CHAP. XII. of his own authority remedy any mistake or blunder that he had made in executing it. (Mordue v. Palmer, 40 L. J., Ch. 8; L. R., 6 Ch. 22; Brook v. Mitchell, 6 M. & W. 477.) Thus, where an arbitrator had made. a mistake in the calculation of figures (Irvine v. Elnon, 8 East, 54), or had put the plaintiff's instead of the defendant's name in the direction to pay costs (Ward v. Dean, 3 B. & Ad. 234), or had executed an engrossed copy which omitted some words contained in the draft award (Mordue v. Palmer, supra), he could not correct the mistake, even within the time fixed for making his award, unless by consent of the parties. If he made such an alteration, the alteration was nugatory, as though it were by a stranger, and the award as originally written would stand good, if the original matter were still legible. (Henfree v. Bromley, 6 East, 309.)

Except to correct clerical error or slip.

Stamping an award.

Now the arbitrators or umpire, acting under a submission by consent out of court, have power "to correct in an award any clerical mistake or error arising from any accidental slip or omission." (Arbitration Act, 1889, s. 7 (c).) But this does not enable the arbitrator to make a new award or to reconsider and correct an award which is bad as being in excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise defective. (Pedler v. Hardy, 18 Times L. R. 591; Re Calvert and Isidore Wyler, 106 L. T. Jour. 288.) In such a case the award should be remitted to him under section 10.

An alteration made by a stranger in an award will not affect it, but leaves it in the state it was before such alteration. (Trew v. Burton, 1 C. & M. 533.) Where a mistake other than such as above noticed has been made the court or a judge may send the award back to the arbitrator to be amended. (Arbitration Act, 1889, s. 10 (1).)

An award must be properly stamped, for though an omission or defect in this respect is no ground for setting

the award aside (Preston v. Eastwood, 7 T. R. 95), yet CHAP. XII. an application to enforce an award will not be granted until the original is properly stamped. (Hill v. Slocombe, 9 Dow. 339.) It may be stamped at any time on paying the penalty.

As a rule, when a document on the face of it does not appear to be an award, it need not be stamped as such; therefore, where the defendant had said that if a miners' jury should say that a shaft down which a horse had fallen was his, he would remunerate the plaintiff, it was held that the verdict of the jury given in writing did not require an award stamp. (Sybray v. White, 1 M. & W. 435.) If two persons agree to be bound by the opinion of counsel, the opinion is not liable to an award stamp. (Ib.; Boyd v. Emmerson, 2 A. & E. 184.)

Where there are several parties to an instrument of submission, having a community of interest in the subject-matter referred, if the award be stamped with one stamp it is sufficient. (Goodson v. Forbes, 6 Taunt. 171.)

The following are now the stamps to be impressed upon awards, under the Stamp Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39):

In any case in which an amount or value is the matter in dispute

Exceeds £5 and does not exceed £10 0 06

Special case.

Of two kinds.

(1) By way of award.

If the award is not measured by an "amount or value" the duty is one pound fifteen shillings; so, if the award is partly an amount or value" and partly something else.

An award may be in the form of a special case stated for the opinion of the court. But, to assist arbitrators, the Arbitration Act, 1889, and the rules of court have enabled them to take the opinion of the court by stating a special case, pending the award. It will be convenient to consider together the difference in the two kinds of special cases, namely those under sections 7 and 19 of the Act respectively.

The case may be pursuant to section 7 of the Act, and is stated when the reference is concluded, and is, in fact, the final award of the arbitrator in an alternative form, taking effect according as the court shall determine the points of law submitted to it. The case stated under section 19 is one before the reference is concluded, and is to enable the arbitrator to take the opinion of the court for his own guidance upon a question of law arising in the course of the reference.

Under section 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1889, unless the submission express a contrary intention, the arbitrators or umpire, under a reference by consent out of court, have power "to state an award as to the whole or part thereof, in the form of a special case, for the opinion of the court."

The power thus given to state a special case applies in the case of an arbitrator acting under the L. C. C. Act, 1845, or other statutory reference. (Ante, p. 78.)

CHAP. XII.

When an arbitrator has made his award in the form of a special case he has exhausted his powers, and the Exhausts opinion of the court determines the rights of the parties. arbitrator's (Re Kirkleatham Local Board [1893] 1 Q. B. 375; 62

L. J., Q. B. 180.)

powers.

An appeal will lie to the Court of Appeal from a Appeal from decision of the divisional court on an award in the form judgment on. of a special case stated by an arbitrator (Ib.; Bidder v. North Staffordshire Rail. Co., 48 L. J., Q. B. 249; 4 Q. B. D. 412), and that without leave (see Judicature Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict. c. 16, s. 2 (b) (v.).) It is an appeal from a final, not an interlocutory, order (Shubrook v. Tuffnell, 9 Q. B. D. 621; 46 L. T. 749; 30 W. R. 740), unless the matter will have to go back to the arbitrator whatever way the court decides, in which case it is to be treated as an interlocutory order. (Collins v. Vestry of Paddington, 5 Q. B. D. 368; 42 L. T. 573.)

Under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1889, the Court of Appeal has power to deal with the cost of an appeal on an award in the form of a special case, notwithstanding the reference is under the L. C. C. Act, 1845-section 34 of which is superseded. (Re Gonty and Manchester, Sheffield, &c. Rail. Co. [1896] 2 Q. B. 439. The case of Re Holliday and the Mayor of Wakefield, 20 Q. B. D. 699, is no longer applicable.)

Any referee, arbitrator, or umpire may, at any stage of the proceedings under a reference, and shall, if so directed by the court or a judge, state in the form of a special case for the opinion of the court any question of law arising in the course of the reference. (Arbitration Act, 1889, s. 19.)

Costs of

appeal on.

(2) By way of for guidance application pending

arbitration.

the court.

The referee may, before the conclusion of any trial Submitting before him, or by his report under the reference made to questions to him, submit any question arising therein for the decision of the court, or state any facts specially, with power to the court to draw inferences therefrom, and in any such.

CHAP. XII.

Arbitrator

may state case voluntarily.

Compelled to

state.

Expression of opinion on the point not

case the order to be made on such submission or statement shall be entered as the court may direct; and the court shall have power to require any explanation or reasons from the referee, and to remit the cause or matter, or any part thereof, for re-trial or further consideration to the same or any other referee; or the court may decide the question referred to any referee on the evidence taken before him, either with or without additional evidence as the court may direct. (R. S. C. Order XXXVI., r. 52.)

This, by rule 55c of the same order, now applies to any matter referred to an arbitrator.

Section 19 provides for a case being stated at any time before the award is made. It contemplates a proceeding by the arbitrator for the purpose of guiding himself as to the course he should pursue in the reference. (Tabernacle Permanent Building Society v. Knight [1892] 2 Q. B. 613; 62 L. J., Q. B. 33 [1892] A. C. 298.)

If he does not voluntarily state a case, he may be compelled to do so by the court. (Re Nuttall and Lynton, dc. Rail. Co., 82 L. T. 17.) But the application to state a case must be made before the award has been made, for then the reference is concluded. (Re Montgomery Jones, and Liebenthal, 78 L. T. 406; Re Palmer and Hosken [1898] 1 Q. B. 131, 139.) It is sufficient, however, if the order to state a case is made by the court, though in the interval between the order made and notice thereof to the arbitrator he has made his award. (Tabernacle Permanent Building Society v. Knight, supra.) There is no power to compel the statement of a case by an arbitrator who is appointed under the Building Societies Acts (57 & 58 Vict. c. 47, s. 20), or under the Friendly Societies Act, 1896. (59 & 60 Vict. c. 25, s. 68.)

It is not a condition precedent to the right to order a case to be stated, that the arbitrator shall have indicated