privity of contract with, nor equities against, W, and that, in consequence of the concealment from her of the real nature of the transaction, she was, in equity, altogether released from the bond. Squire v. Whitton, 1 H. L. Cas. 333.

(b) Appropriation of Taxes to Arrears due from Collector.

M was surety in a bond given by G, the collector of taxes in Jamaica, for payment of the collections for the year 1842. G, at the date of the bond, was in arrear for taxes collected by him in 1841. G appointed one S his deputy, to collect the taxes for the year 1842, which he partly did, and G collected the remainder. Shortly after the collection of the taxes, the receiver-general pressed G for the payment of the arrears of 1841. G went to S and obtained from him 3,000l. to remit to the receiver-general, S taking that amount out of a chest, in which were placed the monies collected for 1842. G converted that sum, and also 2,0001. which he had collected for taxes in 1842, into paper money, and transmitted 5,000l. to the receivergeneral, who appropriated the whole amount in liquidation of the arrears for 1841. In an action brought by the Crown against M upon the bond, the Judge charged the jury, that if they were satisfied that the sum of 5,0007. had been remitted out of the taxes of 1842, and that G had not expressly assented to the appropriation of that amount towards payment of the arrears of 1841, they ought to find for the defendant:-Held, by the Judicial Committee, sustaining a bill of exceptions to the Judge's charge and awarding a venire de novo, that the receiver-general had a right to appropriate the remittance by G to the liquidation of the arrears of 1841, and that it was not necessary that G should assent to that appropriation; and that M was bound by the appropriation, and liable on the bond for the deficiency of the taxes for the year 1842. Attorney General of Jamaica v. Manderson, 6 Moore, P.C. 239.

(c) Merger of Simple Contract Debt.

A simple contract debt, held not to be merged by a bond of the debtor, with sureties conditioned to be void on payment of the amount then or thereafter to become due, or on payment by sureties on default of debtor after notice; or if no notice should be given. Norfolk Rail. Co. v. M'Namara, 3 Exch. Rep. 628.

(d) Of Condition not to practise as a Surgeon.

To debt on a bond, the condition of which was that if obligor should practise as a surgeon at S at any time, without the consent of the obligee, then, &c.; plea, that the defendant did not practise as a surgeon at S without the consent, &c.:-Held, bad for not shewing the performance of the condition; and held, that the period of restraint was not confined to the lifetime of the obligee. Hastings v. Whitley, 2 Exch. Rep. 611.

(e) Of Condition to try in Interpleader Bond. A bond given to plaintiffs under an interpleader order, by two defendants, as security for a claimant of goods seized at the suit of plaintiffs, contained a condition, that if at the trial of the issue the goods should be found to have been the property of the

claimant, or, if he should" proceed to try" according to the order or any further order, or, should pay the value of the goods, the bond should be void. The declaration, after setting out the condition, stated, that when the issue came on to be tried the parties agreed to withdraw a juror; that afterwards a Judge's order was made, directing the claimant to proceed to trial at a certain sittings, and that he did not proceed to trial, or try :-Held, that the declaration was good; that the condition meant that the claimant should try, and was not satisfied by the first proceeding to trial; and that there was a sufficient breach. And a plea which stated that the claimant did proceed to trial, and that a juror was withdrawn, was held bad, as raising an immaterial issue. Williams v. Gray, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 382.

(f) Of Condition impossible of Performance.

In an action against a surety upon a bond under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. s. 8. for the payment of a debt by H, or his rendering himself in any action to be brought, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had brought an action against H in the Court of Queen's Bench, and had issued a ca. sa. on a judg ment recovered therein, on which H was taken and detained in custody, according to the practice of the said court, and that from the recovery of the judgment until the arrest, H was ready and willing to surrender himself according to the practice of the court and the condition of the bond, and that by reason of his having been so taken and detained, "he was, by the practice of the said court, exonerated and discharged from rendering himself according to the said condition." On special demurrer, the defendant was allowed to amend; and

Semble that the plea should either have shewn the practice of the court, and that H did surrender, if the facts alleged amounted to a surrender by such practice, or that it became impossible for H to surrender, on account of the act of the plaintiff, and the practice of the Court. Hayward v. Bennett, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 182; 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 480; 5 Com. B. Rep. 593.

(g) Bond for due performance of Duties by Clerk.

Debt on bond, given by E G and the defendant and another, as his sureties, to the London and Croydon Railway Company, for the due performance by E G of the duties of chief clerk to the booking office at the railway station. The condition was, that if E G should render to the London and Croydon Railway Company, or to the committee for managing the London terminus of the London and Croydon, London and Brighton, and South-Eastern Railways, a true account of all receipts and payments of him, and should pay to the London and Croydon Company, or to the said committee, all sums received by him on account of the company or committee, and also such sums as he should receive from the booking clerks, or on account of the said company or committee, the bond was void.

Second plea, performance by E G by rendering an account to and payment to the London and Croydon Company and the committee.

Third plea, that the bond was made to the London and Croydon Company before the passing of an act of parliament consolidating the London and Brighton

and the London and Croydon Companies; that the action was commenced afterwards, and that immediately after the passing of the act of parliament the London and Croydon Company was thereby dissolved.

Fourth plea, that the bond was made before the passing of the act, and the action commenced afterwards; that from the time of making the bond to the passing of the act, the defendant rendered to the London and Croydon Company a true account, and paid them all sums received by him on account of the said company.

The replication to the second plea traversed the rendering a true account, alleging that E G, on the 9th of April 1846, and on divers other days between that day and the 20th of December 1846, received divers large sums of money, amounting to 100,0002., and did not render a true account to the company or the committee. The second breach stated, that E G received 150,000l. on account of the said company, and other sums amounting to 300,000l. from the booking clerks on account of the company, but did not pay the same to the company or to the committee. The third breach stated a receipt by E G of 350,000l. on account of the said committee, and of 360,000l. from the said booking clerks on account of the said committee, and non-payment of the same to the committee or the company.

Held, on special demurrer, first, that the third plea afforded no answer to the action; secondly, that the fourth plea was bad, as it was consistent with the statements in it that E G did not render to the committee a full account of his receipts and payments, and that he might not have paid to the committee the monies received by him on account of the committee; thirdly, that the breaches in the replication were good. London, Brighton, and South Coast Rail. Co. v. Goodwin, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 174; 3 Exch. Rep. 320.

Debt on bond given by E G, and the defendant and another, as his sureties, to the London and Croydon Railway Company, for the due performance by E G of the duties of chief clerk to the booking-office at a railway station. The condition was, that if E G should render to the London and Croydon Railway Company, or to the committee for managing the London terminus of the London and Croydon, London and Brighton, and SouthEastern Railways, a true account of all receipts and payments, and should-pay to the Croydon Company, or to the said committee, all sums received by him on account of the company or committee, and also such sums as he should receive from the booking clerks, or on account of the said company or committee, the bond was to be void. Breaches

were assigned in the replication. Upon the assessment of damages after judgment for the plaintiff upon demurrer, the breach relied upon was that EG did not pay over to the company what he had received from the booking clerks. It appeared that instead of making up his accounts in the evening of each day, E G had allowed the clerks to be in arrear, and had balanced the accounts on the following day by appropriating a portion of that day's receipts to the deficiency of the previous day, but had in fact paid over all that he had received: -Held, that this was a breach of the condition, for he had not paid it over duly.

Held, also, that the opening an additional line, whereby the duties of the clerk were increased, did not affect the liability of his sureties in respect of the duties as to the original lines specified in the bond and condition. London and Brighton Rail. Co. v. Goodwin, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 337; 3 Exch. Rep. 736.

(B) PARTIES TO SUE [ON OVERSEERS AND COLLECTOR'S BONDS].

The churchwardens and overseers for the time being may still sue upon bonds given under 59 Geo. 3. c. 12. s. 7. for the due performance of the duties of assistant overseer in a parish within an union, the effect of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101. s. 61. being only to substitute, in such cases, the board of guardians for the vestry as the body who are to direct the bond to be sued upon. Skelton v. Rushby, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 29; 4 Exch. Rep. 545.

An act of parliament directed that seven guardians should form a quorum, and that they should sue in name of treasurer:-Held, that an action on a bond, for the due performance of a collector's duties executed by seven of the guardians, was well brought in the name of the treasurer. Kingsford v. Dutton, 1 L. M. & P. 479.

(C) STAYING PROCEEDINGS ON.

In an action against sureties on a bond, particulars of several breaches of the condition were given, of which only one was contested by the defendants: -Held, that the Court had no power to order a stay of proceedings as to the admitted breaches upon payment into court by the defendants of the damage sustained on those breaches. Kepp v. Wiggett, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 235; 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 164; 4 Com. B. Rep. 678.

(D) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS [POST OBIT BOND].

To a declaration upon a bond, not setting out any condition, plea, that the debt and cause of action did not accrue within twenty years. Replication, taking issue thereupon. At the trial the bond and condition were produced, when it appeared that the bond had been executed more than twenty years; but that the condition was for the payment of the money after the death of a party who was proved to have died within twenty years :-Held, that the plea was disproved.

Semble-That the plaintiff might have replied, shewing when the condition was broken. Tuckey v. Hawkins, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 201; 4 Com. B. Rep. 655.

(E) SET-OFF [UNDER 8 GEO. 2. c. 24. s. 5.]

In an action of debt on a bond, where the interest of the sum secured has not been paid on the appointed day, a set-off equivalent to the interest which existed before the commencement of the action, though not at the time of the interest falling due, may be pleaded under the 8 Geo. 2. c. 24. s. 5. Lee v. Lester, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 312; 7 Com. B. Rep. 1008.

(F) PLEADING.

(a) How shewn that Action brought post Diem.

Debt on bond for 3001., dated 29th of September 1827. Plea (after setting out on oyer the condition,

which was for payment of 3001. and interest on the 29th of March next ensuing the date of the bond), general performance. Replication, that the defendant did not pay the 3001. and interest, according to the condition of the bond; concluding with a verification:-Held, that the replication was good, and the plea bad, and that a demurrer to the replication was properly set aside as frivolous. Trix v. Thorne, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 15; 9 Q.B. Rep. 282.

(b) Inferential Allegation of French Law.

Debt upon a bond. Plea, that the bond was made in France, and was not passed by an officer of France, or written throughout by defendant, nor did defendant write the acknowledgment or approuvé," bearing in words at length the debt secured, nor was defendant at the time a merchant, &c.; and that, by_reason of the premises, the bond by the laws of France never was nor is binding on the defendant, and was and is of no force or validity: -Held, on special demurrer, that the plea was inferential only in not stating in direct terms what the law of France is, and was therefore bad.

Quare-Whether de injuria would have been a good replication to such a plea. Benham v. Mornington, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 221; 4 Dowl, & L. P.C. 213; 3 Com. B. Rep. 133.

(G) AMENDMENT.

Bond reformed being erroneously prepared so as to be void for usury. Hodgkinson v. Wyatt, 9 Beav. 566.

BOOKS AND ENGRAVINGS.

Duties on reduced by 9 & 10 Vict. c. 58; 24 Law J. Stat. 159.

BOROUGH.

[See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Rate.]

BOTTOMRY BOND. [See INSURANCE.]

BOUNDARY.

[See BRIDGE-Manor-Settlement.]

BREACH OF PROMISE. [See MARRIAGE.]

BRICKS AND BRICKFIELD. [See EXCISE-RATE.]

BRIDGE.

[See RAILWAY-RATE.]

(A) LIABILITY TO REPAIR.

(a) Construction of Boundary Act.

(b) Bridge erected for private Purposes.
(c) Bridge not transferred from County to
Borough.

(B) PRESENTMENT FOR NON-REPAIR.

An Act to provide more effectually for maintaining, &c. bridges in cities and boroughs, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 64; 28 Law J. Stat. 126.

(A) LIABILITY TO REPAIR.

(a) Construction of Boundary Act.

In the schedule to Boundary Act, 2 & 3 Will. 4. c. 64, part of Glasbury parish was stated to belong to Brecknockshire, to be isolated and to be locally situated in Brecknockshire or Radnorshire, and was annexed, in future, to Brecknockshire. By 7 & 8 Vict. c. 61, every part of a county detached from the main body of such county is to be considered for all purposes as forming part of that county of which it is considered a part for election purposes, under 2 & 3 Will. 4. c. 64. In fact, no part of Glasbury was "isolated" or "detached," unless 470 acres of land therein, which were separated from Brecknockshire by the river Wye, could be so considered :-Held, that notwithstanding the misapprehension in the schedule as to the fact of Glasbury parish being isolated and locally situated in Brecknockshire or Radnorshire, the 470 acres of the parish of Glasbury, though not strictly speaking either "isolated" or "detached" from the main body of the county of Radnor, must upon the facts found be taken to be the part of the parish described in the schedule, and that it therefore became, under the Boundary Act, a part of the county of Brecon, and (under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 61.) for all purposes, including liability to repair a bridge.

Where boundary line between two counties necessarily runs along some part of a public river, the middle of the river is the boundary, there being nothing in the Boundary Act, 2 & 3 Will. 4. c. 64, to prevent the general rule in such cases applying. Regina v. the Inhabitants of Brecknockshire, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 203..

(b) Bridge erected for private Purposes.

The word "riding" in the Statute of Bridges (22 Hen. 8. c. 5. s. 3.) is not confined to districts called by that name, but includes any division of a county which corresponds in its definition to a riding.

By 6 & 7 Will. 4. c. 87. the Isle of Ely has a separate commission and clerk of the peace and a separate county rate and custos rotulorum from the county of Cambridge, and by 7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 53. s. 7, it is enacted that, in statutes theretofore passed or thereafter to be passed respecting counties, ridings or divisions, the Isle of Ely should be deemed and taken to be a division of a county.

Held, that the Isle of Ely is included in the Statute of Bridges, and therefore its inhabitants are prima facie liable at common law to repair the

bridges situate within it; and may be indicted in the same form as ordinary counties.

The general rule as to bridges, built prior to 43 Geo. 3. c. 59. is, that if a private person erects a bridge, and it becomes useful to the county in general, the county shall repair it.

But where an act rendering a bridge necessary, though authorized to be done, is done primarily for private purposes, and interferes with the public right, and the public user, from which public benefit is inferred, is referable only to that act, because made necessary by it, the authority to do the act in question is conditional only on the party maintaining the public right in the same state as before it was interfered with.

Plea to indictment for non-repair not double by reason of its alleging that drain and bridge were vested in corporation. Regina v. the Inhabitants of the Isle of Ely, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 223. (c) Bridge not transferred from County to Borough.

By statute 2 & 3 Will. 4. c. 64, a certain part of the parish of F, in the county of Wilts, was included within the city of New Sarum, which is not a county of itself, but which, after the passing of the 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 76, had a separate court of quarter sessions :-Held, that after the passing of the last-mentioned statute the city of New Sarum was not liable to the repair of a public bridge, locally situate within the part of the parish of F so included within the city. Regina v. the Inhabitants of New Sarum, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 15; 7 Q.B. Rep. 941.

(B) PRESENTMENT FOR NON-REPAIR.

By 13 Geo. 3. c. 78. s. 24. power is given to a single Justice to present any highway or bridge out of repair. The 43 Geo. 3. c. 59. enacts that all matters and things in 13 Geo. 3. c. 78. contained relating to highways shall be extended to county bridges as fully as if they were repeated and reenacted therein. Statute 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 50. expressly repeals 13 Geo. 3. c. 78, leaving untouched the 43 Geo. 3. c. 59, and by section 99. abolished all presentments for non-repair of highways. By the interpretation clause (section 5) "highway" is not to include county bridges:Held, that the power conferred by 43 Geo. 3. c. 59. on a single Justice of presenting a county bridge is not repealed by the 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 50. Regina v. the Justices of Breconshire, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 123.

BROKER.

[See COMPANY-PRACTICE, Adding PleasPRINCIPAL AND AGENT-PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS-STOCK EXCHANGE.]

A party who does work for another in and about the procuring and hiring of persons to be employed by that other, in surveying a line of railway, is not a broker, within the stat. 6 Ann. c. 16, which requires persons acting as brokers within the City of London to be admitted by the mayor and aldermen; and per Rolfe, B., the employment of a broker relates to goods and money, and not to personal contracts DIGEST, 1845-1850.

for work and labour. Milford v. Hughes, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 40; 16 Mee. & W. 174.

BUILDING.

[See FRIENDLY AND BENEFIT SOCIETIESMETROPOLIS.]

BURGLARY.

On the trial of an indictment for a burglary, it appeared that adjoining the prosecutor's dwellinghouse was a kiln, one end of which was supported by the end wall of the dwelling-house; and that adjoining to the kiln was a dairy, one end of which was supported by the end wall of the kiln. There was no internal communication from the dwellinghouse to the dairy, and the roofs of the dwellinghouse, kiln, and dairy were of different heights :Held, that the dairy was not a part of the dwellinghouse, and that a burglary could not be committed by breaking into it. Regina v. Higgs, 2 Car. & K. 322.

BURIAL FEES. [See CLERGY.]

CANAL COMPANY.

[As to what is a judicial act by Commissioners, see CERTIORARI. And see CARRIER.]

Construction of Act as to Tolls.

A canal company was empowered, by act of parliament, to take for tonnage upon all coals, &c., and other commodities whatsoever conveyed upon the canal, duties not exceeding 24d. per ton, on entering or passing out of the canal, and also not exceeding 1d. a mile for every ton of coal, &c., except all dung, soil, marl, ashes and other manure (other than lime, which was to pay half tolls), and except stone, &c., and other materials for mending roads, which was to pass toll-free. By another section it was enacted "that no boat should pass through any of the locks, unless such boat should pay a duty equal to what would be paid by a vessel loaded with a burden of thirty tons, or unless it should be returning, after having passed on the canal with a greater burden than thirty tons":Held, affirming the judgment of the Court below (13 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 283; 13 Mee. & W. 114), that a boat laden with more than thirty tons of manure, which had entered the canal, and passed along it, without paying toll, was not liable to pay any toll on returning through the lock empty, after discharging her cargo. Grantham Canal Company v. Hall, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 63; 14 Mee. & W. 880.

Effect of Interested Persons acting as Com-
missioners.

Upon the general rule of law and the construction of a canal act, proceedings of Commissioners held to be invalid by reason of interest.

Q

Quare, as to interest of the owner of land in which colliery situate.

Semble, that where a large body of Commissioners are appointed by statute, the accidental intrusion of one interested person will not necessarily vitiate the proceedings. Regina v. the Aberdare Canal Co., 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 251.

Notice of Meeting of Commissioners.

By a Canal Act, no meeting of Commissioners was to be held unless previous notice should be given in some newspaper, published or circulated in the county of G at least sixteen days before such meeting. Notice of the meeting of the Commissioners, to be held on the 12th of February, was inserted in a newspaper, dated the 27th of January, on which day the notice itself also bore date; but it was proved that the newspaper was printed and partly circulated on the 26th of January :-Held, that the notice was insufficient, as not being given "at least sixteen days before such meeting." Regina v. Aberdare Canal Co., 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 251.

Canal companies enabled to become carriers by 10 & 11 Vict. c. 94; 25 Law J. Stat. 266.

(A) DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF CARRIERS.

(a) Cases of special Contract.

In an action on the case, the declaration alleged that the defendants were proprietors of a railway and carriages for the conveyance of passengers, cattle, &c. for hire; that they received nine horses of the plaintiff to be safely and securely carried in the carriages of the defendants for hire, and that it thereupon became their duty safely and securely to carry and deliver the said horses, and averred the loss of one of the horses by reason of the insufficiency of the carriage. It appeared that the injury to the horse was occasioned by a defect in the horse-box in which it was placed, and which defect had been pointed out to the servants of the defendants. The plaintiff received a ticket from the defendants' clerk, stating the amount paid for the carriage of the horses, and having the following memorandum annexed: "This ticket is issued subject to the owner's undertaking all risks of conveyance whatever, as the company will not be responsible for any injury or damage (however caused) occurring to horses or carriages while travelling, or in loading or unloading:" - Held, that the terms contained in the ticket formed part of the contract for the carriage of the horses, upon which the defendants' duty arose, and that

the allegation that the defendants received the horses "to be safely and securely carried” by them, was disproved.

Semble-that notwithstanding the contract, the plaintiff might have charged the defendants with a breach of duty in not providing a sufficient carriage. Shaw v. York and North Midland Rail. Co., 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 181; 13 Q.B. Rep. 347.

(b) Servants.

If a carrier who contracts to deliver goods from A to B enters into a sub-contract with another party to convey those goods over a certain portion of the journey, such sub-contractor and every person employed by him in the performance of the contract, is "a servant in the employ" of the carrier within the meaning of the 8th section of the 11 Geo. 4. & 1 Will. 4. c. 68.

A delivery ticket issued by a railway company, as common carriers, in respect of goods they had undertaken to carry, described several persons, amongst others J, as porters in their employ. In an action brought by the bailor of the goods for their non-delivery, they having been stolen on their journey by J,-semble, that the company were not estopped from giving evidence that J was not their servant. Machin or Machu v. London and SouthWestern Rail. Co., 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 271; 2 Exch. Rep. 415.

(c) Loss of Luggage.

The declaration stated that the defendants were common carriers on a railway from Woodgate to the Southwark terminus in London; that CSR, wife of the plaintiff, became a passenger, and was received with a dressing-case, which was part of her luggage, and which was to be safely and securely carried to and delivered at the station at Southwark; that the defendants did not take due or proper care about the conveyance, but by their negligence and improper conduct the dressing-case was wholly lost. It was proved that Mrs. R came to the Woodgate station of the Brighton Railway, and her dressing case was put under the seat of the carriage; that on arriving at the Southwark terminus, Mrs. R was carried to a hackney coach, and the defendants' servants remoevd her luggage from the railway carriage to the hackney coach, and the dressing-case was lost, never having been seen in the hackney coach:-Held, that the evidence was sufficient to support the declaration, there being an allegation of the duty to deliver, and no delivery having taken place.

Held, also, that negligence, though alleged, did not require to be proved. Richards v. London and South Coast Rail. Co., 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 251; 7 Com. B. Rep. 839.

To a declaration in case against common carriers for the loss of a trunk containing certain articles of jewellery and female apparel, the defendants pleaded as to part of the goods in the declaration mentioned, to wit, the said articles of jewellery, one of the said dresses, &c. &c., that at the time of the delivery to them they were contained in the trunk in the declaration mentioned; that they were so delivered to the defendants after the passing of the statute 11 Geo. 4. & 1 Will. 4. c. 68. (the Carriers' Act); that the said goods consisted of