convicted. (a) It is not necessary that the indictment should charge the defendants with having acted corruptly. (b)

The courts do not quash indictments for extortion, but leave the defendants to demur. (c)

The Stat. of West. 3 Ed. 1, c. 26, would seem to apply here. (d).

As to the fees which may be legally exacted by public officers in different cases, it is a general rule that when a duty is cast upon any one by Act of Parliament, and no remuneration is provided for doing it, the party is to perform the duty without remuneration. (e) A clerk of the peace is an officer serving the Crown, and appointed to discharge public duties, and he cannot charge fees for any service for the remuneration of which no provision is made by Statute or otherwise expressly assigned to him by law; (f) for it is a maxim of law that no fee can be demanded for services rendered in the adminis tration of justice, except such as can be shown to have a clear legal origin, either as being specifically allowed in some Act of Parliament, or as being sanctioned by some court or officer that has been permitted by ancient usage to award a fee for the service. (g)

All new offices erected with new fees, or old offices with new fees, are within the Stat. 34 Ed. 1, for that is tallage upon the subject, which cannot be done without common assent by Act of Parliament. (h) A clerk of the peace is not entitled to any fee from the parties to a

(a) Reg. v. Tisdale, 20 U. C. Q. B. 273, per Robinson, C. J.

(b, Ib.

(c) Ib. 272, per Robinson, C. J.; and see Rex v. Wadsworth, 5 Mod. 13. (d) See Askin v. London District Council, 1 U. C. Q. B. 292.

(e) Ib. 295, per Robinson, C. J.; Graham v. Grill, 2 M. & S. 295.

(f) Askin v. London Dis. Council, 1 U. C. Q. B. 292.

(g) Hooker v. Gurnett, 16 U. C. Q. B. 183, per Robinson, C. J.; Price v. Perceval, S. L. C. A. 189; the London S. V. A. R. 140.

(h) The London S. V. A. R. 140.

The table of

cause for striking a special Jury. (a) fees established and promulgated by the Courts, contains all the services for which clerks of the peace are entitled to charge, except that they are entitled to fees in all cases where such fees are authorized by Act of Parliament; but no local tariff or user in particular counties can give any additional right. (b)

In Re Barnhart v. Justices' Home District (c), a man damus was moved for to compel the justices of the peace to make an order upon their treasurer to pay to Barnhart, the late gaoler, several sums of money which he claimed, first, for the expense of a guard provided by him to prevent the escape of prisoners, rendered necessary, as he said, by the insufficiency of the gaol; second, for expenses defrayed by him in retaking prisoners who had escaped from the gaol. The mandamus was refused, as a mandamus never issues except to admit or restore a person to an ascertained right, and the law makes no provision for these charges, but they rest in the discretion of the justices.

It would be illegal, as manifestly contrary to duty, as well as public policy, in a judge to take from the party in whose favour he purposes to decide an undertaking, to indemnify him against all the consequences of his decision. (d) A conviction against a bailiff for exacting more than his legal fees was quashed, on the ground that the magistrate permitted an amendment in the information, and because no precise date of the offence was given. (e) The fees of office and taxes payable to the

(a) Hooker v. Gurnett, 16 U. C. Q. B. 180.

(b) Re Dartnell, 26_U. C. Q. B. 430. See as to auditing accounts of the Clerk of the Peace, Re Poussett and Corporation, Lambton, 22 U. C. Q. B. 80. (c) 5 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 507.

(d) Ballard v. Pope, 3 U. C. Q. B. 320, per Robinson, C. J.

(e) Ex parte Smith, 6 L. C. R. 488.

J

clerk of appeals, Queen's Bench, belong to, and form part of, the revenue of the Crown. (a)

Sale of Offices.-It would seem that an indictment or information lies at common law for the sale of a public office, on the ground that public policy requires that there should be no money consideration for the appointment to any office in which the public are interested, and that the public will be better served by having persons best qualified to fill offices appointed to them; and if money may be given to those who appoint, or through whom an office may be obtained, it would be a temptation to appoint improper persons. (b)

The office of sheriff is an office concerning the administration or execution of public justice, and the sale of it is illegal. The defendant agreed with R., then sheriff of the county of Norfolk, to give him £500, and an annuity of £300 a year, if he would resign. R. accordingly placed his resignation in defendant's hands. The £500 was paid, and certain lands conveyed to secure the annuity; and it was further agreed that in the event of the resignation being returned, and R continuing to hold the office, the money should be repaid, and the land reconveyed. But R. did not undertake in any way to assist in procuring the appointment for the defendant. The latter having been appointed by the Government in ignorance of the agreement, an information was filed against him :-Held that this was an illegal transaction, as being, in fact, a purchase of the office, within the 5 & 6 Ed. 6, c. 16, and that an information might be sustained under this Act as for a misdemeanor; but, at all events, if not sustainable under this Act, the British Act 49 Geo. 3, c. 126, clearly applied in this Province, and made it a

(a) Reg. v. Holt, 13 L. C. R. 306.

(b) Reg. v. Mercer, 17 U. C. Q. B. 625, per M'Lean, J.; and see Russ. Cr. 214; Rex v. Vaughan, 4 Burr., 2494; Rex v. Pollman, 2 Camp. 229.

misdemeanor. (a) The ignorance of the Government as to the illegal agreement was immaterial. (b)

In another case, a sheriff agreed with one O. to give the latter all the fees of his office, except for certain services specified, in consideration of which O. was to pay him £300 a year quarterly in advance, not out of the fees, but absolutely and without reference to their amount:Held that this was a sale of the deputation of the office, and was clearly prohibited by the 5 & 6 Ed. 6, c. 16, and 49 Geo. 3, c. 126, and that the effect of it was to forfeit the office upon conviction under a proceeding by scire facias. (c) But if the defendant in this case had agreed to pay his deputy a certain sum of money annually for acting as his deputy, either in regard to all his ministerial duties, or a part of them, or had agreed to give him a certain portion of the fees, or to take from him a certain portion of the fees, or a certain fixed sum annually out of the fees, he would not have brought himself within the Statute, or done anything illegal. (d)

The 49 Geo. 3, c. 126, expressly extends the 5 & 6 Ed. 6, c. 16, to the Colonies; at least such portions of it as are in their nature applicable. (e) The former Statute expressly extends the 5 & 6 Ed. 6, c. 16, to the office of Sheriff: and any act done in contravention of the latter Statute is indictable, though not expressly made so. (ƒ)

An agreement whereby, after reciting that A. had carried on the business of a law stationer at G., and had also been sub-distributor of stamps, collector of assessed taxes, etc., there, and that he had agreed with B. for the sale of the said business, and of all his goodwill and interest

(a) Reg. v. Mercer, 17 U. C. Q. B. 602.

(b) Ib.

(c) Reg. v. Moodie, 20 U. C. Q. B. 389.

(d) 16. 402, per Robinson, C. ; see also Foott v. Bullock, 4 U. C. Q, B. 480. (a) Reg. v. Mercer, 17 U. C. Q. B. 602.

(ƒ) 1b.

therein, to him, for the sum of £300. A., in consideration of the said sum of £300, agreed to sell, and B. agreed to purchase, the said business of a law stationer at G.; and whereby it was further agreed that A. should not, at any time, after the first of March then next, carry on the business of a law stationer at G., or within ten miles thereof, or collect any of the assessed taxes, but would use his utmost endeavours to introduce B. to the said business and offices, is illegal and void, as being a contract for the sale of an office within the 5 & 6 Ed. 6, c. 16, and also within the 49 Geo 3, c. 126, which makes the offences prohibited by the former Statute misdemeanors.(a)

An arrangement by a clerk of the Crown to resign his office in favor of his son, on condition of sharing the revenues and emoluments of the office, is illegal and void. (b)

The Quarter Sessions is a competent tribunal to hear and determine a charge, under 1 W. & M., c. 21, s. 6, against a clerk of the peace for having "misdemeaned himself in the execution of his office." And when the Quarter Sessions have determined the charge, this Court cannot question the propriety of their decision. (c)

A Court of Justice has power to remove its officers, if unfit to be trusted with a professional status and character. If an advocate, for example, were found guilty of crime, there is no doubt the Court would remove him. (d) And a criminal information will lie against an officer who misconducts himself in the execution of his office. But such an information will never be granted against a Judge, unless the Court sees plainly that dishonest op

(a) Hopkins v. Prescott, 4 C. B. 578; and see Reg. v. Charretie, 13 Q. B. 447. (b) Delisle and Delisle, Rob. Dig. 89.

(c) Wildes v. Russell, L. R. 1, C. P. 722.

(d) Re Wallace, L. R. 1, P. C. App. 295, per Lord Westbury.