A conviction under this Statute, alleging that defendant sold spirituous liquors by retail, without license, stating time and place, is sufficient, without specifying kind and quantity, as this is a particular act, and it is enough to describe it in the words of the Legislature. (a) Under the Statute, the owner of a shop is criminally liable for any unlawful act done therein in his absence by clerk or assistant, as, for instance, in this case, for the sale of liquor, without license, by a female attendant. But it would seem, if the act of sale was an isolated one, wholly unauthorized by him, and out of the ordinary course of his business, he would not be liable. (b)

In Reg. v. Lennox, (c) a conviction under a by-law of the Commissioners of Police, imposing a fine of $5 on a person holding a tavern license, for not exhibiting over his door the words "Licensed to sell wine, beer, and other spirituous and fermented liquors," was quashed, a greater fine than $1 not being authorized by law.

A conviction under Con. Stats., U. C., c. 54, s. 254, which does not negative that the persons to whom the sale is made are travellers, or ordinary boarders, lodging at the place where the liquor is sold, or a requisition for medical purposes, is void. Where the proof must negative the circumstances of exception, the allegations in the instrument of conviction ought to do the same, otherwise the conclusion contra formam Statuti will not remedy the defect. (d)

Where a licensed victualler has opened his house on Sunday, within the prohibited hours, for the bona fide supply of refreshments to travellers arriving at an adjacent railway station, the mere fact that refreshment has

(a) Re Donelly, 20 U. C. C.P. 165.; Reg. v. King, 20 U. C. C. P. 246. (b) Ib.; see ante, p. 104.

(c) 26 U. C. Q. B. 141.

(d) Mills and Brown, 9 U. C. L. J. 246; Reg. v. Jukes, 8 T. R. 542.

been supplied to persons residing within a mile of the house, and who did not come by the train, will not justify a conviction under the 11 & 12 Vic., c. 49, s. 1. (a)

A. walked on Sunday to a spa, two and one-half miles distant from his residence, for the purpose of drinking the mineral water there, for the sake of his health, and was supplied with ale at an hotel at the spa, before halfpast twelve o'clock in the afternoon-this being within the prohibited hours-the Court held that A. was a traveller, within s. 1 of the above Statute. (b)

Upon a complaint against an innkeeper, for keeping an open house on a Sunday before one P.M., contrary to the Statute-Held that, notwithstanding s. 14 of 11 & 12 Vic. c. 43, the complainant was bound to prove affirmatively that the persons supplied by the defendant were not travellers. (c) This rule was also adhered to in two other cases. (d)

Where the defendant held a license to sell beer not to be drunk on the premises, and his servant handed beer in a mug, through an open window of the defendant's premises, to a person who, after paying for it, drank it immediately, standing on the highway, as close as possible to the window:-Held that this evidence did not justify a conviction of the defendant, under 3 & 4 Vic., c. 6, s. 13, for selling beer to be consumed on the premises where sold. (e)

The penalties imposed by the 3 Vic., c. 47, for selling liquor without license, are recoverable before the Mayor of Frederickton, under the Act of Incorporation, 14 Vic., c. 15, s. 67. The Mayor, being ex officio a Justice of the

(a) Peache and Coleman, L. R. 1 C. P. 324.

(b) Peplow and Richardson, L. R. 4, C. P. 168.

(c) Davis and Scrace, L. R. 4, C. P. 179; Taylor v. Humphries, 17 C. B. N. S. 539, followed; Reg. v. Cumberland, 5 U. Ć. L. J. 119, overruled.

(d) Morgan and Hedger, L. R. 5 C. P. 485; Copley and Burton, L. R. 5 C. P 489.

Deal and Schofield, L. R. 3 Q. B. 8.

Peace, may, in that character, proceed for the penalties. which, by the City Charter, are made recoverable before the Mayor. (a)

Under Con. Stats., L. C., c. 6, the convicting Magistrate has a discretionary power of giving any one of the three judgments mentioned in s. 32, ss. 38 and 39, and s. 40. (b) An appeal lies to the General Quarter Sessions of the Peace from a conviction rendered by a Judge of the Sessions of the Peace in and for the City of Montreal, under s. 50 of this Statute. (c) Under the same Statute, the convicting Magistrate has the right to grant costs, either upon conviction or dismissal of the prosecution, and this even to attorneys. (d)

In Ontario, the 32 Vic., c. 32, professes to amend and consolidate the several enactments relating to tavern and shop licenses. The Con. Stat. Can., c. 103, has been repealed by 32 & 33 Vic., c. 36; but it is apprehended that c. 31 of this Statute, as amended by 33 Vic., c. 27, will apply to prosecutions for selling liquor without license, in the same manner as the former Statute.

Compounding Offences.-Compounding felony is where the party robbed not only knows the felon, but also takes his goods again, or other amends, upon agreement not to prosecute. (e) It is a misdemeanor at common law, punishable by fine and imprisonment. (f)

A prosecution is not the property of those who institute it, to deal with it as they please. The public have a higher interest in having redress rendered, and wrong punished, to deter others from offending in like manner; (g) and in general, a prosecution can only be compromised by leave

(a) Reg. v. Allen, 2 Allen, 435.

(b) Ex parte Moley 7, L. C. J. 1.

(c) Ex parte Thompson, 7 L. C. J. 10.

(d) Ex parte Moley, 7 L. C. J. 1.

(e) Russ. Cr. 194-5

(f) Arch. Cr. Pldg. 837.

(g) Reg. v. Hammond, 9 Solr. Jour. 216, per Bramwell, B.

of the Court. A prosecution for selling liquor without license cannot be compromised without the leave of the Court. (a) Leave has been granted to compound a qui tam action on the 32 Hy. 8, c. 9, for buying a pretended title, on paying the King's share into Court. (b)

It is equally illegal to stipulate for the compromise of a charge amounting only to a misdemeanor, if the offence is one which is injurious to the community generally, and not confined in its consequences to the prosecutor himself, as it is to compromise a charge of felony. (c)

The 18 Eliz. c. 5, contains provisions against compounding informations on penal Statutes. But this Statute does not extend to penalties which are only recoverable by information before Justices. (d)

The defendant was indicted for compounding a penal prosecution, instituted by him against one F., under 29 & 30 Vic., c. 51, s. 256. It appeared that F. had been convicted, under that Act, on the information of defendant, by the Police Magistrate of H., and a fine of $50 imposed upon him, and that, on an appeal therefrom, defendant, for $10, agreed with F. not to prosecute this appeal, but consented that the conviction should be quashed, which was accordingly done :-Held that as, in this case, the offence charged in the indictment was the compounding a penal action or prosecution that had been instituted, and as this was no offence at common law, at least as to that part of the penalty going to the informer, and as the 18 Eliz., c. 5, did not apply to the case, (e) the indictment would not lie either at common

(a) Re Fraser, 1 U. C. L. J. N. S. 326, per A. Wilson, J.

b) May q. t. v. Dettrick, 5 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 77. As to stifling a prosecution for felony, and the distinction between it and compounding felony, see Williams v. Bayley, L. R. 1 E. & I. App. 200.

(c) Dwight v. Ellsworth, 9 U. C. Q. B. 540, per Robinson, C. J.

(d) Reg. v. Mason, 17 U. C. C. P. 534; Rex v. Crisp, 1 B. & Ald. 282. (e) Rex v. Crisp, supra.

law or under the Statute, and the conviction of the defendant was therefore ordered to be annulled. (a)

Offences by Persons in Office.-An indictment lies against a person who wilfully neglects or refuses to execute the duties of a public office. (b) An indictment may be maintained against a deputy returning officer at an election for refusing, on the requisition of the agent of one of the candidates, to administer the oath to certain parties tendering themselves as voters. (c) But the omission of the name of the agent from such indictment will vitiate it. (d)

An indictment charging a misdemeanor against a registrar and his deputy jointly, is good, if the facts establish a joint offence. A deputy is liable to be indicted, while the principal legally holds the office, and even after the deputy himself has been dismissed from the office. (e)

Extortion signifies the unlawful taking by any officer, by colour of his office, of any money or thing of value that is not due to him, or more than his due, or before it is due. (f) This offence is of the degree of misdemeanor and all persons concerned therein, if guilty at all, are principals. (g) Two or more persons may be jointly convicted of extortion where they act together and concur in the demand. Where two persons sat together as magistrates, and one of them exacted a sum of money from a person charged before them with a felony, the other not dissenting, it was held that they might be jointly

(a) Reg. v. Mason, 17 U. C. C. P. 534; see also R. v. Stone, 4 C. & P. 379; R. v. Gotley, R. & R. 84; R. v. Best, 2 Mood. C. C. 125; Arch. Cr. Pldg. 837; Macfarlane v. Dewcy, 15 L. C. J. 85; 32 & 33 Vic., c. 21, s. 115.

(b) Reg. v. Bennet, 21 U. C. C. P. 238, per Galt, J.

(c) Ib.

(d) Ib.

() Reg. v. Benjamin, 4 U. C. C. P. 179.

(f) Russ. Cr. 208.

(g) Reg. v. Tisdale, 20 U. C. Q. B. 273, per Robinson, C. J.