report being unfavourable to his claim, he will be compelled to file the report on the application of an interested party for whose protection and assistance the report is necessary to be filed. In re London

Dock Company, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 111; 11 Beav. 78.

One notice of motion to confirm the Master's report of best purchaser, and to pay the purchasemoney into court, is irregular. Duffield v. Elwes, 13 Beav. 85.

(AA) EXCEPTIONS.

(a) In general.

An order for leave to file exceptions in the form of nunc pro tunc will not be made even by consent; but a special order may be made for filing them, notwithstanding the time limited has expired. Biddulph v. Lord Camoys, 9 Beav. 155.

Exceptions for insufficiency overruled where they varied in a material particular from the form of the interrogatory, as where the one was in the present and the other in the past tense. Duke of Brunswick v. Duke of Cambridge, 12 Beav. 279.

(b) Answers.

The Court, in common injunction causes, on the ex parte application of the plaintiff, will, in proper cases, direct exceptions taken to the answer for insufficiency, to be referred instanter, notwithstanding the 25th article of the 16th Order of May 1845; but the application ought to be supported by an affidavit, stating that the plaintiff would be prejudiced, unless the exceptions were referred instanter, and that the application was not made with a view to delay. Muggeridge v. Slowman, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 279: S.P. Jones v. Roberts, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 434.

Application to take exceptions to answer off the file, on the ground of their having been filed on the 10th of December, the answer having been put in on the 15th of August preceding, refused, although the exceptions were held to be filed one day too late, and the defendant was to elect, within the first four days of the next term, whether he would submit to the exceptions. Whitmore v. Sloane, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 104; 9 Beav. 1.

Exceptions to answer will not be ordered to be taken off the file, because the order of reference is not served in due time. But if the plaintiff serves the order after the time, and obtains a warrant, the defendant is entitled to apply to the Court for his costs. Atlee v. Gibson, 1 De Gex & S. 162.

On the 20th of May the defendant filed a plea as to part of the bill, and an answer as to the remainder. On the 29th of June the plea was, after argument, overruled. On the 18th of July the plaintiff took exceptions to the answer for insufficiency, and on the 29th, obtained an order of course, at the RoHs, for referring them to the Master. A motion by the defendant to take the exceptions off the file, on the ground that they were not filed within six weeks after the answer was filed, and to discharge the order of the Master of the Rolls, was refused, with costs.

A Vice Chancellor has no power to discharge an order of course made at the Rolls.

Where a plea and answer are filed to a bill, and the plea is argued and overruled, the time limited

by the 16th Order of May 1845, article 22, for taking exceptions for insufficiency, runs from the overruling of the plea, and not from the time of filing the plea and answer.

Semble-Where, under an order of course, made at the Rolls, exceptions for insufficiency are referred to the Master, a Vice Chancellor has the power of ordering the exceptions to be taken off the file. Esdaile v. Molineux, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 68; 2 Coll. C.C. 641.

Upon exceptions for insufficiency to the answer of a party who had been attorney in the transactions impeached, and who refused discovery on the ground of privilege, the Court cannot regard the subsequent consent of the client to the disclosure of the matters inquired after, for the question of sufficiency must be determined as of a time anterior to the exceptions. Chant v. Brown, 7 Hare, 79.

Defendants filed a demurrer and answer, and, the demurrer being overruled, obtained time to answer. They filed a further answer: on special application leave was given to the plaintiff to file exceptions thereto, although he had not filed any to the original answer. Attorney General v. London, 12 Beav. 217.

An exception to an answer held to have been properly allowed, although it set out inaccurately the interrogatory, the answer to which was the subject of exception, there being besides the inaccurate transcript of the interrogatory, a reference to it by its number. Semble-that the reference by number alone would be insufficient. Esdaile v. Molyneux, 1 De Gex & S. 218.

(c) Reports and Certificates.

[Stocken v. Dawson, 2 Ph. 141.]

The Master, in his report, stated that he had admitted certain evidence, and that he thereupon found certain facts. A party objecting to the admission of the evidence, and to the conclusion thereupon, cannot open that objection as appearing on the face of the report without having taken exceptions. East v. East, 5 Hare, 347.

The defendants demurred to a supplemental bill containing statements and charges, which, if answered, would subject him to penalties. The demurrer was allowed; and under leave given, the plaintiff amended the bill by striking out the interrogatories, and leaving the statements and charges upon which they were made. The defendant took exceptions to the amended bill for impertinence, but these were overruled by the Master:-Held, upon exceptions to the Master's report, that the statements and charges were not impertinent, and that the plaintiff, though not entitled to discovery from the defendant, was not precluded from proving the charges.

Held, also, in answering the interrogatory about books and papers, that the defendant could except those which might subject him to penalties: and the exceptions were overruled. Mitchell v. Koecker, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 294; 11 Beav. 380; 12 Beav. 44.

Where the Master has expunged matter in a state of facts for impertinence, he should nevertheless issue his certificate thereupon, in order that the opinion of the Court may be taken if requisite.

To such certificate exceptions may be taken.

Semble-that an exception to the report for that the Master has found the said state of facts impertinent from the word &c. to the word &c., whereas the Master ought not to have so found, but ought to have found that the same was not impertinent, is sustained if any part of the passage is pertinent.

Where there is a doubt about a passage being impertinent, it should be retained and considered on the question of costs.

Where one of the principal facts relied on by the defendants, contending on a reference before the Master that a suit was not for the benefit of infant plaintiffs, was that the assets were too small to justify the proceeding,-Held, that as this fact could not be properly determined by the Court on exceptions to the report finding in favour of the prosecution of the suit, such exceptions must be overruled, reserving the costs and retaining the deposit.

But on the plaintiffs presenting a petition to confirm the report, the Court, on the defendants undertaking to offer no obstacle to the hearing, directed the petition to stand over till the hearing.

Raven v.

Quare, as to the proper mode of appealing from the Master's decision in such a case. Kerl, 1 De Gex & S. 236.

The Master's report finding the plaintiff's bill scandalous and impertinent was, upon exceptions taken both by the plaintiff and the defendant, varied by the Court:-Held, that the 41st General Order of May 1845 did not apply to this case, and an order was made directing the Record and Writ Clerk to expunge those parts of the plaintiff's bill which the Court considered scandalous and impertinent. Jodrell v. Jodrell, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 265; 12 Beav. 216.

After a Master's report had been absolutely confirmed, a petition was presented for leave to except to it. The petition was heard with the cause for further directions, and the Court, without directing a reference back to the Master, made an order in accordance with the prayer of the petition. Jowett v. Board, 16 Sim. 352.

(BB) SALES BY THE COURT.

The Court declined to open biddings upon an advance under 10l. per cent. Holroyd v. Wyatt, 2 Coll. C.C. 537.

If at a sale by auction under the order of the Court, a purchaser sell his purchase for an additional sum beyond his purchase-money, the Court will order the property to be re-sold; and, semble, if upon such re-sale, the property does not produce the improved price agreed to be given by the subpurchaser, he will be responsible to the Court for the difference. Holroyd v. Wyatt, 2 Coll. C.C. 327.

A bidder at a sale under the decree of the Court, who is not a party to the cause nor interested in the estate which is the subject of the sale, has no right to apply to the Court to set aside a sale to another bidder on the ground of irregularity, in that the latter, though reported the purchaser, was in fact not the highest bidder.

Whether he may apply to be declared the purchaser in place of the bidder reported to be the best purchaser-quære. Hughes v. Lipscombe, 6 Hare, 142.

A purchaser under the Court obtained an order nisi to confirm the Master's report, but delayed to

confirm it absolutely. Plaintiffs moved, on notice to the purchaser, to confirm the same absolutely:Held, that the plaintiffs might do so by motion of course. Robertson v. Skelton, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 215; 10 Beav. 197.

Upon a sale under the Court, an order on the purchaser to pay his purchase-money into court, obtained before the title has been accepted, or the Master's report made in its favour, is irregular, and will be discharged, with costs. Rutter v. Marriott, 10 Beav. 33.

There is no invariable rule as to the sum to be paid into court on obtaining an order opening biddings made at a sale directed by the Court; but where a sum of 27,000l. was the last bidding made at a sale, a sum of 3,400l. was ordered to be paid into court by the applicant on his obtaining an order to open the biddings. Manners v. Furze, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 485.

Where in a suit for performance of the trusts of a will, the decree directed the Master to inquire what estates passed by the will, and that such as he should find to have passed should be sold with his approbation, and the Master proceeded to sell before having made his report, it was held that the purchaser could not object to the title on this ground. Dykes v. Taylor, 16 Sim. 563.

(CC) PAYMENT INTO COURT.

[See INFANT, Guardian.]
[Bartlett v. Bartlett, 4 Hare, 631.]

The Court will not order an executor to pay into court money which he states by his answer to have retained in satisfaction of a debt due to him from the testator. Middleton v. Poole, 2 Coll. C.C. 246.

Unless all persons interested in a fund are before the Court, an order for payment of it into court will not be made on an undertaking by the plaintiff to make them parties, except perhaps in cases of administration of creditors' suits. Whether such an order would be made in those suits-quære. Marriage v. the Royal Exchange Assurance Co., 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 216.

Before the General Orders of June 1848 money might be paid into the name of the Accountant General, under the 10 & 11 Vict. c. 96. without any order of Court. In re Biggs, 11 Beav. 27.

On a motion to pay assets of a testator into court, the Court declined to direct the payment of the income to the tenant for life to be continued, unless the executor took upon himself the responsibility of the payment. Abby v. Gilford, 11 Beav. 28.

A party having a contingent interest in a trust fund may, in a proper case, have it brought into court for his protection; but he must shew sufficient ground for it.

Such a motion was refused, on the ground that there was no allegation of danger, and that the fund might, if necessary, be sufficiently protected by a distringas. Ross v. Ross, 12 Beav. 89.

After the hearing and before the cause came on for further directions, the plaintiff moved, on admissions by the defendant in his answer, for payment of a sum of money into court:-Held, that such admissions were not alone sufficient to induce the Court to make the order, and the motion was refused. Binns v. Parr, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 401; 7 Hare, 288.

Where a fund is carried over to a particular separate account it is released from the general questions in the cause, and becomes marked as being subject only to the questions arising upon the particular matter referred to in the heading of the account. In re Jervoise, 12 Beav. 209.

Though the Court will stay the payment of a fund out of court, to give a stranger an opportunity of enforcing his right against it, yet it will not for the same purpose order into court a sum directed to be paid by one party to another.

By the decree, an arrear of dividends on stock was ordered to be paid to the plaintiff by her trustee. Shortly afterwards such arrears were, under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. s. 14, charged by a common-law Judge with the payment of a sum of money to A B. A petition was presented by A B, that the trustee might pay the amount into court and for a stop order thereon. The petition was dismissed, with costs. Newton v. Askew, 11 Beav. 43.

(DD) PAYMENT out of Court.

A filed a petition in the Insolvent Court for the purpose of obtaining the benefit of the act. Shortly afterwards an order was made in a suit for payment of a sum to her out of court. After the Insolvent Court had made a vesting order, but before any adjudication respecting her, A died; after her death a creditors' assignee was appointed: -Held, that the assignee and not the administrator of A was entitled to the money paid out of court. Bruce v. Charlton, 15 Sim. 562.

A defendant in the cause, to whose separate account a sum of money has been carried, may present a petition for payment out of court by a solicitor who was not her solicitor in the cause, without obtaining an order to change her solicitor. Waddilove v. Taylor, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 384.

A petition was presented by the representatives of one of the next-of-kin of an intestate, praying for the transfer of stock which had been carried to the separate account of a party (since deceased) who was entitled for her life, and of the intestate's next-of-kin, who would become entitled at her decease. The petitioner's claim was deduced under several probates and letters of administration taken out in the Consistorial Court of London; and she was unable, under those circumstances, to procure prerogative probate. An order was made for the transfer of the stock, without requiring probate from the Prerogative Court of the Archbishop of Canterbury. Druce v. Denison, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 149; 15 Sim. 356; reversing s. c. 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 443.

Where very small sums are standing to a separate account in court, and the title is simple, the Court will order payment on petition without attendance in court. Petty v. Petty, 12 Beav. 170.

A general authority from a party out of the jurisdiction to his solicitors to take any necessary proceedings for obtaining payment of his share of the fund in the suit out of court,-Held, on petition, not to authorize payment of it to the solicitors. Waddilove v. Taylor, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 406.

A married woman having a general power of

appointment over a reversionary trust fund, subject to a previous life estate in another person, appointed it by way of mortgage, with a power of sale, under which it was afterwards sold. Her husband became bankrupt, and after the determination of the life estate, the trustees paid the fund into court, under the 10 & 11 Vict. c. 96. The purchasers thereupon presented a petition for the transfer of the fund to them. The petition was only served on the trustees. The Court made the order, subject to a direction that it should not be drawn up for a fortnight, and that the husband's assignees should be served with notice that the fund would be transferred, if no objection were made within that period. Ex parte Stutely, 1 De Gex & S. 703.

The purchase-money of a leasehold interest purchased by a railway company was paid into court to an account "ex parte the company, the account of the two lessees," and the dividends were ordered to be paid to one lessee, and the executrix of the other. The executrix married:-Held, that on a petition for payment of the dividends to the busband and the other lessee it was unnecessary to serve the company, and that the petitioners having served them must pay their costs. Ex parte Hordern, in re the Grand Junction Rail. Co.'s Acts, 2 De Gex & S. 263.

Where a fund stands to the general credit of a cause it will not be paid out in the absence of the legal personal representatives. But if after decree, and where the fund is clear, the executor dies, a supplemental bill is not always necessary, for the fund may be distributed on petition, upon the appearance of the new personal representatives. Parsons v. Groome, 12 Beav. 180.

Dividends of investments of purchase-money paid into court by a railway company for lands belonging to the Archbishop of Canterbury ordered to be paid to the archbishop for the time being. Ex parte Archbishop of Canterbury, in re the East Lincolnshire Rail. Co.'s Acts, 2 De Gex & S. 365.

(EE) SETTING DOWN and Hearing Cause.

Causes to be set down by the registrars upon production of a certificate by the proper officer that they are in a fit state to be set down for hearing, without any fiat, order, or direction from the Lord Chancellor.

Causes for further directions, or on the equity reserved, and pleas, demurrers, exceptions, and objections for want of parties, to be set down for hearing on orders drawn up on petition to the Lord Chancellor without any fiat or direction. Order of February 23, 1850; 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. i.; 1 Mac. & G. xii.; 1 Hall & Tw. x.

A bill had been dismissed in the court below, and on appeal the Lord Chancellor directed the cause to stand over for a year, in order that a question of usury might be tried in a court of common law. After the trial (at which the deed in question was found to be usurious) the cause was set down before the Lord Chancellor:-Held, that it ought to have been set down before the Vice Chancellor to whose court it belonged. Flight v. Marriott, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 449.

In a suit for the distribution of a trust fund, one of the plaintiffs, a married woman, was entitled for

her separate use to a share in the property; her husband, who was made a defendant, not having been heard of since 1843, an application was made to have the cause set down for hearing notwithstanding the husband had not appeared. Upon an objection raised by the registrar to the jurisdiction of the Vice Chancellor, the Court refused to make the order. Russell v. Lucy, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 464.

Where a bill has been retained at the hearing, with liberty to plaintiff to bring an action, he may on having the verdict in his favour obtain an order for setting down the cause on further directions, or on the equity reserved, though the time for moving for a new trial has not arrived. Rodgers v. Nowill, 6 Hare, 338.

A bill was filed by a legatee claiming several legacies under the will, against the executrix and the other legatees, and stating that a legatee named as a defendant was out of the jurisdiction and could not be found. Upon motion, supported by affidavits that the absent legatee could not be found to be served with process, leave was given to file a replication against the defendants who had appeared and answered; and afterwards leave was obtained to set down the cause for hearing against the same defendants. The absent legatee, who had a possible interest in only one of the legacies claimed by the plaintiff, was not proved at the hearing to be out of the jurisdiction; and the executrix took a preliminary objection that the hearing could not be proceeded with under the circumstances. The Court proceeded to dispose of the questions as to those legacies in which the absent legatee was not interested, and reserved the questions as to those legacies in which he was suggested to have an interest, directing the latter legacies to be brought into court, and referring it to the Master to inquire whether the absent defendant was out of the jurisdiction. Mores v. Mores, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 311; 6 Hare, 125.

Suit by one cestui que trust against the trustees and some of the other parties interested, to restore a fund held in trust for a class of persons:-Held, that there must be proof at the hearing that all the persons constituting the class were before the Court. Phillipson v. Gatty, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 241; 6 Hare, 26; 2 Hall & Tw. 459.

(FF) ISSUE AND CASE SENT TO LAW.

[See (X) Orders and Decrees.] As to directing issue, Butlin v. Masters, 2 Ph. 290.

In a creditors' suit, plaintiff did not establish his debt at the hearing; but the Court retained the bill with liberty to bring an action. The plaintiff produced other evidence and recovered in the action. Decree made for payment of the debt and costs in equity, but no costs given for the proceedings at law. Gregson v. Booth, 5 Hare, 536.

On a motion on behalf of the plaintiff, for an issue devisavit vel non, in a suit instituted by him, praying the delivery up of a deed of settlement to be cancelled, and that an issue might be directed as to the will of the alleged testator, the Court refused the application, the defendant having stated, by her answer, that she claimed the estates absolutely for

her own use, and that the plaintiff had no title thereto, even if his alleged title, as heir-at-law of the testator, were fully established, but of which she stated her ignorance. The Court has power, in cases like the present, to grant an issue devisavit vel non, by way of interlocutory proceeding, but it will only be done after great care has been bestowed on the case, and on facts justifying the order. Lancashire v. Lancashire, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 293; 9 Beav. 259.

If an issue is directed, an application for a new trial must be to the Court of Chancery, when all proceedings at law will be examined; but if liberty is given to bring an action, the new trial must be moved for in the court of law, and the Court of Chancery will only look to the result of the action. In the latter case, if there has been a miscarriage at law, relief cannot be obtained on the case coming on upon the equity reserved, without petition. Hope v. Hope, 10 Beav. 581.

A bill was filed to set aside certain securities given to a banking firm, upon the ground that they were obtained by fraud and concealment. The transaction took place between the plaintiff and a late partner in the banking-house, who had since died. Issues were directed to try the question of fraud or concealment; but an order of the Court below, directing that the plaintiff and the defendants might be examined as witnesses, was reversed; it appearing that such a direction would necessarily give the plaintiff an advantage over the defendants who were not parties to the original transaction.

The former partner, who had managed the transaction, had ceased to be a member of the banking firm and had since become bankrupt, and had been made a defendant as the executor of another partner:-Held, that his answer was not admissible as evidence against the other defendants, the continuing partners.

Where money has been paid to one of the parties to the suit, under a decree which is afterwards reversed and the money ordered to be repaid, interest on the money will not be payable unless specially ordered by the Court. Parker v. Morrell, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 226; 2 Ph. 453.

The Court relieved a party from undertaking to make an admission upon a trial at law, the law on the point having since the undertaking been placed in a state of uncertainty by reason of the conflicting decisions of different Courts. Cocks v. Purday, 12 Beav. 451.

On the hearing, the Court expressed an opinion that the case was one which was proper for an issue, but at the request and with the consent of all parties undertook to decide the cause:-Held, that the parties had, by such consent, precluded themselves on appeal from asking for an issue, or a review of the decree of the Court below, if the question raised was one which, according to the course of the Court, ought, in the first instance, to have been sent to a jury; but the Court permitted the appellant to shew, if he could, that the case was so clear upon the proceedings that the Court might decide it without directing an issue. Stewart v. Forbes, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 133; 1 Mac. & G. 137; 1 Hall & Tw. 461.

Where a matter of fact has been once litigated upon an issue directed by the Court, and the verdict

is the result of a fair trial, and is in affirmation of what by the Court directing the issue is thought to be the truth, and the unsuccessful party has not been taken by surprise, and there is no substantial ground for believing that any mistake or accident has occurred, or that on a second trial other evidence of a weighty nature bearing against the existing conclusion can and will be produced, a new trial will not be granted.

It is within the ordinary practice of the Court of Chancery to make a decree conclusively affecting the freehold and inheritance of land upon one investigation of disputed facts, as well where there must be a jury, as where it is in the discretion of the Court to dispense with a jury, and although there has been no consent or acquiescence by the unsuccessful party.

In an establishing suit and verdict in favour of the plaintiff, the heir is not entitled to more favour than a devisee, unless in the sense that the burthen of proof is in that case thrown upon the plaintiff. Waters v. Waters, 2 De Gex & S. 591.

Where, on the trial of an issue, the evidence of a material witness, being uncorroborated and being in other respects unsatisfactory, has been discredited by the Judge, and the jury having given a verdict against the party producing the witness, the Court, upon being satisfied by affidavits filed since the trial, that the evidence of the witness may be substantially corroborated, will grant a new trial. Shields v. Boucher, 1 De Gex & S. 40.

There is no absolute rule in a court of equity requiring that Court, as of course, to grant a second trial in an issue of devisavit vel non, when the first trial has terminated against the heir-at-law, if the Judge in equity is satisfied that no new light can be thrown on the subject by a further investigation.

Though there may be an outstanding legal estate, which compels the heir-at-law to come into equity, he cannot, on that account, claim a right to have the issue tried a second time, if the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, should deem the first verdict satisfactory.

In every such issue the Court of Equity requires that all the attesting witnesses to a will shall, if it is possible to procure their attendance, be examined.

Circumstances under which the Court of Equity, in the exercise of its discretion, was held properly to have refused a new trial. M'Gregor v. Topham, 3 H.L. Cas. 132.

The Court can, on demurrer, send a case for the opinion of a court of law. Spooner v. Payne, 2 De Gex & S. 439.

A testator, who was the subject of a commission of lunacy at the time of making his will and up to his death, being seised of large real estates, made his will, whereby, after giving certain benefits to his daughter and heiress-at-law, he declared, that if she or her husband, or any person on their or either of their behalf, should dispute his will, or if any proceedings should be taken by any person whomsoever, whereby his daughter or her husband might attain a larger interest in his estates than that given by his will, and she and her husband should not disavow or resist such proceedings, then he revoked the benefits thereby given to her. The daughter was married at the date of the will, and on her marriage, articles were executed, by which the hus

band covenanted with A B, a trustee, to settle her present and future property upon trusts, for the benefit of himself, his wife and their issue. There was no issue of their marriage. In a suit by the trustee of the will, to establish it, the evidence in the cause, on the part of the plaintiffs, went to prove the competency of the testator, and there was no evidence to the contrary; and the heiress-at-law did not ask an issue:-Held, that A B had a sufficient prima facie title as trustee for the unborn issue; and the Court directed an issue devisavit vel non, the plaintiffs in equity to be plaintiffs at law, and A B to be the defendant at law. Cooke v. Turner; Cook v. Cholmondeley, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chane. 81; 2 Mac. & G. 18; 2 Hall & Tw. 162: affirming s. c. 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 487; 15 Sim. 61 1. (GG) RECEIVER.

[Bowman v. Bell, 5 Law J. Dig. 641; 14 Sim. 392.]

The plaintiff, claiming real estates as heir-at-law to B, filed his bill to establish his title against the defendant, who claimed under a settlement adversely to the plaintiff, and had the legal estate. Motion for a receiver, on the part of the plaintiff, refused, on account of the absence of fraud, and doubt as to title. Lancashire v. Lancashire, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 54; 9 Beav. 120.

The Court will grant an order for a receiver over a moiety of an undivided share of an estate. Hargrave v. Hargrave, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 280; 9 Beav. 549.

The notice required by the 88th Order of May 1845 does not apply to proceedings for appointing a receiver, but only to his taking possession of the estates when appointed. Dresser v. Morton, 2 Ph. 285.

A receiver, who without the sanction of the Court, successfully defends an action brought against him by a party to the cause, is entitled to be reimbursed his extra costs. Bristowe v. Needham, 2 Ph. 190.

By a settlement on the marriage of A with B, certain trust funds were assigned to three trustees in trust to pay the annual income to B for life for her sepa rate use, with remainder to A for his life, with remainder, as to the principal monies, to the children of the marriage. The trustees, on the application of A, and with the consent of B, invested the trust funds, in contravention of the trusts of the settlement, in the purchase of certain copyhold houses, in which A claimed an interest under an agreement entered into by him with the vendor, previously to the date of the purchase by the trustees. A had also expended a large sum in repairing and rebuilding part of the houses, and, from the time of the purchase until recently, had been allowed to receive the rents, and pay them over to his wife. Differences having arisen between A and the trus tees, the latter directed their solicitor to receive the rents, and commence an action against one of the tenants, who refused to pay the rents to them. On a bill filed by A against the trustees, and his wife and children, praying an injunction against further proceedings in the action, and the appointment of a receiver; a motion for a receiver on his behalf was refused, with costs.

One of the trustees, who lived in the country, at a distance from the other two trustees, appeared,