of words and of persons, the sense of spoken language, or the talent for philology, the sense of the relation of colors, or the talent for painting, the sense of the relation for sounds or the talent for music, the sense of the relations of numbers, or the talent for arithmetic and mathematics, the sense of mechanics, of drawing, of sculpture, of architecture, comparative sagacity, the metaphysical spirit or tendency, the caustic spirit or that of repartee, the talent of induction, the poetic talent, the moral sense and benevolence, or mildness, the talent of imitation, of mimicry or acting; the sentiment of religion and of God, firmness of character; these are the qualities and the faculties which I call moral and intellectual dispositions. It is these dispositions, these qualities, and these faculties, which form the total of the fundamental forces of the soul, the special functions of the brain; it is these forces which I hold to be innate in man, and, in part, in animals, and the manifestation of which is subordinate to organization; it is these qualities, and these faculties, the history of whose discovery I shall exhibit, together with their natural history, their modifications in a sound state, and in the state of alienation, the seat of their organ in the brain, and its external appearance on the head or skull, &c.

All these treatises will be accompanied with an application to human institutions, to education, morals, legislation, medicine, &c.

The work will be terminated by considerations on the characteristic forms of the head in each nation, on physiognomy, pathognomony, and pantomime, on the internal sources of imitation in general, and of the imitation of each affection, each sentiment, each passion, in particular; on universal language, the philosophy of man, the motives of our actions, the origin of arts, sciences, and of the different states; on the perfectibility of the human race, the extent of the sphere of each species, and of each individual, according as they are endowed with organs, more or less numerous, and more or less active.

As this first volume will be particularly devoted to the moral part of the physiology of the brain, and as the ignorant and malicious reproach the doctrine with immoral and irreligious tendency, I have thought it my duty to refute these objections, and to give assurance to those of timid minds.

Before entering directly into the discussion of my principles, it will be useful to remove an unfavorable impression, which my manner of proceeding in the exposition of my proofs, might produce on a certain class of readers, little accustomed to the study of natural history.

I often institute comparisons between men and animals: Is this comparison appropriate; is it even necessary? I am going to answer these two questions.

Is it permitted, is it even necessary, to compare man with animals, in order to acquire a complete knowledge of his nature, moral and intellectual?

Those who make the moral and intellectual acts of men to flow from the understanding and will, independent of the body, and those who, being wholly strangers to natural science, still believe in the mechanical action, in the automatism of brutes, may esteem the comparison of man with animals, revolting, and absolutely futile. But this comparison will be judged indispensable by those, who are familiarized with the works of Bonnet, Condillac, Reimarus, Georges Leroy, Dupont de Nemours, Herder, Cadet Devau, Huber, Virey, and especially by those who are ever so little initiated in the progress of comparative anatomy and physiology. Man is subject, as we have seen, to the same laws which govern plants and animals.

The knowledge of man, supposes the knowledge of the elements of which he is composed, as the knowledge of the mechanism of a clock supposes that of the wheels, levers, spring, weights, balance, movement, &c.

The organ of animal life, the brain of man, is an assemblage of particular organs, many of which are found in animals. The animals of inferior classes have, by the fact of their inferiority to others on the score of intelligence, fewer cerebral organs; they have only the first rudiments of the human brain, and they are, consequently, easier to decipher than those animals which are provided with a more complex brain, and a more complicate animal life, or with more numerous instincts and talents. It naturally follows, that in order to attain the knowledge of man in all the parts which constitute his brain, all his propensities and talents, it is necessary to study the animals one after another, following the gradual march which nature has observed, in the succession of their cerebral organs, and faculties.

This study opens to the philosophical observer, a field infinitely more vast than is supposed. The brutes, the objects of all the contempt resulting from the ignorance and pride of man, share so many things with him, that the naturalist finds himself sometimes embarrassed to determine where animal life terminates, and humanity commences. Animals are produced, born, and nourished, according to the same laws as man; their muscles, vessels, viscera, and nerves, are almost the same, and exercise the same functions; they are endowed with the same senses, of which they make use in the same manner; they are subject to similar affections, to joy, sadness, fear, alarm, hope, envy, jealousy, anger; they have the most part of our propensities; they are naturally inclined, as we are, to propagation; they love and foster their young; they have attachment for each other and for man; they are courageous, and fearlessly defend themselves and theirs against their enemies; like us they feed on vegetables and on other animals; they have the sense of property, and while some are cruel and sanguinary, others take delight in theft; they are sensible to blame and to approbation; they are mild, docile, compassionate, and mutually assist each

other; others are wicked, indocile, wayward, obstinate; they retain the recollection of benefits and injuries, are grateful or vindictive; they are cunning and circumspect; they foresee the future by the past, and take the necessary precaution against the dangers which menace them; they correct their false judgments and their unsuccessful enterprises by experience; they have the idea of time, and foresee its periodical return; they have menory; they reflect and compare; they hesitate and are decided by the most urgent motives; they are susceptible of a certain degree of individual perfectibility; they even form abstractions; by means of articulate language, or by gestures, they communicate their ideas, their wants, their projects; they acquire more sagacity and knowledge, by virtue of the circumstances which force them to be more clear-sighted and more cautious; they balance the evil consequences of certain actions which their memory recals to them, with actually stimulating desires; they are seen to follow a deliberate plan of conduct agreed upon between several individuals; they know each other; they sing, or are sensible to the harmony of music; they have an astonishing local memory, and perform long journeys; a great number among them build; some even count; very often their actions denote a sentiment of morality, of justice, and injustice, &c.

One might almost be tempted to say, with Lactantius, that except the religious sentiment, and the knowledge of God, there is no moral quality, and no intellectual faculty of which the animal kingdom, as a whole, does not share at least the first germs. Should it be thought that this comparison degrades man, I should answer with Pascal, that if it be dangerous to show man too much, in how many respects he resembles the brutes, without pointing out his greatness, or, to let him see his greatness too much without his baseness, it is still more

*

* Pensées sur la religion.

dangerous to leave him in ignorance of both. We shall not recognize the less, in this work, the distinguished place which the Author of nature has assigned to man; his real advantages are sufficiently conspicuous to establish, of themselves, his superiority, without having recourse to distinctions which experience and natural history disavow. The real detractors of the human species are those, who think they must deny the intelligence of animals, to maintain the dignity of man. St. Gregory of Nyssus,* and St. Augustinet long since remarked the necessity of comparing men with animals.

I come, then, at length upon the question, What is the origin of the instincts, mechanical aptitudes, propensi- ties, talents; in a word, the moral qualities and intellectual faculties of man?

* De hominis opificio. Baziliæ, 1567-ch. 18,

+ Lib, de vera religione.