CHAP. XV.

INSANE DELUSIONS AND DRUNKENNESS.

Law relating to Crimes committed by Persons afflicted with insane Delusions. - Drunkenness no Excuse. Prisoner becoming mad before Trial; or during Trial; or after Trial, before Execution.

ON a discussion in the House of Lords in the case of Reg. v. M'Naughten, their lordships directed that the following questions should be submitted to the Judges, in relation to the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane delusion:

"First. What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane delusion in respect of one or more particular subjects or persons; as, for instance, where, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, the accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit?

“Second. What are the proper questions to be submitted to the jury, when a person alleged to be inflicted with insane delusion, respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, is charged

with the commission of a crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a defence?

"Third. In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury, as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when the act was committed?

"Fourth. If a person, under an insane delusion as to the existing facts commits an offence in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused?

"Fifth. Can a medical man, conversant with the disease of insanity, who never saw the prisoner previously to the trial, but who was present during the whole trial, and the examination of all the witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the state of the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner was conscious, at the time of doing the act, that he was acting contrary to law, or whether he was labouring under and what delusion at the time?"

To these questions, the judges replied as follows:

First Question. "Assuming that your lordships' inquiries are confined to those persons who labour under such partial delusions only, and are not in other respects insane, we are of opinion that, notwithstanding the party did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable, according to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew, at the time of

committing such crime, that he was acting contrary to law, by which expression we understand your lordships to mean the law of the land.

Second and third Questions. "That the jury ought to be told in all cases that every man is supposed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that, to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the jury on these occasions, has generally been, whether the accused, at the time of doing the act, knew the difference between right and wrong, which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading to any mistake with the jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate when put generally, and in the abstract, as when put to the party's knowledge of right and wrong, in respect to the very act with which he is charged. If the question were to be put as to the knowledge of the accused, solely and exclusively with reference to the law of the land, it might tend to confound the jury, by inducing them to believe that an actual knowledge of the law of the land was essential, in order to lead to a conviction; whereas the law is administered upon the

principle that every one must be taken conclusively to know it, without proof that he does know it. If the accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable; and the usual course, therefore, has been to leave the question to the jury, whether the party accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act that was wrong; and this course, we think, is correct, accompanied with such observations and explanations as the circumstances of each particular case may require.

Fourth Question. "The answer to this question must of course depend on the nature of the delusion; but making the same assumption as we did before, that he labours under such partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, we think he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility, as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if, under the influence of his delusion, he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take his life and he kills that man, as he supposes, away in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment.

Fifth Question. "We think the medical man, under the circumstances supposed, cannot in strictness be asked his opinion in the terms above stated,

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because each of those questions involves the determination of the truth of the facts deposed to, which it is for the jury to decide; and the questions are not mere questions upon a matter of science, in which case such evidence is admissible. But when the facts are admitted or not disputed, and the question becomes substantially one of science only, it may be convenient to allow the question to be put in that general form, though the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of right."

Drunkenness is no excuse for the perpetration of any crime; on the contrary, it would rather be looked upon as an aggravation. But in some instances it is adduced, to show that the act with which the prisoner stands charged was unpremeditated. No description of madness, voluntarily contracted, will absolve a man from the punishment due to the crime he may commit whilst under the influence of such madness. But if the madness becomes habitual and confirmed, it would be otherwise. For instance, if a man, while in a state of frenzy from drunkenness, kill another, he must be held responsible for the act; but if he kill him while labouring under confirmed madness, caused by a riotous and debauched mode of living, he will not be amenable to punishment. To ascertain the degree of responsibility that attaches to the criminal acts of a person, the points that require to be investigated are, whether, at the time of the commission of the offence charged, he was in a state of mind to distinguish evil from good, and to know