offer to reof the

er. By ted with -m them,

cent, we ges to me. to work

the imagi
e new ob
cale, each

e above it
the Deity,
knowledge

to mention

oughout the in one link

re connected re is neither of, if a low the animal

and betray'd
llectual.
properly to
ning things
fe they are

Harkness, but
ncertain, ever
caufe they do
always gene
al flux, with
them to con

he Pythagore
en to
Houka
ated and that
rporeal forms

are

are perpetually producing and perishing, appearing and difappearing, never refting in one ftate, but always in motion and change; and therefore in effect, not one being but a fucceffion of beings: while to v is understood to be fomewhat of an abstract or fpiritual nature, and the proper object of intellectual knowledge. Therefore as there can be no knowledge of things flowing and inftable, the opinion of Protagoras and Theæterus, that fenfe was fcience, is abfurd. And indeed nothing is more evident, than that the apparent fizes and fhapes, for inftance, of things are in a conftant flux, ever differing as they are view'd at different distances, or with glaffes more or less accurate. As for those abfolute magnitudes and figures, which certain Cartefians and other moderns fuppofe to be in things, that muft feem a vain fuppofition, to whoever confiders, it is fupported by no argument of reason, and no experiment of sense.

305. As understanding perceiveth not, that is, doth not hear or fee or feel, fo fenfe knoweth not: And although the mind may use both fenfe and phancy, as means whereby to arrive at knowledge yet fenfe or foul, fo far forth as fenfitive, knoweth nothing. For, as it is rightly obferved in the Theætetus of Plato, fcience confifts not in the paffive preceptions, but in the reasoning upon them, τῷ πεὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ.

306. In the ancient philofophy of Plato and Pythagoras, we find diftinguifhed three forts of objects: In the first place a form or fpecies that is neither generated nor deftroyed, unchangeable, invifible, and altogether imperceptible to fenfe, being only understood by the intellect. A fecond fort there is ever fluent and changing (g), generating and perishing, appearing and vanishing. This 263, 264. (g) 292, 293.

T 2

is

is comprehended by fenfe and opinion kind is matter which, as Plato tea neither an object of understanding is hardly to be made out by a certain of reafoning λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ μόγις το Timæus. The fame doctrine is co Pythagoric treatife De anima mund tinguishing ideas, fenfible things, an keth the first to be apprehended by fecond by fenfe, and the laft, to λογισμῷ νόθῳ· whereof Themiftius th affigns the reason. For, faith he, t esteemed fpurious, whofe object hath tive, being only a mere privation, darkness, And fuch he accounteth

307. Ariftotle maketh a threefold objects according to the three fpecu Phyfics he fuppofeth to be converfa things as have a principle of motion mathematics about things permane ftracted; and theology about being immoveable; which diftinction may ninth book of his Metaphyfics. ftracted, xwessor, he underftands f corporeal beings and fenfible qualiti

308. That philofopher held tha man was a tabula rafa, and that innate ideas. Plato, on the contrary ideas in the mind, that is, notion were or can be in the fenfe, fuch as goodness, likeness, parity. Some think the truth to be this: That th ly no ideas or paffive objects in t what were derived from fense: but also befides thefe her own acts or op are notions.

309. It is a maxim of the Plato

he third

- being

of fenfe,

ous way See his d in the hich dif tter, ma ellect, the , matter, Terripatetic act is to be thing polifilence or cter.

ftinction of ive sciences, about fuch themfelves; but not aboftracted and be feen in the

here by ab parable from

the mind of

ere were no

held original which never eing, beauty, perhaps may cre are proper he mind, bur that there are perations; fuch

that the foul of man was originally furnished with
native inbred notions, and stands in need of fen-
fible occafions, not abfolutely for producing them,
but only for awakening, roufing, or exciting into
act what was already pre-exiftent, dormant, and
latent in the foul; as things are faid to be laid up
in the memory, though not actually perceived,
until they happen to be called forth and brought
into view by other objects. This notion feemeth
fomewhat different from that of innate ideas, as
understood by thofe moderns who have attempted
to explode them. To understand and to be, are
according to Parmenides the fame thing. And
Plato in his seventh letter makes no difference be-
tween vs and isμn, mind and knowledge. Whence
it follows, that mind, knowledge, and notions,
either in habit or in act, always go together.

310. And albeit Ariftotle confidered the foul
in it's original state as a blank paper, yet he held
it to be the proper place of forms, tlu Luxu
Eva TÓTTOY Edwv (a). Which doctrine firft main-
tained by others he admits, under this restriction,
that it is not to be understood of the whole foul,
but only of the vonlin; as is to be feen in his
third book De anima. Whence, according to The-
miftius in his commentary on that treatise, it may
be inferred that all beings are in the foul. For,
faith he, the forms are the beings. By the form
every thing is what it is.
And he adds, it is the
foul that imparteth forms to matter; Tl alw
μορφῶσα ποικίλαις μορφαῖς. Therefore they are frft
in the foul. He further adds, that the mind is all
things, taking the forms of all things it becomes
all things by intellect and fenfe. Alexander
Aphrodifæus faith as much, affirming the mind to
be all things, καλά τε τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰπάνες. And
(a) 269.

this

7

this in fact is Ariftotle's own doctri book De anima, where he alfo affert that actual knowledge and the thing one: τὸ αὐτὸ δέ ἐσιν ἡ κατ ̓ ἐνέργει πράγματι. egypal. Whence it follows that where the knowledge is, that is to fa Or, as it is otherwife expreffed, t all things. More might be faid to exp notion, but it would lead too far.

311. As to an abfolute actual e fenfible or corporeal things, it do have been admitted either by Plat In the Theætetus we are told, t faith a thing is or is made, he m for what, or of what, or in refpect or is made; for, that any thing fh felf or abfolutely, is abfurd. Agre doctrine it is alfo farther affirmed it is impoffible a thing fhould be f to no body. It muft neverthelefs regard to Ariftotle, that, even in there are some expreffions which f the abfolute existence of corporea inftance, in the eleventh book fpe poreal fenfible things, What wond they never appear to us the fame, to fick men, fince we are always never remain the fame our. felves? faith, Senfible things, although t change in themselves, do neverthel fons produce different fenfations an Thefe paffages would feem to impl abfolute existence of the objects of f

312. But it must be observed, diftinguifheth a twofold exiftence, actual. It will not, therefore, f (b) 264, 292, 294.