400 LEGACY. arose from the bequest of the articles being disputed Semble-the subsequent reservation of interest Bequest of a "bond for 5007., and interest at 51. per cent.,"-Held, to carry the arrears of interest accrued due thereon at the death of the testator. Kent v. Tapley, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 99. A testator directed his trustees to raise the sum of 2,000l. for his son out of his real estate. The sum so directed to be raised was not paid for many years after the death of the testator:-Held, that the 42nd section of the Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27, did not apply, and the legatee was entitled to interest upon the legacies from the death of the testator. Gough v. Bult, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 486; 16 Sim. 323. A testator bequeathed his personal estate to trustees upon trust to place out so much money in the funds as would produce a yearly sum of 100l. to be paid to his wife, and then to place out the further sum of 2,1201. upon the like securities, and pay the dividends of part thereof to W H for life, and afterwards to his children, and the remainder of the 2,1207. to other persons named; and the testator declared that in case his estate should not be sufficient to pay the legacies in full previously to the death of his wife, then such legacies should only be paid in part during the life of his wife, and the same should be made up after her decease. The estates proved to be insufficient to pay the legacies in full during the life of the testator's wife :-Held, that the legatees were only entitled to interest upon the unpaid portion of their legacies from the time at which the remainder should be capable of being paid up. Holmes v. Crispe, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 440. A testator directed his trustees to raise a sum of 12,000l., for portions of the children of his son J and his daughter E, towards whom he stood in loco parentis, and also to levy and raise for their maintenance and education in the mean time, until the respective portions should become payable, such yearly sum (not exceeding what the interest of the expectant portion would amount to after the rate of 41. per cent. per annum) as to the trustees should seem sufficient. The trustees raised for maintenance less than the 41. per cent., and it was held, upon a petition by the legatees, that they were not entitled to interest, but to maintenance only. Rudge v. Winnall, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 469; 12 Beav. 357. (V) ANNUITY. A testator, whose property consisted principally of foreign securities, bequeathed to his trustees so much of his personal estate as would produce 1,5007. a year, which sum was to be appropriated by them at their uncontrouled discretion, and the income was to be paid to his widow for life, with any increase or diminution which might take place in its amount: -Held, that the widow was entitled to have a sufficient sum invested in the 37. per cents. to secure an annuity of 1,500l. a year. Prendergast v. Lushington, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 125; Hare, 171. A testator directed his trustees to sell his personal estate, and after payment of his debts, &c., to invest the residue, and out of the produce thereof, or if need be, by the sale and conversion, from time to time, of a sufficient part of the principal, to pay two annuities; and he directed his trustees if occasion should be, from time to time to pay out of the rents and profits of his freehold and copyhold estates so much of the annuities as his said personal trust estate should be insufficient for discharging. personal estate being exhausted, and the annual rents of the real estate being insufficient to keep down the annuities,-it was held, that the arrears were to be raised by sale or mortgage. Fentiman v. Fentiman, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 436. The A testator while domiciled in Jamaica bequeathed an annuity of 100l. to his son for life, and after his death to be continued to his son's daughter. The testator afterwards gave other annuities in sterling money. Two codicils were made by the testator while he was domiciled in England:-Held, that the testator intended the annuity of 100l. to be paid in Jamaica currency, and that it was a perpetual annuity to his son's daughter, and that a sufficient sum was to be paid over to produce that annuity. Yates v. Maddan, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 310; 16 Sim. 613. A testator bequeathed an annuity to three sisters, and the survivors and survivor for their lives and the life of the survivor, with a gift to the survivor of the corpus of the fund, from the interest whereof the annuity was payable. The fund set apart to answer the annuity was improperly sold out by the surviving trustee immediately after the death of one of the annuitants, and in consequence thereof the annuity fell into arrear; but a fund, less in amount than the original fund, afterwards became available: -Held, that the survivor was entitled to a rateable proportion of this fund, in respect not only of the arrears of the annuity which became due during the joint lives of herself and her sister, but also of the arrears of the annuity which became due after her sister's death up to the time of her own decease, as well as of the corpus to which she became entitled as the survivor. Innes v. Mitchell, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 415; 1 Ph. 710. But see 2 Ph. 346. A testator, by a will not executed so as to pass freehold estate, gave freeholds and copyholds to his brother, on condition of his joining with testator's nephew in the purchase of certain annuities, and gave to the nephew freeholds, leaseholds, and personalty on a similar condition. The brother disclaimed: Held, that the nephew must make provision for one-half of the annuities. One of the annuities was to be paid to the widow so long as she should live, and if she had any child born, such sum to be continued for its life. There were three children born:-Held, that the direction applied to the eldest only, and that taking the annuity she was bound to give effect to the other annuity, and to the gifts to the nephew as regarded the one-third share of freeholds which descended to her. A bequest of 5001. or an annuity of 257. for life,Held, not to give an option to the legatee, but to the parties interested in the property subject to the legacy. Wilson v. Wilson, 1 De Gex & S. 152. Bequest of a chattel leasehold house to trustees, on trust to pay to A an annuity for her life; and after A's death to be possessed of it on certain trusts. The house was taken by a railway company, and the purchase-money was paid into court:-Held, that A was entitled to have the corpus of the fund broken in upon for the purpose of obtaining payment of some arrears, and the payment for the future of the annuity in full. In re the London, Brighton and South Coast Rail. Co., ex parte Wilkinson, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 257. Interest not given on the arrears of an annuity unpaid for several years during the progress of the cause, although the suit was instituted by, and a receiver appointed on the application of, the residuary legatee, and the surplus income out of which the annuity was payable was brought into court, and made productive. In order to entitle an annuitant whose annuity is payable from a fund which has been brought into court to any profit which may have been made by the investment of the arrears of his annuity, he should procure the arrears to be set apart and distinguished from the general estate. Semble-that the claim of an annuitant to interestis not affected by the circumstance that the annuity is secured by a term of years of which he is himself trustee if his title to the annuity, in the circumstances of the case, is one of sufficient doubt to require the direction of the Court. Semble that an annuitant who has established his right to an annuity in a proceeding directed by the Court for trying such right, may immediately apply for the appropriation of the portion of the fund necessary for its payment. Taylor v. Taylor, 8 Hare, 120. A testator, after inaccurately reciting that his wife was entitled for life to 39,000l., which he stated would yield 1,560l. a year, directed his trustees to add an annuity of 440., to raise her jointure to 2,000.-Held, that she was entitled to have her annuity made up to 2,000l. at all events. Ouseley v. Anstruther, 10 Beav. 459. Where a testator's effects are insufficient to satisfy an annuity given by a will and the pecuniary legacies, Held, that the annuity ought to be valued, and the amount of the valuation paid to the annuitant at once, subject to a proportional abatement with the legacies, and that though the annuitant died before the payment of the annuity in full would have equalled the abated amount of valuation, the other legatees would have no claim to the surplus. Wroughton v. Colquhoun, 1 De Gex & S. 357. A general legatee of "the sum of £- long annuities," held, not entitled to dividends accruing before the expiration of a year from the testator's decease. Collyer v. Ashburner, 2 De Gex & S. 404. (W) RECOVERY OF LEGACY. The statute 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27. does not apply to the arrears of a mere personal annuity. A defendant not setting up the statute by his answer, cannot have the advantage of it at the hearing. Roch v. Callen, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 144; 6 Hare, 531. (X) RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE LEGATEE. A legatee, who owed the testator 4,000l., claimed to be entitled to it under the will. By an order he DIGEST, 1845-1850. paid the 4,000l. into court, and it was directed to be invested in stock, and the dividends accumulated. The Court decided in favour of his claim:-Held, that he was entitled only to the stock and accumulations, though owing to a fall in the funds they were of less value than 4,000l. Hyde v. Neate, 15 Sim. 558. [Liability to pay calls on shares bequeathed. See COMPANY.] [See Jaques v. Chambers, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 225; 2 Coll. C.C. 435-(A) Construction. (Y) LEGACY DUTY. [See WILL, Probate Duty.] Parties, strangers in blood, and appointed executors, took the whole real and personal estate of a testator, and paid the duty of 10l. per cent. on the whole personal residue; afterwards, on an ejectment by the heir-at-law, the testator's incapacity was clearly established, and upon a suit being instituted in the ecclesiastical court, the probate was recalled, and administration granted to the next-ofkin, liable to a less duty: by an arrangement the latter, on payment of a sum to the next-of-kin, released all their claim :-Held, that the former were, under the 36 Geo. 3. c. 52. s. 37, entitled to a return of the duty, not only on the sum paid to the nextof-kin, but of the amount retained, being retained not under the will, but as a gift of the next-of-kin; and that the Commissioners of Stamps were to account for the duty as that charged on the next-ofkin at the lower rate. Regina v. Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes, 6 Q.B. Rep. 657. A testator bequeathed to R B sen., and R B jun., and four others, 4,2007. 31. per cent. consols, in trust, as to 1,7001. part thereof, to apply the dividends in establishing and supporting a daily school at N, for instructing twenty boys, resident at N, on the National School principle. That the annual dividends of the 1,7007. should be retained by R B sen. and R B jun. for applying the same in the conduct of the school; that R B jun. should be schoolmaster during his life, and that the management of the school should for ever remain in the family of R B sen.; that the election of the boys should be in the discretion of the schoolmaster; that the schoolmaster should provide a school-room and firing out of the dividends of the said stock; that the dividends from the sum of 400l., part of the said 4,2001, should be applied in providing the boys with pinafores, caps, shoes, books and slates, the same to be left by the boys on their leaving the school or going out to work :-Held, that the sums of 1,7001. and 4007. were liable to legacy duty. In re Griffiths, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 130; 14 Mee. & W. 510. In an information for legacy duty a special verdict stated, that the testator devised his real estates in trust to pay the rents to his brothers and sister and the survivor of them for their lives, and after the death of the survivor to convey the estates to all his nephews and nieces equally, as nearly as they could make partition, and in the mean time to pay the rents to them. That for the purpose of such partition it should be lawful for the trustees to sell all or any part of the estates, and that they should stand possessed of the money arising from such sale 3 F upon the same trusts as were declared concerning the residue of the personal estate, namely, for his brothers and sister and the survivor of them for life, and then for his nephews and nieces. The testator died in 1819, leaving his sister and two brothers him surviving, the last of whom died in 1832. He also left ten nephews and nieces. In 1833, and at various times afterwards, the trustees sold the real estates for 9,0647., with the view of dividing the proceeds of the sale among the nephews and nieces:Held, that legacy duty was payable on the above sum, it being within the meaning of the 55 Geo. 3. c. 184. sched. part 3. tit. 'Legacies,' money arising from "real estate directed to be sold." Attorney General v. Simcox, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 61; 1 Exch. Rep. 749. A, by deed dated 1802, conveyed certain lands to trustees to the use of himself for life, remainder to B, his son, for life, remainder to the defendant, his grandson, for life. The deed provided that it should be lawful for the defendant and the survivor of A and B to declare by deed any new uses or trusts of the said lands. A having died in June 1822, B and the defendant, by an indenture of October 1822, declared and appointed that it should be lawful for B by any deed or will to charge the lands with the payment of any sum not exceeding 47,000l. for his own or any other use. In 1823 B made his will, whereby he charged his lands with payment to his executors of 47,000l. to be applied in payment of his debts, &c. and the residue to the defendant. B died in 1842. The 8 & 9 Vict. c. 76, amending the law relating to duties on legacies, passed in 1845. In 1847 the executors raised 11,2591. 11s. 8d., part of the 47,000l., and paid it to the defendant, the debts, &c. having been previously satisfied-Held, that the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 76. was retrospective, and that the defendant was liable to the payment of legacy duty on the sum of 11,259% 11s. 8d. Attorney General v. Marquis of Hertford, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 332; 3 Exch. Rep. 670. A testator by his will directed that the legacies therein given should be paid free of legacy duty. By a codicil, which he directed might be taken and considered as part of his will, he gave other legacies:-Held, that the latter legacies were not given free of legacy duty. Early v. Benbow, 2 Coll. C.C. 354. A testatrix directed all her personal estate to be converted into money, and her debts and funeral expenses and legacies to be paid out of the proceeds, and that out of the residue large sums of stock should be appropriated upon certain trusts. She then gave some pecuniary legacies of small amount, and directed that all the said legacies, and all legacies thereinafter given, should be paid free from legacy duty: Held, that the exemption from legacy duty applied to the bequest of stock as well as to the pecuniary legacies. Ansley v. Cotton, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 55. In 1795 a reversion in real estate was devised to trustees upon trust, after the death of the tenant for life, to sell the estate, and to pay a part of the purchase-money to A. A, by will, made F his executor and L his residuary legatee. By a deed dated in 1828, in consideration of 6,000l. paid to F as executor of A, F, by the direction of L, assigned the right to the purchase-money to S. No mention was made of the legacy duty at the time of this sale. In 1836 the estate was sold, on the death of the tenant for life, to S, and A's share of the purchasemoney was allowed to him. In 1846, F, as executor of A, was made to pay the legacy duty. L died insolvent. A bill was filed by F in 1846, against the executors of S, and the devisee of the estate under his will, praying to be recouped the sum paid for legacy duty:-Held, that F had no right to recover this sum, either against the executors or the devisee. Farwell v. Seale, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 189. A testator by his will gave certain annuities and legacies, and directed, as to some of them, that the legacy duty thereon should be paid out of his residuary estate, but as to others, he directed that the legacy duty should be deducted. The executor only partially paid the legacy duties, and left various sums unpaid on both descriptions of annuities and legacies. The Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes claimed a lien upon the residuary estate of the testator for the unpaid legacy duties in priority over the costs of the suit and the unpaid legacies:Held, that the executor was personally a debtor to the Crown for the amount of legacy duty where he had deducted it; and where a payment had been made to the legatee without deduction, the legatee, as well as the executor, was liable with respect to the duty which the legatee ought to have seen paid, but the Crown had no claim upon the residuary fund. Wright v. Barnewall, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 38. The declaration in an action for libel, after an introductory allegation that the plaintiff was employed in supplying water to ships calling at St. Helena, set out a letter published by the defendant in a newspaper, which letter stated" that the ship M arrived from Bombay with the passengers in a dying state; that there is no doubt that the illness was occasioned by the water taken in at St. Helena, where it was run into a copper tank, from whence the casks were filled alongside. There is no doubt, therefore, that the poison is imbibed in this copper tank, and it behoves the authorities immediately to replace it with an iron one" (innuendo that the plaintiff had supplied bad and unwholesome water to the ship M). The second count stated, that the defendant published a letter "in substance as follows," (setting out the former letter), and that he further contriving, &c. published another letter, of and concerning the first letter, &c., containing, &c.: "I beg to correct an error in my former letter, with respect to the passengers in the ship M being poisoned by the water supplied at St. Helena from a copper tank. I stated that the tank belonged to the government. This is an error; the copper tank is fitted up in a schooner belonging to Mr. S" (the plaintiff), (innuendo as before):-Held, on motion in arrest of judgment, first, that there was nothing in the first letter to warrant the innuendo applying the imputation of supplying bad water to the plaintiff, and that the first count could not therefore be sustained. Secondly, that the second letter could not be considered a substantive libel, independently of the first, and that the first letter not having been expressly set out and declared on as part of the libel in the second count, that count also could not be supported. Solomon v. Lawson, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 253; 8 Q.B. Rep. 823. In an action for libel, to which the defendant pleaded only not guilty,-Held, that the jury were properly directed that a clergyman gives no occasion for public comment by establishing or carrying into effect any arrangements for the purposes of charity. And where a clothing society, with the vicar at the head of it, was formed and carried on, in a parish containing 5,000 persons, on the principle of the exclusion of dissenters, it was held not to be the subject of public comment, on a plea of not guilty. Quare, as to a sermon preached by a clergyman to his congregation and not published. Per Pollock, C.B. and Parke, B. that it gives no occasion for public comment. Gathercole v. Miall, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 179; 15 Mee. & W. 319. An application to the Court of Queen's Bench, for a criminal information against a party for the publication of a libel, which application has been refused, is no bar to an action on the case in the other courts for the same ground of complaint. Wakley v. Cooke, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 225; 16 Mee. & W. 822; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 702. Allegorical terms of a defamatory character of well-known import, such as imputing to a person the qualities of the "frozen snake" in the fable, are libellous per se, without innuendos to explain their meaning. To write to the members of a charitable institution calling on them "to reject the unworthy claims of Miss H," and stating that "she squandered away the money which she did obtain from the benevolent in printing circulars abusive of Commander D," the secretary of the institution, is libellous. Hoare v. Silverlocke, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 306; 12 Q.B. Rep. 624. A libel upon the plaintiff, amongst other imputations, contained charges of misconduct in relation to his office of coroner for Middlesex on an inquest at Hounslow, and concluded in these terms-"There can be no court of justice unpolluted which this 'libellous journalist' (meaning the plaintiff), this violent agitator and sham humanitarian, is allowed to disgrace with his presidentship." The defendants, in justification of the words "libellous journalist," pleaded that the plaintiff on the 29th of March 1838, being the proprietor of a public journal, intending to injure one C in his profession, published of him a false, scandalous and malicious, &c. libel, setting it out. The proof was, that in the year 1828 an action of libel had been brought by C against the plaintiff in respect of the said libel published by the plaintiff as proprietor of the Medical Times, in which action 1007. damages had been recovered:-Held, that the words "libellous journalist" imputed to the plaintiff habitual libelling and moral misconduct; and that the Judge did not misdirect the jury in stating that the question was, whether the libel on C was a scandalous and malicious libel; and that the defendant ought to have produced other evidence than that of the record of that action for the purpose of proving that it was a scandalous and malicious libel. A coroner on an inquest ought not to exclude the testimony of parties who have material evidence to offer, on the ground that their testimony may tend to criminate themselves. Wakley v. Cooke, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 91; 4 Exch. Rep. 511. A publication, reflecting on the character of the plaintiff, professed to contain a report of the proceedings before two Judges of different courts at chambers, on applications, under the Bankrupt Act, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122. s. 42, to discharge a bankrupt out of custody. The defence (under the general issue) was, that it was a fair account of what took place before those Judges when acting in a judicial capacity:-Held, that if it was, the defendant was entitled to the verdict. Held, also, that if the report, though not correct, was an honest one, and intended to be a fair account of what really occurred before the Judges, that would be a ground for reducing the damages. Smith v. Scott, 2 Car. & K. 580. [See post, (B) (c). (b) Privileged Communications. In an action against a party for publishing a libel,-Held, per Tindal, C.J. and Erle, J., that a person having information materially affecting the interests of another, and honestly communicating it privately to such other party, in the full belief, and with reasonable grounds for the belief, that it is true, is justified in so publishing it, although the publisher has no personal interest in the subjectmatter of the libel, and although no inquiry has been made of him, and although the damage to the other party, or to his property, is not imminent. Per Collman, J. and Cresswell, J., that such a communication is not privileged. The libel in question was written by the mate of a vessel to the defendant, falsely charging the captain of the vessel with having endangered the vessel and lives of the crew by continued drunkenness. The vessel was at this time in port, and likely to continue there a few days. was slightly acquainted with the owner of the vessel, The defendant, who but was not interested in the vessel, and had no inquiry made of him, believing in the truth of the letter, shewed it to the owner, who, in consequence, dismissed the captain. The Chief Justice, upon these facts, having directed the jury that if the defendant acted honestly and bona fide, the publication was justifiable, and their verdict must be for the defendant, if otherwise for the plaintiff; and the jury having found a verdict for the defendant,— held, per Tindal, C.J. and Erle, J., that the publication was justifiable, and that the direction to the jury was right; per Coltman, J. and Cresswell, J., that it was wrong. Coxhead v. Richards, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 278; 2 Com. B. Rep. 569. A, having had no previous knowledge of B, a trader, sold him goods to the amount of 627. 10s., at two months' credit. Upon going to B's shop at the expiration of the credit, A found that the whole of the stock in trade, including a portion of the goods sold by him, had been sold by auction, by B's desire, on the previous day, and at a reduction of 30 per cent., and that the proceeds were in the hands of S, the auctioneer. could not learn where B was to be found. He Upon inquiry, he thereupon went to his attornies, and they, on his behalf, served on S a notice not to part with the proceeds, "the said B having committed an act of bankruptcy." B had, in fact, committed no act of bankruptcy, the goods having been sold for the purpose of his retiring from business:-Held, by Tindal, C.J., Coltman, J. and Erle, J. (Cresswell, J. dissentiente), that he had such an interest in serving the notice as to render it a privileged communication, if it was served with good faith and under the bond fide belief that B had committed an act of bankruptcy. Blackham v. Pugh, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 290; 2 Com. B. Rep. 611. Where the defendant, in a letter addressed to the Secretary of State, stated, that the plaintiff, who was town clerk and clerk to the Justices of the borough of A, was in close intimacy with one RC G and one D H, who had been brought before the Justices of that borough on a charge of embezzling the monies of T K their master, and that when the papers of the two prisoners were produced various accommodation transactions with the plaintiff were discovered, "thus clearing up the mystery as to the uses to which the plunder had been appropriated," and called on the Secretary of State to institute inquiry, &c. (innuendo, that the plaintiff had conspired with and was an accomplice of the said RCG and D H, in embezzling the monies of the said T K, and had made use of the proceeds of the said embezzlement; and also that the plaintiff, as such clerk and legal adviser as aforesaid, had acted corruptly and dishonestly in his office, &c.)-Held, first, that the communication could not be considered privileged or confidential by reason of its being an application addressed to the Secretary of State. Secondly, that the falsehood of part of the state ment was sufficient to support the presumption of malice, supposing the occasion of the publication to be evidence to rebut such presumption. Lastly, that the Judge properly left it to the jury to say, whether the libel bore the meaning alleged in the innuendo; as the words were such as were capable of conveying that meaning. Blagg v. Sturt, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 39; 10 Q.B. Rep. 899. A letter written to a bishop, informing him of a report current in a parish in his diocese, that the incumbent of a district in that parish had collared the schoolmaster, and that a fight ensued between them, is a privileged communication if such letter was written to the bishop honestly, to call his attention to a rumour in the parish which was bringing scandal on the church, and not from any malicious motive; and it is not material that the writer of the letter did not live in the district to the incumbent of which the letter referred. James v. Boston, 2 Car. & K. 4. (B) PLEADINGS. (a) Parties. A and B may join in an action for a libel containing imputations injurious to a trade carried on by them jointly as partners. Le Fanu v. Malcolmson, 1 H.L. Cas. 637. (b) Prefatory Averments. Declaration averred that the defendant used the words "blacklegs and black-sheep," to denote persons guilty of fraud, and persons of disreputable character; that divers persons had formed a club, called "The Royal Western Yacht Club;" that the defendant, intending to cause it to be believed that the plaintiff was a confederate of persons guilty of fraudulent play at cards, and of being blacklegs and blacksheep in the sense aforesaid, in a certain newspaper, called, &c., published of and concerning the plaintif the following libel," Royal Western Yacht Club, expulsion of two blacklegs," (meaning an expulsion from the club of two persons, being blacklegs in the sense in which that word was used as aforesaid). The declaration then stated that suspicion had attached to two members (meaning the aforesaid two persons) of the club, owing to two gentlemen having been plucked at cards, at the residence of one of the two suspected members, in a manner that seemed to indicate foul play; that an inquiry took place which resulted in the expulsion of the two suspected persons. The declaration then stated that a person, "known to be a confederate of the expelled parties sought admission into the club; his name was O'B" (meaning thereby, the plaintiff):-Held, on motion in arrest of judgment, that as it appeared from the innuendos, coupled with the prefatory averments, that the defendant had published libellous matter of and concerning the plaintiff, it was not necessary to allege in the declaration that the libel was published of and concerning the Royal Western Yacht Club, and the other prefatory averments. O'Brien v. Clement, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 77; 16 Mee. & W. 159; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 563. (c) Innuendos. Though defamatory matter may appear only to |