finding that B's tenancy at will commenced more than twenty-one years before the day of the demise in the declaration,-Held, first, that the conveyance to A did not determine the tenancy at will of B.

Secondly, That the mortgage by A did not determine such tenancy even if it could be supposed to exist, with reference to the Statute of Limitations, after the expiration of one year from its commencement; and that an action of ejectment against the defendant was barred by the statute 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27. ss. 2, 7. Doe d. Goody v. Carter, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 305; 9 Q.B. Rep. 863.

Under the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27. ss. 2, 3, and 34, the right to rent is extinguished by the lapse of twenty years from the time of the last payment of such rent, although twenty years have not expired since the rent became due.

Where a Statute of Limitations extinguishes the right and does not merely bar the remedy, the defence under such statute need not be pleaded specially, and therefore in an action of replevin evidence of the lapse of twenty years since the last payment of rent may be given under a plea in bar of non tenuit. De Beauvoir v. Owen, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 177; 5 Exch. Rep. 166; affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer. Owen v. De Beauvoir, 16 Mee. & W. 547.

The petitioner claimed a sum of money due from the estate of a testator on a judgment entered up on a bond given in 1793. The Statute of Limitations was set up as a bar, and it was contended that the statute did not apply to a charge upon personal estate, and that a suit instituted in 1817 against the testator's estate would prevent the statute from running. That suit was for the arrears of an annuity due to the party who instituted it, and it prayed that the estate might be administered, and that certain documents, which were in the possession of the obligee, and upon which he claimed a lien in respect of the money due upon the bond, might be produced, and the lien, if any, of the obligee might be ascertained:-Held, that the Statute of Limitations was a bar to any proceedings upon a judgment after twenty years, although such judgment was a charge upon personal estate only, and that the suit of 1817 was not in the nature of a creditors' suit, and there was not such an acknowledgment of the debt due upon the judgment as would prevent the statute from running. Watson v. Birch, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 188; 15 Sim. 523.

More than twenty years after the death of a testator, the representative of one of his executors, and the residuary legatee under the will, file a bill against the representative of a co-executor to recover residuary assets of the testator alleged to have been possessed by the co-executor. The plaintiffs are barred by the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27. s. 40. as to assets possessed by the executor more than twenty years before the filing of the bill, but not as to assets possessed by him since. Adams v. Barry, 2 Coll. Č.C. 290.

Where an annuity, charged upon land, is given by will to A, and the land is devised to B in fee, B is not a trustee for A within the 25th section of the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27, so as to entitle A to recover more than six years' arrears of the annuity. Francis v. Grover, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 99; 5 Hare, 39.

In consequence of the invalidity of an appoint ment, the plaintiff became entitled to a sum which was to be raised out of real estate under the trusts of a term of 500 years, which was still subsisting, but no steps for questioning the validity of the appointment, or for the recovery of the money, had been taken till more than twenty years had elapsed since the title accrued :-Held, that the right of the plaintiff was not barred by the Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27, that statute not applying to cases of this nature between trustees and cestuis que trust. Young v. Waterpark (Lord), lá Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 63.

A mortgagee who had entered into possession of the mortgaged premises in 1816, in 1827 executed a transfer to another, who thereupon entered into possession, and in 1828 transferred to a second transferee, who also entered into possession. The mortgagor was not a party to either transfer, and never received any acknowledgment in writing of his right to redeem. In 1833, the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27. passed. In 1845, the representative of the mortgagor filed this bill for redemption against the representatives of the second transferee :- Held, that the statute operated retrospectively by taking from the mortgagor the benefit of the acknowledgment of the mortgage title contained in the transfers of 1827 and 1828, and that the suit was barred. Batchelor v. Middleton, 6 Hare, 75.

A contract for sale of an estate was made in March 1811, the purchase-money to be paid in May following, and the purchaser was let into possession immediately on the execution of the contract. The purchase-money was not paid, but the purchaser and persons claiming under him continued in possession. In 1844 the assignees of the vendor filed the bill, claiming a lien on the estate for the purchase-money, and interest from the day fixed for the completion of the contract :-Held, that the right of the vendor to recover the purchasemoney as a lien or charge on the land was barred by the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27. s. 40.

Such equitable title of the vendor to recover from the vendee the purchase-money is not an express trust within the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27. s. 25. so as to be kept alive under that section.

The vendor's right to recover the purchasemoney as a lien or charge on the estate is not preserved by the existence of a suit by creditors of the devisor under whose will the sale took place, nor of suits by the residuary devisees and legatees of the purchaser for the administration of his estate. Toft v. Stephenson, 7 Hare, 1.

The 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27. s. 42. takes away from an incumbrancer upon land, in all cases, the right of recovering as against the land more than six years' arrears of rent or interest; and the statute 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 42. s. 3. merely restores the personal remedy against the debtor on the covenant.

An annuity and certain extra premiums for insuring the life of the grantor were charged upon land, and also secured by the covenant of the grantor:-Held, reversing the order of the Court below, that the annuitant was only entitled to recover against the land the arrears that had accrued due and the premiums paid by him within six years from the time of instituting proceedings to recover the same. Hunter v. Nockolds, 19 Law J.

Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 177; 1 Hall & Tw. 644; 1Mac. & G. 640; reversing 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc.

407.

(c) Under the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 42. Arrears of a fee-farm rent held not recoverable under section 42. of the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27. after the expiration of six years from the last receipt, and no acknowledgment in writing relating thereto; and held that the 42nd section is not repealed by the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 42. s. 2. Humfrey v. Gery, 7 Com. B. Rep. 567.

In July 1817, a mortgage was executed by the defendant, for securing, first, to the defendant's bankers, the payment of a sum of 1,6201. and upwards, and interest; and, secondly, to the plaintiff a sum of 1,500l. and interest, and the plaintiff thereby became a surety with the defendant for payment to the bankers of the amount so due to them. A power of sale was given to the bankers, which they exercised in the year 1834, but the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to satisfy the amount due to them. By a deed-poll, dated the 7th of August 1817, after reciting the existence of the debt due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and the fact that the plaintiff had become surety for the defendant in divers instances, and that the defendant had considerable expectations from the relations and friends of himself and his wife, and that he was desirous as far as might be of securing the payment of the debt due to the plaintiff, the defendant, in the most extensive terms, nominated the plaintiff his attorney irrevocable, to sue for and receive from all persons whomsoever, all sums of money, and all legacies and bequests, which should or might become due or payable to him, or his wife, &c. Several of the relatives of the defendant and his wife, subsequently to the date of the deed-poll, bequeathed legacies to the defendant and his wife respectively; and in the year 1842 the plaintiff filed this bill, seeking the benefit of the deed-poll, and a decree for payment to the plaintiff of the legacies so bequeathed to the defendant and his wife in satisfaction, so far as the same would extend, of the debt due to the plaintiff:-Held, that the plaintiff's debt was not barred by the Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 42, notwithstanding the lapse of twenty-five years between the date of the security and the filing of the bill; that the power of attorney contained in the deed-poll was in the nature of a covenant, and that whilst the trusts of the indenture of July 1817 remained unsatisfied, the Statute of Limitations would not run against the plaintiff's debt. Bennett v. Cooper, 15 Law J, Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 315; 9 Beav. 252.

(B) COMPUTATION OF TIME.

Where a mortgagee is also tenant for life of the mortgaged estate, the Statute of Limitations does not run against the mortgage title until his death.

The same where the mortgagee is tenant in common of the estate. Wynne v. Styan, 2 Ph. 303.

In June 1829, the plaintiff, a mortgagee with power of sale, employed F & S, as his solicitors, to give notice of sale. F & S gave such notice, and under their advice the plaintiff sold the property without the concurrence of the mortgagor. In 1841, on a bill by the representatives of the mortgagor, a

decree for redemption was made on the ground of the insufficiency of the notice. In 1846, the plaintiff brought an action on the case for negligence against F & S, and then filed a bill of discovery in aid of the action. A demurrer to the bill of discovery was allowed, on the ground that the cause of action arose more than six years before the suit.

In an action on the case for negligence, the cause of action was held to arise immediately upon the commission of the negligent act, and not when the negligence was discovered and the damage ensued.

A demurrer on the ground of the Statute of Limitations may be a good defence to a bill of discovery in aid of an action at law. Smith v. Fox, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 170; 6 Hare, 386.

(C) HOW THE STATUTE MAY BE BARRED.

(a) Acknowledgment.

The following letter, by the defendant, to a clerk of the plaintiff, in answer to one applying for payment of a debt, was held insufficient to defeat a plea of the Statute of Limitations:-" I will not fail to meet Mr. H (the plaintiff) on fair terms, and have now a hope that before perhaps a week from this date, I shall have it in my power to pay him, at all events, a portion of the debt, when we shall settle about the liquidation of the balance." Hart v. Prendergast, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 223; 14 Mee. & W. 741.

In order to give in evidence an acknowledgment in writing, to take a specialty debt out of the Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 42, the replication must state such acknowledgment. Kent v. Gibbons, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 120; nom. Kempe v. Gibbon, 9 Q.B. Rep. 609.

To a plea under the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 42. s. 5, that the cause of action on a deed did not accrue within twenty years, a replication, alleging a written acknowledgment of the debt within twenty years, need not set out the writing in its terms. Kempe v. Gibbon, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 298; 12 Q.B. Rep. 662.

To an action by the executor of an attorney to recover the amount of a bill of costs for work done by the testator, the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations and a set-off for money lent, &c., to which latter plea the plaintiff replied the Statute of Limitations.

The testator had transacted the law business of the defendant, and had received his tithes and rents. In a letter written by the defendant's agent the defendant desired to have the testator's account for the purpose of settling. In a second letter written in Welsh, and addressed by the same party to the testator, the writer stated that he would come to the testator's house for certain title deeds. In a subsequent letter by the testator to the defendant, the former says, "I have received a Welsh letter from your agent, and as far as I am able to understand it he requests to have the abstracts of title, and my bill against you and account. . . . . I should be glad to hear from you, as I am no Welsh scholar myself, precisely what is wanted." To this the defendant wrote the following answer:-"Being one of those people who think short accounts make long friends, I directed my agent last year to apply to you for your bill, in order that we might settle the tithe account, &c.

What he applied to you in Welsh the other day was for my title deeds." In a letter written three months subsequently, the agent stated to the testator that the defendant was anxious to have his bill. The defendant, for the purpose of taking his set-off out of the statute, put in evidence an account furnished by the testator to the defendant, in obedience to a rule of court. This account contained items to the credit of the defendant for tithes and rents received by the testator for the defendant, and also items to the credit of the testator for cash paid and work done, and claimed a large balance as due to the testator. The defendant also put in evidence an affidavit of the testator, made on the occasion of his furnishing such account, in which a large balance was claimed by the testator in like manner: Held, that neither the letters nor the account and affidavit were sufficient, within the 9 Geo. 4. c. 14, to take either the plaintiff's claim or the defendant's set-off out of the Statute of Limitations. Williams v. Griffith, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 210; 3 Exch. Rep. 335.

D, in 1824, executed a mortgage to P of houses to secure payment of 4001., and by the same deed covenanted for the re-payment of the money at a certain day. In 1828 D executed a deed to which P was no party, which, after reciting that D had executed a mortgage of the houses to P, conveyed them and other property to trustees to sell, and out of the proceeds to pay off all mortgages and other incumbrances, and then to pay D's creditors:-Held, in an action of covenant on the mortgage-deed (breach, non-payment of the money), that the recital in the deed of assignment in 1828 was not an acknowledgment of a debt, sufficient under the 5th section of the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 42, to take the case out of the operation of the 3rd section of the same statute. Howcutt v. Bowser, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 262; Exch. Rep. 491.

(b) Part Payment.

Where money is paid by a debtor on behalf of a creditor, the character of such payment is matter rather of evidence than of law.

B, a solicitor, managed the affairs of A, a female relative, to whom in 1820 he was indebted in the sum of 1,1531. for money lent. In accounts rendered by B to A from time to time up to 1823, B debited himself with interest on this sum, taking credit in the same accounts for various payments made on behalf of A to A's landlord, for the rent and tithes of the farm she occupied, and also for various cash payments to A. There was no statement of account of interest, nor any proof of payment either of principal or interest to A by B after 1823, but B up to the death of A in 1842, regularly paid to her landlord on her account her yearly rent of 761.-Held, in an action for the 1,153. money lent and interest thereon brought against B in 1843 by A's administrator, that these facts were evidence from which the jury might infer that the payment of A's rent by B was a payment on account of the interest due from B to A, so as to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations. Worthington v. Grimsditch, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 52; 7 Q.B. Rep. 479.

In an action for money lent the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations; and at the trial the

plaintiff proved the transmission of the money to the defendant, and the payment by him of a halfyearly sum for interest up to a certain time, and produced an answer to a bill in Chancery, in which the defendant admitted having paid the same halfyearly sum within six years, but asserted that it was paid by way of annuity, and not of interest. Assuming that an acknowledgment of a payment must be in writing, and signed, under the 9 Geo. 4. c. 14. s. 1, in order to bar the operation of the Statute of Limitations,-Held, that the evidence for the plaintiff was sufficient to go to the jury. That the construction of the admission in the answer was for the Court, and that the whole of it should have been left to the jury; but that they might believe the fact of the payments having been made half-yearly, but reject the residue, and infer from the other evidence that the payments were really made in respect of

interest.

Words used at the time of making a payment qualify it; but it is for the jury to judge of the truth of a statement accompanying the admission of a previous payment. Baildon v. Walton, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 357; 1 Exch. Rep. 617.

Where a specific sum of money is due, as upon a promissory note, the mere fact of a payment of a smaller sum by the debtor to the creditor is some evidence of a part payment to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations.

Semble-It would not be evidence if no specifie sum was due, but the demand was only on a quantum meruit.

Per Tindal, C.J.-If two admitted demands were due at the time of the part payment, so that it was doubtful to which demand the payment applied, such a part payment would not take either demand out of the Statute of Limitations. Burn v. Boulton, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 97; 2 Com. B. Rep. 476.

The plaintiff applied to the defendant for 151. 6s., as interest due to her upon a promissory note made by the defendant. The defendant gave the plaintiff a sovereign, stating that he had paid her 41. in April; that he owed her the money, but would not pay it. The Judge directed the jury that if the defendant by the part payment adinitted his liability, the law created the promise to pay, and that the case was not barred by the Statute of Limitations: -Held, that this was a misdirection; that to take the case out of the statute the facts must be such as to warrant the jury in inferring a promise to pay, and that those facts ought to have been left to the jury. Wainman v. Kynman, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 232; 1 Exch. Rep. 118.

A parish vestry having agreed to borrow money for building almshouses, the defendants, being two of the parish officers, in 1830 gave to the testator, who advanced the money, a promissory note signed thus:

"Joseph Hughes, Church-
"E. R.
wardens.

“John Evans,

"W. E.

Overseers.

"Or others for the time being."

Interest on this note had been regularly paid by the overseers for the time being up to 1847, and had been by them debited to the parish. An action having been brought upon the note, and the Statute of Limitations pleaded,-Held, that the

very form of the note made the existing parish officers the agents of the defendants for the payment of the interest on the note, and therefore that the Judge was wrong in withdrawing the form of the note from the consideration of the jury, and stating that the question was, whether the interest had been paid with the authority or knowledge of the defendants. Jones v. Evans or Hughes, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 200; 5 Exch. Rep. 104.

A, B and C made a joint and several promissory note. A died, leaving B his executor. C, being afterwards sued on the note, pleaded the Statute of Limitations; and the plaintiff, in order to take the case out of the statute, proved a payment of interest on the note by B within six years :-Semble--that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, without reference to the question whether B had paid such interest as the executor of A or as a party to the note. Griffin v. Ashby, 2 Car. & K. 139.

(c) Indorsement on subsequent Writ, under the
2 Will. 4. c. 39. s. 10.

To take a case out of the Statute of Limitations by means of a subsequent writ under the Uniformity of Process Act, 2 Will. 4. c. 39. s. 10, the memorandum required by that section must be proved to have been indorsed on the writ at the time of the service.

In support of a plea of the Statute of Limitations, the defendants put in evidence a copy of an alias writ of summons served upon them, which did not contain a memorandum of the date of the first writ and of the return, pursuant to the Uniformity of Process Act, 2 Will. 4. c. 39. s. 10. The plaintiff, without producing the original alias, gave in evidence an examined copy of the roll, which stated the alias writ in the usual form, and he gave no further proof that the alias contained the requisite indorsement at the time of its service. A verdict having been found for the plaintiff on this issue, and a motion made to enter a verdict for the defendants, the Court directed the rule to be absolute for a new trial, provided the plaintiff produced an affidavit stating that the necessary indorsement had been made on the writ at the time of its being served, otherwise a verdict to be entered for the defendants. Walker v. Collick, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 387; 4 Exch. Rep. 171.

(D) PLEADING.

[Fannin v. Anderson, 5 Law J. Dig. 430; 7 Q.B. Rep. 811.]

To an action of debt on bond, the defendant craved oyer of the bond and of the condition, which was that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff's testator the sum of 6701. on the 1st of February then next, according to and in full performance of the covenant or condition mentioned in an indenture dated, &c., and made between &c., and should perform the covenants, grants, articles, conditions and agreements, comprised and mentioned in the said recited indenture; and then pleaded that no cause of action in respect of the said writing obligatory, by reason of any breach of the condition of the writing obligatory, or of the said covenants, grants, articles, conditions, and agreements, in the said indenture, had accrued at any time within twenty years next before the commencement of the suit:

Held, first, that the plea was bad, in not setting out the indenture, as the same might contain negative or alternative covenants, in which case performance ought to be pleaded specially, or it might contain impossible covenants, in which case the bond would be single, and the plea to the breaches only would be bad; secondly, that the plea was bad in not stating affirmatively that the condition had been duly performed.

Semble-that the proper form of plea would be to set out the indenture; to aver performance of all that was performed within twenty years; to admit the breaches beyond that time; and to plead to those breaches the Statute of Limitations. Sanders v. Coward, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 97; 15 Mee. & W. 48; 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 281.

In trespass qu. cl. fr. the defendant pleaded, deducing title by an inclosure act to an allotment of land, including the locus in quo, to T T, who entered and became and continued possessed thereof, just before the said time when, &c. The plea then justified the trespass by the defendants, as servants of TT, and by his command. The plaintiff replied that the defendants entered and committed the trespasses, after the passing of the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27; that the entry was made to recover the said close in which, &c.; that the right to make such entry did not first accrue to T T, or the defendants, or to any person through whom T T or the defendants claimed the estate in the said close at any time within twenty years next before such entry :Held, on special demurrer, that the replication was good, it being sufficient for the plaintiff to bring the case within the 2nd section of the statute; and that if the defendants sought to avail themselves of a right of entry under the 15th section, they ought to plead it in a rejoinder. Jones v. Jones, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 299; 16 Mee. & W. 699 ; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 494.

Where defendants by their answer claim the benefit of "the Statute" of Limitations, that will entitle them to the benefit of any Statute of Limitations applicable to their case. Adams v. Barry,

2 Coll. C.C. 290.

A bill stated that A C, being seised of Whiteacre, demised it for sixty years from 1765; that A C was in his lifetime in possession or receipt of the rents of Blackacre, which was under lease for terms, of which sixty-seven years were unexpired in 1767; that A C died intestate in 1768, leaving TC his heir-at-law; that T C died in 1817, leaving MS his heiress-at-law; that M S was then and until her death under coverture; that M S died in 1836, leaving the plaintiff her heir-at-law; that the defendant was in possession of the property, and that the plaintiff had brought an action of ejectment in 1845. The bill prayed for a discovery in aid of the action. The defendant put in a plea, whereby he denied that Whiteacre was under lease at the death of A C, and denied that T C, or those claiming under him, had made any claim to Whiteacre or Blackacre between the death of A C and the action of ejectment, and pleaded the 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27. The plea was allowed, with costs. Scott v. Broadwood, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 257; 2 Coll. C.C. 447.

LOAN SOCIETIES.

The 3 & 4 Vict. c. 110. continued by the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 45; 28 Law J. Stat. 79.

LOCAL ACT.

[See STATUTE.]

Preliminary inquiries to be made in cases of application for local acts. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 106; 24 Law J. Stat. 286.

The 9 & 10 Vict. c. 106, as to preliminary inquiries in applications for local acts repealed and amended by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 129; 26 Law J. Stat. 339.

LONDON COAL ACT. [See PENALTIES.]

LORD'S DAY.

[See ARREST.]

LOTTERY.

[See ART-UNION-COMPANY, Companies registered under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110.]

LUNATIC.

[See BANKRUPTCY, Act of Bankruptcy-POOR -PROTECTION-TRUST AND TRUSTEE.]

(A) COMMITTEE.

(B) CONVEYANCE BY.

(C) MAINTENANCE.

(D) GUARDIAN.

(E) CUSTODY AND CONTROUL.

(F) COMMISSION.

(a) Effect of finding under.

(b) Compromise.

(c) Superseding.

(d) Carriage of.

(G) PRACTICE.

(H) INSANE PRISONER.

The laws concerning lunatic asylums and the care of lunatic paupers amended by the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 84; 24 Law J. Stat. 203.

The laws relating to the regulation of lunatic asylums altered by the 10 & 11 Vict. c. 43; 25 Law J. Stat. 156.

(A) COMMITTEE.

The committee of a lunatic is personally responsible in that character only to the Great Seal, and an order on him made by the Master of the Rolls in respect of a liability established against him in that court will be discharged as being without jurisdiction. Ames v. Parkinson, 2 Ph. 388.

Securities belonging to a lunatic's estate ordered to be deposited with the Master for the purpose of

reducing the amount of the committee's recogniZances. In re Eagle, 2 Ph. 201.

The controul of the committee over a lunatic's estate will not generally be interfered with, except in case of improper conduct on the part of the committee and therefore a petition presented on behalf of a joint-stock company, in which a lunatic was a shareholder, praying for a reference, whether it would be for the benefit of the lunatic that the amount due in respect of his shares by virtue of a call which had been made by the company, should be paid out of his estate, which petition was opposed by the committee, was dismissed, with costs. In re Hitchon, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 126.

Notwithstanding the provisions contained in the Land-tax Redemption Act (42 Geo. 3. c. 116.) it is the duty of the committee of a lunatic to obtain the sanction of the Lord Chancellor before proceeding to a sale of any part of the lunatic's estate for the purpose of raising monies wherewith to redeem the land-tax. In re Wade, 1 Hall & Tw. 202.

The residence of a committee at a great distance from the lunatic and his estate is not per se a disqualification for the office.

The 13th General Order in Lunacy of October 1842 enables the Master to institute inquiries and report thereon without a previous order of reference for that purpose; but such report requires the sanction of the Great Seal before it can be acted upon.

Where the committees of a lunatic, acting with the sanction of the Master, but (by mistake) without the authority of the Great Seal, had expended large sums in improving the estate, and had done other acts of an important character, the Court refused to discharge the committees, or to direct a reference at their cost to inquire as to the propriety of such acts, no mala fides being shewn, and no improper items being pointed out in the accounts which had been passed by the Master.

In proceedings in Lunacy, the attendance of the heir-at-law is required, not for the protection of his own interest, but for the protection of the lunatic.

Where an infant heiress-at-law, residing with her mother, a widow, was represented before the Master by her mother's solicitor, and the accounts had been regularly passed, the Court refused, on the petition of the heiress-at-law, to re-open the accounts on the sole objection, that the heiress at the time of passing such accounts had no legal guardian appointed. In re Brown, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 96; 1 Mac. & G. 201; 1 Hall & Tw. 348.

An ad interim committee is incapable of conveying under the 1 Will. 4. c. 60. s. 3. Inre Poulton, 1 Mac. & G. 100; 1 Hall & Tw. 476.

An order was made for payment of a lunatic's maintenance to a married woman (committee of the person) on her separate receipt, her solicitor undertaking that the money should be duly applied. In re Edwards, 2 Mac. & G. 134.

(B) CONVEYANCE BY.

[See PRACTICE, IN EQUITY, Accounts.] Where an equitable interest has been conveyed by a person of unsound mind to a party taking without fraud or notice of the unsoundness of mind, and the case is such that the deed would be void at