that she was, in the night time of the 24th February, 1870, a common prostitute, wandering in the public streets of the City of Ottawa, and not giving a satisfactory account of herself, contrary to the Statute:-Held, that the conviction should allege that the woman was asked, before she was taken, or at the time of her being taken, to give an account of herself, and that she did not give a satisfactory account, and that, therefore, the arrest was made. (a) The Court were of opinion that the allegation, she giving no satisfactory account, did not shew that any prior demand or request had been made upon her for that purpose. Semble, the evidence should shew the place where the person is found, and that it is within the Statute, and also that the person is a common prostitute, and so subject to the provisions of the Statute. (b)

The prisoner threatened A.'s father that he would accuse A. of having committed an abominable offence upon a mare, for the purpose of putting off the mare, and forcing the father, under terror of the threatened charge, to buy and pay for her at the prisoner's price :-Held, that the prisoner was guilty of threatening to accuse, with intent to extort money, within the meaning of the 24 & 25 Vic., c. 96, s. 47, which is similar to the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 21, s. 46. (c)

The Con. Stats. Can., c. 67, s. 16, which declares it a misdemeanor, in any operator or employee of a telegraph company, to divulge the contents of a private despatch, only protects the rights of each individual sender or receiver of a message against disclosures of facts, which come to the knowledge of the operators in the course of

(a) Reg. v. Levecque, 30 U. C. Q. B. 509.

(b) Ib.

(c) Reg. v. Redman, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 12; 35 L. J. (M. C.) 89. As to threats within the 6 Geo. 4, c. 129, s. 3, of force to a master to limit the number of his apprentices, see Wood and Bowron, L. R. 2 Q. B. 21.

their employment. When the rights of others come in question, as when a suit is pending between the sender or receiver of a message and a third party, with whom he is alleged to have contracted, the operator or secretary of the company is bound to disclose the contents of the telegram, in obedience to a subpæna duces tecum. (a)

The 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 32, ss. 3 and 23, forbids, under penalties, the killing or taking of certain game during certain intervals of the year, and s. 23 imposes penalties on any person killing or taking game, or using a dog or engine for that purpose, not being authorised, for want of a certificate. A person, using an engine for taking game without a certificate, during the forbidden interval, is liable to penalties, under the latter section, although he may also be liable to penalties under s. 3; as there is no reason why a man should not be liable to two penalties for the two offences, one against the law for the preservation of game; and one against the revenue, no matter at what season of the year. (b)

The 27 & 28 Vic., c. 47, s. 2, enacts that when any person shall, on indictment, be convicted of any crime punishable with penal servitude, after having been previously convicted of felony, the least sentence of penal servitude that can be awarded shall be a period of seven years.

A. was convicted of the misdemeanor of having done grievous bodily harm to B. The indictment did not charge a previous conviction of felony, but, after the jury had found A. guilty, it was proved, on oath, that A. had been previously convicted of felony, but no record or certificate of such conviction was produced. A. was sentenced to penal servitude for five years, as for a misdemeanor only, without any previous conviction of felony: -Held, that the sentence was correct. (c)

(a) Leslie v. Hervey, 15 L. C. J. 9.

(b) Saunders v. Baldy, L. R. 1 Q. B. 87.

(c) Reg. v. Summers, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 182; 38 L. J. (M. C.) 62.

The prisoner was convicted of a crime punishable with penal servitude, and it was proved that he had been previously convicted of felony; but the previous conviction was not stated in the indictment:-Held, therefore, that the above section did not apply. (a)

By the 11 & 12 Wm. 3, c. 12, and 42 Geo. 3, c. 85, if any Governor of a colony, or other person holding, or having held, public employment out of Great Britain, has been guilty of any crime or misdemeanor in the exercise of his office, every such crime may be prosecuted or enquired of, and heard and determined in the Court of King's Bench in England, either upon information by the Attorney-General, or upon indictment found, and such crime may be laid to have been committed in Middlesex. An offence under the above Statute is an offence committed on land beyond the seas, for which an indictment may legally be preferred in any place in England, within the 11 & 12 Wm. 3, and this section and the other enactments of the Statute, as to preliminary examinations, etc., before a Magistrate, in whose jurisdiction the accused might be, apply to charges under the above Statutes, and the Court of Queen's Bench is included in the term, "next Court of Oyer and Terminer." (b)

Upon an indictment under the Con. Stats. U. C., c. 26, s. 20, for making an assignment to defraud creditors:Held, that a money bond is personalty seizable on an execution, under the Statutes 13 & 14 Vic., c. 53, and 20 Vic., c. 57, and, further, that a transfer, made by a party to a creditor, who accepted the same in full satisfaction and discharge of his debt, did not render the party making such assignment less liable under this indictment. (c)

Under the 4 & 5 Vic., c. 27, s. 27, Magistrates could

(a) Reg. v. Willis, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 363.

(b) Reg. v. Eyre, L. R. 3 Q. B. 487; see 32 & 33 Vic., c. 30, s. 3. (c) Reg. v. Potter, 10 U. C. C. P. 39.

not issue their warrant to imprison absolutely for so many days, but only to imprison for so many days unless the fine and costs be sooner paid. (a)

Under the Statute for repressing riots at elections, no power was given to Magistrates to convict summarily, but the offenders must have been tried by a jury. (b)

To subject a person to the penalty of the 22 Geo. 2, c. 45, for suing out process, the attorney allowing his name to be used must be first convicted. (c)

An offence committed before, though tried after, the Revised Statutes came in force is not indictable under those Statutes, though the words creating the offence are not altered thereby, the Act creating it being embodied in the Revised Statutes in its original words. The indictment must be considered as founded on the Act creating the offence. (d)

The punishment provided by the ordinance 4 Vic., c. 30, s. 1, is cumulative, and sentence of imprisonment and fine is to be awarded upon the conviction had against the defendant in manner and form, as enacted by the ordinance. (e)

An overseer of the poor of a parish is liable, under the Acts of Assembly, 26 Geo. 3,, cs. 28 and 43, and 33 Geo. 3, c. 6, to an indictment for not accounting, to the first General Sessions of the Peace in the year, for moneys received by him for the support of the poor, during the preceding year. (ƒ)

(a) Ferguson v. Adams, 5 U. C. Q. B. 194.

(b) Ib.

(c) Rex v. Bidwell, Taylor's, 487.

(d) Reg. v. Pope, 3 Allen, 161; Reg. v. M'Laugh'in, ib. 159. (e) Reg. v. Palliser, 4 L. C. J. 276.

(f) Reg. v. Matthew, 2 Kerr, 543.

CHAPTER VIII.

EVIDENCE.

THE rules of evidence are, in general, the same in civil and criminal proceedings. (a)

There are, however, some exceptions. Thus, the doctrine of estoppel has a much larger operation in the for

mer.

So an accused person may, at least if undefended by counsel, rest his defence on his own unsupported statement of facts, and the jury may weigh the credit due to that statement. Again, confessions, or other selfdis-serving statements of prisoners, will be rejected, if made under the influence of undue promises of favour or threats of punishment. So, although both these branches of the law have each their peculiar presumptions, still the technical rules, regulating the burden of proof, cannot be followed out in all their niceties when they press against accused persons. (b)

There is a strong and marked difference in the effect of evidence in civil and criminal proceedings. In the former a mere preponderance of probability due regard being had to the burden of proof, is sufficient basis of decision; but in the latter, especially, when the offence charged amounts to treason or felony, a much higher degree of assurance is required. (c)

The persuasion of guilt ought to amount to such a

(a) Reg. v. Atkinson, 17 U. C. C. P. 304, per J. Wilson, J. (b) Best on Ev., 4 Edn. 122.

(c) Clark v. Stevenson, 24 U. C. Q. B. 209, per Draper, C. J.; Hollingham v. Head, 4 C. B. N. S. 388; Reg. v. Jones, 28 U. C. Q. B. 421, per Richards, C. J.

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