CASES

DETERMINED IN

THE CONSISTORY COURT

OF

LONDON,

&c.

TH

LOVEDEN v. LOVEDEN.

HIS was a case of divorce by reason of adultery of the wife, in which the principles and rules of circumstantial evidence, in such cases, were much discussed to the effect appearing in the Judgment.

JUDGMENT.

Sir William Scott.-This is a proceeding by Edward Loveden Loveden Esq. against Ann his wife, praying for separation, by reason of adultery. Nothing arises upon the proceedings: they have been conducted, as far as they go, in the usual manner. The articles, which are many in number, plead a marriage to have taken place on the 15th of November 1794. This marriage is admitted, and is likewise fully proved by many witnesses. Cohabitation continued between the parties till the 15th of March 1809, when, upon the discovery

VOL, II.

B

13th July 1810. Principles of

evidence in

cases of divorce by reason of

adultery, &c.

LOVEDEN.

LOVEDEN U. very of an adulterous intercourse, as alleged, with Mr. Raymond Barker, son of a neighbouring 13th July 1810. gentleman in the country, and who is described as a lay-fellow of Merton College in Oxford, she was ordered to withdraw from her husband's house, and the cohabitation has never been renewed. She has offered no plea of any kind, but rests her defence, so far as it is preferred by her counsel, on the insufficiency of his proofs, and upon the answers to the interrogatories which she has addressed to several of his witnesses. These witnesses are twenty in number, including the person who formally proves the public documents relative to the license and marriage; and they are stated to be supported by letters written and sent by herself to Mr. Barker, but intercepted by a servant, and communicated to Mr. Loveden by the agency of that servant.

It is not necessary for me to state much at large the rules of evidence which this Court holds upon subjects of this nature, or the principles upon which those rules are constructed:-they are principles so consonant to reason and to the exigencies of justice, and so often called for by the cases which occur in these Courts, that it is on all accounts sufficient to advert to them briefly. It is a fundamental rule, that it is not necessary to prove the direct fact of adultery; because, if it were otherwise, there is not one case in a hundred in which that proof would be attainable: it is very rarely indeed that the parties are surprised in the direct fact of adultery. In every case almost the fact is inferred from circumstances that lead to it by fair inference as a necessary conclusion; and unless this were the case,

and