are to be construed strictly, even though such construction may annul their intention. Lord Cairns in Partington v. Attorney-General (21 L. T. Rep. 370 ; L. Rep. 4 H. L., at p. 122) said: “I am not at all sure that in a case of this kind- a fiscal case-form is not amply sufficient : because, as I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation it is this: If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown seeking to recover the tax cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be admissible in any statute what is called an equitable construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute, where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute.” Chief Baron Kelly, it will be observed, held that if there was a document which of itself had the effect of appointing new trustees and also vesting the trust property in them without a vesting order, only one stamp would have been necessary. Now that seems to be exactly what sect. 40 (1) of the New Trustee Act does. Unless a contrary intention is expressed, the appointment operates as if it had contained a vesting declaration ; but it might be argued that if this is the case, then the vesting declaration must be read into the section and the deed be stamped to cover both transactions, the appointment and the vesting, but the absence of an express declaration might, it may reasonably be said, bring the case within the proviso to sect. 62 of the Stamp Act 1891 set out above. What kind of document a conveyance or transfer of property made for effectuating the appointment of a new trustee is it is difficult to imagine. Should it not be a conveyance or transfer for effectuating the vesting of the trust property in the new trustees?

All deeds appointing new trustees henceforth will operate to vest such trust property as does not require to be transferred separately in the new trustees. If the trust property consists entirely of, say, shares in companies, the deed will have no vesting effect and the extra 10s., if payable, will be paid for nothing. In such a case it would seem to be necessary to state in the deed that there is no kind of property which would vest by a declaration.

THE CONVEYANCER Trustees for Sale

WE are frequently reminded that under the new legislation the three classes of owners of land are (1) absolute owners; (2) estate owners under the Settled Land Act; and (3) trustees for sale. People are in some cases hazy as to whether land is subject to the Settled Land Act or subject to a trust for sale. It was one of the experiments of the Settled Land Act 1882 to bring trusts for sale within the ambit of settled land, but it has not been repeated by the new Act. By the Law of Property Act 1925, s. 205, a trust for sale means "an immediate binding' trust." Mr. Justice Tomlin, in the recent case of Re Leigh's Settled Estates (noted, 161 L. T. Jour. 512), has decided that the word binding" means that the entire subject-matter of the settlement is subject to and bound by the trust for sale. So that in the case before his Lordship, as there was a paramount jointure, which the trust for sale could not bind, the person entitled to the rents and profits until sale was entitled to a vesting deed, and the provision as to compound settlements applied. The learned judge also held that the fact that orders had been made under sect. 7 of the Settled Land Act 1884 did not take away the right of the tenant for life to have a vesting deed executed in her favour. The decision is important as affirming the statement we have previously made to the effect that if the trust for sale did not come into force on the 1st Jan. last or was not then in force, the fee simple vested in the tenant for life, and when he dies (whether he has had a vesting deed in his favour or not) his special legal personal representatives, the trustees for the purposes of the Settled Land Act, must vest the property in the trustees for sale before they can sell as such. Assuming that, as trustees with a future trust for sale, they are the trustees for the purposes of the Act they must still go through the form of an assent, if they are to sell as trustees and not as personal representatives.

Undivided Shares

THE provisions of the new Law of Property Acts as to undivided shares do not seem to the writer of these lines to be quite as free from ambiguity as they might be. At all events, the public would have been grateful if they had been a little more explanatory. The Law of Property Act 1925 makes a fair start by enacting that: "A legal estate is not capable of subsisting or of being created in an undivided share in land" (sect. 1 (6). Then sect. 34 provides: (1) That an undivided share in land shall not be capable of being created except as provided by the Settled Land Act 1925, or as thereinafter mentioned; (2) that where, after the commencement of that Act, land is expressed to be conveyed to persons of full age in undivided shares, the conveyance is to operate as if the land had been expressed to be conveyed to the grantees, or if there are more than four to the four first named in the conveyance as joint tenants upon the statutory trusts, and so as to give effect to the rights of the persons who would have been entitled to the shares if the conveyance had operated to create them. That sub-section seems also to be clear and unambiguous. (3) That a devise, coming into operation after the commencement of the Act of land to two or more persons in undivided shares, is to operate as a devise to the trustees, if any, of the will for the purposes of the Settled Land Act 1925, or if there are no such trustees then to the personal representatives of the testator (without prejudice to powers of the personal representatives for purposes of administration) upon the statutory trusts. That sub-section does not appear to be quite clear. What is the meaning of " coming into operation after the commencement of this Act"? In one sense a devise comes into operation immediately after the death of the testator. In another sense it comes into operation after the determination of some previous estate such as a life estate. The next provisions on the subject are contained in Part IV. of the First Schedule to the said Act. The first question which arises on Part IV. is whether sub-sects. (1), (2), (3), and (4), of sect. 1 are controlled by the first four lines of that section, which only refer to cases where immediately before the commencement of the Act land is held at law or in equity in undivided shares vested in possession. There is a difficulty in reconciling sub-sect. (3) with sect. 1, as sub-sect. (3) only applies to settled land, and primâ facie that connotes a limited owner. Presumably settled land there means the land which has been subject of a settlement, but which has ceased to be so by reason of the termination of a preceding life or other estate, or settled land for which there is no limited owner of the entirety. Again, it is doubtful if sub-sect. (4) is intended to be controlled by the first four lines of sect. 1, or whether it applies to other cases. Sect. 2 of Part IV. seems to show that sub-sect. (4) does not apply to all other cases. With regard to sect. 2 of Part IV., if and when undivided shares fall into possession, why should not the entirety vest in the owners of the undivided shares, if not exceeding four, upon the statutory trusts, in lieu of the procedure prescribed by that section, subject, of course, to the legal estate being got in. Sect. 36 of the Settled Land Act 1925 provides that if and when, after the commencement of that Act, settled land is held in trust for persons entitled in possession under a trust instrument in undivided shares, the trustees of the settlement (if the settled land is not already vested in them) may require the estate owner in whom the settled land is vested (but in the case of a personal representative subject to his powers for purposes of administration) to convey the land to them, or assent to it vesting in them, as joint tenants, to be held upon the statutory trusts. Here again settled land appears to mean land which has been settled, or at all events land of which there is no tenant for life. Sect. 36 seems to cover the same cases as those dealt with by sect. 2 of Part IV. of the First Schedule to the Law of Property Act 1925. The foregoing observations are made from the standpoint of an ordinary practitioner, and not in any dogmatic or carping spirit.

Universities and College Estate Act 1925

THIS Act (15 Geo. 5, c. 24), which may perhaps be termed the seventh of the new Law of Property Acts, came into force on the 1st Jan. 1926. It consolidates the Universities and College Estate Acts 1858–1898, and enactments amending those Acts. It applies to the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and Durham, and the Colleges or Halls therein, and the Colleges of Winchester and Eton, and to the House of Christchurch in Oxford. Under the Act of 1898 the universities and colleges had the powers of sale, enfranchisement, exchange, partition Second Sheet

and leasing, conferred on tenants for life by the Settled Land Acts 1882-1890. Under the new Act a university or college may sell or exchange its land, with the consent of the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (sect. 2). Save as thereinafter provided every sale must be for the best consideration in money that can reasonably be obtained. A sale may be made in consideration of a rent, but it must be the best rent that can reasonably be obtained (sect. 3). Land in England or Wales cannot be given by a university or college in exchange for land out of England and Wales (sect. 4). A university or college may lease its land for any term not exceeding : (1) In case of a building lease, ninety-nine years; (2) in case of a mining lease, sixty years ; (3) in case of any other lease, twentyone years (sect. 6). Such lease must be by deed, and take effect in possession not later than twelve months after its date, and must reserve the best rent which can reasonably be obtained, regard being had to any fine taken, and to any money laid out for the benefit of any land belonging to the university or college (sect. 7). There are special provisions as to building and mining leases (sects. 9 and 10). The Minister has power under certain circumstances to authorise building and mining leases to be granted for any terms and on any conditions (sect. 11). A university or college may accept surrenders of leases, and all money received thereon is to be paid to the Minister, and be treated as capital money, unless the Minister otherwise orders (sect. 13). Sect. 15 enables a university or college with the consent of the Minister, for the benefit of land belonging to them, to make grants gratuitously for public purposes, limited to one acre in some cases, and to five acres in others. There is also power to appropriate land for streets, squares, and open spaces (sect. 16) and to compromise claims, and to release restrictive covenants (sect. 17). Also to vary the terms of leases and to agree to the apportionment of rent reserved by any lease of land belonging to the university or college (sect. 19). By sect. 21 the Minister may authorise any other transaction concerning land belonging to the university or college which would be for its benefit (sect. 21). A sale or other disposition may be made of land without the mines and minerals, or vice versa (sect. 22). A university or college may, with the consent of the Minister, either with or without consideration, grant options to purchase or take a lease of land belonging to the college, but such option must be exercisable within an agreed number of years not exceeding ten, and otherwise on the terms mentioned in the Act (sect. 33). Capital money may, with the consent of the Minister, be invested in the manner mentioned in the Act (sect. 36). There is power for a university or college, with the consent of the Minister, to raise money on mortgage in such sums as may be certified by their surveyor to be properly required (sect. 30). Provision may be made for the discharge of money borrowed, either by the creation of a sinking fund, or otherwise as mentioned in the Act (sect. 32). There are special provisions enabling arrangements to be made with the authority of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners for a university or college to sell or purchase advowsons (sects. 33 and 34). The consent of the Minister to any sale or exchange, or investment, or mortgage, is to be evidenced by an order under the official seal of the Minister, who may require a valuation to be made by a surveyor to be approved by him of any lands the subject of any sale, exchange, purchase or mortgage (sect. 38). Provisions is also made for the fees of the Minister (sect. 39); and there are a few supplemental provisions. The foregoing short résumé may be useful as calling attention to the scope of the Act.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS

By Our Reporters in the Several Courts COURT OF APPEAL Bankruptcy Married woman-Trade or business-Professional artist-Contracts for fixed sum to supply costumes, scenery, and assistant artists if necessary-Addition of word "business" intended to enlarge sphere of responsibilityFinance (No. 2) Act 1915 (5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 89), s. 39 (c)— Bankruptcy Act 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59) s. 125.

Appeal by petitioning creditors from a decision of Registrar Francke given on the 15th May 1926 refusing to make a receiving order against the debtor. The act of bankruptcy alleged was a failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice founded on a judgment obtained in respect of a debt incurred by the debtor, in the course of carrying out contracts

to appear on the stage as a professional artist. The debtor was a married woman, and sect. 125 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914 provided that every married woman who carried on a trade or business whether separately from her husband or not should be subject to the Bankruptcy laws as if she were a feme sole. The question arose whether the debtor did in fact carry on a trade or business. She was engaged in producing scence in the course of which she incurred liabilities. She entered into a number of contracts under which she received a fixed sum out of which she undertook to pay for and supply when necessary one or more assistant artists, the necessary musical accompaniment, costumes, and any special scenery. It was alleged that under these circumstances she was a professional artist and was not engaged in the carrying on of a trade or business within the meaning of sect. 125 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914, and the registrar held that she was a professional artist and the words "trade or business " were ejusdem generis and she was not carrying on a trade or business.

Held, that the debtor was entitled to be called a pro fessional artist but her activities involved liabilities to others and she was carrying on a trade or business within the meaning of sect. 125 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914, therefore the appeal must be allowed and a receiving order made, the addition to the word " trade " used in the earlier Bankruptcy Acts and the Married Women's Property Acts of the word "business" by the Bankruptcy Act 1914 intended to enlarge the sphere of responsibility (see Smith v. Anderson, 43 L. T. Rep. 329; 15 Ch. Div. 259; Rolls v. Miller, 50 L. T. Rep. 597; 27 Ch. Div. 71, at p. 85); the word business used in a comprehensive sense as was shown by sect. 39 (c) · of the Finance (No. 2) Act 1915 which excepted from trades or businesses any profession in which no capital expenditure was required, or only capital expenditure of a comparatively small amount.

was

[Re a Debtor (No. 3 of 1926); Petitioning Creditor v. Debtor. Ct. of App.: Lord Hanworth, M.R., Scrutton, L.J., and Russell, J. June 25.—Counsel: for the appellant, Edward Clayton, K.C., and E. W. Hansell; for the respondent, W. T. Monckton. Solicitors for the appellant, Finnis, Downey, Linnell, and Chessher; for the respondent, Withers, Bensons, Currie, Williams, and Co.]

Business name-Registration of—Action by defaulter Judgment for plaintiff-Bankruptcy petition-Relief granted after judgment Proceedings validated ab initio Registration of Business Names Act 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 58), s. 8 (1) (a).

Appeal from a receiving order made by Mr. Registrar Mellor. The debtor, Abraham Shaer, a baker, was indebted to the creditor, trading as Morris Silverman, in the sum of £217 10s. 9d. for flour sold and delivered. The creditor sued him and applied for judgment under Order XIV. The Master ordered the plaintiff to be at liberty to sign judgment for £120 unless that sum were paid into court within seven days, and remitted the rest of the claim to the Shoreditch County Court. Judgment was signed, and the defendant then appealed to Fraser, J., who dismissed the appeal, and at the same time, upon the application of the plaintiff, granted relief from the disability imposed upon him in enforcing the contract by reason of the fact that his real name was Moses or Moysiez Silbermann, being an Austrian Pole by origin, and that he was not registered under the Registration of Business Names Act 1916. A receiving order having been made on the judgment, the debtor appealed, and contended that the relief was granted too late; it could be granted in proceedings actually pending, but not after judgment.

Held, that the court has power at any time to grant relief from disability upon terms, under sect. 8 (1) (a) of the Act, and that when granted such relief went right back to the contract sued on, and rehabilitated the proceedings from beginning to end. The decision of McCardie, J. in Hawkins v. Duché (125 L. T. Rep. 671; (1921) 3 K. B. 226) was quite correct, but must even be extended, for relief could be given not only before, but after judgment was signed, either generally or as respects any particular contracts sued on.

[Re Shaer; Ex parte Silverman. Ct. of App. Lord Hanworth, M.R., Warrington and Sargant, L.JJ. June 21.-Counsel: E. C. Morey; E. H. Coumbe. Solicitors: W. H. Lane; J. Howard Smith.]

Partnership Enemy firm-British and German partnersDissolved by war—Vesting of partnership assets in controllerParties Treaty of Peace Order 1919, art. 297—Partnership Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 39), ss. 31, 38.

Appeal from a decision of Eve, J. Under an agreement dated the 21st Aug. 1911 a partnership was created between three German nationals and one English subject, under the firm-name of Arnold Otto, Meyer, and Co. The partnership carried on business until dissolved by the outbreak of war in 1914. On the 3rd Nov. 1914 the English partner, F., was licensed to wind up the partnership affairs in England. He carried on the business and collected the assets with a view to liquidation. On the 22nd Nov. an order was made by the Board of Trade that the business should be wound up by the controller. No partnership accounts had been taken between the partners since the last balance sheet on the 31st Dec. 1913. F. died on the 2nd Oct. 1920, and the defendant was the sole executor of his will. By a vesting order made by the Board of Trade on the 1st April 1924 all the property rights and interests of the German partners in the firm were vested in the plaintiff as controller, and he was also charged to take all necessary legal proceedings to get in and collect any money due in respect thereof. It was alleged that F. owed a balance to the partnership, and the plaintiff commenced this action in June 1924, claiming an account against the defendant of all dealings by F. in the partnership assets, including any dealings since dissolution. The German partners were not made parties to the action. The defendant objected that no account could be taken of partnership dealings in any proceedings to which the German partners were not parties. Eve, J. upheld this objection and dismissed the action. The plaintiff appealed.

Held, that the appeal must be dismissed. The fact that the rights of the German partners had become vested in the plaintiff could not affect the defendant's rights. The German partners were liable in any partnership action to render accounts to him, and they could not get rid of their liability by assignment. Their presence was therefore essential to the maintenance of the action : (Bergmann v. Macmillan, (44 L. T. Rep. 794; 17 Ch. Div. 422, 427) and Tolhurst v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Limited (89 L. T. Rep. 196 ; (1903) A. C. 414). An undertaking to accept liability did not cure the defect for want of parties.

[Public Trustee v. Elder. Ct. of App.: Lord Hanworth, M.R., Warrington and Sargant, L.JJ. April 23, 26, 27, and May 17.-Counsel: Gover, K.C. and Vaisey, K.C.; Green, K.C. and E. J. Heckscher. Solicitors: Walker, Martineau, and Co.; Roney and Co.]

Workmen's compensation Accident-Collier-Loss of right eye -Work resumed as dataller-Wages higher than pre-accident wages-Loss of left eye nine years after by disease unconnected with accident-Incapacity resulting from accident-Supervening outside event-Liability of employer-Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58), s. 1 (1), Sched. I. (1) (b) (3).

Appeal by the employers from an award made on the 17th March 1926 by His Honour Judge H. C. Dowdall, K.C., sitting as an arbitrator under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906, in the County Court of Lancashire holden at St. Helens. The workman, whilst employed by the appellants as a collier, on the 13th July 1915, getting coal at the face, was struck by a quantity of coal, a portion of which entered his right eye, resulting in its loss. Full compensation was paid to him until Jan. 1916, when he resumed work with the appellants as a dataller. His wages as a dataller prevented any right arising for compensation, and he continued so working until the 2nd Oct. 1925, when he had to give up owing to the loss of his other eye from a disease in no way connected with the accident. It was agreed that the average weekly earnings of a collier for five working days a week were £2 15s, and of a dataller £2 3s. 9d. From Jan. 1916 to Oct. 1925 his average weekly earnings were £2 2s. 1d. and before the accidents were £1 12s. On the 28th Jan. 1926 he filed a request for arbitration, claiming 16s. a week during total incapacity. The employers denied liability on the ground that but for the condition set up by disease and the loss of sight of the left eye, the appellant had and has an earning capacity equal to or greater than his pre-accident earnings. And the work he was engaged upon was then and would be open to him when the condition of his left eye permitted him to return to work, and, therefore, the incapacity was not the