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such assignment, and afterwards became bankrupts. The assignees of the charter-party having sued upon it in the names of the plaintiffs, the defendants pleaded the bankruptcy of the plaintiffs, by which the right to their choses in action vested in their assignees. Replication, setting forth the assignment by the plaintiffs of their interest in the charterparty to D, and notice to the defendants of that assignment given by them before the bankruptcy of the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs sued on account of D. Rejoinder (after terms to rejoin gratis and issuably had been imposed), setting up the previous agreement between the plaintiffs and defendants, that they should share the benefits of the charter-party, by way of a mutual credit between the parties, on which an account should be stated, and one demand set against the other, under 6 Geo. 4. c. 16. s. 50:-Held, not issuable, and bad in substance, for at the time of the bankruptcy no mutual credit existed between the plaintiffs and defendants. Boyd v. Mangles, 16 Mee. & W. 337.

(K) ASSIGNEES.

(a) Official Assignee.

An official assignee of a bankrupt or insolvent, who has been made a plaintiff in an action without his authority, is entitled to an indemnity from costs. Laws v. Bott, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 279; 16 Mee. & W. 300.

The official assignee represents the creditors sufficiently to enable the Court to suspend the advertisement by consent before the choice of creditors' assignees, although the bankruptcy is not disputed. Ex parte Potts re Potts, 1 De Gex, 326.

In the case of a defaulting official assignee the Court ordered that no sum should be paid in respect of monies due to him in any bankruptcy, until he had made good all the amounts due from him in other bankruptcies. Ex parte Graham re Gray, 1 De Gex, 328.

It is the duty of the official assignee to examine the lists of creditors prepared by the solicitors to the fiat, before he signs them; and he is liable for the consequences of the omission of any creditors from the lists. Ex parte Hall re Carey, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Bankr. 10; 1 De Gex, 555.

A mortgaged estate belonging to a bankrupt was bought at a sale by auction by the mortgagee, who had obtained liberty to bid for 500. An application to open the biddings at an advance of 750l., on the grounds that the title was much embarrassed at the time of sale, and that the commissioner had stated that the biddings might be opened, was granted. Ex parte Lee re Higgonson, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Bankr. 6.

(b) Choice of.

A fiat issued against a bankrupt on his own petition. At the meeting of creditors for the choice of assignees, A tendered a proof of a debt, which was adjourned by the commissioner. The choice of assignees was then proceeded with. The solicitor who had been concerned for the bankrupt represented all the other creditors at this meeting. A was afterwards admitted to prove for the whole of his debt. On the petition of A, the choice of assignees was ordered to be set aside. Ex parte

Morse re Layt, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Bankr. 9; 1 De Gex, 478.

(c) Rights and Liabilities.

B, being indebted to the defendant in 5001, delivered to him a bill of exchange for 600, which defendant agreed to discount on the terms of retaining 1001. and the ordinary discount, and paying over the difference to B. Defendant kept the bill, and paid no part of the difference to B, who became bankrupt shortly afterwards, when his assignees brought an action upon the contract against the defendant. The Judge directed the jury that the assignee stood in the same situation as the bankrupt, if solvent, would have stood in, and were entitled to recover the amount of the bill, minus the 1001. and the discount :-Held, that this was no misdirection; and the jury, having found for the plaintiffs, damages 4951., allowing 51. per cent. discount, the Court refused to disturb the verdict. Alder v. Keighley, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 100; 15 Mee. & W. 117.

A fiat in bankruptcy having issued against D, the petitioning creditor came before the commissioner, but being unable to prove his debt, other creditors were permitted to prosecute the fiat under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122. s. 4. That section enacts, that if the fiat shall not be opened by the petitioning creditor within three days after it shall have been transmitted, the Court may at any time within fourteen days next following, open it on the application of any other creditor to the requisite amount, and may adjudicate thereon upon proof of the debt of such creditor, and of the "other requisites" to support such fiat. The prosecuting creditors accordingly proved their debt, the trading, and the act of bankruptcy, and D was declared a bankrupt, and the plaintiffs appointed his assignees:-Held, on an issue raised as to the title of the plaintiffs as assignees, first, that the words of the statute "opening the fiat" included all the proceedings previous to adjudication, and therefore that the fiat had not been opened by the petitioning creditor. Secondly, that the petitioning creditor's debt was not one of the "other requisites" to support the fiat, and therefore was unnecessary to be proved before the commissioner. Thirdly, that an order of the Lord Chancellor, under the 6 Geo. 4. c. 16. s. 18, for substituting a new petitioning creditor's debt was unnecessary, and therefore that the title of the plaintiffs as assignees was proved. Kynaston v. Davis, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 336; 15 Mee. & W. 705.

On the 4th of March the sheriff of London entered upon the premises of B under a writ of fi. fa. in his hands, at the suit of defendant, an execution creditor. When the sheriff entered all the goods of B were in possession of an officer of the Lord Mayor's Court, who had taken them in execution, at the suit of one L, and the goods were also under a distress put in by the landlord for rent. On the 9th of March a fiat issued against B. On the 6th of April the landlord sold all the goods, and paid himself and L, and paid the surplus into court to abide the event of an issue directed to be tried between the assignees of B and defendant:-Held, that the assignees could not impeach the title of the defendant, by setting up the claims of the landlord, or of L.

Held, also, if the assignees had intended to deny

that there was a "seizure" within the meaning of the 108th section of the 6 Geo. 4. c. 16, they should have done so before the Judge directed an issue. Belcher v. Patten, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 69; 6 Com. B. Rep. 608.

Where an assignee bought in without an order, he was ordered to make good the loss occasioned by a re-sale. Ex parte Gover re Humphryes, 1 De Gex, 349.

(d) Affirmation of Sale by.

After an act of bankruptcy, committed by A, the plaintiffs, who were subsequently appointed assignees, directed A's shop to be kept open as usual. Defendants, with notice of act of bankruptcy, purchased goods at the shop, which were delivered to them on the 28th of February, and plaintiffs were appointed assignees on the 24th of March. Applications were made on the 9th and 23rd of April to defendants, by the direction of plaintiffs, as assignees, for payment for the goods supplied on the 28th of February, and a formal demand of them was made and refused on the 14th of May :-Held, that the above facts furnish no evidence of an affirmation by the assignees of a contract of sale, and that defendants were liable in trover. Valpy v. Sanders, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 249; 5 Com. B. Rep. 886.

(e) Allowance of Costs.

Trustees under an assignment for the benefit of creditors employed an agent to proceed to America to recover part of the property. Afterwards the debtors became bankrupt, and three of the trustees were appointed assignees :-Held, that the assignees should be allowed the expense of employing the agent.

Expenses will be allowed if there was a fair probability of their benefiting the estate. It is not necessary to shew they have actually done so. parte Shaw re Robbins, 1 De Gex, 242.

Ex

A petitioner, in the matter of a petition for the sale of some property which had been mortgaged to him by the bankrupt, employed the solicitor who acted for the creditors' assignees. The official assignee appeared at the hearing of the petition by separate counsel :-Held, that the official assignee was, under the circumstances, entitled to the costs of such separate appearance. Ex parte Bromage re Jones, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Bankr. 13; 1 De Gex, 375.

Where creditors' assignee omitted to pay over to the official assignee the balance in his hands, and the commissioner had directed the payment, with 201. per cent. on the amount,-Held, that application should be made to the commissioner to enforce his order, and creditors were not allowed the extra costs occasioned by applying to the Court of Review.

The 6 Geo. 4. c. 16. s. 104, directing payment of 201. per cent. by assignees retaining part of the estate in their hands, means 201. per cent. per an

num.

Semble-that the offer of a cheque on a banker at a town where the estate has no banker, is not a proper tender by a creditors' assignee to the official assignee. Ex parte Cunliffe re Archer, 1 De Gex, 408.

(f) Actions and Suits.

A declaration in trespass stated a breaking and entering, damaging the doors, hinges, and locks; spoiling the grass and fruit-trees; and exposing the plaintiff's goods to sale on his premises; by means of which, &c. the plaintiff was not only disturbed in the possession of his house, but prevented from carrying on his business, and deprived of the enjoyment of his goods. The defendant pleaded that, before the action brought, the plaintiff became a bankrupt :-Held, on general demurrer, (affirming the judgment of the Court below), that as there were some causes of action included in the declaration which would not pass to the assignees, the plea which embraced the whole, and was not addressed to any particular portion of the declaration, was insufficient and bad. Rogers v. Spence, 12 CL. & F. 700.

The creditors' and official assignees have, by the 1 & 2 Will. 4. c. 56. s. 25, a joint title to the bankrupt's estate, so that if one of them die pending a suit in which they are co-plaintiffs, the suit may be continued by the other. Man v. Ricketts, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 79; 1 Ph. 617.

Assignees who had brought an action against an annuity creditor of the bankrupt on a cross-demand were, on the petition of the creditor submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court, restrained from proceeding in the action.

Semble-that the commissioner has no jurisdiction to value the annuity for the purpose of its being set off in the action. Ex parte Law re Kennedy, 1 De Gex, 378.

(g) What Property passes to.

(1) In general.

A entered into an agreement with B and C to serve them for seven years, at fixed wages, at three guineas weekly, "the party making default to pay to the other the sum of 5001. by way or in nature of specific damages." A was dismissed; he became bankrupt, and after the bankruptcy brought an action of assumpsit on the agreement to which the defendants pleaded his bankruptcy:-Held, that this plea was an answer to the action, for that the right of action in respect of this breach of the agreement passed to the assignees. Beckham v. Drake, 2 H.L. Cas. 579.

Trespass for breaking and entering the plaintiff's dwelling-house, and making a great noise and disturbance therein, and damaging the doors, &c., and seizing certain goods of the plaintiff, and exposing them to sale on the premises without his leave, whereby the plaintiff and his family were greatly disturbed and annoyed in the peaceable possession of the dwellinghouse, and the plaintiff was prevented carrying on his lawful business. Plea, in bar of the further maintenance of the action, that the plaintiff became bankrupt after action brought, and that an official assignee had been appointed, who accepted the appointment, whereby and by virtue and by force of the statutes, the said causes of action became vested in the said official assignee. On demurrer to that plea, judgment was given for the plaintiff; and on writ of error, it was held, affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, that the primary personal injury to the bankrupt being the principal and

essential cause of action, it still remained in the bankrupt and did not pass to the assignee; therefore, that the plea was bad. Rogers v. Spence, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 49; 13 Mee. & W. 571. In November 1847, A, a trader, by deed, assigned all his effects to trustees for the benefit of his creditors. In January 1848, A filed a declaration of insolvency under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, upon which a fiat issued. This fiat, however, was not prosecuted by A. In February, on the application of B, a creditor of A, whose debt would have been sufficient for a petitioning creditor's debt, and was prior in date to the deed of November, the commissioner made the adjudication in the bankruptcy, and assignees were appointed:-Held, that the money realized by the trustees under the trust deed ought to be administered in the bankruptcy. Ex parte Jackson re Ferens, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Bankr. 19. [And see ante, Re Marshall (C)-(f); Follett v. Hoppe, ante (C)—(g).]

(2) Wife's Property.

Household furniture, linen, and plate belonging to B were assigned by him by deed, in contemplation of his marriage, to plaintiffs in trust after the marriage to stand possessed thereof during the joint lives of B, the settlor, and his intended wife, for her sole and separate use, independently of A. The marriage took place, and B afterwards became bankrupt. The settled furniture, &c. was then in the house in which he resided with his wife :-Held, that it was not, at the time of his bankruptcy, "in his order and disposition, with consent of the true owners," so as to pass the property in it, under 6 Geo. 4. c. 16. s. 72, to the defendants, his assignees; and the fact of the furniture, &c. not having been the wife's before the marriage was immaterial. Edwards, 16 Mee. & W. 838.

Simmons v.

(3) Order and Disposition and reputed Ownership. [See 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106. s. 125.]

B on the 1st of July fraudulently bought from the plaintiffs a quantity of goods, without an intention of paying for them. After the sale and delivery he became a bankrupt, and a fiat issued against him on the 8th of July. The defendants, who were his assignees, thereupon took possession of the goods, as being in the order and disposition of the bankrupt with the consent of the true owner, within the 72nd section of the Bankrupt Act, 6 Geo. 4. c. 16, whereupon the plaintiffs brought an action of trover for the goods:-Held, that as at the time of the bankruptcy, the bankrupt was not the apparent but the real owner of the goods, the section did not apply, and the plaintiffs were entitled to recover.

Quare-Whether the case would have fallen within the 72nd section if the plaintiffs had discovered the fraud long before the act of bankruptcy, and had omitted, for an unreasonable time, to rescind the contract. Load v. Green, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 113; 15 Mee. & W. 216.

A employed the local agent of an insurance office as his attorney, to effect a policy on the life of B in such office, and to get it assigned by B to A as security for a debt; B having become bankrupt,— Held, that the circumstance of the company's authorizing their agent to receive notices of assignment for them, though no notice was, in fact, given

to the head office of the company in this instance operated to prevent the policy from being within the order and disposition of the bankrupt; and that the case was not altered by the notice being received by the agent in his character of attorney for A. Gale v. Lewis, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 119; 9 Q.B. Rep. 730.

In 1843, H, residing in Australia, being indebted to B in 7711. 3s. 4d., B on the 8th of January 1844 assigned the debt to W, and on the 22nd of January joined W in a letter to H apprising him of the assignment, and requiring him to pay the debt to W. This letter was posted by W to H, in Australia, in the ordinary way in which letters to that country are posted, and could not have reached Australia before the 10th of February had it been posted on the 8th of January. On the 10th of February a fiat in bankruptcy issued against B. On the 29th of January 1844 a bill for 50l. was remitted by H in Australia, who had no notice of the bankruptcy, to the bankrupt, and by him handed over to W. The assignees of the bankrupt having brought an action against W to recover the amount of, the bill,-Held, that W having done all in his power to prevent the debt from remaining in the possession of the bankrupt it could not be said to be, by the consent of the true owner, in the order or disposition of the bankrupt at the time of his bankruptcy, and that the assignees were not entitled to recover. Belcher v. Bellamy, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 219; 2 Exch. Rep. 303.

A being indebted to B, and pressed by him for payment, gives him a promissory note made by C, payable to A, (without the words "or order") and indorsed by A. B takes the note, but in consequence of its not being negotiable, returns it to A, in order that A may give him a negotiable security instead of it; and C does, at A's request, accept negotiable bills of exchange, drawn by A upon him, instead of the note, and at the same time that this is done, A desires C to hand the bills to B; and on the same day, A absconds to France, thereby committing an act of bankruptcy:-Held, that it not appearing, on this state of facts, that C had any notice of the transaction that had passed between A and B, or that the bills were given in substitution of the note, or that he had assented to B's title in any way, A's assignees were entitled to them. Belcher v. Campbell, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 11; 8 Q.B. Rep. 1.

Books in possession of a bookseller, to be sold by him on commission and mixed with his general stock, do not pass to his assignees under his commission, as goods in his possession, order and disposition as reputed owner within the 6 Geo. 4. c. 16. Whitfield v. Brand, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 103; 16 Mee. & W. 282.

By a deed of trust, W, a horse contractor and jobber, assigned, until such time as all his then debts should be paid off, all his stock in trade, &c. to certain trustees for the benefit of his creditors, to hold upon certain trusts, inter alia, that so long as W should observe the orders of the trustees he was to be allowed to carry on business, subject to the orders of the trustees; that if he refused to comply with those orders, the trustees might immediately determine such permission; that the trustees should have power to sell any portion of the stock they pleased; that all monies received

in the business were to be paid to the account of the trustees, and all monies paid by their cheques; and that W was to receive a weekly salary for carrying on the business. The creditors also agreed to advance a large sum of money for the purposes of the business. This sum was advanced, and the business was carried on for some time under the terms of the deed, but W having refused to comply with certain orders of the trustees, the trustees, on the 22nd of July 1847, determined the permission to W to carry on the business, and W thereupon admitted in writing that the trustees had his leave to assume possession of the stock in trade, &c. Several of the horses used in the business were at that time let out on hire to various persons, and the trustees on that day served notice upon each of those persons that the horses in their possession belonged to them as trustees. On the 24th of July W committed an act of bankruptcy. Upon an interpleader issue to try the title to these horses as between the trustees and the assignees,-Held, upon these facts, first, that by the deed no partnership was created between W and the trustees.

Secondly, that by allowing W to carry on the business in his own name the trustees were not estopped from relying upon their own title to the property under the deed as against the assignees.

Thirdly, that the horses were not at the time of the bankruptcy in the possession, order, or disposition of the bankrupt within the meaning of 6 Geo. 4. c. 16. s. 72. Price v. Groom, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 346; 2 Exch. Rep. 542.

London sub-mortgagees of shipments at Ceylon and Hong Kong sent thither directed to the parties in possession notices of their security by the next direct mail, there being another earlier mail by a different route by which the notices might possibly have sooner reached their destination. Before, however, this could have taken place by either mode of transmission, the sub-mortgagees became bankrupt: -Held, that the notice was sufficient to take the goods out of their reputed ownership.

A man may give a valid security on merchandise at sea belonging to him, although at that time he is ignorant of the particulars of which it consists. Ex parte Kelsall re Beattie, 1 De Gex, 352.

A worsted-dyer, by deed, mortgaged fixtures used by him in his business, which were in a house occupied by him as tenant, and which he had a right to remove, to B. He continued to be in possession of the fixtures after the mortgage, and was in possession of them at the time of his bankruptcy. A petition by B to have the benefit of his security was dismissed, with costs, upon B's declining to file a bill in equity to have the question tried in a suit. Ex parte Sykes re Clarke, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.S.)

Bankr. 16.

[See ante, (C) Acts of Bankruptcy, (f) Fraudulent Conveyance-(G) Transactions, (d) Cases of Fraudulent Preference-(M) Fiat, (d) Superseding.]

(L) PROOF OF Debt.

[See 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106. s. 164.]

(a) In general.

A entered into a charter-party with the owners of a vessel stated to be of the burthen of 310 tons, by DIGEST, 1845-1850.

which it was provided that she should proceed to Ichaboe, and there take in a full cargo of guano and return to Liverpool, and that A should pay for freight 41. 10s. for every ton delivered; and that he would provide and put on board a full cargo at his own expense; and the parties mutually bound themselves in the penalty of 1,800l. for due performance of the contract. A having failed to supply a cargo, and an action having been brought on the charter-party for this breach, before interlocutory judgment by default was signed, a fiat in bankruptcy issued against him, under which, before the execution of the writ of inquiry, he obtained his certificate, subject to six months' suspension. Upon the execution of that writ, the damages were assessed on this, among other claims, at 1,6441. 3s. 9d., and A was arrested on a ca. sa.:-Held, upon motion for his discharge, that this was not a proveable debt under the fiat, and that he was not entitled to be discharged. Woolley v. Smith, 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) C.P. 81; 4 Dowl. & L. P.C. 469; 3 Com. B. Rep. 610.

A, the owner of a ship at sea, agreed to sell her to B for 4,000l. when she should arrive within the United Kingdom, and should have discharged her cargo and been repaired. B was then to give promissory notes in payment, and, in case of default on his part, A was to be at liberty to resell the ship, and B was to make good any loss arising from the sale. Before the arrival of the ship, B became bankrupt, and his assignees refused to purchase the ship when she arrived. She was then sold by A for less than 4,000, and he afterwards applied to prove against B's estate for the deficiency:-Held, (reversing the decision of the Court below), that the agreement to purchase was contingent, and that no debt was created, and that A was, therefore, not entitled to prove against B's estate. Re Gales, ex parte Jonassohn, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Bankr. 9.

A was indebted to B in 20,000l. An interview took place between B and C, a son of A, in respect of the debt. A bond was subsequently drawn out and executed by A and C, whereby they became jointly and severally bound to pay B 10,000l. by instalments of 1,000l. a-year, with interest on such instalments as should be in arrear. The terms of the agreement under which the bond was executed, were not put into writing. It was stated by B that the agreement, made at the above-mentioned interview was, that the old debt should not be cancelled until the bond was satisfied; but it was stated by C that the agreement was that the old debt should be at once cancelled on the execution of the bond. A became bankrupt. A proof for the old debt, tendered by B, was rejected on the ground that the old debt was extinguished by the bond. Ex parte Hernaman re Ewens, 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Bankr. 17.

(b) Bonds.

A gave a voluntary bond to B in 1812 for 3,000%. and interest, with an agreement that, on regular payment of interest, the principal was not to be called in until five years after the death of A. B bequeathed this bond to her three children, and died in 1840. In 1841 an arrangement was made between A and the children, under which the old bond was cancelled, and a new bond was given to each of the children, for 1,000l. and interest, with like

L

agreement to that on the old bond as to the calling in of the principal. In 1847 A, who carried on business as a banker, was made a bankrupt. In 1841, when the bond was given, the debts of A considerably exceeded his assets, and this state continued until the bankruptcy; but there was no suggestion of any fraud, mala fides, contrivance to defeat creditors, or of the contemplated bankruptcy of A, on the part either of the obligor or obligees :Held, that, under these circumstances, the new bonds ought to be admitted to proof. Ex parte Hookins re Gundry, 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Bankr. 11.

(c) Annuity.

[See 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106. s. 175.]

The bankrupt, before bankruptcy, covenanted by indenture that in the event of marriage between W and M, he would, during the lives of them and their issue, pay to trustees such sum yearly as should, either alone, until any estate should vest in them or their issue under a previous indenture, or together with the annual value of such estate when vested, amount to 1501. The marriage took place, and one child (still alive) was born before the bankruptcy; no estate vested under the previous indenture; the fiat issued on the 24th of October 1842: -Held, that the trustees were not entitled to prove against the separate estate for instalments of the annuity accrued since the 25th of March 1843, up to which time all arrears had been paid in full. In re Foster, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 274.

(d) Shares.

A, a shareholder in a joint-stock banking company directed to be wound up under the JointStock Companies Winding-up Act, 1848, had a call made on him in respect of his shares, and was shortly after made a bankrupt :-Held, that the official manager had a right to prove for the amount against the estate of A. Ex parte Brown re Fenwick, 19 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Bankr. 4.

A, having applied for shares in a railway company, received, on the 30th of September 1845, a letter of allotment, whereby he was informed that ten shares had been allotted to him, and that a deposit of 51. 5s. a share was to be paid on a certain day, and that the banker's receipt would have to be exchanged for scrip certificates, on the parliamentary contract and subscribers' agreement being signed, and that those instruments must be signed within a month from the transmission of the letter of allotment. A paid the deposit on the 9th of October, but never signed the parliamentary contract or subscribers' agreement, alleging, but not proving, that he had been prevented by the servants of the company. He also stated certain acts of misconduct on the part of the directors in the management of the affairs of the company. A fiat in bankruptcy issued against the company in October 1846:Held, that A had no right of proof in the bankruptcy in respect of the deposit paid by him. Ex parte Clarke re Tring, Reading, &c. Rail. Co., 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Bankr. 13.

(e) Joint and Separate Debts.

Where a partner gives a separate security for a joint debt and becomes bankrupt, the other partners

remaining solvent, the creditor may have under the separate fiat the usual order for sale, but can only have liberty to prove for the deficiency against the joint estate. Ex parte Leicestershire Banking Co. re Wilders, 1 De Gex, 292.

A wine-merchant carrying on business under the firm of J R & Co., announced by a circular that he had taken his nephew into partnership. The business was thenceforth carried on under the style of JR sen. & Co., but as between the uncle and nephew the latter received a salary only, and did not participate in the capital, profits or losses of the concern. On both becoming bankrupt,—Held, that a creditor who supplied goods to the firm might prove against the separate estate of the uncle.

Part of the stock in trade consisted of wines in the docks, which the uncle on announcing the partnership directed the dock company to deliver to the order of the new firm :-Held, that these wines were in the reputed ownership of the two, and ought to be administered as joint estate.

Other wines were in the hands of a lien creditor of the uncle, and after the announcement of the partnership some of these were withdrawn and replaced by others in the name of the new firm :Held, that the possession of the creditor did not prevent section 72. applying, and that these wines should, subject to the lien, be administered as joint

estate.

Where a large number of creditors had a right of election to prove against a joint or separate estate, and the estates were not so ascertained as to enable the creditors to elect, a temporary order was made that no larger dividend should be declared of the one than of the other estate. Ex parte Arbouin re Reay, 1 De Gex, 359.

(f) Mortgages.

A lessee annexed tenant's fixtures and then deposited his lease by way of mortgage, with a memorandum, not noticing the fixtures:-Held, on his becoming bankrupt, that the security extended to the fixtures. Ex parte Tagart re Mackie, 1 De Gex, 531.

(g) Partners.

A note was issued by a bank in this form: “ I promise to pay the bearer, on demand, 54, for A, B, C, and D.-Signed A;" A, B, C, and D. being the partners in the bank :-Held, that the holder of the note had not a right of separate action against A, and that, on the bankruptcy of the firm, he had not a right of proof against the separate estate of A.

On the hearing of an appeal, upon a special case from the Court of Review, the Lord Chancellor may direct a case to be sent for the opinion of a court of law. Ex parte Buckley re Clarke, 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Bankr. 3.

B, a trader, being indebted to A, entered into partnership with C. After the formation of the partnership, a parol agreement was entered into between A, B, and C, that the debt due from B to A should be converted into a debt to be due from B and C as partners, to A. Some time after this agreement B and C were made bankrupts :-Held, that A had a right of proof against the joint estate of B and C, in respect of the debt. Ex parte Lane

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