even aries, part. the s ve inter5) and be the hilofoith the . It is do not he more ory into difcover s endless more fubcontinu. hefe mie ancient in the pothefis, es, is not without Ficinus, Platonics Own, that be underDon which and by octrine of Philo Philo appears to be of this opinion in feveral parts of his writings. And Virgil, who was no ftranger to the Pythagorean and Platonic tenets writes to the fame purpose. Deum namque ire per omnes Terrafque tractufque maris coelumque profun dum. Hinc pecudes armenta, viros, genus omne fe rarum, Quemque fibi tenues nafcentem arceffere vitas. Thus much the schools of Plato and Pythagoras feem agreed in, to wit, that the foul of the world (b) whether having a diftinct mind of its own, or directed by a fuperior mind (c) doth embrace all it's parts, connect them by an invisible and indiffoluble chain, and preferve them ever well adjufted, and in good order. 285. Naturalifts, whofe proper province it is to confider phænomena, experiments, mechanical organs and motions, principally regard the vifible frame of things or corporeal world, fuppofing foul to be contained in body. And this hypothefis may be tolerated in phyfics, as it is not neceflary in the arts of dyalling or navigation to mention the true fyftem or earth's motion. But those who, not content with fenfible appearances, would penetrate into the real and true caufes (the object of theology, metaphyfics, or the philofophia prima) will rectify this error, and fpeak of the world as contained by the foul, and not the foul by the world. 286. Ariftotle hath obferved there were indeed fome who thought fo grofly, as to fuppofe the universe to be one only corporeal and extended nature but in the first book of his Metaphy 287. It is a doctrine among ot contained in the Hermaic writings, are one. And it is not improbabl Parmenides, and others among the have derived their notion of To Ev, Ægypt. Tho' that fubtil metaphyfi in his do&trine of ἓν έτως, feems to h thing of his own. If we fuppofe, fame mind is the univerfal princi harmony throughout the world, connecting all it's parts, and givi fyftem, there feems to be nothing a pious in this fuppofition. εν 288. Number is no object of fe of the mind. The fame thing in ception is one or many. Compreh the creatures in one general notic that all things together make on a. But if we fhould fay, that one God; this would, indeed, be tion of God, but would not amou long as mind or intellect was adr To nyaμovinov, the governing part. lefs more refpectful, and confequen tion of God, to fuppofe him neit parts, nor to be himfelf a part of foever. 289. All thofe, who conceived be an animal, muft in confequence 3 reat mi peculations erroneous ne the univerfe to fuppofe all things to be one. But to conceive God to be the fentient foul of an animal, is altogether unworthy and abfurd. There is no fense, nor fenfory, nor any thing like a fenfe or sensory in God. Senfe implies an impreffion from fome other being, and denotes a dependence in the foul which hath it. Senfe is a paffion; and paffions imply imperfection. God knoweth all things, as pure mind or intellect, but nothing by fenfe, nor in nor through a fenfory. Therefore to fuppofe a fenfory of any kind, whether space or any other, in God would be very wrong, and lead us into falfe conceptions of his nature. The prefuming there was fuch a thing as real abfolute uncreated fpace, feems to have occafioned that modern mistake. But this prefumption was without grounds. 290. Body is oppofite to fpirit or mind. We have a notion of fpirit from thought and action. We have a notion of body from refistance. So far forth as there is real power, there is fpirit. So far forth as there is refiftance, there is inability or want of power. That is, there is a negation of fpirit. We are embodied, that is, we are clogged by weight, and hindered by refiftance. But in refpect of a perfect fpirit, there is nothing hard or impenetrable: there is no refiftance to the Deity: Nor hath he any body: nor is the fupreme being united to the world, as the foul of an animal is to it's body, which neceffarily implieth defect, both as an instrument, and as a conftant weight and impediment. 291. Thus much it confifts with piety to fay, that a divine agent doth by his virtue permeate and govern the elementary fire or light (đ), which ferves as an animal fpirit to enliven and actuate the (a) 157, 172. S 2 whole whole mafs, and all the members world, Nor is this doctrine lefs ph pious. We fee all nature alive or in fee water turned into air, and air ra elaftic (e) by the attraction of an more pure indeed, more fubtil, and than air. But ftill, as this is a mov and, confequently, a corporeal being be itself the principle of motion, b turally and neceffarily to an incor agent. We are confcious that a fpiri er, or determine motion, but noth pears in body. Nay the contrary is to experiment and reflection. 292. Natural phænomena are o pearances. They are, therefore, fuc perceive them. Their real and of are, therefore, the fame; paffive wi active, fluent and changing without manent in them. However, as the impreffons, and the mind takes her fpring, as it were, by refting her fo jects, they are not only firft confide but moft confidered by moft men. phantomes that refult from thofe a children of imagination grafted upo example as pure fpace (i) are though very firft in existence and ftability, and comprehend all other beings. 293. Now although fuch phanto real forces, abfolute motions, and pafs in phyfics for caufes and princip they in truth but hypothefes, nor objects of real fcience. They pafs phyfics converfant about things of (c) 149, 152, 200. (ƒ) 207. 449 250. 1. vifible al than We id made nedium, ! volatile xtended, it cannot is us na fpirit o begin, al F this ap lent, both atural ap we fee and ive natures at any thing thing per ake the fir t flight and on thefe ob by all me, hey and the arances, th nfe, fuch fu by many the to embrac fined to experiments and mechanics. But when we enter the province of the philofophia prima, we discover another order of beings, mind and it's acts, permanent being, not dependent on corporeal things, nor refulting, nor connected, nor contained; but containing, connnecting, enlivening the whole frame; and imparting those motions, forms, qualities, and that order and fymmetry to all thofe tranfient phænomena, which we term the course of na ture. 294. It is with our faculties as with our affections: what first feifes, holds faft (a). It is a vulgar theme, that man is a compound of contrarieties, which breed a restless struggle in his nature, between flesh and spirit, the beaft and the angel, earth and heaven, ever weighed down and ever bearing up. During which conflict the character fluctuates: when either fide prevails, it is, then fixed for vice or virtue. And life from different principles takes a different iffue. It is the fame in regard to our faculties. Senfe at firft befets and overbears the mind, The fenfible appearances are all in all, our reafonings, are employed about them; our defires terminate in them: we look no farther for realities or causes; till intellect begins to dawn, and caft a ray on this fhadowy scene. We then perceive the true principle of unity, identity, and exiftence. Thofe things that before feemed to constitute the whole of being, upon taking an intellectual view of things, prove to be but fleeting phantomes. 295. From the outward form of grofs maffes which occupy the vulgar, a curious inquirer proceeds to examine the inward ftructure and minute parts, and from obferving the motions in nature, to discover the laws of thofe motions. By the way he frames his hypothesis and fuits his language to (a) 264, this |
