(A) ARTICLES OF CLERKSHIP.

[In re Bateman, 5 Law J. Dig. 46; 6 Q.B. Rep. 853.]

(a) Return of Premium.

The Court refused to order an attorney to repay any portion of a premium of 200 guineas received by him with an articled clerk, who died within a month after he was articled. In re Thompson, 1 Exch. Rep. 864.

The plaintiff was articled to an attorney for five years at 2001. The attorney died three years before the term had expired, and the plaintiff filed a bill against his representatives for a return of a proportionate part of the premium:-Held, that a debt had been established, and the plaintiff had a right to proceed against the assets of the deceased attorney; the Master to inquire what part of the premium ought to be returned. Hirst v. Tolson, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 308; 16 Sim. 620; affirmed, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 441; 2 Mac. & G. 134; 2 Hall & Tw. 359.

(b) Affidavit of Execution of.

An articled clerk "from inadvertence only" neglected to file the necessary affidavit within six months :-Held, not a sufficient ground for relieving him from the consequences under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. s. 9. In re Benson, 10 Beav. 435.

(B) ADMISSION.

An indictment will lie against a person who acts as an attorifey, without being admitted and inrolled pursuant to 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. s. 2, although by section 35. disabilities and penalties are imposed on persons so acting. Regina v. Buchanan, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 227; 8 Q.B. Rep. 883.

Where notice of an intention to apply for admission as an attorney in Hilary term had been given before Michaelmas term, the Court, under special circumstances, ordered that the clerk should be examined and admitted in Michaelmas term. Ex parte Cunliffe, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 41; 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 348.

An attorney who has paid the stamp duty of 60%. on being articled, in order to being admitted in the court of a county palatine, must, under 9 Geo. 4. c. 49. s. 4. pay the further stamp duty of 120l. on being admitted in any of the courts at Westminster.

And though he has been admitted on payment of an additional 604., by mistake of the officers of the court or the Stamp Office, and without any fraud or mala fides on his part, the Court will make an order for striking him off the roll, unless he consents to pay the additional duty of 60l. In re Myers, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 209; 8 Q.B. Rep. 515.

Though an attorney has paid the duty of 60%. on his articles of clerkship in Wales, and the duty of 251, on admission as an attorney of the Court of Great Sessions, he cannot be admitted an attorney of the superior courts of Westminster, under stat. 11 Geo. 4. & 1 Will. 4. c. 70. s. 17, without paying an additional sum of 60l. to make up the full amount of duty payable in England in order to admission as an attorney of such superior courts. In re Humphreys, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 65.

The Court allowed an attorney to be enrolled in

Every attorney duly qualified is entitled to be admitted an attorney therein, although there is not and never has been a roll of the attornies of that court-affirmed on error (see below).

Mandamus, to admit A B an attorney of the court, alleging it to be an inferior court. The return, without traversing this allegation in terms, set out at length the peculiar customs and jurisdiction of the Court, in order to shew that it was not within the operation of the 27th section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73:-Held, on special demurrer, that the return was not bad in form, as an argumentative traverse of the allegation in the writ. Regina v. the Mayor, &c. of London (In re Ashurst), 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 185; 13 Q.B. Rep. 1.

Attornies of the superior courts are entitled, by virtue of the statute 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. s. 27, to be admitted to inferior courts of law. Where, therefore, a writ of mandamus directing the presiding officers of the lord mayor's court to admit A B, described it as an "inferior court," without stating it to be a court of law or equity,-Held, on error, that such writ was bad, and that the defect was not cured by such court being described in the return to the writ as a court of law. The Mayor, &c. of London v. Regina (In re Ashurst), 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 330; 13 Q.B. Rep. 30.

(C) CERTIFICATE.

The 26th section of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. disables an attorney, who is uncertificated, only from suing for fees, rewards, and disbursements for any business, matter, or thing done by him as an attorney or solicitor, in some suit or proceeding in one of the courts mentioned in the act, and not for business done which had no reference to such suits or proceedings. Richards v. Suffield, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 362; 2 Exch. Rep. 616 s. P. Greene v. Reece, Com. B. Rep. 88.

An attorney's bill of costs having been referred to taxation, certain items were objected to before the Master, on the ground that the attorney at the time those items were incurred, was uncertificated; and the Master accordingly disallowed them :Held, that the Master acted rightly in disallowing the items, and that it was no ground for reviewing the taxation. In re Angell, 6 Dowl. & L. P.C. 144.

An attorney in October 1848 took out a certificate for the year ending the 15th of November 1848. The certificate, by mistake of the clerk at the Stamp Office, stated that it was to be in force until the 15th of November 1849, instead of 1848. The attorney paid duty in respect of the year ending in November 1848, but paid none for the year 1849:-Held, that the attorney was not entitled in August 1849 to tax his costs in respect of business done in that year. In re Duke of Brunswick, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 112; 4 Exch. Rep. 492.

The Court will, in urgent cases, dispense with the Reg. Gen. Easter term, 9 Vict. which regulates the taking out a certificate as an attorney where more than a year has elapsed from the admission: provided it appear that there has been no neglect in the party applying to give as long notices as were in his power, and that the notices so given afforded a reasonable time for inquiry into his conduct, &c., since his admission. Ex parte Webb, 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 641.

Where little more than a twelvemonth had elapsed since the admission of an attorney, the Court under special circumstances allowed him to take out a certificate, without giving the notices required by Reg. Gen. Easter term, 9 Vict. Ex parte Weymouth, 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 60.

The Court refused to allow an attorney to take out his certificate, where it appeared that he had been found guilty on an indictment for a conspiracy to procure a fiat, and had been sentenced to, and had undergone, eighteen months' imprisonment; although the motion was unopposed, and the fact appeared only on his own affidavit, and he swore he was not guilty of the offence, and it had occurred eighteen years ago, since which time he had been engaged as law clerk in the offices of several attornies. Ex parte Grey, 5 Dowl. & L.

P.C. 275.

Where an attorney had omitted to take out a certificate for upwards of ten years, and had given the notices required in order to take it out at the end of the term, pursuant to Reg. Gen. Easter term, 9 Vict. the Court refused, although special grounds were stated for the application, to allow him, on the first day of the term, to take out his certificate forthwith. Ex parte Barnes, 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 294. (D) AMENDMENT OF THE ROLL [Change of NAME].

An attorney who, without royal licence, or any formal authority for the change, has assumed another name from that on the roll, for a specified reason, may have the roll altered to the assumed name, if it appear to the Court that such name has been taken bona fide and without fraudulent intention. Ex parte Daggett, 1 L. M. & P. 1.

If an attorney changes his name and wishes to be described by his new name on the roll of attornies, the Court, if satisfied respecting the circumstances of the application, will allow an entry of the change of name to be made on the attornies' roll. Ex parte Moses or James, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 345; 1 L. M. & P. 4.

[See In re James, (B) ADMISSION.]

(E) RIGHTS, POWERS AND PRIVILEGES.
(a) In general.

The Court will in general set aside a release, executed after action by a plaintiff suing in forma pauperis, which would deprive the attorney appointed by the Court of his costs. Wright v. Burroughs, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 277; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 226; 3 Com. B. Rep. 344.

Where a release has been executed by a pauper plaintiff after action brought, and without the knowledge and consent of the attorney, it is matter entirely within the discretion of the Court, whether

under the circumstances of the case they will set it aside.

Where such a release had been executed in pursuance of a bond fide arrangement between plaintiff and defendant, the Court refused to set it aside, although its effect was to deprive plaintiff of his costs. Jones v. Bonner, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 343; 2 Exch. Rep. 230.

The attorney in an action has authority to order the sheriff to withdraw from possession under a fi. fa.

A return to a writ of testatum fi. fa. stated an order from E L L, the attorney of the plaintiff, to withdraw from possession:-Held, that this could only mean the attorney in the action. Levy or Levi v. Abbott, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 62; 4 Exch. Rep. 588.

A town agent of a solicitor in the country cannot, on an authority given to the solicitor for a particular purpose, take proceedings on behalf of the client not specially authorized. Malins v. Greenway, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 26; 10 Beav. 584; affirmed 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 331.

(b) Arrest.

An attorney who had been properly admitted in the superior courts, was arrested while attending in his professional capacity in the county court:Held, that he was entitled to his discharge, upon affidavits shewing the above facts, and in the absence of any counter statement that he was not entitled to practise in the county court. Clutterbuck v. Hulls, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 310; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 80.

(c) Suing and being sued in the Superior Courts. A creditor who sues in a superior court for a debt for which he might have sued in the county court cannot be considered as within the jurisdiction of the county court. And the words of sect. 67. of stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. being, that privilege shall not exempt" from the jurisdiction" of the county court, and not "from the provisions of the act," -Held, that an attorney is not deprived of his privilege of suing in the superior court for a cause of action under 201. Lewis v. Hance, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 172; 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 641; 11 Q.B. Rep. 921.

An attorney may sue in the superior courts for a debt recoverable in the county court, and his right to costs in respect thereof is not affected by the 67th and 129th sections of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. Jones v. Brown, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 163; 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 716; 2 Exch. Rep. 329.

Under the 49th section of the London Small Debts Act (10 & 11 Vict. c. lxxi.), the privilege of attornies to be sued as defendants in their own court is abolished. Jefferies or Jeffreys v. Beart, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 290; 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 646. [See 12 & 13 Vict. c. 101. s. 18, abolishing all privilege of attornies in the county courts.]

(d) Venue.

In order to entitle an attorney, suing in person, to retain the venue in Middlesex, it is not necessary that he should state in the declaration that he sues

as an attorney. Cutts v. Surridge, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 2; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 373.

(e) Plea of Privilege.

Where, to plea of privilege by an attorney alleging that defendant was an attorney of the Court of Queen's Bench and not of the Court of Exchequer, plaintiff replied that defendant was an attorney of the Court of Exchequer, and concluded to the country,-Held, on special demurrer, that the replication was bad for not concluding with a verification by the record. Graham v. Ingleby, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 313; 2 Exch. Rep. 442.

To a plea of privilege by an attorney as an attorney of the Queen's Bench, plaintiff replied, averring that defendant was an attorney of the Court of Exchequer, and after the prayer of judgment by inspection of the record added an entry of continuance by Curia advisari vult, and a day for judgment was given for plaintiff:-Held, that no rejoinder was necessary; and judgment was given for the plaintiff upon its appearing by the roll that defendant was an attorney of the Court of Exchequer. South Staffordshire Rail. Co. v. Smith, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 356; 5 Exch. Rep. 472.

(F) DUTIES AND LIABILITIES.

(a) In general.

Plea in trespass for false imprisonment, stating the bankruptcy of T and B, and that after a summons under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122. disobeyed, a warrant was obtained by the defendant from the commissioner, to arrest and bring the plaintiff before him as a person suspected of having part of the bankrupt's estate in his possession, and capable of giving information, &c., which was duly executed by the messenger, the defendant taking no part in the caption:-Held, that the issuing the warrant was the judicial act of the commissioner, and although turning out to be invalid for defect of tendering expenses, the defendant, the attorney suing out the warrant, was not liable in trespass. Held, also, that the term suspected referred to the parties applying and not to the commissioner. Cooper v. Harding, 7 Q.B. Rep. 928.

An attorney indorsed a writ of fi. fa. in a case of Gv. D: "The defendant resides at W and is an innkeeper." D (the defendant in that suit) resided at W, and conducted the business of A, who was his mother-in-law, and kept an inn there, and the goods on the premises were her property. The sheriff having seized A's goods, at the inn, under the f. fa.,-Held, that there was evidence to go to the jury, that the attorney directed the sheriff to seize the goods, and to make him liable in trespass. Rowles v. Semior, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 231; 8 Q.B. Rep. 677.

Where at the trial before an under-sheriff an attorney opened the case as an advocate for the plaintiff, cross-examined defendat's witnesses, and addressed the jury in reply, and then tendered himself, and was admitted as a witness to disprove the defendant's case, a verdict so obtained for plaintiff was set aside. Stones v. Byron, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 32 ; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 393.

The attorney of the execution plaintiff is not liable to the sheriff for the fees due on the execution of a writ of ca. sa. Maybery v. Mansfield, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 102; 9 Q.B. Rep. 754.

An attorney, although he need not be instructed

by a plaintiff personally, but may receive instructions from any one interested in the action, is liable to defendant for costs if it turns out that plaintiff is a non-existing person. Hoskins v. Phillips, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 339.

An attorney is bound to be at his office by himself or clerk till 9 o'clock in the evening. Grant v. Mackenzie, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 255; 1 Exch. Rep. 12; 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 129.

A declaration alleging that the defendant, an attorney, wrongfully, and without the consent or retainer of the plaintiff, entered an appearance for him in an action brought by D (a third party) against the plaintiff, and took upon himself to conduct the action, and such proceedings were thereupon had that D recovered judgment, and issued execution, and the plaintiff was obliged to pay the amount recovered and the costs of the execution, and "by reason of the premises" was injured in his credit and character,-Held ill, after verdict, as not shewing any damage resulting from any act of defendant. Westaway v. Frost, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 286.

Where a sheriff's bailiff is employed by an attorney to issue a writ of execution against a defendant, the attorney and not the client is liable to the bailiff for his fees. Maile v. Mann, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 336; 2 Exch. Rep. 608; 6 Dowl. & L. P.C. 42.

In an action by a sheriff's officer against the attorney of the plaintiff, for levy and caption fees, evidence of usage that "the sheriff's officer always looks to the attorney and not to the plaintiff in the action," cannot be admitted.

Quare-Whether a sheriff's officer can maintain an action for levy and caption fees against the attorney of the plaintiff, unless specially employed by him. Seal v. Hudson, 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 760.

An attorney, to whom administration had been granted on behalf of the relict of a deceased, being cited at the instance of the relict residing abroad to exhibit an inventory and account, appeared under protest, alleging that the Court had not jurisdiction to require an account between a principal and agent-Held, that the attorney was bound to comply with the citation. Bailey v. Bristowe, 2 Robert. 145.

(b) On their Undertakings.

Where an attorney, for the purpose of settling an action, in which he had not been professionally employed, prepared a promissory note to be signed by defendant, and also himself signed an undertaking to pay the amount due on the note in case of default being made by defendant, the Court, on a summary application, compelled him to perform the undertaking. In re Fairthorne, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 131; 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 548.

It is no answer to a rule, calling upon an attorney to pay money pursuant to his undertaking, that more than two years have elapsed since the undertaking was given. In re Swan, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 402; s. c. nom. Titterton v. Sheppard, 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 775.

Plaintiff having issued execution on a Judge's order against defendant, defendant's attorney R F L, sent to the plaintiff the following letter:-"Sir, -Yourselfv.Gordon. In consideration of your agree

ing to suspend execution upon this judgment, I hereby undertake to make an arrangement with you respecting payment of the debt and costs prior to Mr. Gordon being discharged from prison under his present detainers, or in the event of your not agreeing to the terms offered by me, to inform you in sufficient time of Mr. Gordon's intended discharge, so that you may not be deprived of your power of lodging a detainer against him in this action. Your reply, approving this arrangement, will oblige. I am, &c., RF L." The Court discharged a rule obtained to compel the attorney to pay the debt and

costs.

An attorney, who has acted as such in one of the superior courts, and signed an undertaking in such court, cannot refuse to perform that undertaking, on the ground that he is not an attorney of that court. Thompson v. Gordon, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 344; 15 Mee. & W. 610; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 49.

Where the attorney of a mortgagor who was desirous of selling the property, had induced the attorney of the mortgagee to give up the title deeds, &c., on his undertaking to pay him the costs of preparing the abstract of titles, &c.; the Court granted a rule ordering him to pay the amount pursuant to his undertaking. In re Gee, 2 Dowl. & L. P.C. 997.

The defendant had obtained a Judge's order in the following terms: "It is ordered that the plaintiff do forthwith give security for costs to the satisfaction of the Master; no stay of proceedings in the mean time; the attorney for the plaintiff hereby undertaking to find such security":-Held, that the attorney was not bound to find security for costs, unless further proceedings were taken by the plaintiff. Hill v. Fletcher, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 320.

A petition was presented by a husband and wife, which related to her separate property; an objection was taken to its being heard on the ground that there was no security for costs: the solicitor of the petitioners instructed counsel to undertake to ainend the petition, if required by the Court, by making it the petition of the wife by her next friend. The petition was accordingly heard, and an order made, but the petitioners were ordered to pay the costs. The petitioners and the solicitor afterwards declined to amend the petition, though ordered by the Court so to do; and upon an application that they might do so in four days, or that the solicitor might perform his undertaking,-Held, that the undertaking of the solicitor could only be considered as the undertaking of the client, and that no order could be made against the solicitor personally, but he was refused his costs. In re Williams, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 422; 12 Beav. 510.

On the application of four of the directors of a railway company, an order for the taxation of the bill of parliamentary agents was made, under which the directors submitted to pay what should be found due to them. The bills were taxed at 2247. 1s. 8d., but before the certificate of the taxing Master was obtained, a petition was presented and an order was made for winding up the company. Upon an application for an injunction to restrain the parliamentary agents from issuing any process against the directors,-Held, that their submitting to pay

was a personal undertaking; and the injunction was refused, but without costs. In re Sudlow, ex parte Dover and Deal Rail. Co., 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 524; 12 Beav. 527.

(c) Attachment.

A rule of court calling on C, an attorney, to deliver a bill of costs to Messrs. B & D was served only by a clerk of B & D, who made a demand of the bill; but it did not appear that the clerk had any authority to make the demand:-Held, that the demand was not sufficient as a ground for an attachment. Ex parte Briggs in re C- —or in re Cattlin, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 184; 7 Com. B. Rep. 136.

An attorney of the Welsh Court of Great Sessions, whose name had been placed on the shilling roll in the superior courts under the 1 Will. 4. c. 70. s. 16, but who had not been admitted under section 17, is guilty of a contempt in acting as attorney in the conduct of a suit commenced against a person residing out of the limits of Wales, and may be proceeded against under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. s. 36, although the proceedings were conducted in his agent's name. In re Humphreys, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 65.

(d) Summary Jurisdiction.

(1) By Courts of Law.

A, who was the London agent of S & J, attornies in the country, by their directions issued a fi. fa. and warrant to levy on the goods of a debtor in Wilts, at the suit of one of their clients, referring the officer to S & J for instructions. The officer not being able to meet with S & J paid the amount of the levy to the under-sheriff, who without any instructions from S & J remitted the money to A in London, whose name was indorsed on the warrant. A refused to pay the money over to the client, claiming to apply it in reduction of the general balance due from S & J for agency business:Held, that on these facts there was no privity of contract to support an action by the client against A for money had and received to his use. But it appearing that the money had been paid in the first instance to the town agent under a mistake, and retained by him against the express directions of S & J, the Court made absolute a rule obtained by the client to compel the town agent to refund the money. Robbins v. Fennell, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 77; 11 Q.B. Rep. 248.

The Court will exercise its summary authority over an attorney only with reference to his conduct in a cause. In re Anonymous, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 219.

The Court will not in the exercise of its summary jurisdiction, prevent an attorney, defendant in an action at the suit of his client, suing as administratrix, from pleading a plea not directly to the merits, such as the plea of the Statute of Limitations; even though the accrual of the statute may have been owing to his neglect in not advising plaintiff to take out the letters of administration earlier. In re Triston, 1 L. M. & P. 74.

[And see (b) On their Undertakings; and (e) Striking off the Roll for Misconduct.]

(2) By Courts of Equity.

An application (not in a cause) to compel a solicitor to deliver up papers is not within the 12th Order of August 1841, but must follow the old practice. In re Taylor, 10 Beav. 221.

Motion by an executor and trustee to restrain a solicitor from acting for plaintiffs in a suit, charging the executor with breaches of trust, was refused, though solicitor had been employed many years in the testator's affairs by the executor who had made many confidential communications to him relating thereto, and had never discharged him from being his solicitor. Parratt v. Parratt, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 346; 2 De Gex & S. 258.

Upon the compromise of a suit, an agreement was entered into between the respective solicitors of the plaintiff and defendants, from which certain benefits were to be derived by the defendants, and the defendants' solicitor undertook to pay to the plaintiff's solicitor the amount of his bill of costs, and to indemnify the plaintiff against the costs of other defendants. It was not stated by either party whether the other parts of the agreement had or had not been performed. Upon motion in the cause and in the matter of the defendants' solicitor, he was ordered to pay the bill of costs of the plaintiff's solicitor within two days. But upon appeal to the Lord Chancellor, the order was discharged. Gilbert v. Cooper, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 265; 15 Sim. 343.

B, a solicitor in the country, being employed by A and C to carry in and prosecute their claims as creditors under a decree of the Court made in the year 1841, employed K as his London agent for that purpose. Neither B nor K was the solicitor of A or C except in that transaction. In 1846 B died; and K, in 1847, without any authority from A or C, and without having previously obtained any order of the Court for that purpose, carried in a state of facts and charge before the Master, complaining of an arrangement and compromise that had been entered into between the plaintiffs and defendants. K afterwards abandoned that state of facts and charge, and took into the Master's office another state of facts and charge precisely the same as the former, except that it was on behalf of the executor of B. The Master disallowed the last state of facts and charge on production of an affidavit of service of the warrant taken out by the plaintiff on K. On the petition of the plaintiffs and one of the defendants in the cause, K was ordered to pay the costs incurred by the petitioners in and about the proceedings in the Master's office, having relation to the two states of facts and charge, and the costs of the petition. Malins v. Greenway, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 26; 10 Beav. 584; affirmed 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 331.

A solicitor acted for clients under a special agreement as to costs which was doubtful:-Held, that the Court had no jurisdiction to determine the construction and effect of the agreement on petition. In re Beale, 11 Beav. 600.

(e) Striking off the Roll for Misconduct.

The Court made absolute a rule to strike off the roll an attorney convicted upon an indictment charging a conspiracy to defraud, though the rule DIGEST, 1845-1850.

nisi was drawn up upon reading the record of the conviction only, and the judgment had been reversed on the ground of the insufficiency of the indictment, prior to the rule being made absolute; the acts of misconduct imputed to him in the indictment, though disclosing no legal offence, rendering him in the discretion of the Court an unfit person to practise as an attorney. In re King, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 2; 8 Q.B. Rep. 129.

A rule to strike an attorney off the roll for misconduct having been applied for on production of a similar rule granted by the Common Pleas against the same party, the Court refused it, there being no evidence of the identity of the parties.

A rule of this kind ought not to be moved for on the last day of term, but in sufficient time to enable the party to shew cause against it within the term. Anonymous, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 20; 1 Exch. Rep. 453.

A rule to strike an attorney off the roll on the ground that he has been convicted of a misdemeanour in the Court of Queen's Bench, and struck off the roll of that court, is a rule nisi only in the first instance, which, in the Court of Exchequer, makes itself absolute unless cause is shewn. In re Wright, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 128; 1 Exch. Rep. 658; 5 Dowl. & L. P.C. 394.

On a bill filed by parties interested under a will, against the sole acting trustee and executor and against his solicitor, under whose advice the testator's property had been improperly sold and applied, principally to the solicitor's use, praying that the stock might be replaced, the Court at the hearing, after directing inquiries, ordered that the solicitor should shew cause why, having regard to his answer and the evidence in the causes, his name should not be struck off the roll of solicitors. Goodwin v. Gosnell, 2 Coll. C.C. 457.

(f) Negligence.

Where declaration stated that plaintiff retained defendants as attornies in and about ascertaining the title of G R to certain lands and tenements, and to take due and proper care that "the same" should be a sufficient security for the repayment of a sum of 6001.,-Held, that the words "the same" had reference to the title of G R, and were not to be construed as charging defendants upon a contract to inquire into the value of the lands, and was, therefore, supported by evidence of a retainer to investigate the title as a security for the repayment of the 6001. Hayne v. Rhodes, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 137; 8 Q.B. Rep. 342.

An attorney undertook to conduct a cause, charging his client only money out of pocket. The client advanced money to the attorney during the progress of the cause, which was properly expended in carrying it on. By subsequent negligence in the attorney the cause failed,-Held, first, that the attorney was not entitled to recover money out of pocket paid by him subsequently to the negligence of which he had been guilty; and, secondly, that the client was not entitled to set off the money advanced and expended previous to such negligence. Lewis v. Samuel, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 218; 8 Q.B. Rep. 685.

Where in an action against an attorney for

H