sum, L agreed to pay besides the purchase-money and 5007. the then existing liabilities; but if they did not amount to 500l., then N was to pay the liabilities. And it was agreed that N should receive the surplus profits till they amounted to 500l., and that all additional surplus profits should belong to L:-Held, in an action for paper and other necessaries, supplied subsequently to the date of this agreement, to L's order, for the purpose of conducting the newspaper, and which were used for it, that N was a partner, and was liable to satisfy the demand. Barry v. Nesham, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 21; 3 Com. B. Rep. 641.

A participator in the profits of a particular transaction is a partner quoad third parties, and must be taken to have authorized everything done by his partners in carrying out that particular transaction.

A document, by which F and F agreed to give the defendant a share of the profits in a particular adventure, though insufficient in itself to constitute a partnership for want of mutuality, was held good evidence, along with evidence of interference by the defendant, to prove that he was a partner. Heyhoe v. Burge, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Č.P. 243.

(b) Dissolution.

(1) What amounts to.

By articles of partnership it was agreed that if the defendant should by illness be obliged to quit India for more than a year, the books should be made up to the end of the partnership year, and a valuation made of the stock. The defendant became an incurable lunatic on his way to India, and was sent back on his arrival there in 1841 :-Held, that the articles contemplated a dissolution, and that the event having happened, there should be a dissolution from the end of the partnership year 1842, and not from the decree. Bagshaw v. Parker, 10 Beav. 532.

A partner having excluded his co-partner, an injunction was granted to restrain him from obstructing or interfering with his co-partner in the exercise and enjoyment of his rights under the partnership articles.

Upon a disagreement, one partner by letter proposed to the other either to retire or to refer to arbitration. The other partner in answer said he concurred in the retirement, but subject to a condition as to taking the accounts:-Held, that the partnership was not dissolved. Hall v. Hall, 12 Beav. 414.

The defendant had had dealings with A and B, as partners, and afterwards entered into a contract with one in the presence of the other, and received letters relating thereto signed in the name of the firm in an action by B, A was called as a witness to prove that he had ceased to be a partner prior to the contract, and that he made it as agent for B:-Held, that the jury were warranted in finding that the contract was with B alone, although there was no direct evidence of the dissolution of the partnership. Cox v. Hubbard, 4 Com. B. Rep. 317.

(2) Notice to dissolve.

G was a shareholder and director of a joint-stock bank, and attended the weekly meetings of the

board, but his being a director gave him no management or interference in the banking accounts, which, together with the business of the bank, were managed by the manager; G was also a member of a co-partnership, which had opened an account with the bank, and of which the defendant was also at that time a member. The defendant having afterwards retired from the co-partnership, and having given no notice to the bank of his retirement, and the co-partnership having become indebted to the bank,-Held, that the defendant was liable to the bank for the debts of the co-partnership, and that G's knowledge of the defendant's retirement was not an actual or constructive notice of that fact to the bank. Powles v. Page, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 217; 3 Com. B. Rep. 16.

The plaintiff and the defendant entered into partnership, and an agreement was made that six months' notice should be given by either of the parties wishing to dissolve the partnership. The defendant became insane, and the plaintiff served him with notice for dissolving the partnership:Held, that this notice was sufficient. Robertson v. Lockie, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 379; 15 Sim. 285.

(3) Cause of Dissolution.

Decree for a dissolution of partnership on the ground of insanity, as from the date of the decree. Sander v. Sander, 2 Coll. C.C. 276.

(4) Agreement to dissolve.

By agreement, a partnership between two solici tors was to be dissolved, the accounts taken, and the continuing partner to pay an annuity quarterly, for three years, to the retiring partner. The latter died before the expiration of the third year, without having received any part of the annuity:-Held, on bill, filed within six years from his death, but after six years from the quarter-day preceding it, that the annuity was part of the agreement; and that his representative was entitled to specific performance of the whole of the agreement, irrespective of the question whether he was or not barred by the Statute of Limitations from recovering the annuity in a court of equity. Murray v. Parker, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 530.

By the deed of dissolution of a firm of three partners one of whom retired, the two continuing partners covenanted for themselves, their heirs, executors, &c., that they or one of them would pay the outgoing partner certain specified sums:Held, that this only constituted a joint liability at law, and could not be otherwise construed in equity, and a demurrer to a creditor's bill filed by the outgoing partner against the executrix of one of the covenanters who died before the other, was allowed. Wilmer v. Currey, 2 De Gex & S. 347.

(c) Construction and Validity of Contracts creating it.

A declaration stated, that by a certain indenture the defendant covenanted to pay the plaintiff 4001 in equal moieties on the 11th of November and the 11th of May, and that it was agreed that the drugs, stock-in-trade, utensils, and shop fixtures in certain premises should be valued by a person to be named by the plaintiff and the defendant, and one moiety of the amount paid immediately upon such valua

tion, and the residue at the expiration of a year. Averment, that the said drugs, &c. were valued by one L, named by the plaintiff and the defendant, at 1901. Breach, that the defendant refused to pay the second moiety of the 4007. on the 11th of May, and also the residue of the 1907. at the expiration of the year. Pleas, set-off for money had and received, money paid, and on an account stated, and that the said drugs, &c. were not valued by a person named by the plaintiff and the defendant; on which issues were joined. It appeared in evidence that L was agreed upon by the plaintiff and the defendant to value the drugs, stock in trade, utensils, and shop fixtures, and that, after the valuation was complete, except as to the drugs, 70l. was agreed on by the parties as the value of the drugs, and 50l. as the value of a horse and gig belonging to the plaintiff, which sum, together with the rest of the valuation, amounted to 1907.:-Held, that the jury were rightly directed that if the horse and gig were part of the stock-in-trade, or were treated as such by the parties, the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict on the last plea.

The indenture was put in evidence, by which it appeared that the plaintiff agreed to sell the defendant his business for 9001., of which 5001. was to be paid immediately, and the residue by equal moieties on the 11th of November and the 11th of May; and, in consideration thereof, the plaintiff granted to the defendant all his interest, &c. in the business, subject, as to one twelvemonth from the date thereof, to the stipulation thereinafter contained. The plaintiff then covenanted that he would not carry on his business within three miles of the present place of business: and then followed a stipulation that the plaintiff should introduce the defendant to the business, and during one year continue to reside in the place where it was carried on, and attend to the practice as he had theretofore done; and, in consideration of the premises, the defendant agreed to allow the plaintiff, during such period of one year, one moiety of the clear profits of the said concern, to be paid at the expiration thereof:-Held, that the effect of the deed was to assign all the interest in the business from the plaintiff to the defendant from its date, and that the above stipulation did not create a partnership during the year, between the parties, but was merely a mode of paying the plaintiff for his services, and that under the plea of set-off the defendant was entitled to give evidence of money received to his use, by the plaintiff, in the course of the business. Rawlinson v. Clarke, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 171; 15 Mee. & W. 292.

Where by the partnership deed the executors or administrators of a party dying were entitled to succeed to his share on giving notice within three months from his decease,-Held, that notice given by the widow within the time, but who did not take out letters of administration till some months after, was an effectual notice within the meaning of the deed. Holland v. King, 6 Com. B. Rep. 727.

W S, an attorney, held the office of clerk of the peace, clerk to magistrates, clerk to Commissioners of Land and Assessed Taxes, clerk to Commissioners of Sewers, clerk to Deputy-Lieutenants, steward of manors, coroner, secretary to Conservative Association, and clerk to a polling district. By articles of

partnership it was recited that WS held " many offices, clerkships and stewardships of manors," and it was agreed that the defendant should enter into partnership with W S, and that the emoluments of the offices, &c. should be distributed as partnership profits; and it was provided, that if W S died during the partnership, and no son of his should have been admitted, the defendant should be interested in the moiety of the partnership, and the executors of W S should be entitled to the profits of the other moiety as part of the personal estate:Held, first, that the articles of partnership were not void at common law, as infringing the statutes 5 & 6 Edw. 6. c. 16. and the 49 Geo. 3. c. 126, which provide against the sale of offices.

Secondly, that the clause providing that the executors should be entitled to the moiety of the profits was not contrary to the Attornies Act, 22 Geo. 2. c. 46. s. 11, confirming Candler v. Candler, 6 Madd. 141. Sterry v. Clifton, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 237.

(d) Accounts.

A club consisting of numerous members, and having property, was dissolved; and eleven members were appointed to wind up the affairs of the club. Two of the most active of the eleven members, accordingly, sold the furniture and effects of the club, and out of the proceeds paid some of the debts of the club. A bill being filed by a member, on behalf of himself and all other members of the club, except the defendants, against the two directors, seeking an account of the receipts and payments by them, and payment of the balance to the plaintiff, or as the Court should direct, but not asking that the affairs of the club might be wound up,-it was held, that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for an account; and that the Court would, in case a balance should be found due from the defendants after taking the accounts before the Master, devise a mode of distributing the same amongst the parties entitled. Richardson v. Hastings, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 322; 11 Beav. 17.

The promoters of two competing railways agreed to consolidate, and appointed the plaintiff and defendant solicitors of the proposed company, who accepted the office without making any definite arrangement as to the division of the business, or the profits, and a much larger proportion of the work was done by the defendant than by the plaintiff. In a conversation between them, before the principal part of the work was done, the plaintiff stated as the result of his inquiries in like cases, that the allowance for office expenses and personal trouble in such limited partnerships between solicitors was made by each party retaining, besides his expenses and disbursements, from 10 to 25 per cent. on the amount of the net charges for the business done, and which principle he considered satisfactory: the defendant replied there could be no misunderstanding about it between honourable men. Upon a bill by plaintiff, claiming an account and division of profits of the business done by the company upon the footing of an equal co-partnership, and offering to allow 25 per cent. upon the work done separately, to the partner who did it, the Court under the circumstances decreed accordingly. Webster v. Bray, 7 Hare, 159.

Where the accounts of a partnership between two had been carelessly kept, and after the death of one, the other furnished to the executors of the deceased partner an account current of the partnership dealings, which afforded them the only evidence, to charge the surviving partner,-Held, that they were entitled to use it for that purpose in a suit instituted by the surviving partner to have the accounts taken, without being bound by the entries on the credit side of the account current. Morehouse v. Newton, 3 De Gex & S. 307.

In 1828 A, B, C and three other persons became co-partners, as colliers, in equal sixth shares, and took a lease of certain mines for twenty-one years. In 1836 A died, and his widow and administratrix thenceforth to the end of the term continued to carry on the business of the partnership. In 1845 B & C, without the privity of the rest of the firm, obtained for themselves exclusively a reversionary lease of the same mines. On the expiration of the original lease in 1849, B & C, being in exclusive possession, gave notice of dissolution, and claimed a right to purchase the partnership stock. The administratrix of A then filed her bill for a dissolution, and the usual accounts, and for a declaration that the renewed lease formed part of the partnership assets, and for a receiver. On a motion for a receiver,-Held, affirming the decision of the Court below, that the plaintiff, as the representative of her husband, had a prima facie interest in the renewed lease; and a receiver was ordered of her one-sixth, including such renewed lease.

In 1839 the administratrix and her children, by deed, joined in assigning all the intestate's estate to arbitrators named for the purposes of partition, and in the same year the arbitrators allotted all the intestate's "colliery shares" to the children absolutely-Held, that the plaintiff, as administratrix of her husband, was under liabilities and had duties to perform respecting the partnership, from which she could not discharge herself by the assignment; and that therefore she had, notwithstanding, sufficient interest to sustain the suit; and that the children were not necessary parties. Clegg v. Fishwick, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 49; 1 Mac. & G. 294; 1 Hall & Tw. 390.

(B) RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES.

The plaintiff and the defendant carried on business as partners on the plaintiff's premises: the duration and terms of the partnership were not definitely settled. On the 26th of December, the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice of dissolution. On the 2nd of January, the defendant broke and entered the shop, &c. of the plaintiff, where the partnership concerns were carried on and the books kept, for which entry the plaintiff declared in trespass, and the defendant pleaded not possessed: -Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover.

A partnership at will exists between A & B, the business being carried on on the premises of A. Such partnership is put an end to by a notice of dissolution, and A can maintain trespass for a subsequent entry by B on that part of his premises where the partnership business had been transacted. Benham v. Gray, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 50; 5 Com. B. Rep. 138.

A, in 1847, agreed with B to supply him with bricks whenever he wanted them, for 28s. per 1,000, ready money. In 1828, B and C became partners; and after that, B from time to time ordered bricks of A, which were used for a partnership purpose:Held, that C, as the partner of B, was liable to A for the price of these bricks, each order being a new contract; but if the contract of A and B had been for the supply of a certain number of bricks, at so much per 1,000, a subsequent partner would not have been liable.

If there be a partnership to carry on a work, that would give each partner authority to make such contracts as would be proper for the completion of the work; and whether a contract be so or not, is a question for the jury.

B and C entered into partnership by an unstamped agreement, which was in the hands of J S. A sued B and C as partners, for goods sold, and applied to J S to take or send the agreement to the Stamp Office that A might get it stamped; JS refused to do so, and a Judge at chambers would not order him to do so, as he held the agreement for B and C, and did not in any way hold it for A. Dyke v. Brewer, 2 Car. & K. 828.

One of two partners procured the discount of a promissory note of the firm, on an agreement for a mortgage of shares belonging to the firm in certain ships and their freight, and of the policies of assurance effected by the firm on the shares. A mortgage deed was prepared, purporting to be made by both partners, but was only executed by one. At the time of the execution of the deed, one of the ships was lost; but this fact was not then known to the parties:-Held, that the security was binding on the firm notwithstanding the execution of the deed by one partner only, and passed the insurance money although the deed was not registered according to the shipping acts.

Quare-Whether insurance brokers have a lien on a policy effected by them for the general balance due from their principal. Ex parte Bosanquet, re Boyd, 1 De Gex, 432.

A trader, by his will, appointed his partner and other parties executors, and authorized his partner to purchase his share of the trade, premises and stock; and if he declined to do so, the trade was to be carried on for the benefit of the testator's wife and family. A valuation was made, and the surviving partner took possession of the whole partnership property under circumstances which induced the Court to set aside the sale as invalid. The surviving partner, and subsequently his son and legatee, carried on the business for several years, and the son ultimately became bankrupt. The partnership property was then sold, and the proceeds paid into court:-Held, that the representatives of the deceased partner were entitled to one moiety of the fund in court, and also to a lien on the other moiety for sums which were found by the Master to be due to them from the estate of William; and that their claim ought to be satisfied in preference to the debts of the creditors of the bankrupt, the case not being affected by the question, whether any of the partnership stock was or was not in the order or disposition of the bankrupt. Stocken v. Dawson, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chane. 282.

(C) POWERS AND DISABILITIES.

One partner cannot authorize an attorney to enter an appearance and submit to judgment for a copartner.

The co-partner having been taken in execution upon the judgment, and never having been served with a summons, or been cognizant of the action, the Court set aside the appearance and other proceedings, with costs. Hambridge v. De la Crouée, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 85; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 466; 3 Com. B. Rep. 742.

After evidence has been given of a partnership between S & A, a printed circular issued by S in the name of the firm and from the place of business, is evidence against A.

Where Thomas Seymour and Sarah Ayres carried on business in the name of "Seymour & Ayres," and Seymour signed a promissory note, "Thomas Seymour, Sarah Ayres:"-Held, that this was a sufficient signature in the name of the firm, and was binding upon Ayres.

Semble, per Maule, J., if A and B carry on business in the name of B & Co., a signature by A with the true names of the partners A and B, will be binding on B. Norton v. Seymour, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 100; 3 Com. B. Rep. 792.

(D) ACTIONS AND SUITS.

[Deeks v. Stanhope, 5 Law J. Dig. 506; 14 Sim. 57.] To an action for money had and received, the defendants pleaded, as a set-off, that the plaintiff's were partners, and that before the money had been received by the defendants, G, one of the plaintiffs, applied to the defendants, who were auctioneers, to sell some property, and that the defendants, at the time of the application, and at the time of the selling, and at the time when the set-off accrued, believed G to be the sole owner of the property, and had no notice that the plaintiffs had any interest in it; that the money in question was received upon the sale of the property; and that after G had so employed the defendants, and before the defendants had notice that G was not the sole owner, G became indebted to the defendants for money lent, &c. Replication, that at the time of the selling of the property, the defendants knew that G was not the sole owner of it:-Held, on demurrer to the replication, that the plea was bad; that it did not shew that G appeared as sole owner, with the consent or by the default of the other plaintiffs; and that it amounted merely to a set-off of a debt due from one partner to a demand from several partners. Gordon v. Ellis, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 178; 3 Dowl. & L. P.C. 803; 2 Com. B. Rep. 821.

The answer in Chancery of one who has been a partner in a firm, but who had retired from the firm, and ceased to have any interest in it before the commencement of that suit, is not admissible in evidence against the continuing partners of the firm, although it relates to transactions which occurred with the firm at the time when the retired partner was a member of it. Parker v. Morrell, 2 Car. & K. 599.

A joint fiat in bankruptcy issued against two partners, pending a suit by one of them against the other and a third person who had previously retired DIGEST, 1845-1850.

from the business, to set aside the partnership agreement on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation on the part of both defendants, and for repayment of the monies which the plaintiff had brought into the concern under that agreement. The assignees obtained leave from the Court of Review to prosecute the suit against the retired partner, and proceeded by supplemental bill, in which the creditors' assignees were plaintiffs and the official assignee and the retired partner defendants:-Held, that the creditors' assignees, who represented not only the original plaintiff on whose behalf relief was sought, but also the bankrupt partner, who was an original defendant against whom relief was sought, could not sustain the suit against the retired partner.

Semble-that the suit might have been prosecuted by assignees appointed to represent the separate estate of the plaintiff in the original suit.

Quare-whether, if it had appeared in evidence in the suit that the defendant, the retired partner, was alone or otherwise answerable for the fraud, the Court could have made a conditional decree imposing terms upon the plaintiffs as representing the bankrupt who was originally charged as defendant. Robertson v. Southgate, 6 Hare, 536.

A trader directed his trustees with all convenient speed to convert into money his residuary estate, but he provided that three or (in case of any substantial reason) seven years might be allowed for withdrawing his capital from the business in which he was a partner. Parties beneficially interested in the will filed a bill against the surviving partners and the legal personal representatives, insisting that the administratrix had improperly allowed the capital to remain in the business beyond the prescribed period, and asking for a share of the profits made while it so remained. The defendants pleaded that before the testator's death a valuation was made, when his share appeared to be 63,000l.; and that a year after his death it was agreed that the new firm should take to the stock on payment to the administratrix of 63,000l., for which sum they should purchase the testator's share. They gave a bond for 40,000l. and placed the residue at her disposal, which was drawn out from time to time at her pleasure. The surviving partners insisted by their plea that they had become purchasers of the share for a valuable consideration and without notice of the trusts of the will:-Held, that this was a valid defence to the claim to participate in the profits. Chambers v. Howell, 11 Beav. 6.

Articles of partnership between two persons for twenty-one years made various provisions for carrying on the firm in case of the death of either of the partners, but none for the case of the representatives of a deceased partner refusing to be concerned in the business with the surviving partner. In a suit by the executors of a deceased partner against the survivor for a dissolution, it was held that specific performance could not be decreed against the executors, and the partnership was dissolved, subject to any legal right which the surviving partner had for breach of covenants in the articles. Downs v. Collins, 6 Hare, 418.

Effect in equity of an execution against the share of one of two partners in the partnership stock. Habershon v. Blurton, 1 De Gex & S. 121.

3 P

(A) WHEN VALID OR VOID.

[Cooke v. Pearce, 5 Law J. Dig. 507; 8 Q.B. Rep. 1044.]

A patent was taken out for " a new and improved mode of manufacturing silk, cotton, linen and woollen fabrics." The specification, and a disclaimer, subsequently filed under the statute 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 83, set forth that the patentees claimed the mode herein before described of producing or preparing stripes of silk, cotton, woollen, or linen, or of a mixture of two or more of these materials, in such a manner that the weft or lateral fibres of both cut edges of each stripe are all brought up on one side, and into close contact with each other, and the reweaving of such stripes with the whole fur or pile uppermost, into the surfaces of carpets," &c. It appeared that one of these processes was old. The Judge directed the jury that if one was new, the patent could be supported for the combination of them, and would only be invalid if there had been a public use of both before the date of the patent :Held, that this direction was erroneous, and that the patent was void. Templeton v. Macfarlane, 1 H.L. Cas. 595.

The user of an invention in England, prior to the date of letters patent granted for Scotland, will invalidate the Scotch patent. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, under the 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 83. s. 2, refused to confirm a Scotch patent, the invention being used in England before the date of the Scotch patent. In re Robinson's Patent, 5 Moore, P.C. 65.

Case for the infringement of a patent. Fifth plea, that one D was the inventor of the subject-matter of the patent, and used the same in France; that D was an alien, domiciled abroad, and employed one B, as agent, to procure the said letters patent in his own name, in trust for D, and communicated the invention to B; that B, thereupon, brought into this country the knowledge of the invention, and was no otherwise the first inventor; and that B, afterwards, as agent for D, procured the letters patent upon trust for D, being such alien, and not for his own use-Held, on special demurrer, that the plea was bad in substance: that a person who has imported an invention into this country, where it was not known before, is the first inventor, within the statute of Jac. secondly, that it does not affect the patent that the party importing it is merely an agent for the inventor; thirdly, nor that it was taken out in trust for aliens residing abroad.

The sixth plea, after stating as in the fifth plea, stated that D, by agreement, assigned to the government of France the invention in question, and that thereby, according to the laws of France, the invention became the property of the King of the French, who became entitled, by the laws of France, to publish the invention as well in France as in Great Britain. The seventh plea, after stating as in the sixth plea, stated, that the King of the French published the invention to the people of France, for the benefit of all nations:-Held, that both these pleas were bad in substance, as containing no answer to the allegation in the declaration that B was the first and true inventor within this realm.

The title of the invention was, "a new or improved method of obtaining the spontaneous reproduction of all the images received in the focus of the camera obscura:"-Held, that it was not ambiguous or repugnant. Beard v. Egerton, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 270; 3 Com. B. Rep. 97.

A person availing himself of information from abroad is an inventor within the 21 Jac. 1. c. 3. s. 6. Nickels v. Ross, 8 Com. B. Rep. 679.

Where by a patent previously granted to B, the same object for which a patent was afterwards granted to A was effected by a similar method, with a trifling addition, but the object might be effected without such addition :-Held, that the two patents were substantially the same, and that A's patent was void. Dobbs v. Penn, 3 Exch. Rep. 427.

Before the date of the patent, part of the garancine (colouring matter) in madder had been obtained by boiling, but the spent (boiled) madder still contained garancine; the whole of the garancine had also been obtained by a known process. The patent was for the application of the latter process to spent madder :-Held, that it was not a new manufacture. Steiner v. Heald, 2 Car. & K. 1022.

(B) SPECIFICATION, CONSTRUCTION AND VALIDITY

OF.

It is a question for the jury, whether or not the specification in a patent describes with sufficient accuracy the material of which the proposed article is to be made; that question being raised by the issue. Bickford v. Skewes, 10 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 302; 1 G. & D. 736.

In an action of covenant upon a deed of licence to use a patent for making buttons, the issue being whether certain buttons made by the defendant were made under the licence, the specification stated the invention to be the application of such fabrics only wherein the ground is produced by a warp of "soft or organzine silk such as is used in weaving satin," and claimed the application of such fabrics to the covering of buttons as have the ground woven with "soft or organzine silk" for the warp :-Held, that the proper meaning of the word "or" being disjunctive, it ought to be so construed, unless there were anything in the context or the facts proved to give it a different meaning; and that the Judge ought not to have told the jury absolutely, that unless the buttons were made of organzine silk they were not within the patent, but that the words "soft" and "organzine" were capable of being construed to mean the same thing, if the jury were satisfied that there was only one description of silk, viz., organzine, used for weaving satin, at the date of the