nies, and in some cases, even where an act is only impliedly made an offence in England. There are several cases in which summary convictions have been upheld in Ontario upon English statutes, which are not otherwise in force than as they were considered to have been introduced under our general adoption of the criminal law, although the act done was not otherwise made an offence in England than by its being positively prohibited by statute and a penalty imposed upon conviction before the magistrates, with imprisonment in case of the penalty not being paid. (a) And the learned Chief Justice further observes, "I by no means mean to say that all such Acts have been held to form part of our criminal law, for there are cases in which reason has pointed out obvious grounds for exception, as in the instance of particular regulations made for the method of carrying on certain manufactures. But where acts have been prohibited under a penalty, from their tendency to lead to vice and immorality, as in the instance of Sabbath breaking and gambling, the English statutes respecting them, which were in force in 1792, have been treated as being in force here. And our statute, 11 Geo. 4, c. 1, was passed to obviate the practical inconvenience we were under in enforcing such Acts, by reason of the penalty, or a portion of it, being in many cases appropriated to the poor of the parish, or in some other manner not exactly applicable to the existing state of things here. (b) It was held in this case that, notwithstanding the 19 Vic. c. 49, passed in this Province, the 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, as to lotteries, is in force here; first, because it comes within our adoption of the criminal law of England as it stood in 1792, and next, because this statute and other

(a) Cronyn v. Widder, 16 U. C. Q.B. 361, per Robinson, C. J. (b) Cronyn v. Widder, 16 U. C. Q. B. 361, per Robinson, C. J.

statutes of the same nature, and resting on the same footing, have been treated in our courts as being in force. (a)

By the 14 Geo. 3, c. 83, the British Parliament clearly designed to give to Canada the criminal law of England as to those objects and in those matters for which no special provision had before been made by Parliament, but it had no intended reference to, nor did it introduce, Acts of Parliament which, from their very terms, already were as much in force in the colonies as in England, and which consequently required no introduction at that period. (b) This statute introduced only that portion of the criminal law of England which was of universal application, and not such parts as were merely municipal and of local importance (c): but it was introduced in toto in law as well as in practice. (d)

The 40 Geo. 3, c. 1, did not apply to or introduce Acts which were already in force in the Province of Ontario. (e)

As somewhat illustrating the principles already explained, we now proceed to refer to cases in which particular criminal statutes have been held to be in force, giving, as far as possible, the reason upon which the decision in each case proceeded.

The statute 32 Henry 8, c. 9, which prohibits the buying of disputed titles, is in force in Ontario, as it constitutes part of the criminal law of England adopted by the 40 Geo. 3, c.1 (ƒ). In the case of Shea v. Choat (g), it was

(a) Ib. 356-361; see also as to lotteries and the 12 Geo. 2, c. 28; Corby v. Me. Daniel, 16 U. C. Q. B. 378; Marshall v. Platt, 8 U. C. C. P. 189: Lloyd v. Clark, 11 U. C. C. P. 250, per Draper, C. J.; Mewburn v. Street, 21 U. C. Q. B. 306-498.

(b) Bank of Upper Canada v. Bethune, 4 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 171 per Robinson, C. J.; see also Bank of Montreal v. Bethune, 4 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 193. (c) Ex parte Rousse, S. L. C. A. 321.

(d) Notman v. Reg. 13 L. C. J. 257 per Badgley.

(e) Bank of Upper Canada v. Bethune, 4 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 171-2, per Robinson, C. J.

(f) Beasley q. t. v. Cahill, 2 U, C. Q. B. 320; see also Baldwiu q. t. v. Henderson, 3 U. C. Q. B. 287; Benns, q. t. v. Eddie, 2 U. C. Q. B. 286; Aubrey, q, 1. v. Smith, 7 U. C. Q. B. 213; May, q. t. v. Dettrick, 5 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 77; Ross, q. t. v. Meyers, 9 U. C. Q. B. 284; McKenzie v. Miller, 6 U. C. Q. B. 0. S. 459; Smith v. Hall, 25 U. C. Q. B. 554.

(g) 2 U. C. Q. B. 211.

held that the statute 5 Eliz., c. 4, is not in force in Ontario, but the statute 20 Geo. 2, c. 19, is, though both statutes are of a date long anterior to the introduction of the English law in this Province. In giving judgment in this case the learned Chief Justice Robinson says, in reference to the 5 Eliz. c. 4, that "it cannot possibly admit of doubt that its provisions are inapplicable to any state of things that ever existed here. A clause here and there might be carried into effect in this colony, or anywhere, from the general nature of their provisions, but that is not sufficient to make such a statute part of our law, when the main object and tenor of it is wholly foreign to the nature of our institutions, and is therefore incapable of being carried substantially and as a whole into execution. (a)

The 28 Geo. 3, c. 49, s. 1, as to perjury, is local in its character, and therefore is not in force here. (b)

In Reg. v. Mercer, (c) it was held that the 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 16, against buying and selling offices, is in force in this country, under the 40 Geo. 3, c. 1, as part of the criminal law of England. The 49 Geo. 3, c. 126, applies here and expressly extends the 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 16, to the colonies, or at least such of its provisions as are in their nature applicable. (d) Semble, the 3 Edw. 1, c. 26, is in force here. (e)

The 1 W. & M. c. 18, s. 18, is in force here, notwithstanding the Con. Stats. Can. c. 92, s. 18, and a person offending against the former statute may be punished. (f)

The 32 Geo. 3, c. 1, introducing the law of England as to property and civil rights into the Province of Ontario,

(a) Ib. 221.

(b) Reg. v. Row, 14 U. C. C. P. 307.

(c) 17 U. C. Q. B. 602.

(d) Ib.; see also Reg. v. Moodie, 20 U. C. Q. B. 389; Foot v. Bullock, 4 U. C. Q. B. 480.

(e) Askin v. London District Council, 1 U. C. Q. B. 292.

(ƒ) Reid v. Inglis. 12 U. C. C. P. 195; per Draper, C. J.

included the law generally which related to marriage, that is, the common and statute law of England applicable to the state of things existing in this colony at the time the Act was passed. The stat. 26 Geo, 2, c. 33, being in force in England when our stat. 32 Geo. 3, c. 1, became law, was adopted, as well as other statutes, so far as it consisted with our civil institutions, being part of the law of England at that time "relating to civil rights." It would seem, however, that the 11th clause of 26 Geo. 2, c. 33, is not in force in this country. (a)

The 8 Henry 6, c. 9, 6 Henry 8, c. 9, and 8 Henry 4, c. 9, and 21 James 1, c. 15, as to forcible entry, are in force here (b): so the 8 & 9 Wm. 3, c. 27 (c): so the 33 Henry 8, c. 20 (d) so the Mutiny Act, 25 Vic. c. 5, s. 72 (e): so by the 14 Geo. 3, c. 83, the 9 Geo. 1, c. 19, and 6 Geo. 2, c. 35, which impose certain penalties on persons selling foreign lottery tickets, have been made to form part of the law of Quebec. (ƒ)

(a) Reg. v. Roblin, 21 U. C. Q. B. 352-5; Hodgins v. McNeil, 9 Grant, 305; 9 U. C. L. J. 125; Reg, v. Secker, 14 U. C. Q. B. 604; but see Reg. v. Bell, 15 Ú. U. C. Q. B. 287.

(b) Boulton v. Fitzgerald, 1 U. C. Q. B. 343; Rex. v. McGreary, 5 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 620.

(c) Wragg v. Jarvis, 4 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 317.

(d) Doe dem. Gillespie v. Wixon, 5 U. C. Q. B. 132.

(e) Reg. v. Dawes, 22 U. C. Q. B. 333.

(f) Ex parte Rousse, S. L. C. A. 321.

See further on the general subject Hesketh v. Ward, 17 U. C. C. P. 667; Mercer v. Hewston, 9 U. C. C. P. 349; Heartly v. Hearns, 6 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 452; Torrance v. Smith, 3 U. C. C. P. 411; James v. McLean, 3 Allen, 164; Marks v. Gilmour, 3 Allen, 170-217; ex parte Bustin, 2 Allen, 211; Fish v. Doyle Draper, 340; Purdy q, t. v. Ryder Taylor, 236; Reg. v. Street, 1 Kerr, 373; doe dem Allen v. Murray, 2 Kerr, 359; Milner v. Gilbert, 3 Kerr, 617; Morrison v. McAlpine, 2 Kerr, 36; ex parte Ritchie, 2 Kerr, 75; Reg. v. McCormick, 18 U. C. Q. B. 131; Pringle v. Allan, 18 U. C. Q. B. 578; Warner v. Tyson, 2 L. C.J. 105; Reg. v. Beveridge, 1 Kerr, 58; Reg. v. Street, 1 Kerr, 373; Atty. General v. Warner, 7 U. C. Q. B. 397.

EXTRADITION.

FOR the purposes of this chapter, it may be said that where, upon a requisition by the Government of Canada or the United States, a person found within the territories of either nation, charged with murder, assault, with intent to commit murder, piracy, arson, robbery, the utterance of forged paper, or forgery committed within the jurisdiction of the other, is delivered up to justice, pursuant to the Ashburton Treaty, and the statutes passed to give effect thereto, the surrender under such circumstances is called extradition.

Jurists are not unanimous on the question whether in the absence of treaty stipulations there is any obligation recognized between nations to make such surrender. But the better opinion seems to be that, in an international point of view, the extradition of criminals is a matter of comity, and not of right, except in cases specially provided for by treaty. (a) The law of England does not recognize it as an international duty in the absence of treaty stipulations, and the Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, s. 12, in effect prohibits it in the case of subjects, except fugitives from one part of Her Majesty's dominions to another. (b)

Both Great Britain and the United States maintain, upon principles of international law, irrespective of treaty, that the surrender of foreign criminals cannot be demanded. Hence the necessity for a treaty on the subject, which can only be made by the treaty-making

(a) Re Anderson, 11 U. C. C. P., 61 per Richards, J. Reg. v. Bennet H. Young. 9 L. C. J., 44 per Badgley, J.

(b) Reg. v. Tubbee, 1 U. C. P. R., 102-3, per Macaulay, C. J.