Opinion. sons to the grand jurors unknown-all of whom had theretofore been regular customers of the said firm of Baughman Brothers— that if they, the said H. J. Myers, W. F. Seymore, Luke Harvey, G. A. Lathrop, or their said mercantile firms, as above named, or other persons, to the grand jurors unknown, thereafter bought anything from the said firm of Baughman Brothers, or employed them, the said Baughman Brothers, in their said business as printers, they, the said Wilde, Shelton, Crump, and all the members of the said trades' union or association called Richmond Typographical Union, No. 90, and they, the said Mullen, Jones, Lewis, Healy and Schonberger, and all the other members of the said trades' union or labor association called the Knights of Labor, would do all in their power to break up and destroy the business of the said H. J. Myers, W. F. Seymore, Luke Harvey, G. A. Lathrop, and their said mercantile firms, as above named, and many other persons to the grand jurors unknown, who had theretofore been customers of the said Baughman Brothers, and, by and through said threats, they, the said Crump, Wilde, Shelton, Mullen, Lewis, Healy, Jones and Schonberger, and all the other members of the said trades' union or association called Richmond Typographical Union, No. 90, and all the other members of the said trades' union or labor association called the Knights of Labor, did, then and there, by reason of said threats, drive off, hinder, deter, and prevent the said H. J. Myers, W. F. Seymore, Luke Harvey, G. A. Lathrop, and their said mercantile firms, as above named, and many other persons to the grand jurors unknown, who had theretofore been customers of the said Baughman Brothers, from buying anything from, or from dealing with in any way, or from employing as printers, the said firm or partnership of G. H. Baughman, E. A. Baughman and C. C. Baughman, doing business as Baughman Brothers, as aforesaid; and they did, then and there, by their said unlawful, malicious, wicked and corrupt threats, and by their said unlawful acts, as hereinbefore set forth, do a Opinion. serious injury to the business of the said Baughman Brothers, against the peace and dignity of the commonwealth of Virginia." The defendant, W. F. Crump, thereupon pleaded not guilty, and, electing to be tried separately, he was so tried; and the jury, on the 13th day of May, 1887, found him guilty, by their verdict, and fined him $5; which verdict the court, upon motion of the defendant, refused to set aside and grant a new trial, but approved the said verdict and entered up the judgment here complained of. Upon the trial, the defendant excepted to the rulings of the court giving the instruction asked for by the commonwealth, and refusing to give the instructions asked for by him; and he also excepted to the overruling by the court of his motion to set aside the verdict and grant to him a new trial. The first error assigned, is the action of the court in overruling the demurrer to the first count of the indictment. It is objected that the indictment does not charge a conspiracy to do any unlawful act, and does not particularly state the means to be used by the conspirators to break up and destroy the business of Baughman Brothers, and show that the means to be used were unlawful. The objection cannot be sustained— it is wholly groundless and gratuitous; as is plainly manifest by the first count in the indictment (which we have, purposely, set out in full), to which the defendant pleaded, and upon which the issue was made up and tried, and under which the defendant was found guilty. It charges, directly, that the defendant and others "did unlawfully and maliciously, wickedly and corruptly, knowingly and intentionally, combine, conspire and confederate together, to injure, ruin, break up and destroy, Baughman Brothers in their business as printers and stationers;" and that they did this by unlawfully, wickedly, maliciously, knowingly, intentionally and corruptly making threats to a great number of persons mentioned, and others unknown to the grand jurors, all of whom had been, and were Opinion. at the time, regular customers and patrons of the said Baughman Brothers; and that they did, then and there, by their said unlawful, malicious, wicked and corrupt threats, and by their said unlawful acts, as hereinbefore set forth, do a serious injury to the business of the said Baughman Brothers, and a still greater injury to the peace, dignity and good name of the commonwealth of Virginia-to the evil example of all her people. This specially and exactly charges a criminal conspiracy unprovoked, wanton, and unlawful, both as to the end aimed at and the means used to accomplish it. It charges a combination of this defendant and his co-conspirators to ruin, break up, and destroy the business of Baughman Brothers, and it charges the means used, and the success of the unlawful endeavor operated upon the peaceful and honest industries of the customers and patrons of Baughman Brothers. A conspiracy or combination to injure a person in his trade or occupation is indictable. In the case of Rex v. Eccles, 1 Leach, 274, several persons were indicted for conspiring to impoverish a tailor, and to prevent him, by indirect means, from carrying on his trade. They were convicted; and, upon a motion in arrest of judgment, it was objected (as in this case) that the indictment ought to have stated the acts that were committed to impoverish the tailor and prevent him from carrying on his trade, in order that the defendants might thereby have had notice of the particular charges they were called upon to answer. But Lord Mansfield, without hearing the prosecution, said: "The conspiracy and object of it, are both stated in the indictment, but it is contended that the means by which the intended mischief was effected, ought also to have been particularly set forth, as in the case of Rex v. Sterling; but this is certainly not necessary, for the offence does not consist in doing the acts by which the mischief is effected, for they may be perfectly indifferent, but in conspiring with a view to effect the intended mischief, by any means. Opinion. Buller, The illegal combination is the gist of the offence.' Justice, said: "The indictment states that the defendants, intending unlawfully and by indirect means to impoverish the prosecutor, unlawfully did conspire,' &c., but nothing need to have been stated about the means, for the means are matter of evidence, to prove the charge, and not the crime itself. The indictment, therefore, rather states too much than too little." This case was under consideration in the recent case of Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 15, 2 B. Div., 476, decided in 1885, when Lord Coleridge, C. J., said of the case, "It seems to both of us to be within the principle of an old case decided by Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Eccles, 1 Leach, 200, 274, 276, * * * and so far as I know, the case itself is as good law now as when Lord Mansfield enunciated it, and could be upheld at the present day. It seems to me also to be within the principle neatly stated by Tindal, C. J., in The Queen v. O'Connell, 11 Clark and F., 234, as to what is evidence necessary to make out conspiracy; and also of the opinion of Lord Fitzgerald in the case of Regina v. Parnell. (The Times of January 25-6, 1881.) If the judgment of the learned judge is correct—and I do not mean to intimate the slightest doubt as to its correctness-that a conspiracy to do the thing which has been called by the name of Boycotting,' is unlawful and an indictable offence; and if so, then a thing for which an action will lie, an action may well lie for that which is complained of here." "A combination is a conspiracy in law, whenever the act to be done has a necessary tendency to prejudice the public or oppress individuals by unjustly subjecting them to the power of the confederates and giving effect to the purposes of the latter, whether of extortion or mischief." (Wharton's Crim. Law, 3 Vol., sec 2322, 6th edition.) In section 2304 of same writer, it is said the unlawful purpose may be some object of the confederation which it would be unlawful for them to attain either singly, or which, if lawful singly, it would be dangerous to the public to 6 Opinion. See be attained by the combination of individual means.' Greenleaf on Evidence, 3 vol., sec. 90. In the case of Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox C. Cases, Baron Bramwell said: "The liberty of a man's mind and will, to say how he should bestow himself and his means, his talents and his industry was as much a subject of the law's protection, as was that of his body"--and "if any set of men agree among themselves to coerce that liberty of mind and thought, by combination and restraint, they would be guilty of a criminal offence, namely, that of conspiring against the liberty of mind and freedom of will of those towards whom they conducted themselves. He was referring to coercion and compulsion-something that was unpleasant and annoying to the mind operated upon, and he laid it down as clear and undoubted law, that if two or more persons agreed that they would, by such means, cooperate together against that liberty, they would be guilty of an indictable offence. The public had an interest in the way in which a person disposes of his industry and his capital; and if two or more persons conspired, by threats, intimidation, or molestation, to deter or influence him in the way he should employ his industry, his talents, or his capital, they would be guilty of a criminal offence. This was the common law of the land," &c. In the case of the State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. L., 157, it was held to be an "indictable conspiracy for several employees to combine and notify their employer that unless he discharges certain enumerated persons, they will in a body quit his employment." In his opinion in that case Chief-Justice Beasley said, "there are a number of cases in which neither the purpose intended to be accomplished, nor the means designed to be used, were criminal, which have been regarded to be criminal-quoting State v. Norton, 3 Zab., 44; and citing Rex v. Lord Gray, 3 Hargrave's State Trials, 519; Rex v. Sir Francis Deleval, 3 Burr., 1434. He says: "These are all cases, it will be noticed, in which the act, which formed the foundation of |