So, by s. 47 of this Statute, the forgery of an instrument in this country payable abroad, or the uttering of an instrument in this country, forged, and payable abroad, is made an offence within the meaning of the Act. (a)

When a prisoner, being pressed for payment of a debt, obtained further time to pay, by giving, as security, an IOU, in the following form:

"NOVEMBER 21st, 1870.

"IO U thirty-five pounds (£35).

"ARTHUR CHAMBERS.

"GEORGE WICKHAM."

and purporting to be signed by the prisoner, and another whose signature was forged by the prisoner :-Held, that this was an "undertaking for the payment of money within the (24 & 25 Vic., c. 98, s. 23), corresponding English section of the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 19, s. 26. (b)

There being a consideration for the IO U, the fact that it did not appear was of no consequence; for the consideration of a guarantee need not be shown on its face. (c)

The following instrument was held to be a promissory note for the payment of money within s. 3, of the 10 & 11 Vic., c. 9:

"The President, Directors and Co. of the Montreal Bank promise to pay five dollars, on demand, to W. Martin, or bearer:

"MONTREAL, June 1, 1853.

"A. SIMPSON, Cashier, "WM. GANN, Pres.

(a) See Reg. v. Kirkwood, 1 Mood. C. C. 311.
(b) Reg. v. Chambers, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 341.
(c) Ib. See 26 Vic. c. 45.

for a forged paper, purporting to be a bank note, is a promissory note within the meaning of the statute, and it is equally so if there is no such bank, as that named, the bank intended being erroneously described in the instrument. (a)

A country bank note for the payment of one guinea, "in cash cr Bank of England notes," was holden not to be "a promissory note for the payment of money " within, the 2 Geo. 2, c. 25, for it was necessary that such a note should be for the payment of money only (b); such a case is now provided for by the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 19, S. 15.

Under s. 26, the forgery of a request for the payment of money is made felony, though it was formerly no of fence. (c)

A forged magistrate's order for a reward for apprehending a vagrant, which appeared upon the face of it to be defective, as not being under seal or directed to the constable, etc., was holden not to be within the former statute; for, without these requisites, it was nothing more than the order of a mere individual, which the treasurer was not bound to obey; (d) such orders would be authorities or requests within the above section.

An instrument in the following form.

$3.50.

"CARICK, April, 10, 1863.

"JOHN MCLEAN, tailor, please give Mr. A. Steel to the amount of three dollars and fifty cents, and by doing, you will oblige me,

(a) Reg. v. M'Donald, 12 U. C. Q. B. 543.

(b) R. v. Wilcock, 2 Russ. 498; Arch. Cr. Pldg. 579.

(c) See Reg. v. Thorn, 2 Mood. C. C. 210; C. & Mar. 206. (d) R. v. Rushworth, R. & R. 317; Arch. Cr. Pldg. 583.

is an order for the payment of money, and not a mere request. (a) But an instrument as follows:

"RENFREW, June 13, 1860.

"MR. MCKAY,-Sir, would you be good enough as for to let me have the loan of $10 for one week or so, and send it by the bearer immediately, and much oblige your most humble servant,

is not an order for the payment of money, within the Con. Stats. Can. c. 94. (b)

"MR. WARREN,-Please let the bearer, William Tuke, have the amount of ten pounds, and you will oblige me, "B. B. MITCHELL,"

is an order for the payment of money, within this Statute, and not a mere request; (c) but it would not be a warrant for the payment of money, within the meaning of the Statute. (d) The true criterion as to the instrument being an order or not, is whether the person, to whom it is directed, could recover the amount on payment. (e)

A writing not addressed to a particular person by name, or to anyone, may be an order for the payment of money, within the statute, if it be shewn by evidence that it was intended for such person, or for whom it was intended. (f)

Where the order was for $15, in favour of "bearer or R. R." and purported to be signed by one "B," and the

(a) Reg. v. Steel, 13 U. C. C. P. 619.

(b) Reg. v. Reopelle, 20 U. C. Q. B. 260.

(c) Reg. v. Tuke, 17 U. C. Q. B. 296.

(d) Ib. 298, per Robinson, C. J.

(e) Ib. 299, per Robinson, C. J.; Reg. v. Carter, 1 Cox, C. C. 172; Ib. 241; Reg. v. Dawson, 3 Cox, C. C. 220.

(f) Reg. v. Parker, 15 U. C. C. P. 15; Reg. v. Snelling, 6 Cox, 230; 1 Dears.

219.

prisoner in person presented it to M., representing himself to be the payee and a creditor of "B"-Held, that it might fairly be inferred to be intended for M., and a conviction for forgery was sustained. (a)

An indictment will not lie for forging or altering the Assessment Roll for a township, deposited with the clerk. (b) This would probably now be an offence within the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 19.

An indictment for forging a note must allege that the note was forged.

The defendant was convicted, at the Quarter Sessions, upon an indictment, charging that he, feloniously, did offer, dispose of, and put off a certain promissory note, purporting to be made by one F, for the sum of £410s., with intent to defraud, he, the said defendant, at the time he so uttered and published the said note, as aforesaid, then and there, well knowing the same to be forged. It appeared that some boys had been amusing themselves with writing promissory notes, and imitating persons' signatures, and among them was one with F.'s name. The papers were put in the fire, but one of them was carried up the chimney by the draft, and fell in the street, where it was picked up by the defendant. The latter did not know by whom, or with what intent, it had been made, though he suspected it was not genuine. A person, who was with him at the time, said he thought it was not genuine, and advised him to destroy it; but defendant kept it, and afterwards passed it off, telling the person who took it that it was good:-Held, that, upon these facts, the defendant was guilty of a felonious uttering; but the conviction was quashed, for the indictment was

(a) Reg. v. Parker, 15 U. C. C. P. 15; Reg. v. Snelling, 6 Cox. 230; 1 Dears. 219. (b) Reg. v. Preston, 21 U. C. Q. B. 86.

defective, in not stating expressly that the note was forged, or that the defendant uttered it as true. (a)

Until the Provincial Statute, 9 Vic., c. 3, the old rule of the criminal law of England prevailed, that the party, by whom a forged instrument purported to be signed, was not competent to prove the signature to be forged, and any one who might, by possibility, receive the remotest advantage from the verdict was equally excluded. But the objection was founded on the ground of interest, and, if the witness were divested of such interest he became competent. (b)

The 10 & 11 Vic., c. 9, re-enacted the provisions of the 9 Vic., c. 3, and the 16 Vic., c. 19, Con. Stats. U. C., c. 32, removed the incapacity of crime or interest. This latter Statute did not supersede the former, and both are founded on the same principle, namely, to prevent the exclusion of witnesses, on the ground of interest in the subject matter of enquiry, the first being applicable to enquiries relative to forgery, the latter, general, and also removing the disqualification attached to a conviction for crime. (c)

The £2 & 33 Vic., c. 19, s. 54 and c. 29, s. 62, now embody all the provisions of the former enactments on these points.

Where the prisoner was indicted for forging an order for the delivery of goods, and on the trial the only witnesses examined were the person whose name was forged and the person to whom the order was addressed, and who delivered the goods thereon, and, there being no corroborative evidence, it was held, that, under the proviso in the 10 & 11 Vic., c. 9, s. 21, there was not sufficient evidence to support a conviction. (d)

(a) Reg. v. Dunlop, 15 U. C. Q. B. 118.

(b) Reg. v. Giles, 6 U. C. C. P. 86, per Draper, C. J.

(c) Ib. 86, per Draper, C. J.

(d) Reg. v. Giles, 6 U. C.

P. 84. As to what is sufficient corroboration, see

Reg. v. M'Donald, 31 U. C. Q. B. 337.