the two estates in order to detect the blunder which Mr.. Cornish has made. It may be shown in the ordinary illustration: A. is feoffee to the use of B. in trust for C. The statute of Richard converts B.'s use into a legal estate, and thus divides the estate at law into two independent parts with concurrent power over it in the feoffee and in the cestui que use. The statute of 27 Hen. VIII. re-unites these separated parts in one legal estate, and in this limited view (which is also imperfect as the parts are united, not in the original owner, the feoffee, but in the cestui que use) may be said to repeal the statute of Richard, though its general aim as well as its effect was to carry out more completely the design of that statute by transferring to the cestui que use the feoffee's legal estate. Now if the statute of Richard were to operate a second time, it would create a use (ie., turn a trust, an equitable estate into a use, a legal estate) upon the use which the statute of 27 Hen. VIII. had executed. All the authorities agree that such a use is void. Where the trust is not limited upon the use which the statute executes, but upon a common law use, it has been the object of this article to show that the same reason applies. The first use exhausts the beneficial ownership of the estate, and any second use is void at law.

ART. III.-JUDICIAL STATISTICS, 1862.-ANNALS OF THE CIVIL COURTS.

THE

HE "Judicial Statistics" will in future constitute the main oracle of the legal reformer. "Full and minute details," as was well observed by Lord Brougham, at the International Statistical Congress, 1860, "are to the lawgiver, as the chart, the compass, and the lead to the navigator." They are, perhaps, even more. At least they represent, under an abstract form, the very elements upon which legislation is to operate. The importance, therefore, of having a well-digested system of judicial statistics cannot

be over-estimated, since they so clearly indicate the comparative constitution and anatomy of the various branches of our criminal and civil systems. The study of statistics ought to be especially congenial to the English mind, which has always shown a preference for the inductive and practical to the more attractive and ambitious paths of à priori speculation.

Although the present condition of the judicial statistics indicates a tolerably perfect realisation of the conceptions they were intended to carry out, yet there is no reason why, in so important a matter, we should not endeavour to accomplish still further improvements. To effect this, the systems in vogue on the Continent of Europe may be advantageously referred to. Every practical art is more readily improved by imitation than by original suggestion. Amongst foreign

countries, Belgium deserves especial estimation in respect of its statistics. These emanate from a General StatisticalBureau, founded in 1841, in connexion with the Ministère de l'Interieure, and were brought to great perfection by the illustrious M. Quetelet during the period of his presidency. Condensation and apposite correlation of parts are, doubtless, two of the most essential requisites for a practical system of statistics. These ends, indeed, are very effectively sought to be attained in the present Blue Book. However, we sometimes notice in it an unnecessary waste of space, especially in Part II. This defect, indeed, is not very considerable; we allude to it merely to suggest that condensation ought to be a main object of the compiler of the statistics. He should certainly have the assistance of a practising lawyer familiar with the procedure of our courts and the relative importance of the various steps in a suit. Mr. Redgrave, although himself so eminently competent for the work, expressed an opinion to this effect, in his report for 1858.

Part II. of the Judicial Statistics for 1862, comprises the annals of our civil courts, just as Part I. related to the criminal returns. The following table gives a comparative sketch of the proceedings on the Crown side of the Court of

Queen's Bench, for the years 1861 and 1862, and the average for 1861-60-59:

The amount of the chief proceedings in each of the three superior courts on the plea side, for the years 1861 and 1862, is shown in the following summary. An increase had appeared in 1860, as compared with 1859, under every head, except those of writs of capias and causes referred to masters. The increase in 1861 in the number of writs of summons issued was 17.1 per cent. over the returns for 1860, and amounted to no less than 32.4 per cent. upon the number for 1859. There was a decrease in this item, however, for 1862 of 103, as compared with the corresponding return for 1861:

Total amount of fees.... £24,271 17 0 £16,883 13 6 £26,495 13 0 £67,651 3 6 £74,761 5 0

It is not a little strange that the Court of Exchequer still maintains its old ascendancy in the favour of the profession; the Court of Common Pleas, on the other hand, is still avoided. Formerly a higher scale of costs attracted the profession to the Court of Exchequer; while the Court of Common Pleas, being virtually a monopoly of the serjeants, was avoided, in consequence of the high fees it thus entailed. But at the present day, when no advantage is to be gained by a resort. to any particular court, it is singular that the force of old habits continues to prevail to such an extent; and what is still more surprising is, that the proportion of judgments to the whole number of cases in each court, is highest in the Court of Exchequer, as if in very deed its old advantages, where a suit was fully litigated, existed at the present day. When estimating the relative merits of courts having a concurrent jurisdiction by the standard of their popularity (a case in which, above all others, one would naturally be disposed to rely on statistics), we should therefore take care that the manifold condition implied in the phrase cæteris paribus, is complied with before we institute an experimentum crucis. For we find that courts, the condition, government, administration, and circumstances of which in no material respect differ from each other, nevertheless meet with very unequal favour at the hands of the profession. A comparison of the real merits of co-ordinate courts taken with reference to their popularity, it thus appears, can be safely instituted only in cases where these courts were established on the same footing at the same date without having had any previous existence. If they had their respective originals prior to their induced uniformity, their antecedents may long continue to affect their career. In reasoning upon statistical data, therefore, if there be any discrepancy in the originals or circumstances of the things compared, we should take it into account, and make due allowance not only for these obvious disturbing influences, but also for the prejudices, habits, passions, and associations to which the discrepant elements may have given

rise. The anomalies we have just noticed, must, indeed, gradually disappear. Else we should abandon all faith in statistical philosophy. Their continuance, however, shows that a reform in legal procedure, however ultimately beneficial, will not necessarily at once bear fruit. In the Irish courts we may observe a most unexceptionable course prevails, which was prescribed by the Irish Common Law Procedure Act, 1852. The writs are filed in batches of four in each court in rotation, so that no one court can have over its fellows a greater number of incipient cases than the number mentioned. We are disposed to recommend a similar improvement in our procedure.

The Judicial Statistics for 1862 contain an item not given in the Blue Books for preceding years, in the shape of the number of bills of costs taxed in the preceding twelvemonth. Those taxed in the Court of Queen's Bench were, as between party and party, 6,218; as between attorney and client, about 824. In the Court of Exchequer the number taxed, exclusive of bills taxed under the statute, was 8,324. No return under this head is given for the Court of Common Pleas.

The writs of summons issued in 1862 were less than those issued in 1861, by 10.3 per cent. The total number of causes entered for trial was, at Westminster 2,225, and at Nisi Prius 1,366. The total of trials was 1,025. These returns vary very slightly from the corresponding numbers for 1861.

We need extract only a few items regarding the nature of the suits. The most numerous class was on promissory notes, bills of exchange, &c., 185. Next in number were those for goods sold and delivered, 169. Next come those for breach of contract, 151. Next are actions for work and labour done, 100; for compensation for injuries under Lord Campbell's Act, 69; trover, 56; ejectment, 42; trespass, 35; assault, 24; infringement of patents, 14; slander, 27; libel, 20; life and fire policies, 13; for breach of promise of marriage, 4.