the Judge was actuated by any improper motives, and alleged that he was throughout desirous of doing his duty in a fair and impartial manner, without bias or affection for or towards any person or persons whomsoever. The affidavits further shewed that the Judge was not aware of what passed between the counsel of the accused and the jury, nor had he any information that the jury had not agreed, or the least intimation that there was any dissentient among them. The information was refused.

An attachment has been granted against Commissioners of a Court of Requests, for trying a cause in which they were interested. (a) And where a Magistrate acts in his office with a partial, malicious, or corrupt motive, he is guilty of a misdemeanor, and may be proceeded against by indictment or criminal information in the Queen's Bench. (b)

It is a well-established maxim of law that no one shall be a judge in his own cause, and the general rule applicable to judicial proceedings is, that the judgment of an interested judge is voidable, and liable to be set aside by prohibition, error, or appeal, as the case may be. (c) In cases of necessity, however, where all the Judges having exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter happen to be interested, the objection cannot prevail. And the objection does not apply to a party claiming the protection of an Act of Parliament, though he is a necessary party to its passing, as the Governor of a Colony, there being no analogy between judicial and legislative proceedings in this respect. (d)

A direct pecuniary interest in the matter in dispute disqualifies any person from acting as a Judge in such

(a) Rex v. M'Intyre Taylor, 22.

(b) Burns Jus., vol, iii. 144-5, 13 edn.

(c) Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 6, Q. B. 22, per Willes, J. (d) Ib. 22, per Willes, J.

matter. (a) The interest, however, which disqualifies at common law must be direct and certain, not remote or contingent. (b)

The mere possibility of bias in favour of one of the parties does not ipso facto avoid the Justice's decision; in order to have that effect, the bias must be shewn at least to be real.

The Corporation of B. were the owners of water-works, and were empowered by Statute to take the waters of certain streams, without permission of the mill-owners, on obtaining a certificate of Justices that a certain reservoir was completed of a given capacity, and filled with water. An application was made to Justices accordingly, which was opposed by mill-owners; but, after due enquiry, the Justices granted the certificate. Two of the Justices were trustees of a hospital and friendly society respectively, each of which had lent money to the society on bonds, charging the corporate funds. Neither of the Justices could, by any possibility, have any pecuniary interest in these bonds; but the security of their cestui que trusts would be improved by anything improving the borough fund, and the granting of the certificate would indirectly produce that effect, as increasing the value of the water-works. There was no ground to doubt that the Justices had acted bona fide:-Held that the Justices were not disqualified from acting in the granting of the certificate, and the Court refused a certiorari for the purpose of quashing it. (c)

But if a Judge is really biassed in favour of one of the parties, it would be very wrong in him to act, and seems the Court would interpose in such case. (d)

(a) Reg. v. Rand. L. R. 1 Q. B. 232, per Blackburn, J.

(b) Reg. v. M. S. & L. Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 339, per Mellor, J. (c) Reg. v. Rand, L. R. 1 Q. B. 230.

(d) Ib. 233, per Blackburn, J.

It seems no objection to a Justice that he is remotely connected with one of the parties, so long as there is no consanguinity or affinity. (a)

If a person assault a Justice, the latter might, at the time of the assault, order him into custody; but when the act is over, and time intervenes, so that there is no present disturbance, it becomes, like any other offence, a matter to be dealt with upon proper complaint, upon oath, to some other Justice, who might issue his warrant; for neither a magistrate nor a constable is allowed to act officially in his own case, except flagrante delictu, while there is otherwise danger of escape, or to suppress an actual disturbance, and enforce the law while it is in the act of being resisted. (b)

Monopoly.-A by-law passed under 31 Vic., c. 30, s. 44, for exempting from taxation any person commencing any new manufacture of the nature contemplated by the section, and employing therein more than $1,000, and paying to operators more than $30 weekly, was held bad, for exempting new manufactures in preference to old-established business, and for exempting only those persons doing a specified amount of business. (c) The giving to one person of a trade a benefit which another of the same trade does not get also, is a monopoly of the worst description; (d) and a by-law passed for such a purpose would be void.

Rules in restraint of trade are not criminal, though they may be void as against public policy. (e) Nor are strikes necessarily illegal, and their legality or illegality must depend on the means by which they are enforced,

(a) Reg. v. Comrs. High Ways, St. Joseph, 3 Kerr, 583. See also on this subject Wildes v. Russell, L. R. 1C. P. 722; Ex parte Leonard, 1 Allen, 269. (b) Powell v. Williamson. 1 U. C. Q. B. 156. per Robinson, C. J.

(c) Pirie and the Corporation of Dundas, 29 U. C. Q. B. 401.

(d) Ib. 407, per A. Wilson, J.

(e) Reg. v. Stainer, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 230, 39 L. J. (M. C.) 54.

and upon their objects. They may be criminal, if part of a combination for the purpose of injuring or molesting either masters or men, or they may be simply illegal, as when they are the result of an arrangement depriving those engaged therein of the liberty of action. (a)

"The Trade Unions Act, 1872," declares that the purposes of any Trade Union shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, be deemed to be unlawful, so as to render any member of such Trade Union liable to a criminal prosecution for conspiracy, or otherwise.

By an Act of the last session of the Dominion Parliament, every person who uses violence to any person, or any property, or threatens or intimidates any person in such a manner as would justify a Justice of the Peace, on complaint made to him, to bind over the person so threatening or intimidating to keep the peace, or who "molests" or "obstructs" any person in manner defined by the Act, with a view to coerce such person-being a master, to dismiss or cease to employ any workman; or, being a workman, to quit any employment, or return work before it is finished; being a master, not to offer, or, being a workman, not to accept, any employment or work; being a master or workman, to belong to, or not to belong to, any temporary or permanent association or combination; being a master or workman, to pay any fine or penalty imposed by any temporary or permanent association or combination; being a master, to alter the mode of carrying on his business, or the number or description of any persons employed by him—shall be guilty of an offence against the Act, and shall be liable to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding three months.

(a) Farrer v. Close, L. R. 4 Q. B. 612, per Hannen, J.; Hilton v. Eckersly & B. 47.

Any person shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to molest or obstruct another person in any of the following cases :-that is to say (1) If he persistently follows such other person about from place to place; (2) If he hides any tools, clothes, or other property owned or used by such other person, or deprives him of, or hinders him in the use thereof; (3) If he watches or besets the house or place where such other person resides, or works, or carries on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place, or if with two or more other persons he follows such other person, in a disorderly manner, in or through any street or road.

By the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 20, s. 42, assaults in pursuance of any unlawful combination or conspiracy to raise the rate of wages, are punishable as misdemeanors.

These Statutes, in a great measure, assimilate the law as to trades unions and strikes to that existing in England. Several cases have been decided in England, which may assist in the construction of the Canadian Statutes. (a)

A by-law of Frederickton, to regulate the public market, required the stalls in the market to be leased annually, and declared that the lessee of a stall should receive from the Mayor a license to occupy, and that any person occupying without license should be liable to a penalty:-Held, in a prosecution for the penalty, that the only question was, whether the defendant had a license. (b)

Champerty and Maintenance.-The offence of champerty

(a) See Reg. v. Bykerdike, 1 M. & Rob, 179; Reg. v. Rowlands, 2 Den, 364, 17 Q. B. 671; Reg. v. Duffield, 5 Cox, 404; Walsby v. Anley, 30 L. J. (M. C.) 121; O'Neill v. Longman, 4 B. & S. 376; O'Neill v. Kruger, 4 B. &. S. 389; Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox, 592, 601-2; Reg. v. Shepherd, 11 Cox, 325; Reg. v. Selsby, 5 Cox, C. C. 495; Hilton v. Eckersly, 6 E. & B. 47-53; 24 L. J. Q. B. 353; Hornby v Close, L. R. 2 Q. B., 153; Reg. v. Hunt, 8 C. & P. 642; Reg. v. Hewit, 5 Cox, C. C. 162.

(b) Ex parte Milligan, 2 Allen, 583; see as to forestalling, Wilson v. Corporation, St. Catherines, 21 U. C. C. P. 462.