right, but that the conviction must be quashed, for that it appeared that the proximate cause of the death of the deceased, for which only the prisoner, on this indictment, would be responsible, was the insufficient supply of food, and that the prisoner was not criminally responsible for that, as there was no sufficient evidence that the deceased had lost the exercise of her free will, and was unable to withdraw herself from her mistress's dominion and control. (a)

The prisoner was convicted on an indictment which charged him with neglecting to provide food and clothing for his child, but omitted specifically to allege his ability to do so-Held that the ability to provide was implied, and therefore sufficiently averred in the use of the word "neglect." (b)

Where in an indictment of a single woman, the mother of a bastard child, for neglecting to provide it with sufficient food, it was alleged that she neglected her duty, "during all the time aforesaid being able and having the means to perform and fulfil the said duty" and as to that allegation, the evidence was that she was cohabiting with a man who was not the father and there was no evidence of her actual possession of means for nourishing the child, but it was proved that she could have applied to the relieving officer of the Union and that, if she had done so, she would have received relief adequate to the support of the child and herself:-Held, that the allegation was not proved, and that the conviction could not be supported. (c)

Deceased, immediately after being struck by the pri soner, had walked two miles to the police barrack, and ridden home a distance of four miles, the next morning.

(1) Reg. v. Charlotte Smith, 13 W. R. 816; 1 U. C. L. J. N. S. 164.

(b, heg. v. Ryland, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 99; 37 L. J. (M. C.) 10.

() Reg. v. Chandler, 1 U. C. L. J. 135; Dears. 453; 24 L. J. (M. C.) 109.

The doctor stated that the re-action caused by this walking and riding accelerated the death of the deceased; that but for such exercise deceased would have had a better chance of recovery; that deceased died of compression of the brain; that the blow was alone sufficient to cause such compression, but that deceased was more likely to recover, if he had not so walked or ridden:-Held that the Judge was right in directing the jury that, if they believed the doctor's evidence, they should find the prisoner guilty. (a)

If a man kill an officer of justice, either civil or criminal, such as a bailiff, constable, etc., in the legal execution of his duty, or any person acting in aid of him whether specially called thereunto or not, or any private person endeavouring to suppress an affray or apprehend a felon knowing his authority or the intention with which he interposes, the law will imply malice and the offender will be guilty of murder. (b) But the officer must have a legal authority and execute it in a proper manner, and the defendant must have knowledge of that authority and intention. (c)

The 32 & 33 Vic. c. 29, s. 2 empowers, a constable or peace officer to apprehend without warrant, any person found committing an offence punishable either by indictment or upon summary conviction. Where a person was supposed to have obtained money by false pretences at 1 P. M. and was not arrested until 10 P. M.: Held that the party was "found committing" the offence at 1 P. M. and might be arrested, when found committing or after a pursuit immediately commenced. But "immediately' means after the commission of the offence and not after its discovery for the intention of the Statute was that the

criminal should be apprehended immediately on the commission of the offence. (a)

A person found committing an offence against the Larceny Act, 32 & 33, Vic. c. 21, may be immediately apprehended by any person without a warrant, provided, according to the rule laid down in Herman v. Seneschal, (b) and adopted in Roberts v. Orchard, (c) the person so apprehending honestly believes in the existence of facts which, if they existed, would have justified him under the statute, 24 & 25 Vic., c. 96. s. 103. It is not necessary that an offence should have been committed under the statute by any one; but the belief must rest on some ground and mere suspicion will not be enough. (d)

The Police Act (N.B.) 11 Vic. c. 13 s. 22 does not authorize the arrest without warrant of known residents of the place. (e)

In King v. Poe, (f) it was left undecided and in doubt whether a Magistrate has a right to arrest a person for a misdemeanor committed in his view. Where there has been no breach of the peace, actual or apprehended, a Magistrate has no right to detain a known person to answer a charge of misdemeanor, verbally intimated to him, without a regular information before him in his capacity of Magistrate that he may be able to judge whether it charges any offence to which the party ought to answer. (g)

Where a Magistrate allows a prisoner to depart, without examining into the charge against him, with a direction to appear the next morning at the police office, and in the meantime, on the ground that he was assaulted by the

(a) Downing v. Capel, L. R. 2 C. P. 461.

(b) 11 W. R. 184; 13 C. B. N. S. 392.

(e) 12 W. R. 253; 2 H. & C. 768.

(d) Leete v. Hart, 4 U. C. L. J. N. S. 201.

(e) Foley v. Tucker, 1 Hannay, 52.

(f) 15 L. T. Rep. N. S. 37.

(g) Caudle v. Ferguson, 1 Q. B. 889; Rex v. Birnie, 1 M. & R. 160.

Q

prisoner, when in custody before him the previous evening, gives verbal instructions to a constable to apprehend him and take him to the station house or gaol, such imprisonment is illegal and the Magistrate cannot justify the arrest. (a) Under the 1 Vic. c. 21, it is illegal in a Magistrate to cause the arrest of a party in the first instance, he must be first summoned before him. (b)

Where a defendant has been brought before one Magistrate and bailed by him, although a statute may require the presence of three to convict the prisoner—a second arrest for the same charge by the same complainant before the time appointed for the hearing is illegal. (c)

A constable may arrest any one for a breach of the peace committed in his presence, not merely to preserve the peace, but for the purposes of punishment. (d)

Where a policeman saw a man, who was drunk, assault his wife, and within twenty minutes after took him into custody-Held that the policeman was justified in so doing, nothwithstanding that the man had left the spot, where his wife was saying he should" leave her altogether." (e)

A constable may arrest a person without a warrant upon a reasonable charge, that is upon probable information that he has committed a crime. (ƒ)

It would appear that a constable has nothing to do virtute officii in a civil proceeding, and he can have no colour or pretence for acting without authority specially given by some process (g)

It is the duty of a person arresting any one on suspicion of felony to take him before a Justice of the Peace

(a) Powell v. Williamson, 1 U. C. Q. B. 154.
(b) Croukhite v. Sommerville, 3 U. C. Q. B. 129.
(c) King v. Orr, 5 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 724.

(d) Deercourt v. Corbishley, 1 U. C. L. J. 156.

(e) Reg. v. Light, 4 U. C. L. J. 97; Dears. & B. 332; 27 L. J. (M. C. ) 1. (f) Rogers v. Van Valkenburgh, 20 U. C. Q. B. 219, per Robinson, C. J. (g) See Brown v. Shea, 5 U. C. Q. B. 143, per Robinson, C. J.

as soon as he reasonably can; and the law gives no authority, even to a Justice of the Peace, to detain a person suspected but for a reasonable time till he may be examined. (a) A private person not being by office a keeper of the peace or a Justice or constable cannot arrest on suspicion of felony without a warrant, but must shew a felony actually committed. (b)

The

But if a person is prepared to shew that there really has been a felony committed by some one, then he may justify arresting a particular person upon reasonable grounds of suspicion that he was the offender. (c) general rule would seem to be that, at common law, if a a felony were actually committed, a person might be arrested without a warrant by any one, if he were reasonably suspected of having committed the felony; and if a constable had reasonable grounds for supposing that a felony had been committed, and reasonable grounds for assuming that a certain person had committed the supposed felony, he might arrest him, though no felony had actually been committed. (d) Neither a constable nor any other could arrest a person merely on suspicion of his having illegally detained goods. (e)

A clerk in the service of a railway company, whose duty it is to issue tickets to passengers and receive the money, and keep it in a till under his charge, has no implied authority from the company to give into custody a person whom he suspects has attempted to rob the till, after the attempt has ceased, as such arrest could not be necessary for the protection of the company's property. (f) It would seem that, if a man in charge of a till

(a) Ashley v. Dundas, 5 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 754, per Sherwood, J.

(b) Io; M'Kenzie v. Gibson, 8 U. C. Q. B. 100.

(c) Ib. 102, per Robinson, C. J.

(d) Hadley v. Perks, L. R. 1 Q. B. 456, per Blackburn, J.

(e) Ib.

(f) Allen v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co. L. R. 6 Q. B. 65.