examined and cross-examined as a witness at the trial was refused.

Such a motion as the above should be made, if at all, at the time when the issue is directed. Hepworth v. Heslop, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 352; 6 Hare, 561, 622.

A testator who was carrying on the business of a brewer, made his will, and thereby gave all his real and personal estate to his son J K and three other persons, upon trust to raise an annuity and portions, and subject thereto, the testator directed that the trustees should permit the son during his life, to receive the annual produce and income of the testator's real and personal estate for his own use. The testator also appointed his four trustees and his wife his executors and executrix :-Held, on bill filed after a great lapse of time, and after the death of all the trustees and executors, against the personal representatives of the deceased executors, that the plaintiffs were entitled to an account and inquiry as to all the property which the testator possessed at his death, and what had become thereof, and what steps the executors took for the purpose of recovering or receiving any part of the property which without their wilful default they might have received.

Held, also, that, as to the furniture and converted debt, the Master ought to have liberty to state special circumstances, and that there ought to be a direction that if the Master could not satisfactorily take the inquiry, he should be at liberty to state the circumstances that created the difficulty. Kirkman v. Booth, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 25; 11 Beav. 273.

(d) Decrees and Costs.

A party sued as executor de son tort jointly with a rightful executor stated by his answer that he had before bill filed accounted with his co-defendant, and paid over to him the balance :-Held, that such settlement did not bind the plaintiff, who was beneficially interested in the estate; and the Court refused to make the usual decree as to not disturbing the accounts. Carmichael v. Carmichael,

2 Ph. 101.

Proof of improper expenditure by executors will not support a decree against them on a bill for an account on the footing of wilful neglect or default, and the executors are entitled to the costs of depositions taken relative to that proof. Smith v. Chambers, 2 Ph. 221.

The Court will give to the administrators of a defaulting executor their costs of suit out of the assets of the executor that have been received by them. Haldenby v. Spofforth, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 328; 9 Beav. 195.

EXTENT.

A writ of extent may be made returnable in vacation.

If a defendant in prison under a writ of extent be taken out of the precincts of the prison for a time, by order of the Commissioners of Excise, but without a writ, for the purpose of giving evidence, and be afterwards brought back and detained in the same custody, such custody is lawful. Regina v.

Renton, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 204; 2 Exch. Rep. 216; 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 750.

Upon an inquiry under a writ of extent, it appeared that the defendant had assigned all his property two days before the teste of the writ, by a deed which was an act of bankruptcy, and upon which a fiat was issued before the teste of the writ. The sheriff returned that to the knowledge of the jurors the defendant had no goods, &c. :-Upon an application by the Attorney General, the Court ordered a writ ad melius inquirendum to issue, that the facts as to the assignment might appear upon the inquisition, it being suggested that the Crown would be entitled to the goods as against the assignees. Regina v. Jobling, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 14; 4 Exch. Rep. 483.

A bond given to the Crown under the 33 Hen. 8. c. 39. may be made payable to the king, his heirs or

successors.

By a bond given to the Crown under that statute all the lands of the obligor are bound from its date; and as such bond is a voluntary act, the obligor cannot by mortgaging any portion of his lands, even under a power of appointment contained in a deed prior to the bond, render them free from liability under an extent subsequently issued on the bond,

Upon a proceeding of amoveat manus the Court may take notice of the bond upon which the extent has issued. Regina v. Ellis, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 77; 4 Exch. Rep. 652.

EXTORTION.

An information under the 33 Geo. 3. c. 52. s. 62, alleged that the defendant being a British subject, and exercising an office in the East Indies, and residing there, unlawfully did receive from a certain person called Sevajee Rajah a certain sum of money, to wit, &c., as a gift and present:-Held, affirming the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench (16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 117; 13 Q.B. Rep. 42), first, that the offence was sufficiently described, as the statute prohibited a receipt of any gifts whatever. Secondly, that it was not necessary to allege for whose use the money was received (Platt, B. dubitante). Thirdly, that it was not necessary to aver that the money was received extionately, or under colour of the defendant's office.

Held, also, that the provisions of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 64. s. 21. curing defects by verdict, apply to all informations and indictments triable in England whether the offences were committed abroad or not.

The information charged the receipt of a certain number of rupees. The jury found the value of each rupee at the time of the receipt. The Court passed judgment, imposing a fine upon each count, and a forfeiture of the value of the gift, adopting the value of a rupee as found by the jury, and sentence of imprisonment until the fine and forfeiture were paid:-Held, that under the 33 Geo. 3. c. 52. s. 63, where money was received, it was not necessary to give the defendant the option of returning the gift or the value; and that the information and judgment were therefore right.

Held, also, that the proper time to estimate the value was at the time of the receipt, and not of the conviction.

Held, also, that the Court had power to pass sentence of imprisonment until the forfeiture was paid. Douglas v. Regina, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 176; 13 Q.B. Rep. 74.

FACTOR.

Meaning of "intrusted" in statute 6 Geo. 4. c. 94. s. 2. Hatfield v. Phillips, 14 Mee. & W.665; 5 Law J. Dig. 296.

Plaintiffs not intrusted with the bill of lading as agents by the true owners, but claiming to hold in their own right, have no title under the Factors Acts (see title Stoppage in Transitu). Van Costeel v. Booker, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 9; 2 Exch. Rep. 691.

Principal and factor-accounts. ping, 9 Beav. 284.

Clarke v. Tip

The Factors Act (5 & 6 Vict. c. 39.) applies to mercantile transactions only, and not to advances made on the security of furniture, used in a furnished house, to the apparent owner of the furniture, who afterwards turns out to be merely an agent intrusted with the custody of the furniture by the true owner. Wood v. Rowcliffe, 6 Hare, 191.

A Calcutta firm, by a letter dated in January and received in London on the 11th of March 1841, directed their London correspondents to hold a sum of money (equal to a lac of rupees at the current rate of exchange), payable on the 19th of November following, out of remittances and consignments on the general account, at the disposal of a creditor of the Calcutta firm in Liverpool. The Calcutta house at the same time acquainted the Liverpool house of the directions which had been given. The London house informed the Liverpool house that they had received and registered the order; and, after stating that they were in advance of the Calcutta house, and declining to accept bills for any part of the amount, said, that if remittances should come forward to enable them to meet the wishes of the Calcutta house, they would lose no time in advising the Liverpool house. The London house, also, in acknowledging to the Calcutta house the receipt of the order, said, that the state of their account did not then warrant them in meeting the requisition, but they would meet it if in a position to do so before November. The Calcutta house revoked the order by a letter of January 1842, received by the London house on the 12th of March 1842. The Court below having directed an account to be taken in favour of the Liverpool house as against the London house, the Lord Chancellor, on appeal, directed the cause to stand over, with liberty to the plaintiff to bring such action as he might be advised, to establish his right at law; and the plaintiff subsequently failing in an action at law, the bill was dismissed.

When mercantile correspondence respecting the appropriation of funds in the hands of a consignee belonging to the debtor, does not constitute a legal contract on the part of the consignee to apply the funds in payment of debt of the creditor, quære, whether the creditor may still support a claim to the funds on the ground of there being an equitable assignment. Malcolm v. Scott, 2 Hall & Tw. 440; 3 Mac. & G. 49.

DIGEST, 1845-1850.

FACTORY.

The provisions as to print works in 8 & 9 Vict. c. 29. amended by 9 Vict. c. 18; 24 Law J. Stat. 59. Ropeworks exempted from the Factory Acts by 9 & 10 Vict. c. 40; 24 Law J. Stat. 119.

Hours of labour in mills and factories limited by 10 Vict. c. 29; 25 Law J. Stat. 95.

School attendance of children in print works regulated by 10 & 11 Vict. c. 70; 25 Law J. Stat. 219. The laws relating to labour in factories amended by 13 & 14 Vict. c. 54; 28 Law J. Stat. 106.

It is no offence against the Factory Acts to employ a young person, or female, for ten hours in any one day, such ten hours ending at a period which is more than ten hours (in addition to the hour and a half allowed for meal-times) from the period another child or young person or female began to work.

Those acts limit the periods between which young persons and women are to work, and the number of hours, and also require the same hour and a half to be allotted to all for meal-times, but do not enact that all shall work during the same ten hours; so that, subject to the above limitations, working by relays is legal.

All children, young persons, and females must be taken to have commenced work when any one child, young person, or female commenced work. Ryder v. Mills, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 82; 3 Exch. Rep. 853.

FAIRS AND MARKETS.

The exception in 27 Hen. 6. c. 5. as to holding fairs and markets on the four Sundays in harvest repealed by 13 & 14 Vict. c. 23; 28 Law J. Stat. 32.

The provisions usually inserted in acts for constructing or regulating markets and fairs consolidated by 10 Vict. c. 14; 25 Law J. Stat. 29.

FALSE ANSWER.

[See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.]

FALSE IMPRISONMENT. [Under Speaker's Warrant. See Parliament.] (A) WHAT IS AN IMPRISONMENT. (B) ACTION For, and DamagES. (C) JUSTIFICATION OF THE IMPRISONMENT. On Suspicion of Felony.

(b) Under the Metropolitan Police Act. (c) Reasonable and probable Cause.

(A) WHAT IS AN IMPRISONMENT.

The forcibly preventing a party from proceeding in a particular direction, e. g. along a public footway, is not an imprisonment in law. Per Patteson, J., Williams, J. and Coleridge, J.; dissentiente Lord Denman, C.J. Bird v. Jones, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 82; 7 Q.B. Rep. 742.

20

(B) ACTION FOR, AND DAMAGES.

B voluntarily attended before a magistrate to answer a charge of embezzlement, which C then preferred against him. Before taking the depositions formally, the magistrate said, "Do you intend giving him into custody for it?" C replied, "I do give him into custody." B was then told by one of the constables to go into the dock:-Held, that the act of C amounted to no more than calling on the magistrate to exercise his jurisdiction; and that the placing B in the dock must be referred to the authority of the magistrate, and that C was not liable in trespass for the consequent imprisonment. Brown v. Chapman, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 329; 6 Com. B. Rep. 365.

In trespass for false imprisonment, the defendant pleaded that under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. the defendant issued a summons in the county court against the plaintiff, which was duly served upon the plaintiff; that the plaintiff did not appear to the summons, and that judgment was given against him by default for payment of the debt by instalments; that a minute of such judgment was served on the plaintiff, and that default being made in payment of the instalments, the defendant obtained a summons to the plaintiff to be examined touching his circumstances, &c.; that the last-mentioned summons was served on the plaintiff, who did not appear thereto, whereupon the Judge ordered him to be committed for fourteen days to the house of correction, and a warrant of commitment under the seal of the court was duly issued, under which the plaintiff was seized. Replication de injuriâ, and issue. It was proved that the defendant entered a plaint in the county court against one I, and had issued a summons against him, and had served it on the plaintiff, who said it was a mistake, and that he was not I. The defendant, however, persisted in leaving the summons with him. The plaintiff did not appear, and judgment for payment of the debt by instalments was given against I, which was served on the plaintiff, who still protested against it, and default being made in payment the defendant sued out against I a fraud-summons, under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. s. 98, which was served on the plaintiff, and on the day for appearance thereto the defendant, on proof of the service, obtained an order for the commitment of I, and a warrant was accordingly made out. The defendant went together with the officer, and, disregarding the plaintiff's protest, directed him to be apprehended, and he was accordingly taken to prison. The jury found that the plaintiff had not specifically or by his acts represented himself to be I: Held, that the plea was not supported by the evidence, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the verdict. Walley v. M'Connell, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 162.

The defendant gave the plaintiff into custody on a charge of felony, and he was taken before a magistrate, who remanded him; and on his again being brought up he was discharged. In trespass for the false imprisonment, the Judge told the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for the whole time he was in custody:-Held, to be wrong, as the damages ought to be limited to what occurred prior to the remand, which was the act of the magistrate,

and not of the defendant. Lock v. Ashton, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 76; 12 Q.B. Rep. 871.

(C) JUSTIFICATION OF THE IMPRISONMENT.

(a) On Suspicion of Felony.

To trespass, first, for breaking and entering a dwelling-house; secondly, for false imprisonment; the defendant pleaded setting out grounds of suspicion of felony against the plaintiff, and then stated, "wherefore the defendant, suspecting the plaintiff to have been guilty of feloniously stealing the said goods, did peaceably enter the said dwelling-house of the plaintiff, the outer door being opened to him by the plaintiff's mother, in company with one B, a constable, and did then give the plaintiff into the custody of B, and then, in a reasonable time from entering the said dwelling-house, left the same, and then conveyed the plaintiff therefrom to the police station:-Held bad, on special demurrer, for not shewing, with sufficient certainty, for what purpose the defendant entered into the dwelling-house, nor whether he found the plaintiff there. Smith v. Shirley, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 230; 3 Com. B. Rep. 142.

In an action for false imprisonment, the defendant pleaded that his goods had been stolen, and having cause to suspect the plaintiff of the felony, he gave her into custody, the plea stating several grounds of suspicion. The plaintiff called a policeman to prove that the defendant directed him to take the plaintiff into custody; and in his crossexamination the policeman said, that, at the same time, and in the presence of the plaintiff, the defendant stated that the goods had been stolen, and also stated some of the grounds of suspicion mentioned in the plea :-Held, that this was evidence for the jury to consider, and from which they might find that the felony had been committed; and that the defendant had good cause to suspect the plaintiff, if this evidence satisfied them that the facts really

were so.

Held also, that, although in this plea the defendant ought to set out his grounds of suspicion, yet that he would be entitled to a verdict without proof of the whole of them, if he proved that a felony was in fact committed, and proved so much of the grounds of suspicion as satisfied the jury that he had reasonable cause to suspect the plaintiff. Williams v. Crosswell, 2 Car. & K. 422.

(b) Under the Metropolitan Police Act.

The 54th and 63rd sections of 2 & 3 Vict. e. 47. (the Metropolitan Police Act) empowers a police constable to take into custody, without warrant, persons who " within view" of the constable, commit certain offences therein made punishable by summary conviction. The 66th section enacts, that any person "found committing" any offence punishable, either upon indictment, or as a misdemeanour, upon summary conviction, by virtue of the act, may be apprehended by the owner of the property, on or with respect to which the offence shall be committed, or by his servant, or any person authorized by him, and may be detained, &c. A plea, justifying an imprisonment of the plaintiff, on the ground of her having committed one of the offences mentioned in the 54th section, stated, that

it was committed "in view of the constable"; this allegation having been disproved at the trial,Held, that the allegation was material, and that the justification, therefore, failed.

Held, also, that the plea was not a justification under the 66th section, because there was no allegation that the plaintiff was "found committing the offence," and that if the words "in view of the constable" were equivalent, they were not proved. Per Maule, J. and Erle, J.-The words "in view of the constable" are not equivalent to the words "found committing."

Semble-that the 66th section points to a different class of offences from those mentioned in sections 54. and 63. Simmons v. Millingen, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 102; 2 Com. B. Rep. 524.

(c) Reasonable and probable Cause.

Upon a plea of justification to an action for false imprisonment, the jury are to find what facts are proved, and the question of reasonable and probable cause on those facts is to be determined by the Judge.

A statement alleged in the plea of justification to have been made to O, but proved to have been made to H, may be admissible in evidence to shew that the defendant acted with proper motives. West v. Baxendale, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 149.

[See ante, (a), and title LEAVE AND LICENCE.]

(A) WHAT IS A FALSE PRETENCE UNDER THE STATUTE.

A false pretence, knowingly made to obtain money, is indictable, though the money be obtained by means of a contract which the prosecutor was induced to make by the false pretence of the prisoner. Regina v. Abbott, 1 Den. C.Ĉ. 273; 2 Car. & K. 630.

If a party by means of a false pretence obtain a voluntary charitable gift of money, he may be indicted for obtaining money by false pretences under the statute 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 29. s. 53. Regina v. Jones, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 162; I Den. C.C. 551.

The prisoner, who was the secretary of a lodge of Odd Fellows, came to the prosecutor, who was a member of the same lodge, and told the latter that he owed a sum of money to the society, and he at the same time produced a paper purporting to be a summons signed by himself, giving notice to the prosecutor that he owed the money to the lodge. The prosecutor, believing the statement, then paid the prisoner the amount :-Held, that the prisoner was properly convicted under the statute for obtaining the money by false pretences, although the paper

was not set out in the indictment; and although by the rules of the society the secretary had no authority to receive money out of the lodge, and although the fact of what was due was as much within the knowledge of the prosecutor as of the prisoner. Regina v. Woolley, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 165; 1 Den. C.C. 559.

A party, by a false pretence, obtained from a railway company a ticket, which entitled him to travel without payment from one place to another place on the railway in one of the company's carriages, but which ticket was to be delivered up to the company at the end of the journey:-Held, that the obtaining by a false pretence such ticket was obtaining by a false pretence a chattel of the company with intent to cheat and defraud them of the same, within the meaning of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 29. s. 53. Regina v. Boulton, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 67; 1 Den. C.C. 508; 2 Car. & K. 917.

(B) INDICTMENT for.

(a) Venue.

The prisoner, in a begging letter containing a false tale of pretended distress, requested the prosecutor, who resided in Middlesex, to forward by post to an address in Kent a sum of money by way of charity. The prosecutor, believing the story, obtained a post-office money-order, inclosed it in an envelope, which he addressed as requested by the prisoner, and put the letter into a post-office in Middlesex: -Held, that the prisoner might be indicted in Middlesex for having obtained the post-office order by false pretences in that county, since by directing the prosecutor to send the money by post he constituted the postmaster in Middlesex his agent to receive the post-office order there for him. Regina v. Jones, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 162; 1 Den. C.C. 551.

(b) Allegation of Intent.

An indictment which alleged that A R H, intending to defraud J W, falsely pretended that he was a captain in the 5th Dragoons, by means of which false pretence he obtained from J W a valuable security, &c., whereas the said A R H was not, at the time of the making such false pretence, a captain in the 5th Dragoons,-Held, good on writ of error. Hamilton v. Regina, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 9; 9 Q.B. Rep. 271.

(c) Allegation of Scienter.

In an indictment for obtaining money by false pretences, under 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 29, it was alleged that the defendant" did unlawfully falsely pretend," &c.-Held, that the omission of the word "knowingly" was no ground for arresting the judgment. Regina v. Bowen, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 65. [See next case.]

(d) Allegation of the false Pretence.

An indictment for obtaining money and goods under false pretences stated that the prisoners unlawfully (not saying "knowingly") did falsely pretend that a certain printed paper produced to the prosecutor was a good and valid promissory note for the payment of 51., and that by means of such pretence they obtained the money and goods from

the prosecutor, and then alleged that such printed paper was not a good and valid promissory note:Held, that the false pretence was sufficiently alleged, and that it was not necessary to set out the terms of the printed paper in the indictment, as nothing turned upon the nature or character of the document. Regina v. Coulson, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 182; 1 Den. C.C. 592.

FALSE REPRESENTATION.

[See CONTRACT, Rescission of.]

A party is not liable for a false representation made by him without knowledge of its being false and without fraud. Ormrod v. Huth, 14 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 366; 14 Mee. & W.651; 5 Law J. Dig. 7.

If A knowingly utter a falsehood to B, with intent to defraud B, and with a view to his own profit, and B, giving credit to the falsehood, is injured thereby, he may maintain an action against A for the false representation. Where, therefore, a declaration alleged that B had sent to A certain handkerchiefs, printed by B with a certain pattern, and that he was about to print others of the same pattern for profit, and that A, in order to defraud B, and to induce him to desist from printing the same, and to deprive him of the profits, and to acquire the same for his own use, falsely represented to B that the pattern was a registered pattern, and that the parties intended to proceed against B for pirating the design,-all which was untrue, to the knowledge of A; in consequence of which, B was induced to take a journey for the purpose of inquiring into the matter, and was meanwhile prevented from printing or selling other goods of the same pattern,-Held, on general demurrer, that the declaration disclosed a good cause of action, and that the special damage naturally flowed from the wrongful act of the defendant. Barley v. Walford, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 369; 9 Q.B. Rep. 197.

Where the plaintiff made a purchase under the influence of the misrepresentations of the defendant, although a considerable time had elapsed between the misrepresentations and the sale,-Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendant, and that it made no difference that the sale was made by auction. Bardell v. Spinks, 2 Car. & K. 646.

Where the declaration alleged that the defendant had falsely represented himself as an agent of the master of a vessel, and so entered into a charterparty with the plaintiffs,-Held, that, under the plea of "not guilty," the contract must be proved by the plaintiffs, and not the misrepresentation only; and, secondly, that the charter-party being unstamped could not be read in evidence, though the defendant was not an agent of any "master, or captain, or owner" of a vessel. Brink v. Winguard, 2 Car. & K. 656.

FEIGNED ISSUE.

[See ERROR, When it lies.]

A feigned issue alleging a pretended wager is not

rendered illegal by the statute against wagers, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109; s. 19. of which gives a new form for the issue; but either form of issue may be used. Luard v. Butcher, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 187; 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 815; 2 Com. B. Rep. 858.

Under a feigned issue, brought to try the right of property in certain goods which had been seised under an execution against A,— Held, that the question for the jury was, not whether the goods were the property of the plaintiff in the feigned issue, or of A, but merely whether they were or were not the property of the former. Green v. Rogers, 2 Car. & K. 148.

Where goods have been taken under a fi. fa., and an issue is directed to try whether the goods were those of a third person, and on that issue the jury at the assizes find for such person who is plaintiff in the issue, the practice is for the associate to keep the Nisi Prius record till after the fourth day of the next term, unless the Judge orders it to be immediately delivered up to the plaintiff's attorney upon an application in the nature of an application for speedy execution. Abbott v. Clarke, 2 Car. & K. 209.

FELLOWSHIP.

Motion by an incumbrancer on a fellowship for a receiver and injunction refused, with costs. Berkeley v. King's College, Cambridge, 10 Beav. 602.

FELONY, MISPRISION OF.

Upon the trial of an indictment under the 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 29. s. 58. for corruptly receiving money to recover stolen goods, and not causing the thieves to be apprehended and brought to trial, it was proved that the prisoner brought certain suspected persons to the house of the prosecutrix, whom she recognized as having been implicated in breaking into her house and stealing some cheese, and then received from her 31. for the purpose, as he promised, of obtaining from such persons a part of the stolen cheese. The prisoner never did obtain any part of the cheese; and the jury having found expressly that he knew the thieves, and assisted in endeavouring to purchase the stolen cheese from them, not meaning to bring them to justice, he was convicted:-Held, that such conviction was proper. Regina v. Pascoe, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 186; 1 Den. C.C. 456; 2 Car. & K. 927.

FERRY.

[See PLEADING.]

The second count alleged that the defendant, contriving to disturb the plaintiffs in the enjoyment of their ferry, carried divers passengers for hire over the river, near to the plaintiffs' ferry, whereby the plaintiffs were disturbed in the possession thereof:-Held, on motion in arrest of judgment, after verdict for the plaintiffs, that the count disclosed a good cause of action. Blacketer v. Gillett, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 307; 1 L. M. & P. 88.

Upon the construction of the act for establishing