articles and property of the descriptions following, or of some or one of such descriptions, that is to say, gold or silver in a manufactured or unmanufactured state, &c. (enumerating the several articles mentioned in the 1st section of the act), and that their value exceeded 107.; that at the time of the receipt of the goods by them, the defendants had duly affixed the notice required by section 2. of the act; and that the plaintiff gave them no notice of the nature or value of the goods, nor did she pay or tender the increased rate of charge demandable under the act:-Held, that the plea was bad for not alleging with certainty that the articles in question were articles of some or one of the descriptions mentioned in the act. Smith v. London, Brighton, and South Coast Rail. Co., 7 Com. B. Rep. 782.

(d) Gratuitous Bailment.

Defendant, a carrier and wharfinger, received into his warehouse certain goods of the plaintiff, on the terms that they should be conveyed by defendant's barges to London, when the plaintiff should direct, at the usual freight, and that, in the mean time, they should be kept by defendant without charge for warehousing:-Held, in an action for not keeping the goods safely, that defendant was not a gratuitous bailee. White v. Humphery, 11 Q.B. Rep. 43.

(e) Delivery to.

If, in an action against a carrier for the loss of a parcel, the defendant plead that it was not delivered to him to be carried, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to shew that it was delivered to a person and at a house where parcels were in the habit of being left for this carrier, and it is immaterial whether this person was paid any money or not; and in such an action the person who so left the parcel may be asked, on cross-examination, what direction was on the parcel. Burrell v. North, 2 Car. & K. 680.

(f) Damages.

The plaintiff sent goods to the London warehouse of the defendants, who were carriers, to be forwarded to Bedford. The goods, which ought to have reached Bedford in time for Saturday's market, did not arrive there until Monday. The plaintiff's clerk, who had been sent to Bedford on the Saturday to receive and sell the goods, waited there until the Monday, when be removed them to St. Neots, in order to sell them :-Held, that it was a question for the jury, whether the expenses of the clerk's stay at Bedford were a reasonable consequence of the defendants' breach of contract, and that the Judge was not bound as a matter of law to direct the jury that the defendants were not liable for such expenses, unless they had notice that it would be the consequence of a delay in the delivery of the goods. Black v. Baxendale, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 50; 1 Exch. Rep. 410.

Where a parcel containing several small ones was sent through the railway company to the plaintiff's agent at B, and one of them, directed to CD, was lost,-Held, not necessary to shew, in an action against the company, that they had not delivered it to C D, and that the amount of damages was the value of the parcel, as the plaintiff would be liable for that amount. Crouch v. the

London and North-Western Rail. Co., 2 Car. & K. 789.

(B) CARRIERS TO FOREIGN Parts.

A declaration in case stated that the defendants were common carriers of passengers for hire from Southampton to Gibraltar, which was stated to be a place beyond the seas. The defendants pleaded that they were not common carriers as in the declaration alleged :-Held, that this plea put in issue only the fact of their being common carriers, undertaking to carry for any one who chose to employ them, and not their liability as common carriers according to the custom of England, Benett v. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Boat Co., 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 85; 6 Com. B. Rep. 775.

A declaration in case stated that the plaintiffs, manufacturers of cutlery, were accustomed to mark their knives with certain marks denoting their manufacture, and that the defendants, intending to injure the plaintiffs, did fraudulently impose similar marks on knives made by the defendants, to induce the public to believe that the knives made by the defendants were manufactured by the plaintiffs, &c.:-Held, that it was properly left to the jury to consider, whether there was such a resemblance between the defendants' marks and those used by the plaintiffs, as was calculated to deceive the public; and whether the defendants used the marks with an intention to deceive.

No person has a right to sell his own goods as and for goods manufactured by another person. Rodgers v. Nowill, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 52; 5 Com. B. Rep. 109.

Obligation on Owner of House to repair as regards

his Neighbour.

A declaration in case stated, that a certain messuage was in the occupation of T S as tenant to the plaintiff, the reversion belonging to the plaintiff, and that the defendant was owner and proprietor of another messuage, and by reason thereof as such owner and proprietor of such messuage ought to have repaired and kept repaired in a substantial manner the said messuage secondly mentioned. Breach, non-repair by the defendant. Plea, that the said messuages were contiguous and abutting on each other, and were divided by a party wall, whereof the plaintiff was seised of an undivided moiety; that the wall was in a ruinous state, and being parcel of the messuage in the declaration secondly mentioned, had fallen on the first-mentioned messuage. Replication, traversing that the wall was a party wall, and that the plaintiff was seised thereof:-Held, first, that the replication was good. Secondly, that the declaration was bad, there being no obligation towards a neighbour on the owner of a house, merely

as owner, to repair or keep it in repair in a substantial manner, the whole of his obligation being to prevent it from becoming a nuisance.

The term "owner," as well as that of "proprietor," of premises may mean one who has the whole legal interest in the premises, so that no one else has any estate in possession or reversion, or it may mean one who has a subsisting estate at the time of the wrong complained of, or one who is the owner of the whole or of some interest as distinguishable from that of tenant in possession. Chauntler v. Robinson, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 170; 4 Exch. Rep. 163.

CASTE.

Suit by certain Comaties of the Vaisyas, or third caste of the Hindoos, against the Mantri-maha-nad (secret assembly, for avenging encroachments upon rules or rights of caste), to establish their right to have performed for them and their tribe, certain religious ceremonies, call soobha and asoobha (auspicious and inauspicious), by Brahmins, in the language of the Vedas, in the enjoyment of which they had been disturbed by the Brahmins refusing to perform such ceremonies. In the answer to the plaint, the defendants denied the right of the Comaties, and set forth certain acts, whereby they had forfeited their right to have the ceremonies performed for them, by the Brahmins. The Zilla Court, taking that part of the defendants' answer which set forth the acts by which the forfeiture of the rights in question was occasioned, framed it into a statement of facts and law, for the opinion of the Pundit of the Court; and upon his opinion, declared the plaintiffs' tribe entitled to have the ceremonies performed for them by Brahmins. Upon appeal, the provincial court remitted the suit to the Zilla Court, to take evidence, and upon such evidence, and the opinions of the Pundits, which the provincial court took upon the same statement as the Zilla, they affirmed the decree. The Sudder Dewanny Adawlet, upon the whole case, reversed these decisions:-Held, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, reversing the decisions of the three Courts, that the whole proceedings were irregular and contrary to the express provisions of the Madras Regulation XV. of 1816, sect. x. cl. 3 and 4, which required the Judge to record the points necessary to be established, before the evidence could be taken; the opinion of the Pundits being also taken upon an assumed statement of facts, not admitted or recorded. But in consideration of the circumstances, such revisal was without prejudice to bringing a fresh suit. Namboory Setapaty v. Kanoo-Colanoo Pullia, 3 Moore, In. App. 359.

CATTLE.

Provisions for preventing the introduction and spreading of contagious or infectious disorders among cattle. 11 & 12 Vict. cc. 105. and 107; 26 Law J. Stat. App. xvi., xvii.

CERTIORARI.

[See CONVICTION-POOR-REvenue-Tithe.] (A) WHEN IT LIES.

(a) Although restrained by Statute.
(b) Judicial Acts and Orders.

(c) Order of Removal unappealed against.
(d) Indictment for keeping disorderly House.
(e) Certificate of Admission to Lunatic Asylum.
(f) Resolution of Vestry.

(B) NOTICE OF.

(C) MATTERS OF PRACTICE.

(a) Within what Time to issue.
(b) Ex parte Application.
(c) Rule absolute in first instance.
(d) Motion in open Court.

(e) What Points may be gone into.
(f) Motion to quash.
(g) Other Matters.

(D) COSTS TO PROSECUTOR AND PARTY

GRIEVED.

(A) WHEN IT LIES.

[Regina v. Lancaster and Preston Junction Rail. Co. 5 Law J. Dig. 161; 6 Q.B. Rep. 759.]

(a) Although restrained by Statute. Though the Excise Act, 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 53. takes away a certiorari from the Queen's Bench, it may still issue where a conviction has been obtained by fraud. Regina v. Gillyard, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 153; 12 Q.B. Rep. 527.

The 10th section of the statute 25 Geo. 2. c. 36. taking away the writ of certiorari for the removal of indictments against any person for keeping a bawdyhouse, gaming-house, or other disorderly house, does not apply where the indictment has once been removed, at the instance of the prosecutor, into the Central Criminal Court, under the 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 36.-Held, therefore, that after an indictment for keeping a disorderly house had been so removed from the Middlesex Sessions, a second writ of certiorari for the removal of the same indictment from the Central Criminal Court into the Court of Queen's Bench, might be granted at the instance of the party indicted. Regina v. Brier, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S. )

M.C. 121.

It is no ground for a certiorari to remove several convictions before Justices under the Factory Act, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 15. s. 41. (the certiorari being expressly taken away), that the summons to appear and answer the charges was served only the day

before the hearing, and that the Justices made the convictions upon no other appearance than that of an attorney who professed to represent the parties charged, without requiring proof of the service of the summons, and upon the evidence offered in support of one of the charges only. Ex parte Hopwood, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 197; 15 Q.B. Rep. 121. (b) Judicial Acts and Orders.

The Court of Quarter Sessions made an order, October 1844, that no officer of the court should thereafter take any fee from any defendant in misdemeanour :-Held, a judicial order properly removable by certiorari. Regina v. Coles, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 10; 8 Q.B. Rep. 75.

B, an owner of lands adjoining a canal, made a request to the committee of the company for their consent to erect a bridge over the canal, and after twenty-one days' refusal, applied to Commissioners under the act for their consent and approbation, who, after hearing evidence and arguments on both sides, gave their consent and approbation, and entered a minute of the proceedings in their books :-Held, that this was such a judicial act as could be removed by certiorari. Regina v. Aberdare Canal Co., 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 251.

(c) Order of Removal unappealed against.

An order of removal, against which there has been no appeal to the Quarter Sessions, may be brought up by certiorari for defects appearing on the face of it. Regina v. Blathwayt, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 48; 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 542.

(d) Indictment for keeping disorderly House. No indictment for keeping a disorderly house can be removed by certiorari, whether the indictment be at the prosecution of the constable, under the statute 25 Geo. 2. c. 36, or at the instance of a private individual. Regina v. Sanders, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 158; 9 Q.B. Rep. 235.

(e) Certificate of Admission to Lunatic Asylum.

A certificate for the admission of a lunatic into an asylum, signed by a clergyman and overseer, under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 100. s. 48, is not removable by certiorari.

The objection that such a certificate is not properly the subject of a certiorari, may be taken on shewing cause against a rule to quash the certificate after it has been removed. Regina v. Inhabitants of Hatfield Peverel, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 225.

(f) Resolution of Vestry.

A certiorari will not lie to bring up a resolution of vestry for the appointment of paid constables under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 109. s. 18. Nor the copy of such resolution forwarded to the Justices in petty sessions, on which they made the appointment. But it will lie to bring up the appointment itself made by the Justices in petty sessions, where the proceedings in vestry have not been conducted in conformity to the 58 Geo. 3. c. 69, amended by the 59 Geo. 3. c. 85, a poll having been demanded and refused, and the resolution having been carried by a shew of hands. A certiorari being granted for that purpose, it is competent to the parties moving to shew upon affidavit that the irregularity in the pro

ceedings of the vestry was of such a nature as to take away the jurisdiction of the Justices. In re the Constables of Hipperholme-cum-Brighouse, 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 79.

(B) NOTICE OF.

A notice given to Justices of an intention to move for a certiorari in six days from the giving of the notice, or as soon after as counsel can be heard, is sufficient. Regina v. Rose, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 6; 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 359.

(C) MATTERS OF PRACTICE.

(a) Within what Time to issue.

The Court refused to grant a certiorari to bring up an order of Sessions, made, subject to a case, more than six months after the making of the order, where application had been made at chambers within the time, but had failed in consequence of non-attendance of a Judge there until after the six months had expired. In re the Parishes of Llanbeblig and Llandyfrydog, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 92.

(b) Ex parte Application.

A writ of certiorari to remove a plaint from the county court may issue, under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. s. 20, upon an ex parte application, if the Judge, in the exercise of his discretion, thinks it proper to grant leave without notice to the other party. Symonds v. Dimsdale, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 247; 2 Exch. Rep. 533.

(c) Rule absolute in first instance.

Where the preliminary steps have been duly taken, a rule under stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 118. s. 44, for a certiorari to remove an award of an Assistant Inclosure Commissioner will be absolute in the first instance. Ex parte Kelsey or Kelcey, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 145; 1 L. M. & P. 55.

(d) Motion in open Court.

Where the Sessions have granted a case for the opinion of the Court, the Court will not, on the argument on such case, entertain any question not raised by the Sessions for their decision. If it be intended to object to the order of Sessions as bad on the face thereof, upon any grounds not raised by the special case, the certiorari must be moved for in open court, and such additional grounds of objection stated. Regina v. Inhabitants of Heyop, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 70; 8 Q.B. Rep. 547.

(e) What Points may be gone into.

Where a case has been sent from the Sessions, the Court will not, upon the certiorari, go into any objections arising on the face of the order itself, not raised by the case. Regina v. Inhabitants of Hartpury, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 105; 8 Q.B. Rep. 566.

[And see ante, (d).]

(f) Motion to quash.

When a whole term has elapsed after a case, granted by an order of Quarter Sessions, has been brought up by certiorari, it is too late to quash the certiorari, on the ground that although the affidavits on which the certiorari was obtained alleged service of notice on two Justices present at the time of the

making of the order, one of those Justices was, in fact, not then present. Regina v. Inhabitants of Basingstoke, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 28; 6 Dowl. & L. P.C. 303.

(e) Other Matters.

The proper practice upon the return of a certiorari to remove a conviction is, that the case should be put into the Crown paper. Regina v. Lord or Ex parte Lord, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 15; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 405.

Where, by act of parliament, the original jurisdiction as to the merits of a case is given to magistrates, from whose decision no appeal as to the merits is given to the Court of Queen's Bench, that Court, when the decision of the magistrates is complained of, and their proceedings brought up by writ of certiorari to be quashed, has only power to see whether the case was one in which the magistrates had jurisdiction, and whether their proceedings are regular upon the face of them.

That Court will not receive affidavits, for the purpose of impeaching the decision upon the facts, of which the magistrates are the sole judges; as, if they have jurisdiction over the case, their jurisdiction cannot be affected by, or made to depend upon, the truth or falsehood of the facts, or the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence brought to support the case.

In a proceeding, therefore, before magistrates, under the 59 Geo. 3. c. 12. s. 24, against the defendant, for not giving up possession of a parish house, after a proper demand, where they had made an order in pursuance of the statute, which was brought up by certiorari to be quashed, the Court refused to receive affidavits as to the facts proved before the magistrates, and others attacking the credit of the witnesses; and as it appeared that the case was one in which the magistrates had jurisdiction, and that their proceedings were good in form, the rule was discharged. Regina v. Bolton, 10 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 49; 1 Q.B. Rep. 66.

(D) COSTS TO PROSECUTOR AND PARTY GRIEVed. Where a side-bar rule has been obtained for costs to prosecutors and parties grieved, under the statute 5 & 6 Will. & M. c. 11. s. 2, the Court will not discharge the side-bar rule on affidavits, which shew that sums of money have been raised by subscription towards defraying the expenses of the prosecution; or on the ground that all the prosecutors do not appear to have been aggrieved; or on the ground of its appearing that the certiorari was obtained at the instance of one of the defendants alone. Regina v. Dobson, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 97; 9 Q.B. Rep. 302, n.

Where an indictment has been removed by certiorari under 5 Will. & M. c. 11, if the party grieved or injured be in point of fact the prosecutor, he will be entitled to costs under that statute, although not bound over to prosecute, and although another person, not a party grieved or injured, was bound over to prosecute, and was at the trial in pursuance of his recognizance. Regina v. Bishop, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 63; 6 Dowl. & L. P.C. 499.

CHAMPERTY.

[See CONTRACT, Rescission of.]

CHANCERY.

Certain offices in the Petty Bag and the practice on the common law side of the Court of Chancery and the inrolment office regulated by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 94; 26 Law J. Stat. App. ix.

Orders in pursuance of that act, made December 29, 1848; 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 503. The 11 & 12 Vict. c. 94. amended by 12 & 13 Vict. c. 119; 27 Law J. Stat. 250.

An Act to diminish the delay and expense of the proceedings in the Court of Chancery, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 35; 28 Law J. Stat. 52.

The Attorney General (after the passing of the statute 5 Vict. c. 5.) filed an information in Chancery against the mayor and commonalty of London, alleging that the Crown was seised of the bed and soil of the river Thames; that the defendants were conservators thereof, and in breach of their duty as such conservators had granted to divers persons (also made defendants) licences to embank parts of the river, and had received fines for such licences, and that such embankments were nuisances; and the information prayed that the rights of the parties might be ascertained, that the licences might be declared void, and that injunctions might issue to prevent the completion of the embankments. The defendants denied that the embankments were nuisances, and demurred to the rest of the bill for want of equity.

Held, affirming an order of the Master of the Rolls, that, upon these pleadings, the information

was maintainable.

If a bill or information discloses, upon the facts stated in any part of it, ground for a decree in equity, it is maintainable. Per the Lord Chancellor, pp. 464, 6, 7.

A bill, which raises a legal question, may be so framed as not to be open to demurrer on that account, bnt, on the real nature of the question appearing at the hearing, the court of equity will refuse to interfere. Per the Lord Chancellor, p. 468.

As the Crown would not be liable to costs in this case, the judgment of the Court below was affirmed, without costs.

Quare-Whether, when an act of parliament transfers jurisdiction from one Court to another, or grants an extension of the jurisdiction of an existing Court, it is necessary, in order to make the act binding on the Crown, that the Crown should be named therein. The Corporation of London v. the Attorney General, 1 H. L. Cas. 440.

A Scotchman, by a testamentary instrument in the Scotch form, gave all his personal estate to trustees in trust to pay legacies and annuities, and the income of the surplus to A for life, and on A's death to invest the capital in the purchase of lands in Scotland. The trustees named in the will having disclaimed, the Court of Session appointed new trustees, who, as well as A and several of the legatees and annuitants, were resident in Scotland. A administered to the testator's estate in England; and filed a bill in Chancery against the trustees for

the usual accounts of the testator's estate possessed by them, and to have the residue ascertained and secured. The trustees filed a cross-bill for an account of the testator's estate in England possessed by A, and to have the residue ascertained and paid over to them upon the trusts of the will. The Court refused to relinquish its jurisdiction over the fund in A's hands, and directed it to be paid into court, and to be invested in consols, and the dividends to be paid to A for life. Melville, 15 Sim. 35.

CHAPEL.

[See CHURCH-RATE.]

CHARGE.

[See JUGDMENT.]

Preston v.

A held shares as trustee and executed a declaration of trust, but gave no notice at the office of the company. He afterwards mortgaged the shares for his private debt, and gave notice to the company, who entered the mortgage in their books:-Held, that the mortgagee had priority over the cestui que

trust.

Notice to one proprietor is not for this purpose notice to the company. Martin v. Sedgwick, 9 Beav. 333.

A, who was entitled to a residuary fund in the hands of his father's army agents, charged it, first to the agents and afterwards to M without notice. The agents voluntarily paid the whole fund into court in an administration suit. M obtained the first stop-order thereon:-Held, that M had priority over the agents. Swayne v. Swayne, 11 Beav. 463.

The owner of a vessel, then on a voyage, mortgaged it and the cargo to A, subject to two prior mortgages thereof; and the third mortgagee forthwith gave notice of his mortgage to the two prior incumbrancers. The master of the vessel afterwards at Sydney transhipped the cargo and consigned it to London to consignees, who honoured his bill on having a lien on the consignment. The mortgagor induced B to advance 1,000l. on a mortgage of the cargo so consigned without notice of any charge thereon, except the lien of the consignee. B gave notice of his mortgage to the consignee. A as soon as he knew of the consignment (but after B's notice) gave notice to the consignee of the mortgage to him; and after such notice the consignee after satisfying his lien paid over the balance of the proceeds to B:-Held, that A, having done all he could towards possession, was entitled to priority over B. Feltham v. Clark, 1 De Gex & S. 307.

(A) CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENT CREATING IT.

In the year 1584 an act was passed, the objects of which were of a public nature, viz. to supply the ships in the harbour and the inhabitants of Plymouth with water, &c. An hospital, founded in the year 1617, was endowed with certain lands, emanating from the corporation of Plymouth, and a very close connexion was otherwise established between the two bodies. In 1653, in consideration of a sum of 1,4001., part of a larger sum due from the corporation to the hospital, an estate in fee simple was granted by the corporation to the hospital of one-fourth part of certain mills, together with one-fourth of the leat or water-course (constructed under the act), running, coming, and going to all the said mills-Held, that the corporation had no right to apply to the use of the mills situate on the leat any water brought by it other than that which remained after the public purposes had been satisfied, and that one-fourth only of the surplus water of the leat passed by the grant of 1653.

Held, also, notwithstanding probable adequacy of consideration paid, that a deed, dated in the year 1805, by which that interest of the hospital in the mills, leat, &c. was conveyed to the corporation by the hospital, was invalid, the hospital having been always treated and considered as dependent on the corporation. Attorney General v. Plymouth (Mayor, &c.), 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 109; 9 Beav. 67.

A party being desirous of establishing some schools, entered into an agreement with a corporation, who accepted a conveyance of certain lands and fee-farm rents, and covenanted therewith to keep up the charity, whether the income arising from the property so conveyed should or should not be sufficient to pay all the expenses of the charity: -Held, notwithstanding, that under the circumstances, the corporation were not entitled to the surplus of the income, but that the charity ought to be extended. Attorney General v. Merchant Venturers' Company of Bristol, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 137.

By a charter of Phil. & Mary (1553) reciting that eighteen presbyters, fifteen clerks and twelve poor men had been lately maintained at B out of the issues of certain guilds since dissolved and seized to the Crown, it was witnessed that, con