of a great party in the House of Commons, was beyond the reach of that powerful body, such is not the condition common ὀξυροῖσι βροτοῖσιν, who tread the rugged paths of professional life; and so long as such power is vested in such a class, the attempts to pluck up the tares sown in the field of English law, during the night of the dark ages and long afterwards, by the enemies of all reason and all right, will be languid and unavailing." For this plain speaking, Mr. Phillimore expects his punishment. "I say this, perfectly well knowing to what misrepresentation and abuse it will expose me, because the study of many years has satisfied me that I do well to be angry at the absurdities and abuses which contribute so largely to the profit of a handful of men, and to the moral and intellectual detriment of that class of the profession to which I belong." We hope Mr. Phillimore need not mind "misrepresentation and abuse" in so just a cause, although he himself would be a more successful and acceptable instructor in the qualifications for "great works on jurisprudence" if he exhibited in his writings more of the spirit of calm and erudite inquiry, and less of the precipitate temper which shows itself with its foregone conclusion. In regard to this expectation, however, we receive but scanty encouragement from the following self-pronouncement: "But if ever the time shall come in the history of this country, when all men in a certain station are ashamed of haranguing in favour of the servile empiricism which has made so many fit, it may be, for better things, mechanics instead of jurists, masons instead of architects, and the law a profitable trade instead of a noble science; which has given us Wrights, Norths, Wedderburnes, and Eldons, instead of De Thous, Hôpitals, Molès, and Lamoignons; and when incapacity to comprehend a principle is not looked on as a mark of practical

if ever that time shall come, I shall be rewarded far beyond my hopes, if my name is remembered with kindness by those who trace the progress of our institutions, not as that of one holding lucrative office, and opposing education because the system under which he obtained the patronage of

an inferior and comparatively illiterate body must be perfect," but as that of one who, according to the measure of his abilities, and without regard to immediate interest, which he was not too stupid to perceive, was the first and ultimately the successful assailant of special pleading." Mr. Phillimore is therefore pleased with himself and his performances, and he expects posterity to be grateful. That it will approve his attacks on special pleading (which he has never appeared to us to understand) or his depreciation of the illustrious Englishmen he names, we have no desire to believe. At their expense he appears to compliment the present Lord Chancellor—although rather equivocally-for it is possible to hold the "highest rank" (alluding to the Chancellor) in such a profession as the author describes the legal one in this country to be, and yet not to be a De Thou, Hôpital, Molè, or Lamoignon. The truth is, Mr. Phillimore's literary and intellectual food is too strong to be nourishing, and with whatever kindness posterity may regard him, we are quite sure it will concur in our opinion that he ought not to have published the present work.

But let us give him a parting hint, and point to a field where his energy and industry might operate serviceably. We refer to a work with which no doubt he is familiar, Pothier's Pandects," Pandecta Justinianeæ in novum ordinem digestæ."

"Sensible," says Lord Mackenzie, "of the great imperfections of Justinian's collection in point of arrangement, Pothier resolved to throw light upon this chaos of Roman law, and to do for it what Tribonian and his associates ought to have done that is to say, to collect together the texts which were scattered through those immense books, to elucidate these texts one by the other, and that solely by the manner in which they were placed and connected; in a word, by substituting order for confusion, to render almost useless the innumerable commentaries under which the buried texts had groaned for ages. Nothing could exceed the boldness of this design; it seemed to surpass the resources of any single man, and to require time exceeding the ordinary duration of human

life. And how was this herculean task accomplished? After twelve years of continuous labour, Pothier produced a work written in Latin, in which he preserved the ancient division of the books and titles of the Pandects, but re-arranged the texts under each title according to their natural order, so that each title forms a complete treatise on the subject indicated in the rubric. Immediately after the exposition of the subject, are placed the texts containing definitions and general principles. Methodical divisions and subdivisions facilitate the classification and understanding of the other texts. The ancient law is explained and illustrated, and great care is taken to show how far its provisions have been confirmed, interpreted, modified, or repealed by the Institutes, the Code, and the Novels. Antinomies are either reconciled or explained, and obscure texts are elucidated in notes of remarkable clearness and brevity. Whatever is the work of the author, the transitions by which he has so skilfully connected the laws so as to show their relation to each other, the notes, equally learned and concise, with which he has illustrated them, are all clearly distinguished by being printed in italics, and by this ingenious device the texts are presented in their original purity." Now, if our learned author would apply himself to the following task, he would do great service to the law of England, and secure, we believe, the grateful acknowledgments of future generations. Let him with all necessary modifications and omissions, publish an edition of Pothier's great work, applicable to the state of jurisprudence in the present day, and in an English dress, everything but the text of the Pandects being in the English language, with notes for analogous or illustrative reference in the law of England. It would even be desirable if the text itself were translated into good English, and given along with the original Latin. Let him do all this calmly, steadily, and modestly. If so, we are very sure he will do it well, and, in the result, he would produce a work better calculated to diffuse "some knowledge of the Roman law," than a score of such books as we have felt it our duty to make the subject of this

article.

ART. VI.-WHAT IS THE VALUE OF A SHIP? BY LAURENCE R. BAILY.

AN answer to this question is necessary when a vessel is

insured, when, by the fault of the crew of one vessel, another vessel is sunk in a collision, when the expediency of repairing or condemning her must be determined, when the shares of part owners of a ship are transferred, and when there is a general average. Consequently it is of great importance that the question should be answered correctly.

In the above cases, the values differ to some extent, because the time at which they are taken is not the same in all; but, in other respects, the value is the same in all. In the first, the value is the value at the time at which the risk under the policy begins. In the second, at the moment immediately before the collision. In the third, at the time when the repairs, if executed, will be completed. In the fourth, at the time when the transfer is made; and in the last, at the time when the ship becomes liable for the general average.

All will probably agree that her value to her owner is the value required; but, on the question-What is her value to her owner?—there will, probably, be much difference of opinion.

The dictum that "the value of a thing is what it will fetch," is treated generally as an axiom applicable to everything, and is applied to ships, even by some of the courts of law.

As an axiom, applicable to everything that can be sold, it is clearly erroneous: for instance-If a man sold his new coat, or his new wig, for which he had paid his tailor, and his wigmaker, fair prices only, he could not reasonably expect to realise the cost price of them. If he had worn either the coat or the wig, the proceeds of them would still less be a true test of their value to him, although there may have been no alteration whatever in the fashions since he purchased them.

It is correct, in most cases, to apply it to an article which,

from its nature, the owner acquires only to sell again. The amount that article will sell for is, in most cases, a fair test of its real value to that owner. Thus, the selling value at the place of destination is, in most cases, a correct criterion, at any time, of the value of cotton and sugar to the merchant at that time; but, as a test of the value of an article which is built or made for use only, like the above-mentioned coat and wig, it is no test at all.

Is it a proper test to apply to a ship?

Most people will probably admit that the price for which an English ship will sell at a foreign port, is not in many cases a proper test of her value to her owner, since the foreign port, in most cases, is not even a market for English ships. The same with foreign ships in an English port, or in any port foreign to them. Most people will probably admit further that the value of each ship must be determined by her value in the country in which she is owned. Probably they will also admit that the time at which that value is to be taken, is the time to which the question applies-i. e., When the value, on the 1st of January, of an English ship in a foreign port is required, that value is her value to her owner in her own country on that date, and in the state in which she is on that date.

Some may doubt whether a deduction should not be made from that value for the wear and tear that must result from her subsequent passage home; but, in determining a general principle to be applied to all cases—those of ships which go straight home from the foreign port, those which go from one foreign port to another, those which go home in ballast, and those which, on the passage home, earn freight sufficient to cover the wear and tear on that passage-even those who hold that such a deduction should be made, will probably agree, in the expediency at least, of ignoring that wear and tear, and of taking the value she would have on the 1st of January in her own country, on that date in the state in which she then is.