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CHAPTER XI

CASE STATED

IN the year 1857 a statute (20 & 21 Vict. c. 57) was passed, which is commonly known as the Case Stated Act. It mentions in the preamble that "it is expedient that provision should be made for taking the opinion of a Superior Court on questions of law, which arise in the exercise of Summary Jurisdiction by justices of the peace."

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It can be availed of when any question of law arises; and where either party, complainant or defendant, is dissatisfied with the determination of a justice or justice of the peace, of any information or complaint as being erroneous in point of law. This limitation must be observed. Justices have no right to send a statement of facts, and ask an opinion on them, except only so far as they raise a point of law (Knight v. Halliwell, L. R. 9 Q.B. 412). The Superior Court accepts the justices' findings upon the facts within his or their jurisdiction as conclusive, whatever may be the opinion of the Court as to the value of the evidence, the Superior Court in such a case having only to see whether the justices' determination is erroneous in point of law. The main question decided in a case, namely, whether an offence has or has not been committed within the statute, would be subject to review as involving a question of law, but the subordinate facts leading up to it would be left entirely to the decision of the justices. The circumstances which lead to the conclusion of law are for the justices. It is for the Superior Court to say whether they are sufficient to warrant the conclusion. Where a case is stated on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence in point of law to warrant the decision, it is sufficient if the Superior Court see that there was some evidence before the justices to justify it, or, in other words, if the case was before a jury, that there would be sufficient evidence to be left to the jury (R. v. Gloucester JJ., 2 E. & B. 420).

This statute does not apply where a party alleges that he has been improperly rated, as, in such a case, he should appeal to the Quarter Sessions, and it was not intended to substitute cases stated under this statute for the old mode of appeal in such cases. Nor does the Act apply where the justices refuse to enforce the payment of rates, the validity of which they have no power to inquire into, if good on their face and unappealed against. It has also been held not to apply where the justices refuse to make an order authorising the sanitary authority to enter premises under sect. 305 of the English Public Health Act, 1875, inasmuch as their decision is not the determination of a complaint, and the application to make such order is one wholly within their discretion to grant or refuse. When the functions of the justices are merely ministerial, or the matter in question is not a determination of any information or complaint, this statute does not apply (re Dillon, 11 Ir. C. L. 232). No justice or justices who state and deliver a case, in pursuance of this statute, are liable to any costs in respect of, or by reason of, such appeal against him or his determination (sect. 6).

Application. Sect. 2 provides that either party, if dissatisfied with the decision as being erroneous in point of law, may apply in writing within three days after the same to the said justice or justices to state or sign a case, setting forth the facts and the grounds of such determination, for the opinion thereon of the Superior Court. The person so applying is called "the appellant," and the opposite party the respondent. The application in writing to the justices referred to in this section should be served upon each of the justices who have determined the matters by delivering it personally, or by leaving it at their places of residence.

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Form of application.-To A. and B., Esquires, two of his Majesty's justices of the peace acting in and for the county of

In the matter of an information [or complaint] wherein E. F. was informant or complainant] and the undersigned G. H. was defendant, heard before, and determined by you at in the said county

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I hereby give you notice that, pursuant to the provisions of the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, intituled, "An Act to Improve the Administration of the Law, so far as respects Summary Proceedings before Justices of the Peace," I, being dissatisfied with your determination of the said information [or complaint], as being erroneous in point of law, do hereby make application to you and require you to state and sign a case, setting forth the facts and grounds of your determination upon the hearing of the said information [or complaint], in order that I may take the opinion thereon of the King's Bench [or Exchequer] Division of his Majesty's High Court of Justice in Ireland.

Dated the day of

18-.

I am, Gentlemen,

Yours, &c.,

G. H. (Place of abode.)

Unless the dissatisfied party applies within three days after the determination to the justices to state and sign a case, the Court above has no power to entertain the matter.

Sunday is to be computed in the three days allowed in this section for an application to justices to state a case, although it be the last day. For where an Act gives a particular number of days, saying nothing of Sundays, these are consecutive days. Sunday counts as one of them, although it is the last day. The appellant should therefore apply to the justices on the Saturday, when Sunday appears to be the last of the three days (Peacock v. The Queen, 4 C. B., N.S., 261).

Appellant to enter into recognisance. It is provided by sect. 3 that the appellant, "at the time of making such application, and before a case shall be stated, and delivered to him by the justices, shall enter into a recognisance before such justices, or any one or more of them,

or any other justice exercising the same jurisdiction, with or without surety or sureties, and in such sum as to the justice or justices shall seem meet, conditioned to prosecute without delay such appeal, and to submit to the judgment of the Superior Court, and pay such costs as may be awarded by same.'

It has been held (Stanhope v. Thorsby, L. R. 1 C. P. 423) that the recognisance need not be entered into within the three days mentioned in sect. 2. It is enough if this is done before the case is given out by the justices. The form of recognisance may be the same as that provided by the Petty Sessions Act (see post, App. of Statutes, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 93, Schedule Form C).

Fees.-The appellant must at the same time pay to the clerk his fees for the case and recognisance, and any other fees to which the clerk shall be entitled.

Appellant if in custody to be liberated.—The same sect. 3 provides that the appellant, if then in custody, shall be liberated upon the recognisance being further conditioned for his appearance before the same justice or justices, or, if that is impracticable, before some other justice or justices exercising the same jurisdiction, who shall be then sitting within ten days after the judgment of the Superior Court shall have been given, to abide such judgment unless the determination appealed from be reversed.

Form of case to be given by justices.-The following may be the form of case to be given by the justices upon their receiving the above notice :

In the matter of an information [or complaint] wherein A. B. was informant [or complainant] and C. D. defendant.

This is a case stated for the opinion of his Majesty's High Court of Justice in Ireland, -- Division, at the instance of the defendant [or complainant, as the case may be], pursuant to the provisions of an Act to improve the administration of the law, so far as respects summary proceedings before Justices of the Peace (20 & 21 Vict. c. 43).

At a Petty Sessions holden in and for the Petty Sessions district of -, county of, on the day of, before us, the undersigned justices of the peace, acting in and for the said county of in the Petty Sessions district aforesaid, one C. D., the above-named defendant, was charged in and by a certain information [or complaint or summons] for that [here state the subject-matter of information, complaint, or summons], and the said parties respectively being then present, the charge was duly heard before us, and upon such hearing we adjudged or ordered] [here state the order made by the justices].

And whereas, the said C. D. hath, pursuant to the provisions of the before-mentioned statute, given us notice and required us to state and sign a case setting forth the facts and grounds of our determination upon the hearing of the said information [or complaint], in order that he might take the opinion of the said Court thereon:

Now we, the said justices, pursuant to the said notice, and the provisions of the said statute, do hereby state and sign such case as aforesaid as follows:

At the hearing of the said information [or complaint, &c.] it was proved on the part of the informant [or complainant] that [if the question reserved turns upon the fact, whether or not the evidence brings the case within the operation of the statute upon which the proceedings are founded, or whether or not it renders the defendant legally liable, or is in itself legally admissible, set out so much of it as is necessary to raise the point].

And whereas, it was contended on the part of the defendant [here state the legal objections as taken by the defendant].

And whereas, upon the said hearing, we being of opinion that [here state the grounds upon which the justices decided, as that the evidence brought the case within the operation of the statute; or that it rendered the defendant legally liable under the statute; or that the said evidence was admissible, and they admitted it accordingly] we gave judgment against the defendant as aforesaid.

And hereupon the judgment of the Court is required as to whether we, the said justices, were correct in point of law in our determination as aforesaid, or as to what should be done in the premises.

Given under our hands this

day of, 18—.
(Signed),

E. F.

G. H.

Justices may refuse to state a case where they think the application frivolous. If the justices be of opinion that the application is merely frivolous, but not otherwise, they may refuse to state a case, and shall on the request of the appellant, sign and deliver to him a certificate of such refusal; but they are not to refuse to state a case, when application for that purpose is made by, or under direction of, the AttorneyGeneral for Ireland or England (sect. 4).

King's Bench Division may order a case to be stated. In case of such a refusal, the appellant may apply to the King's Bench Division, on an affidavit of the facts, for a rule calling on the justices, and on respondent, to show cause why a case should not be stated, and the Court may make the same absolute, or discharge it, with or without costs, and the justices upon being served with such rule absolute, must state a case accordingly, upon the appellant entering into a recognisance as before mentioned. In the case of R. v. Macclesfield JJ. (2 L. T., N.S., 352), Crompton, J., said: "The Court cannot interfere in every case when justices have received improper evidence as it does in granting rules for new trials. Although the determination might be wrong, there may have been other evidence justifying the conviction."

11 Ir. C. L. 232.

Where a publican applied to magistrates at Petty Sessions for a In re Dillon, renewal of his licence under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 89, and 18 & 19 Vict. c. 92, which application is refused upon the ground that the applicant's house had not been properly conducted during the previous year, it has been

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held that this is not a case in which the Superior Court will direct the magistrates to state a case under this section, it being neither an information nor a complaint within the meaning of this statute, but a matter Pollard v. West, of fact, to be ascertained by the justices. Where a party charged with 59JT., N.S., obstructing the works of a local board of health set up the defence of an assertion of a private right, it was held that he was not necessarily entitled to have the case dismissed, because the obstruction took place in assertion of a private right, and that the justices, under such circumstances, were not warranted in refusing as frivolous an application to state a case. Although a statute gives a power of appealing from the justices to the Quarter Sessions, that does not deprive a party of the right to have a case stated for the opinion of the Superior Court.

Muir v. Hore,

47 L. J. M. C.

17.

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Justices cannot refuse to state a case, on the ground that an objection has not been formally brought to their notice, where the objection is of such a kind as goes to the root of the whole matter before them for adjudication, and one which they must be presumed to have known. But when no facts were disclosed at the hearing on which the magistrates could raise a question for the consideration of the Superior Court, & rule for a mandamus was discharged.

No case can be stated unless there has been a hearing and determination of an information or complaint.-Where, on the hearing of an information before justices at Petty Sessions, the evidence was partly heard, and on an objection being raised that one of them was interested in the subjectmatter, the justices decided that they had no jurisdiction, stopped the further hearing of the information, and granted a case for the opinion of the Superior Court as to whether such justice was interested, it was held that it was not competent for the justices to state such a case, because there had been no hearing and determination of the information or complaint (Wakefield Local Board v. West Riding Railway Co., 12 Jur., N.S., 69).

Lord Blackburn said: "I think nothing can be clearer than that the magistrates made a mistake in stating a case, as the statute does not apply. The justices, when the question of jurisdiction was raised before them, decided rightly, or wrongly, that they had no jurisdiction. If they were right, then the complainant can only go and renew the information before other justices who are not interested. If they were wrong, then the only remedy is to apply for a rule commanding them to hear and determine the case. There was no need of a case to be stated to raise a point of law regarding the interest of the parties. The Act (20 & 21 Vict. c. 63) was only intended for those cases, where formerly there was no means of bringing the matter otherwise before the Superior Courts; but it was never intended to decide in this way a question of jurisdiction."

Where justices have heard a complaint, and determined to dismiss it on the ground that they have no jurisdiction, a case may be stated (Muir v. Hore, 47 L. J. M. C. 17).

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Where justices have in fact heard and determined a case, an order making "no rule is erroneous in form, but it amounts to such a determination of the case against complainant as entitles him to require a case to be stated for the opinion of the Superior Court (Stevenson v. O'Neill, I. R. 11 C. L. 184).

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