constituting it, as alleged in all the counts, were the same, and the difference in statement was only to meet the evidence. The third section of the Con. Stats., U. C., c. 98, as amended by the the 29 & 30 Vic., c. 4, is as follows," every subject of Her Majesty, and every citizen or subject of any foreign state or country, who has, at any time heretofore, offended, or may, at any time hereafter offend against the provisions of this Act is, and shall be, held to be guilty of felony, and may, nothwithstanding the provisions herein before contained, be prosecuted, and tried before any Court of Oyer and Terminer, and General Gaol delivery in, and for, any county, in Upper Canada, in the same manner as if the offence had been committed in such county, and, upon such conviction, shall suffer death as a felon." The prisoner being indicted under this section, and charged as a citizen of the United States, was acquitted on proving himself to be a British subject. He was then indicted under the same section as a subject of Her Majesty, and pleaded autrefois acquit. It was held that the plea was not proved; for by this section the offence, in the case of a foreigner, and a subject, is substantially different, and that the section intended to preserve a distinction between the offences committed by a foreigner and a subject of Her Majesty ; that, when the prisoner was charged as a British subject, the Act, (in the second section) required proof, not only of the status as such subject, but also of the joining with foreigners in the commission of it, and the same evidence, irrespective of national status, which would convict the foreigner, would not convict the subject, and the prisoner, therefore, was not in legal peril on the first indictment. (a) Under s. 11, of the 28 Vic., c. 1, for repressing outrages (a) Reg. v. Magrath, 26 U. C. Q. B. 385. on the frontier, the Court can only order restoration of property seized, when it appears that the seizure was not authorized by the Act. (a) On the facts of this case, they refused to interfere, holding that the collector, who seized, had probable cause for believing that the vessel was intended to be employed in the manner pointed out by the ninth section. (b) It would seem that the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 29, regulating the procedure in criminal cases, is not limited to felonies or offences existing at the time of the passing of the Statute, but applies to offences created by subsequent Statutes, and establishes a general rule of practice and procedure, in all cases that may come before the Court for adjudication, for it would appear that a Statute affecting procedure is not restricted to offences actually committed at the time of its coming into operation. (c) At all events, the (N. B.) Rev. Stats. c. 159, s. 16, by which, on a trial for felony, the jury is authorized to acquit of the felony, and find a verdict of guilty of misdemeanor if the evidence warrants it, applies, as a rule of procedure, to all criminal cases, and is not confined to felonies existing at the time of the passing of the Statute. Therefore, on an indictment for a felonions assault, under the Act 25 Vic., c. 10, passed subsequent to the revised Statute, the prisoner may be found guilty of an assault only. (d) The 32 & 32 Vic., c. 20, s. 26, provides that whosoever unlawfully abandons or exposes any child, being under the age of two years, whereby the life of such child is endangered, or the health of such child has been, or is likely to be, permanently injured, is guilty of a misde meanor. (a) Re Georgian, 25 U. C. Q. B. 319. (b) Ib. (c) See Reg. v. Ryan, 1 Hannay, 116. (d) Ib. As this Statute uses the word "unlawfully," it would seem that it only applies to persons on whom the law casts the obligation of maintaining and protecting the child, and makes this a duty. A person who has the lawful custody and possession of the child, or the father who is legally bound to provide for it, may offend against the provisions of the Statute. But where two persons, strangers to the child, were indicted under this clause. the Court held they were entitled to an acquittal. (a) It would seem, also, if the child dies the clause does not apply, but the prisoner would be guilty of murder or manslaughter, according to the circumstances. (b) A woman who was living apart from her husband, and who had the actual custody of their child under two years of age, brought the child, on the 19th of October, and left it at the father's door, telling him she had done so. He knowingly allowed it to remain lying outside his door, and subsequently in the roadway, from about 7, P. M., till 1, A. M., when it was removed by a constable, the child then being cold and stiff but not dead-Held, that, though the father had not had the actual custody and possession of the child, yet, as he was by law bound to provide for it, his allowing it to remain where he did was an abandonment and exposure of the child by him, whereby its life was endangered, within the meaning of the corresponding English section of 32 & 33 Vic., c. 20, s. 26. (c) A. and B. were indicted, for that they did abandon and expose a certain child, then being under the age of two years, whereby the life of the child was endangered." A., the mother of a child five weeks old, and B. put the child into a hamper, wrapped up in a shawl, and packed (a) Reg. v. White, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 311. with shavings and cotton-wool, and A., with the connivance of B., took the hamper to M., about four or five miles off, to the booking-office of the railway station there. She there paid for the carriage of the hamper, and told the clerk to be very careful of it, and to send it to G. by the next train, which would leave M. in ten minutes from that time. She said nothing as to the contents of the hamper, which was addressed, "Mr. Carr's, Northoutgate, Gisbro. With care, to be delivered immediately," at which address the father of the child was then living. The hamper was carried by the ordinary passenger train from M. to G., leaving M. at 7.45, and arriving at G. at 8.15, P.M. At 8.40, P.M., the hamper was delivered at its address. The child died three weeks afterwards from causes not attributable to the conduct of the prisoners. On proof of these facts at the trial, it was objected, for the prisoners, that there was no evidence to go to the jury that the life of the child was endangered, and that there was no abandonment and exposure of the child, within the meaning of the Statute. The objections were overruled, and the prisoners found guilty :-Held, by a majority of the fifteen Judges, that the conviction should be affirmed. (a) The 32 & 33 Vic., c. 32, contains provisions respecting the prompt and summary administration of criminal justice, in certain cases. It repeals and substantially re-enacts the provisions of the former Statute, Con. Stat. C., c. 105, so that the decisions under the old will equally apply to the new Act. The prisoner was convicted, by the Police Magistrate for the City of Toronto, for that she "did on,” etc., " at the said City of Toronto, keep a common disorderly bawdy house on Queen Street, in the said City,” etc., and (a) Reg. v. Falkingham, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 222. and committed to gaol, at hard labour, for six months. A habeas corpus and certiorari issued, in return to which the commitment, conviction, information, and depositions were brought up, On application for her discharge, no motion being made to quash the conviction :-Held, (1). No objection that the commitment stated the of fence to have been committed on the 11th of August, instead of the 10th, as in the conviction, the variance not being material to the merits, and the Court, not being able to go behind the return and commitment which it set forth. (2) Nor that the commitment charged that the prisoner "was the keeper of," and the conviction "that she did keep,” both differing from the Statute, which designates the offence as "keeping any disorderly house," etc., for it would seem the Court could not go behind the commitment, and all these expressions conveyed but one idea. (3) Nor that the commitment did not shew that the offence was committed within the "Police limits" of the city, the words used in the Act; for the limits of the City of Toronto were assigned by a public Statute, and the Municipal Institutions Act, creating the Police Court and Magistrate, and the whole body of police, contains nothing to shew that there are any police limits differing from the ordinary city limits. (4) Nor that the commitment did not follow the form of conviction given in the Statute, in shewing that the party was charged before the convicting magistrate i. e., charged as the Statute required, namely put upon her trial, and asked whether she was guilty or not guilty, nor whether she pleaded to the charge or confessed it. It might, and probably would, be a defect in the convic tion if it did not pursue the statutory form, in shewing |