firft ink ciples really econ aking d pri- nd. ith the effects. rances, by an thought yes and and the ference, or prinhumane Out, not to be fo fenfible the fame principles maginati e the fure [ 127 ] mental and mechanical knowledge very far, yet it must be owned, that the ancients too were not ignorant of many things (e), as well in phyfics as metaphyfics, which perhaps are more generally, though not first known in these modern times. 266. The Pythagoreans and Platonists had a notion of the true fyftem of the world. They allowed of mechanical principles, but actuated by foul or mind: they diftinguished the primary qualities in bodies from the fecondary, making the former to be phyfical caufes, and they understood physical caufes in a right fenfe: they faw that a mind infinite in power, unextended, invifible, immortal, governed, connected and contained all things: they faw there was no fuch thing as real abfolute space: that mind, foul or fpirit, truly and really exists: that bodies exift only in a secondary and dependent fense: that the foul is the place of forms: that the fenfible qualities are to be regarded as acts only in the caufe, and as paffions in us: they accurately confidered the differences of intellect, rational foul, and fenfitive foul, with their diftinct acts of intellection, reafoning, and fenfation, points wherein the Cartefians and their followers, who confider fenfation as a mode of thinking, feem to have failed. They knew there was a fubtil æther pervading the whole mafs of corporeal beings, and which was itself actually moved and directed by a mind and that phyfical caufes were only inftruments, or rather marks and figns. 267. Those ancient philofophers understood the generation of animals to confift, in the unfolding and diftending of the minute imperceptible parts of pre exifting animalcules, which paffeth for a modern discovery: this they took for the work of nature, but (e) 166, 167, 168, 241, 242, &c. nature 268. The Egyptians, who imperfon had made her a diftinct principle, and her under the name of Ifis. But Ofiris ftood to be mind or reafon, chief and all. Ofiris, if we may believe Plutar first, pure, unmixed and holy principle nible by the lower faculties; a glymy like lightening darting forth, irradiate ftanding; with regard to which Plutarc Plato and Ariftotle termed one part of xoxlxov; to wit, when having foared mon mixed objects, and got beyond th of fenfe and opinion, they arrive to the first and most fimple being, free f ter and compofition. This is that r of Plato, which employeth mind al alone governs the world, and the foul i immediately informs and animates natu 269. Although the Ægyptians did reprefent the fupreme divinity fitting and that gefture has been interprete the most holy and venerable being to at reft repofing within himfelf; yet, fo that appears, this gefture might denot well as repofe. And it cannot be c Jamblicus, fo knowing in the Egyp (f) 4724-5 ood Tup nion Dunt- n and. ature, deified under eign of was the difcerwhereof e underds, that ilofophy Ove com. precincts template all matΕντως όσε 3 which at which mbolically na lotus, to fignify De utterly any thing dignity as nied, that n notions taught taught there was an intellect that proceeded to generation, drawing forth the latent powers into light in the formation of things. Nor was this to be understood of an external world, fubfifting in real abfolute space: For it was a doctrine of those antient fages, that foul was the place of forms, as may be seen in the twelfth book of the arcane part of divine wisdom, according to the Ægyptians. This notion was embraced by divers philofophers of Greece, who may be fuppofed to have derived it from the fame fource from whence many of their other opinions were drawn. 270. The doctrine of real abfolute external fpace, induced fome modern philofophers to conclude it was a part or attribute of God, or that God himself was space; inafmuch as incommunicable attributes of the Deity appeared to agree thereto, fuch as infinity, immutability, indivifibility, incorporeity, being uncreated, impaffive, without beginning or ending; not confidering that all thefe negative properties may belong to nothing. For nothing hath no limits, cannot be moved or changed, or divided, is neither created nor destroyed. A different way of thinking appears in the Hermaic as well as other writings of the ancients. With regard to abfolute fpace, it is obferved in the Afclepian dialogue, that the word Space or Place hath by it felf no meaning; and again, that it is impoffible to understand what fpace alone or pure fpace is. And Plotinus acknowledgeth no place but foul or mind, exprefly affirming that the foul is not in the world, but the world in the foul. And farther, the place of the foul, faith he, is not body, but foul is in mind, and body in foul. See the third chapter of the fifth book of the fifth Ennead. 271. Concerning abfolute space, of the mechanic and geometrical pl it may fuffice to obferve, that it ceived by any sense, nor proved and was accordingly treated by th ancients as a thing merely vifionary tion of abfolute space fprings that tion; and in these are ultimately tions of external exiftence, indep fity, and fate. Which fate, the id derns, was by old philofophers di ftood, and in fuch a fenfe, as not αυτεξέσιον of God or man. thought all things to be made by understood juftice and providence with fate; which, how fixed an with refpect to man, may yet be refpect to God. Empedocles decl a caufe ufing principles and eleme taught that fate was the general through the whole nature of the nature he fuppofed to be an æth feed of the generation of all thin fate to be the eternal reason or ཐ P hantome her per over-born by eafonings, fince ace obfcure no d about them, er men: witnes thefe ten years Tertations, who ftent with each ir pretentions t 272. A 272. All the foregoing notions of fate, as reprefented by Plutarch, plainly fhew that those antient philofophers did not mean by fate a blind, head-long, unintelligent principle, but an orderly fettled course of things conducted by a wife and provident mind. And as for the Ægyptian doctrine, it is indeed afferted in the Pimander, that all things are produced by fate. But Jamblichus, who drew his notions from Egypt, affirms, that the whole of things is not bound up in fate; but that there is a principle of the foul higher than nature, whereby we may be raised to an union with the gods, and exempt ourfelves from fate. And in the Afclepian dialogue it is exprefly faid, that fate follows the decrees of God. And indeed, as all the motions in nature are evidently the product of reafon (c), it should seem there is no room for neceffity, in any other fense than that of a fteddy regular course. 273. Blind fate and blind chance are at bottom much the fame thing, and one no more intelligible than the other. Such is the mutual relation, connection, motion, and fympathy of the parts of this world, that they seem as it were animated and held together by one foul and fuch is their harmony, order, and regular course, as fheweth the foul to be governed and directed by a mind. It was an opinion of remote antiquity that the world was an animal (d). If we may truft the Hermaic writings, the Ægyptians thought all things did partake of life. This opinion was alfo fo general and current among the Greeks, that Plutarch afferts all others held the world to be an animal, and govern ed by providence, except Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. And although an animal, contain (d) 153, 172, R 2 (c) 154. ing |