satisfaction that I have learned, since this chapter was first written, and am now allowed to communicate to others, that a most careful inquiry has been in the course of the last year instituted by authority, with a view of entertaining with safety the question of the abolition, or the change of oaths now usually required in that University. The evidence before me leaves no doubt in my mind, that as honest and sound guardians of their high trust, those who are now in authority there, are doing as they ought to do. They know that change is not in itself necessarily improvement, and that on all important subjects, patient inquiry, and calm and grave deliberation, are indispensable before any body of men can legislate wisely.

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CHAPTER XI.

COURTS OF LAW.

BUT if the Universities offend in these particulars by their tens, the Courts of Law offend by their tens of thousands. The blessed Founder of Christianity said, "Swear not at all:" The Apostle James re-echoed his Saviour's words; the earliest Christians interpreted this command as prohibitory at least of every oath not absolutely necessary for the preservation of justice and peace. And yet, in England, if ever the voice of our Christian legislature is heard bearing on these points, its words seem to sound, "Swear on all occasions. Omit no opportunity of insisting upon an oath." Indeed, our country has been, not without reason, called "A land of Oaths*." I have made careful and extensive inquiries among many of those able and good men, who either preside in our Courts of Law, or are well acquainted, by personal experience, with

* See a very sensible pamphlet, written in a truly Christian spirit, and with great moderation, entitled, Remarks on Oaths. It was published anonymously in 1826; but I understand the author is a gentleman much respected by those who know him. The present treatise was advancing to its close before the pamphlet came into my hands. Its character is the direct opposite to that of Jeremy Bentham's work, published in 1817.

the general principles, and the minutest details of our present system; and the inference which their representations, taken one with another, have forced upon my mind is, that a very large proportion indeed of the oaths now administered might safely be omitted. I must not dwell on details here; but perhaps I may be expected to specify some instances, by way of example, and they shall be very few. In the Bankruptcy Court, where the average of oaths administered may fairly be taken at one thousand by the week (though, I beg to observe, that nothing turns upon the accuracy of that statement), a gentleman of great talent and attainments, whose station, also, is a guarantee to us against his speaking in ignorance or haste, has assured me, that one half, at least, of the oaths (chiefly in the proof of debts) might be safely dispensed with in his court, without any increased probability of the ends of justice being defeated or evaded. And a gentleman, whose character stands among the first at the Chancery bar, after dividing the oaths principally sworn in that court into four distinct heads, and having most clearly explained and exemplified each, says,—" The fourth class is extremely numerous. The things deposed to are formal matters, not seeming to require or scarcely to admit of any religious sanction, nor capable of being considered with any feeling of reverence. It would, I think, be desirable," he continues, "that

the solemn form of an oath should not be resorted to in such cases." My friend's observations are most instructive and interesting; but, I fear, their insertion might seem to intrench upon the line which I have already marked out for my guidance. Enough, I think, has been said, to show that, at all events,

AN INQUIRY IS CALLED FOR.

Were a commission now existing, such as I trust our governors may soon be induced to appoint, whose duty it would be to ascertain in what cases oaths now required might be safely omitted, as well as to examine any proposed improvement in the administration of those which might be retained, I would venture to suggest that their primary attention should be directed to the inferior courts" of the first instance," as they are called;-our police-offices, our petty sessions, and meetings of magistrates, and the proceedings where one magistrate only is required to act. The general business of such courts arises from questions relating to the poor-laws, benefit societies, the road-laws, petty thefts, assaults, trespasses, and breaches of the peace: questions in determining which, my own experience has convinced me, that in nine out of ten cases, the oaths required by law might be cut off at once, without any impediment whatever to substantial justice; and thus, an incalculable accumulation of perjury and false-swearing might be prevented.

In all these or any other substitutions of affirma

tions for oaths, care should be taken not only to render the temporal punishment of falsehood at least as severe as that which is now apportioned to perjury, but to make the conviction of the offender far more easy and certain than now is the conviction of a perjurer. Probably it might be necessary to render it imperative on a judge or magistrate, before whom the false affirmation might be made, (or before whom complaint of the offence might be brought,) to commit the offender for trial and to prosecute him at the public expense.

But it will be said, are you not removing one of the safeguards by which public peace and justice are secured? Are you not loosening the bands which hold society together? Experience of the past, a knowledge of the present, and the general opinion of those practical men who are best able to judge, as well as the soundest arguments in the abstract, all unite in answering that question in the negative. Oaths as at present operative among us, are at best no trust-worthy safeguards-securities on which no banker or merchant would depend in his private transactions; and they lead to an appalling mass of perjury. In almost every case, I would say, "Increase bonds and penalties, and diminish oaths."

I shall not be going, I trust, beyond my prescribed limit, if I refer my reader to the improvements in the Tuscan code (see part ii. c. 8, of this treatise),