But it will not therefore follow, tha operates in the courfe of nature, and applied by intellect, although neither will understands, nor intelle fore, the phænomena of nature, the fenfes and are underftood by not only a magnificent fpectacle, coherent, entertaining, and inftru and to effect this, they are conduct ranged by the greateft wifdom. 1 difcourfe is ftudied with different terpreted with different degrees of as men have ftudied and remark can interpret right, fo far they r knowing in nature. A beaft is hears a ftrange tongue, but under 255. Nature, faith the learne 'worth, is not mafter of art or wi ratio merfa & confufa, reafon imm ed into matter, and as it were fud founded with it. But the formati animals, the motions of natural b ous properties, appearances and word, the whole feries of things in which we call the courfe of nat managed and carried on, that th human reafon cannot thoroughly the leaft particle thereof; fo far to be produced by fuddled or con 256. Natural productions, it i equally perfect. But neither dot order of things, the ftructure of the ends of providence that th General rules, we have feen (a), (a) 249, 252. 11, which conducted anted that s. There ftrike on hind, form Ifo a moft difcourfe; Hjufted, and language or on, and in But fo far s rules, and De faid to be a man whe Is nothing ed and plung , is fo wile's most impront mprehend ere re neceffary make the world intelligible: and from the conftant obfervation of fuch rules, natural evils will fometimes unavoidably enfue: things will be produced, in a flow length of time, and arrive at different de-. grees of perfection. 257. It must be owned, we are not confcious of the fyftole and diastole of the heart, or the motion of the diaphragm. It may not nevertheless be thence inferred, that unknowing nature can act regularly, as well as ourfelves. The true inference is, that the felf-thinking individual, or humane per-. fon, is not the real author of thofe natural motions. And in fact no man blames himself if they are wrong, or values himself if they are right. The fame may be faid of the fingers of a musician, which fome object to be moved by habit which understands not; it being evident, that what is done by rule must proceed from fomething that understands the rule; therefore, if not from the mufician himself, from fome other active intelligence, the fame perhaps which governs bees and fpiders, and moves the limbs of thofe who walk in their fleep. : 258. Inftruments, occafions, and figns (b) occur in, or rather make up, the whole vifible courfe of nature. Thefe, being no agents themfelves, are under the direction of one agent concerting all for one end, the fupreme good. All thofe motions, whether in animal bodies or in other parts of the fyftem of nature, which are not effects of particular wills, feem to fpring from the fame general caufe with the vegetation of plants, an, ætherial fpirit actuated by a mind. 259. The first poets and theologers, of Greece and the east confidered the generation of things, as ascribed rather to a divine cause, but the Phyfici to natural caufes fubordinate to, and by a divine; except fome corpore chanics, who vainly pretended to mak out a God. The hidden force that and causeth all things to hang toget in harmony, which Orpheus and ed love; this principle of union is ciple, but acts with intellect. This intellect are not themfelves obvious otherwise difcerned than in their eff enlightens, Love connects, and the attracts all things. 260. All things are made for the all things tend to that end: and we account for a thing, when we fhe beft. In the Phædon, Socrates de his opinion, that he, who fuppof have been difpofed and ordered 1 fhould not pretend to affign any them. He blames phyfiologers fo account for phænomena, particula and cohesion, by vortexes and æth the τὸ ἀγαθὸν and τὸ δέον, the ftro cement which holds together all universe, and not difcerning the ca thofe things which only attend it. 261. As in the microcofm, the tenor of the motions of the vifcera juices doth not hinder particular vo to be impreffed by the mind on th even fo in the mundane fyftem, t vance of certain laws of nature, in t and more confpicuous motions, but a voluntary agent may fometim particular impreffions to the fine æ (c) 154, 160. ed ftill nd meld withadjufts, nd move cles ftylind prin love and view, or Intellect eign Good reme good, be faid to hat it is fo es it to be Il things to a mind (), her caufe of tempting to for gravity overlooking ft bond and parts of the it felf from nftant regul nd contained tary motions animal fpirit; fteddy obfer groffer males ch not hinder, s communicate erial medium, which which in the world answers the animal fpirit in man,} Which two (if they are two) although invifible and inconceivably small, yet feem the real latent fprings, whereby all the parts of this vifible world are moved; albeit they are not to be regarded as a true cause, but only an inftrument of motion; and the inftrument not as a help to the creator, but only as a fign to the creature. 262. Plotinus fuppofeth that the foul of the uni verse is not the original cause or author of the fpecies, but receives them from intellect, the true principle of order and diftinction, the fource and giver of forms. Others confider the vegetative foul only as fome lower faculty of a higher foul, which animates the fiery ætherial spirit (d). As for the blots and defects which appear in the course of this world, which fome have thought to proceed from a fatality or neceffity in nature, and others from an evil principle, that fame philofopher obferves, that it may be the governing reafon produceth and ordaineth all those things; and, not intending that all parts fhould be equally good, maketh fome worse than others by defign, as all parts in an animal are not eyes: And in a city, comedy, or picture, all ranks, characters, and colours are not equal or like; even fo exceffes, defects, and contrary qualities, confpire to the beauty and harmony of the world. 263. It cannot be denied, that with respect to the universe of things, we in this mortal state are like men educated in Plato's cave, looking on fha dows with our backs turned to the light. But though our light be dim, and our fituation bad, yet if the best use be made of both, perhaps fomething may be feen. Proclus, in his commentary on the theology of Plato, obferves there are two forts of philofophers. The one place in the order of beings, and made the facu ing depend thereupon, fuppofing that t of all things are corporeal: that body or principally exifts, and all other thin dary fenfe, and by virtue of that. Oth all corporeal things to be dependent mind, think this to exift in the first P mary fenfe, and the being of bodies to b derived from, and presuppose that of t 264. Senfe and experience acquaint courfe and analogy of appearances or na Thought, reafon, intellect, introduce knowledge of their caufes. Senfible though of a flowing, unftable, and unce yet having first occupied the mind, th early prevention, render the after task more difficult and as they amufe ears, and are more fuited to vulgar u mechanic arts of life, they easily obtain in the opinion of most men, to thofe fu ciples, which are the later growth of mind arrived to maturity and perfectio affecting the corporeal fenfe, are thou far deficient in point of folidity and rea and real to common apprehenfions bei thing. Although it be certain, that th of fcience are neither objects of fenfe no on; and that intellect and reafon are a guides to truth. 265. The fuccefsful curiofity of the in arts and experiments and new fyftem elate men, and make them overlook But notwithstanding that the encoura purfe of princes, and the united endeav focieties in thefe later ages, have exter |