directed goods seized under a fi. fa. to be sold, and the money to be paid into court to abide the event of an issue between the claimant and the execution creditor. A verdict was found for the claimant, who thereupon brought an action against the sheriff for breaking and entering his dwelling-house, and seizing and converting his goods. The Court made absolute a rule to strike out of the declaration so much as charged the defendant with seizing and converting the plaintiff's goods. And, semble, the proceedings ought in such a case to be stayed altogether. Abbott v. Richards, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 330; 15 Mee. & W. 194; 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 487. (F) ENTRY OF Judgment. The judgment on an issue under the Interpleader Act ought to be entered as directed by the statute, and not as in an ordinary suit. Dickenson v. Eyre, 7 Q.B. Rep. 307, n. (G) ORDER TO PAY PROCEEDS Pending Writ of ERROR. Where an issue was taken, in which the assignees of the debtor were made plaintiffs and the execution creditor defendant, the money levied by the sheriff being in the mean time paid into court, and at the trial the assignees recovered, and a bill of exceptions having been tendered, and on error brought in the Exchequer, the writ was quashed; but before an order made under the Interpleader Act for payment of the money over to the plaintiffs, the defendant brought a writ of error in the House of Lords; the Court refused, pending the writ of error, to make any order, there being no proof of its being frivolous. King v. Birch, 7 Q.B. Rep. 669. (H) TRIAL. On an interpleader issue, where the question was whether certain goods, &c., which had been seized by the sheriff under a fi. fa., issued upon a judgment, were the property of the plaintiffs, as assignees of a bankrupt, or of the defendant, the execution creditor, the defendant pleaded that by virtue of the said fi. fa., and as against the plaintiffs, he was entitled to the proceeds of the goods, &c.:-Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to begin at the trial. The fact of the Judge having directed the wrong party to begin at Nisi Prius is not a ground for a new trial, unless it also appears that a substantial injury has been thereby done. Semble-that in the case of an issue directed to inform the conscience of the Court, if the Court are satisfied with the result, they will not grant a new trial, although the Judge who tried the cause may have directed the wrong party to begin. Edwards v. Matthews, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 291; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 721. INTERPLEADER SUIT. A life insurance company received notice of an assignment by an insurer of a policy, and the insurer afterwards became bankrupt. Soon after the DIGEST, 1845-1850. death of the assured, the assignee of the policy applied for payment of the sum due, and the company inquired of the assignees of the bankrupt whether there was any objection to payment being made to the claimant. The assignees did not assent to the payment, but made no positive claim to the policy. In the mean time, the claimant brought an action in the name of the bankrupt against the company:-Held, that the company were entitled to file their bill of interpleader against the plaintiff in the action, the bankrupt and his assignees, and that the assignees who had in the suit shewn no title to the policy must pay the costs. Fenn v. Edmonds, 5 Hare, 314. The right of the plaintiff in interpleader is to be protected not only from double liability, but from double vexation; and he is not therefore bound to shew an apparent title in each of the claimants who are defendants. The stakeholder is entitled to relief by interpleader, and is not bound to accept an indemnity from either of the claimants, although such claimant shews an apparent title to the property. A defendant in interpleader cannot generally be ordered to interplead by bringing or defending a suit in respect of the property in question, until he has put in his answer, or the bill is taken pro confesso against him; but where he seeks for time to answer he must satisfy the Court that the case cannot be put into a course for determination without further delay, and terms may be imposed on granting further time. The plaintiff in interpleader undertakes to use all proper diligence to get in the answer of, or to take the bill pro confesso against each of the defendants; and if any delay should occur, any defendant may apply as against the plaintiff for a dissolution of the injunction or delivery up of the subject of interpleader, as the case may be. East and West India Dock Co. v. Littledale, 7 Hare, 57. A bill was filed by A, stating that B was a mortgagee, with a power of sale, of an estate belonging to D, and mortgagee of some chattels also belonging to D; that C had also an interest in the said chattels; that B, with the assent and concurrence of C, had instructed A to sell all the property; that A had sold it, and had the money in his hands; and that A had afterwards received a notice that D had been made a bankrupt, and that he was required by the assignees not to part with the money, and praying that B, C, and the assignees of D might interplead together. To this bill B demurred. The demurrer was overruled. Farebrother v. Beale, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 149. INVENTORY. A release in general terms, given to an executor, is no bar to a claim for an inventory and account. The Court has power of itself, though it seldom exercises the right, to call for an inventory and account. Acaster v. Anderson, 1 Robert. 672. 2 Y JOINT-STOCK COMPANY. [See COMPANY.] JOINT TENANTS AND TENANTS IN Testator devised property, then in lease at a rent of 261., to the principal of Brasenose College, the bailiff of Birmingham, and the mayor of H for the time being, to hold to them and their successors for ever. The said rent to be paid as follows:-81. 13s. 4d. to the schoolmaster of Birmingham; 81. 13s. 4d. to Brasenose College for a scholar, and 81. 13s. 4d. to the schoolmaster of H; and he directed that at the expiration of the lease the land should be "sett forth and improved by the said principal bailiff and mayor for the time being or their successors, either by fine or otherwise, and the fine so sett should be equally divided betwixt the said schools and college:"-Held, that this was a devise to the three as joint tenants in fee and descended to the heir of the last survivor; and that the college took no beneficial interest in the increased rents or fines afterwards reserved. Attorney General v. Gilbert, 10 Beav. 517. Two women being joint tenants of copyhold lands, one of them and her husband surrendered their estate and interest, to the intent that the lord should re-grant the same to such person or persons as the husband should by will appoint. The wife died in the lifetime of the husband and sister. The husband afterwards died, having by his will appointed the surrendered share to his executors :-Held, that there was a severance of the joint tenancy. Edwards v. Champion, 1 De Gex & S. 75. Real and personal property was given by will to A, B and C and their heirs, share and share alike, as soon as they should have attained twenty-one; it being testator's will that if one of them should die before he attained that age, his share should vest in and belong to the survivors. A died under twentyone, leaving B and C surviving:-Held, that the share which A would have taken vested in B and C as joint tenants. Jones v. Hall, 16 Sim. 500. A tenant in common, occupying the premises held in common, but not excluding his co-tenants, is not chargeable by them with an occupation rent. M'Mahon v. Burchell, 5 Hare, 322. (e) Where there are Issues of Law and Fact. (B) BY CONSENT UNDER JUDGE'S ORDER. (D) NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO [See PROHIBITION.] (E) AS IN CASE OF NONSUIT. (a) Rule for, when granted generally. (b) Peremptory Undertaking. (2) Enlarging the Undertaking. (3) Rule discharging the Undertaking. (c) Enlarging Rule for. (d) Waiver of Right to. (F) REVIVAL of. (N) CHARGING STOCK UNDER 1 & 2 VICT. c. 110. s. 14. (0) CHARGE ON LANDS UNDER 1 & 2 VICT. c. 110. s. 13. (a) What is charged. (b) Upon what Property charged. (P) PROCEEDINGS UPON IN EQUITY. (Q) RIGHTS OF JUDGMENT CREDITOR. (A) SIGNING AND ENTERING UP. [See ARBITRATION.] (a) In general. The expression in the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 42. s. 18. that judgment may be signed "at the return" of the writ of trial, means at the return day named in the writ, and a judgment signed before the return day, though after the sheriff has actually returned the writ, is irregular. Holmes v. London and SouthWestern Rail. Co., 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 87; 13 Q.B. Rep. 211. Upon demurrer to a declaration upon a bond, the judgment of the Court is upon the declaration, and not upon the breaches assigned. Where, therefore, a declaration upon a bond assigned two breaches, one of which was good and the other bad, the Court gave judgment generally for the plaintiff for the penalty of the bond, and not for the plaintiff upon the good breach for the damages to be assessed upon it, and for the defendant as to the bad breach. Kingsford v. Dutton, 1 L. M. & P. 479. (b) For Want of a Plea. When the time for pleading expires on the 10th of August, the case falls within the 12th rule of Reg. Gen. Mich. term, 3 Will. 4, and the plaintiff cannot sign judgment on the 11th of August. Savery v. Lister, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 13; nom. Severin v. Leicester, 12 Q.B. Rep. 949. In an action for calls, the declaration stated that the board of directors met to make a call, that another board of directors met to determine how notice of a call should be given, and that another board met to determine when the call should be paid. The abstract of the fifth plea was, that the persons alleged as having made the call did not constitute a board of directors. The plea was, that the persons in the declaration mentioned as constituting a board of directors did not constitute such board:-Held, that judgment signed by the plaintiff, on the ground of a variance between the abstract and the plea, was regular. Wills v. Robinson, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 248. (c) Nunc pro tunc. A cause was tried at the Summer Assizes, in 1839, and the plaintiff had a verdict. In Michaelmas term following, the defendant obtained a rule nisi for a nonsuit, which was made absolute in Trinity term 1841. The plaintiff having died on the 29th of November 1839, the Court ordered judgment to be entered up for the defendant, as of Michaelinas term 1839. Abington v. Lipscomb, 11 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 15. In an action there were issues of law and of fact, and the issues of fact were tried in August 1843, and a verdict found for the plaintiff, and a rule for a new trial was discharged in Trinity term 1844, in which term the demurrers were set down in the special paper, but did not come on for argument until May 1845, when judgment was given upon them for the plaintiff. The plaintiff having died in March 1845, a rule to enter judgment as of Trinity term 1844 was made absolute. Miles v. Bough, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 30. A record contained an issue in fact as well as issues in law. The issue in fact was tried in 1843, and found for the plaintiff, and a rule nisi for a new trial discharged in Trinity term 1844. Afterwards, in the same term, the demurrer was set down for argument, but did not come on to be argued till Trinity term 1845, when judgment was given for the plaintiff. The plaintiff having died in March 1845,-Held, that judgment might be entered nunc pro tune, as of Trinity term 1844. Miles v. Williams, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 56; 9 Q.B. Rep. 47. Judgment nunc pro tunc cannot be entered unless the delay is the act of the Court. The cause was tried in December 1845; there were numerous defendants, who severed in pleading. R and S each pleaded non assumpsit; the other defendants pleaded special pleas only, on which issues were joined, and from finding on any of which the jury were, by consent, discharged. R and S succeeded on non assumpsit, subject to a bill of exceptions, tendered by the plaintiffs. The bill of exceptions was settled and sealed in May 1846, and the postea delivered to the defendants on the 3rd of June. Negotiations took place between the parties as to the mode of entering up judgment; the defendants submitted two forms of judgment to the plaintiffs, one of which was altered and approved of by them, and returned to defendants on the 22nd of August. The defendant R assented to the form as altered and returned to him, and was about to sign judgment, when, on the 27th of October, R died. On application by R's executors to enter up judgment nunc pro tunc,-Held, that the delay was not the act of the Court, and therefore the Court would not assist the executors. Held, also, that though the plaintiffs were parties to the negotiations which produced the delay, they were not thereby prevented from resisting the application made by R's executors. Fishmongers Company v. Robertson, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Č.P. 118; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 656. (d) After Certificate for immediate Execution. Since the General Rule Trin. t. 4 Vict., when a Judge certifies under the statute 1 Will. 4. c. 7. s. 2, for immediate execution, the plaintiff may sign judgment and take out execution, not only without a four day rule, but without any delay. Alexander v. Williams, 8 Q.B. Rep. 931. A verdict having passed for the plaintiff at the trial of the cause, which took place in the vacation, the Judge granted a certificate for immediate execution. The same day the plaintiff gave notice of taxation of his costs, and on the following day taxed them, signed judgment, and issued execution :Held, on motion to set aside the judgment and subsequent proceedings, that the plaintiff was regular in the course that he had pursued, and that he was not bound to take out a rule for judgment, or to wait four days before proceeding to sign judgment. Alexander v. Williams, 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 132. (e) Where there are Issues of Law and Fact. Where upon demurrer there has been judgment for the defendant upon pleas going to the whole cause of action, and issues of fact are also upon the record (which have not been tried), the Court will not compel the defendant to enter up judgment of nil capiat per breve, so as to enable the plaintiff to go to a court of error before trying the issues in fact. Hinton v. Acraman, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 2; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 462; 3 Com. B. Rep. 737. (f) On Scire Facias by Executors. The Court refused to permit judgment recovered by the testator to be entered up on a scire facias, where the affidavits stated that the plaintiffs had been appointed her executors, but not that they had obtained probate. Vogel v. Thompson, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 309; 1 Exch. Rep. 60; 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 114. (g) Waiver of Irregularity in. Signing judgment on a warrant of attorney for a sum larger than that mentioned in the warrant is only an irregularity, which may be waived by the laches of the defendant. Stopford v. Fitzgerald, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 310; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 725. The omission to enter an appearance before signing judgment upon a Judge's order to confess judgment is an irregularity only, and may, therefore be waived. Where, after a judgment so signed, and delivery of bill of costs containing no charge for entering an appearance, the defendant's attorney attended the taxation, and obtained time to pay the debt and costs, it was held a waiver of the irre gularity in the judgment. Grandin v. Maddans, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 31; 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 241. (B) BY CONSEnt under Judge's Order. The rule of the 12th of June 1845, as to obtaining Judge's orders for signing judgment, which requires that the defendant's "written consent be attested by an attorney acting on his behalf," has not the force of a rule of court; and, where a Judge's order for signing judgment was obtained, on a written consent, attested by an attorney acting for the plaintiff, the Court held the attestation sufficient in Îaw, and refused to set aside the order and judgment signed thereon. Dixon v. Leyden or Sleddon, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.8.) Exch. 284; 15 Mee. & W. 427; 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 697. (C) OF NON PROS. After leave given to amend the declaration upon payment of costs, the defendant did not serve a rule to plead several matters, or produce to the Master the draft pleas as meant to be amended, with 6s. 8d. costs for the amendment. The plaintiff replied to the old pleas, and made up and delivered the issue, with notice of trial, though the defendant was not under terms to rejoin gratis. The delivery of the issue was set aside; but-Held, that, as no production of the intended new pleas took place on taxing the costs of amendment, the defendant had no right to sign judgment of non pros. Rishworth v. Dawes, 16 Mee. & W. 440. (D) NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO. (E) AS IN CASE OF NONSUIT. (a) Rule for, when granted generally. Where a town cause was made a remanet from the sittings after Easter term to the sittings after Trinity term, and the plaintiff then made default, a rule for judgment as in case of nonsuit made in Michaelmas term was discharged on a peremptory undertaking. Ladbroke v. Williams, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 46; 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 368. The plaintiff, being under a peremptory undertaking to go to trial on the 10th of January, obtained the usual order to discontinue, on payment of costs, and a consent in case of non-payment to the defendant's signing a non pros. The defendant protested against the taxation, which was appointed for the 12th, and on that day obtained a rule absolute for judgment as in case of a nonsuit: - Held, on motion to set aside this rule, that the rule to discontinue did not operate as a stay of proceedings, and that the defendant was not precluded from obtaining judgment as in case of a nonsuit. Beeton or Baker v. Jupp, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 120; 15 Mee. & W. 149; 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 474. In an action of tort against two defendants, one of whom has suffered judgment by default, the other, who has pleaded to issue, may have judgment as in case of nonsuit against the plaintiff for not proceeding to trial against him. Hadrick v. Haslop, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 442. In a country cause a plaintiff suffered two assizes to elapse after notice of trial without proceeding to trial. Upon a rule nisi for judgment as in case of a nonsuit, the plaintiff stated in excuse that the action was against provisional committeemen; the uncertain state of the law; and his anxiety to wait the result of other cases and especially one then pending in the Exchequer Chamber:-Held, that as the defendants might have made the application in the previous term, and had not done so, the excuse was sufficient to discharge the rule upon a peremptory undertaking. Edwards v. Ward, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 164; 4 Com. B. Rep. 315. In an action against four defendants, two died before issue joined, and issue was joined against the two survivors. The plaintiff neglected to make up the record and proceed to trial; and on application by the surviving defendants,-Held, that the surviving defendants against whom issue has been joined cannot obtain a rule for judgment as in case of a nonsuit, unless the deaths of their co-defendants against whom issue has not been joined appear by suggestion on the record. Semble-If, in such a case, the plaintiff fail to make up the record and enter a suggestion of the death, the course for a defendant to pursue is to call upon the plaintiff to do so, and if he fail, to apply for leave for the defendant to do it; and then (the suggestions having been entered) to move for judgment as in case of a nonsuit. Pinkus v. Sturch, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 120; 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 515; 5 Com. B. Rep. 474. Where a cause, sent down to be tried before the sheriff under a writ of trial, is not reached on the day for which it is set down, it goes over to the next sitting day, as a remanet, and no fresh notice of trial is necessary; therefore, if the plaintiff omits to alter the return day of the writ of trial, where such alteration is requisite, and the cause is not proceeded with, he is guilty of a default which will entitle the defendant to move for judgment as in case of nonsuit. Crockford v. Tucker, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 114; 6 Dowl. & L. P.C. 542. Issue was joined on the 15th of April 1849. There were issues in law and issues in fact. Judg ment was given on the issues in law at the sittings after Hilary term 1850. No step was taken by the plaintiff to bring the case to trial. In Trinity term 1850 the defendant moved for judgment as in case of a nonsuit:-Held, that the application was premature. Chrisp v. Atwell, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 416; 1 L. M. & P. 454. An action to recover compensation for services rendered to the defendant as a member of the provisional committee of a railway company after notice of trial given stood for trial as a special jury cause for the sittings after Hilary term 1850. In the November previous, the Vice Chancellor had made an order for winding up the affairs of the company under the Joint-Stock Companies Winding-up Act, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 45. An official manager was appointed some time in January 1850. After his appointment the plaintiffs withdrew the record, stating their intention of carrying in their claim and proving it before the Master in Chancery. The defendant having moved for judgment as in case of a nonsuit for not proceeding to trial at the sittings after Hilary term, the Court discharged the rule, holding that as by section 73, after the appointment of an official manager, the plaintiffs were bound to prove their debt before the Master before they could proceed with the action, and as they had not been shewn to have been guilty of any neglect or delay in making such proof, they had given a reasonable excuse for not proceeding to trial. Birch v. Lowndes, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 431; 1 L. M. & P. 541. A judgment as in case of nonsuit may be entered in a feigned issue, under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 118. s. 56. (the General Inclosure Act). Hancock v. Earl of Carlisle, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 45; 4 Exch. Rep. 447. The deponent in an affidavit was described as M. B. clerk-S. N. (the word "to" being omitted): Held, insufficient. Shakespear v. Willan, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 184. It is no ground for discharging the rule without a peremptory undertaking that the plaintiff has discovered since the action that the debt was recoverable in the Court of Requests; and, quære, whether a writ of trial may be carried down by proviso. Nicholson v. Jackson, 1 Com. B. Rep. 622. An order staying all further proceedings in the cause "until the further order of the Court," cannot be waived by a notice of abandonment of such order from the defendant, so as to enable him to move for judgment as in case of a nonsuit. Wilson v. Upfill, 5 Com. B. Rep. 245. An affidavit of the plaintiff's attorney that he had not an opportunity of suing the plaintiff, who resided some distance off, and that he believed he was not prepared to go to trial earlier,-Held, sufficient to discharge a rule for judgment as in case of a nonsuit, upon the plaintiff giving a peremptory undertaking. Richards v. Hamer, 5 Com. B. Rep. 582. Upon motion for judgment as in case of a nonsuit for not going to trial after notice, the affidavit need not allege that due notice of trial has been given and held, no objection to such a rule that such notice was given at an earlier period than, for anything shewn by the defendant, it need have been given. Butler v. Frost, 7 Com. B. Rep. 969. An action of debt was brought in the joint names of the official and trade assignees of a bankrupt, but without the knowledge or consent of the former, who, as soon as he was made acquainted with it, obtained a rule against his co-plaintiff to stay the proceedings until he gave security for the costs. This rule was made absolute, and served on the defendant in the action. The cause had stood for trial at the sittings in the same term, but had been made a remanet to the sittings after the term, on the application of the defendant, on the ground of the absence of a material witness. At the latter sittings the record was withdrawn:-Held, that the defendant was entitled to move for judgment as in case of a nonsuit. The Court will discharge a rule for judgment as in case of nonsuit on a peremptory undertaking to try given by one of two plaintiffs, though the other protests against it. Laws v. Bott, 16 Mee. & W. 362. Judgment as in case of a nonsuit may be moved for by one of several defendants, though other defendants have moved for costs of the day for not proceeding to trial. Bridgeford v. Wiseman, 16 Mee. & W. 439. Issue was joined on the 3rd of June 1844, and notice of trial given for the adjourned sittings after Trinity term 1844, which was afterwards postponed by consent to the sittings after Michaelmas term in the same year. The record was at those sittings withdrawn, on the ground of the absence of some material witnesses on the part of the plaintiff. In Trinity term 1845, the plaintiff obtained commissions to examine his witnesses abroad, and in July in the same year the defendants also obtained a Judge's order for a commission to issue to examine witnesses on their behalf, which order contained the usual proviso, that the trial of the cause should not be proceeded with till the return of the commission. The defendants did not issue any commission:-Held, that they had waived any right they might have had to move for judgment as in case of a nonsuit. Bordier v. Barnett, 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 370. Issue was joined in a country cause on the 19th of March. On the 20th an agreement to consent to an order to refer was entered into by the attornies on both sides, the award to be made on the 1st of June. No step was taken to draw up the order to refer by either party; nor was any further proceeding taken by the plaintiff in the cause:-Held, that a motion for judgment as in case of a nonsuit in the ensuing Michaelmas term was regular. Fontainemoreau v. Encontre, 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 425. On a motion for judgment as in case of a nonsuit, the affidavit stated "that no notice of trial had been given in this cause," without negativing that a trial had, in point of fact, been had:-Held, sufficient. Woolmer v. Collins, 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 306. (b) Peremptory Undertaking. Where plaintiff, being under a peremptory undertaking to try a cause before the sheriff within two months, gave notice of trial for a court day within the time, but no causes were then tried on account of the occurrence of the assizes, and the plaintiff then gave notice of trial for the next court day, which was beyond the two months, and obtained a verdict, in the subsequent term, the Court refused to give judgment as in case of nonsuit, but set aside the trial, as had without authority, and compelled the plaintiff to give a peremptory undertaking to try within a limited time. Bushell v. Slack, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 3; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 388. A rule nisi for judgment as in case of a nonsuit was discharged in Michaelmas term upon the plaintiff's giving a peremptory undertaking to try at the sittings after that term. The plaintiff entered the cause for those sittings; but it was not reached in the course of business, and was made a remanet. On the fifth day of Hilary term, the defendant obtained a rule absolute for judgment as in case of a nonsuit. On application to set the rule aside,Held, that a peremptory undertaking to try is not an engagement to try at all events: a bona fide attempt to fulfil the undertaking is a compliance therewith. Rizzi v. Foletti, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 213; 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 808; 5 Com. B. Rep. 852. A defendant is not entitled to judgment as in case of a nonsuit for the non-performance of a peremptory undertaking, where, on the cause being called on, the plaintiff applies to amend the pleadings, an order for which, and also for the postponement of the cause, is made by the Judge. Jackson v. Carrington, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 385; 4 Exch. Rep. 41. |