asserts the New Testament confirms, that there is none other God but one, 1 Cor. viii. 4. who is the living and true God, 1 Thess. i. 9. And thus we see how Scripture affirms what this first part of this article asserts, "There is but one living and true God."

2. Confirmation from REASON. -Neither is this so high a mystery as to be out of the sight of reason, and therefore only to be embraced by faith; for if we should consult our reason, as we have done the Scriptures, we should find that as clear in concluding as these are express in affirming of this truth. Indeed there is scarce an argument can be produced to prove the existence of a Deity, but may easily be brought to prove moreover the unity of that Deity which doth exist. So that the same weapons that reason useth wherewith to beat down atheism, she useth also in her conflicts with polytheism: there is no God, and there are many gods, being propositions of the same absurdity in her

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The usual reason that is brought for the existence of a Deity is taken from the order of causes; that there must be some one cause of all causes, which is the first cause of all other things, itself being caused by nothing, without which all causes would run in a circle and find no end, but must pass on from one to another, even into infinitude itself, which reason looks upon as the greatest absurdity in the world; for then there would be eternal changes and motions within the narrow compass of time, and finite causes could never come to an end, and so become infinite; which is such a solecism, yea contradiction, that none could ever bring any arguments for it, and therefore I need not bring any against it; but from the undeniable order and dependence of all causes upon one, must conclude, there must be such an universal first cause upon which all the rest must thus depend. And truly this argument proves as much, that there can be no more than one, as that there must be one such universal cause, which we call God; it being as great an absurdity to say there are many as to say there is never a first cause.

* Απὸ μιᾶς γὰς ἄνωθεν ἀρχῆς τῆς τὸ θέλημα ἐνεργούσης, ἤρτηται τὰ πρῶτα καὶ δεύτερα nai rgira. Ab uno desuper principio, quod convenienter voluntati operatur, dependent prima, secunda, et tertia.-Clem. Stromat. lib. vii. p. 704. C. Ed. Par. 1629.

For, supposing many universal causes, either one must be before another, or else one must not be before another. If one be not before another, none of them is the first cause, because there are others of equal causality with itself. If one be before another, one of them must needs be before all the rest, and it is he alone that can be called the first cause, because all the rest come after him.

If after this we take a view of those perfections, which reason certainly concludes to be all concentred in the Deity, we shall clearly see that it is impossible they should be in more than one. So that to say they are in many, would be as much as to say they are in none at all. As first, supremacy, which is a perfection whereby we apprehend God, as being the supreme Governor over all the world; which if he be not, our reason will not suffer us to call him God, nothing coming under the notion of a Deity but what is above all other things whatsoever. Now if there should be many gods, either all of them should be equal to one another, or else one would be above another: if they be all equal to one another, there is never a superior, much less a supreme amongst them, and so never a one that in reason can be termed a God, they all wanting the great perfection of supremacy or sovereignty over all the world: if they be all one above another, there must needs be one above them all, and it is only that one that we can call God f.

And as there is but one supreme over the world, so is there but one neither that is supreme in goodness; but one " summum bonum.' Neither is it possible there should be any more than one summum bonum,' or, by consequence, than one God, which is an argument I find Anselme, once archbishop of Canterbury, elegantly deducing the unity of the godhead from. Quòd autem, saith he, unus solus sit Deus, et non plures, hinc facilè probatur; quia aut Deus non est summum bonum, aut sunt plura summa bona, aut non sunt plures Dii, sed unus solus. Deum verò summum bonum esse nullus negat; quia quicquid aliquo minus est, nullatenus Deus est, et quicquid summum bonum non est, minus est aliquo, quia minus est summo bono. Summum certè bonum pluralitatem sui non admittit, ut plura sint summa bona. Si enim plura sunt summa bona, paria sunt. Summum ergo bonum est, quod sic præstat aliis bonis, ut nec par habeat, nec præstantius. Summum ergo bonum unum et solum est; non igitur sunt plures Dii, sed unus et solus est Deus: sicut summum bonum est unum et solum sic summa substantia, vel essentia, sive natura, quæ eâdem ratione, quâ summum, nullatenus pluraliter dici posse probantur.-Anselm. de Incarnat. Verbi, cap. 4. And Tertullian to the same purpose; Duo ergo summa

Again, infinitude in general is a perfection which reason cannot but attribute unto God, and to none but God, whereby he must be without bounds and limits of his nature and glory, which it is impossible for any more than one to be; for if one be without bounds, and so every where, where can the other be,- especially how can the other be without bounds too? For supposing two gods, one essentially distinct from the other, it is impossible they should both be together, (for then their natures would be confounded, and so not distinct from one another,) and therefore they must needs set bounds and limits to one another's power and essence, by which means neither of them would be God, because not infinite or without bounds. And therefore there can be no more than one infinite, and so no more than one God.

Again, omnipotence is also a perfection, whereby God is not only infinite in nature but in power, and so able to do whatsoever in its own nature does not imply a contradiction, or is possible to be done by any power. Now it is impos

magna quomodo consistent, cùm hoc sit summum magnum par non habere? par autem non habere, cùm uni competat, in duobus esse nullo modo possit.-Adv. Marcion. lib. i. cap. 3. And again, Deum autem unum esse oportet: quia quod summum sit, Deus est: summum autem non erit, nisi quod unicum fuerit, &c.-Tertul. adv. Herm. Par. 1634. cap. 4. And again, Porrò summum magnum unicum sit necesse est: ergo et Deus unicus erit, non aliter Deus, nisi summum magnum: nec aliter summum magnum nisi parem non habens: nec aliter parem non habens, nisi unicus fuerit.— 1d. advers. Mar. lib. i. cap. 3.

6 Εἰ δύο ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἡ πλείους ἦσαν θεοὶ, ἤτοι ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ταυτῷ ἦσαν, ἡ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν. ἐν μὲν οὖν ἑνὶ καὶ ταυτῷ εἶναι ουκ ἠδύναντο, οὐ γὰρ εἰ θεοί, ὅμοιοι· ἀλλ ̓ ὅτι ἀγεννητοὶ τε καὶ γεννητοί, οὐχ ὅμοιοι. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεννητὰ, ὅμοια τοῖς παραδείγμασι τὰ δὲ ἀγέννητα ἀνόμοια, οὔτε ἀπό τινος οὔτε πρός τινα γενόμενα· εἰ δὲ ὡς χεὶρ καὶ ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ ποὺς περὶ ἓν σῶμα εἰσιν συμπληροῦντες τὰ μέρη, ἕνα ἐξ αὐτῶν συμπληροῦντες, ὁ Θεὸς εἶς. Καὶ τοι ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης παρὸ γεννητὸς καὶ φθαρτὸς, συγκείμενος καὶ διαιρούμενος εἰς μέρη. ὁ δὲ Θεὸς αγέννητος καὶ ἀπαθὴς, καὶ ἀδιαίρετος. οὐκ ἄρα συνεστὼς ἐκ μερῶν, εἰ δὲ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστου αὐτῶν ὅντος, τοῦ τὸν κόσμον πεποιηκότος, ἀνωτέρῳ τῶν γεγονότων καὶ περὶ ἅ ἐποιησέ τε καὶ εκόσμησε, ποῦ ὁ ἕτερος, ἢ οἱ λοιποί, εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κόσμος σφαιρικὸς ὑποτελεσθείς, οὐρανοῦ κύκλοις ἀποκέκλεισται, ὁ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Ποιητὴς ανωτέρω τῶν γεγονότων ἐπέχων αὐτὸν τῇ τούτων προνοίᾳ, τὶς ὁ τοῦ ἑτέρου Θεοῦ ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν τόπος. — Athenag. Leg. pro Christianis, p. 30. Ed. Oxon. 1682.

Quis dubitet potentissimum esse regem, qui totius orbis habeat imperium? neque immeritò: cùm illius sint, quæ ubique sunt omnia: cùm ad eum solum omnes undique copiæ congerantur. At si plures partiantur orbem: minus certè opum, minus virium singuli habebunt, cùm intra præscriptam portionem se quisque contineat. Eodem etiam modo Dii, și

sible that there should be two essentially distinct beings endowed with this perfection. For, supposing two such beings, what one doeth will easily be granted to be possible in its own nature to be done, otherwise he could not do it. Yet though it be possible in its own nature, yet it is impossible for the other god to do it; for then there would be two whole and perfect causes of the same kind to one effect, which is a contradiction; for then one would be wholly the cause, and yet not wholly the cause, because there is another that is as wholly the cause as itself; and therefore there can be no more than one such being invested with this perfection of omnipotence, and so but one God.

But I needed not to have gone so far to have proved there are some perfections which it is impossible for more than one being to have. For, indeed, unity itself is a perfection which, whosoever saith a multitude can have at the same time, gives himself the lie: for if they be many essentially distinct Gods, it is impossible they should all be but one: and, therefore, whatsoever other perfections many Gods may have, this undoubtedly they must want upon that very account, because they are many, and so cannot be all perfectly Gods, because not perfect Gods; wanting some perfection which God must have, or not be God: and therefore I conclude, that, seeing in the order of causes there. must be one, and but one first cause, and seeing there

plures sint, minus valebunt, aliis tantundem in se habentibus. Virtutis autem perfecta natura non potest esse, nisi in eo, in quo totum est; non in eo, in quo pars exigua de toto est. Deus verò, si perfectus est (nam perfectus est) ut esse debet, non potest esse, nisi unus, ut in eo sint omnia. Lactant. de Falsa Relig. cap. 3. Ποῦ δὲ καὶ ἔσται, ὁ κατ ̓ αὐτοὺς Θεὸς, τὰ πάντα τοῦ μόνου καὶ ἀληθινοῦ πληροῦντος κατα τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γης περίληψιν, πῶς δὲ καὶ ἄλλος ἂν εἴη ποιητὴς, ὧν αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ πατὴς τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐστι Κύριος, κατα τὴν τοῦ σwrñgos pœviv.—Athan. Orat. con. Gent. Ed. Ben. Par. 1698. p. 6. And the aforecited Lactantius again: Sit igitur nostri operis exordium, quæstio illa consequens, ac secunda: utrum potestate unius Dei mundus regatur, anne multorum? Nemo est quidem, qui sapiat, rationemque secum putet, qui non unum esse intelligat, qui et condiderit omnia, et eâdem, quâ condidit, virtute moderetur. Quid enim multis opus est ad mundi regimen sustinendum? Nisi fortè arbitremur, si plures. sint, minus habere singulos nervorum atque virium. Quod quidem faciunt ii, qui esse multos volunt: quia necesse est, imbecilles esse: siquidem singuli sine auxilio reliquorun tantæ molis gubernaculum sustinere non possent. Deus autem qui est æterna mens, ex omni utique parte perfectæ consummatæque virtutis est. Quod si verum est, unus sit, necesse est.-Lactant. de Falsa Relig. c. 3. Oxon. 1684.

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can be no more than one Being absolutely supreme, infinite, omnipotent, and one, there is but one living and true God."

3. To Scripture and reason, if we add the ancient FATHERS of the primitive church, we shall find that they all agree with us in this particular. I shall instance but only in some as, first, Tertullian', "But the Christian truth expressly saith, God, if he be not one, he is none for whatsoever is not as it ought to be, we think better of it if we believe it not to be. But that thou mayest know that God should be but one, inquire what God is, and thou wilt find it cannot be otherwise. As far as human reason can define any thing of God, I assert, what every one's conscience also acknowledges, that God is the chief and highest Being in the world, eternal, unbegotten, unmade, without beginning, without end. Therefore, he must needs be one only, because he is the chiefest, not having an equal, lest he should not be the chief." And before him, Ignatius taught the same truth: "Therefore God and the Father is but one, not two or three: who is one, neither is there any other besides him, the alone and true God; for, saith he, The Lord thy God is one Lord. And again, Did not one God make us? Have we not all one Father?" And not long after him', Justin Martyr tells us, that, According to those who received their doctrine from God, and knew the difference betwixt God and a creature, there is but one God, unbe

i Sed veritas Christiana distinctè pronunciavit: Deus, si non unus est, non est: quia dignius credimus non esse, quodcunque non ita fuerit ut esse debebit. Deum autem ut scias unum esse debere, quære quid sit Deus, et non aliter invenies. Quantum humana conditio de Deo definire potest, id definio, quod et omnium conscientia agnoscit: Deum, summum esse magnum, in æternitate constitutum, innatum, infectum, sine initio, sine fine. And a little after, Ergo unicum sit necesse est, quod fuerit summum magnum, par non habendo, ne non sit summum magnum.-Tertull. adv. Marcion. lib. i. cap. 3. Par. 1634.

κ Εἷς οὖν Θεὸς καὶ πατὴς, καὶ οὐ δύο, οὐδὲ τρεῖς. Εἷς ὁ ὢν, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ, ὁ μόνος ἀληθινός. Κύριος γὰς φησὶν, ὁ Θεός σου, Κύριος εἷς ἐστι. Καὶ πάλιν, οὐκ εἷς Θεὸς ἔκτισεν ἡμας ; οὐκ εἰς πατὴρ παντῶν ;-Ignat. Epist. ad Philip. cap. 2.

1 Καὶ κατ ̓ ἐκείνους μεν τοῖς ἐκ διδασκαλίας Θεοῦ, καὶ κτίσεως ἐγνωκότας τὴν διαφορὰν, εις ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς, καθ ̓ ἑκάτερον τὸν τῆς ἀγεννησίας τρόπον αγέννητος ὤν. Θεὸν δὲ ἡ Θεοὺς οὔτε πρὸ αὐτοῦ οὔτε μετ ̓ αὐτὸν ἐσχηκὼς, συναίδιον οὐκ ἔχων οὔτε ὑποκειμενον οὔτε ἀντικείμενον, ἄφθαρτον ἔχων τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ ανεμπόδιστον τὴν ἐνέργειαν, δημιουργὸς ὢν τοῦ κόσμου παντός. Justin. Martyr, in Aristot. Dogmat. p. 111. B. Paris. 1636.