offer to reof the er. By ted with -m them, cent, we ges to me. to work the imagi e above it to mention oughout the in one link re connected re is neither of, if a low the animal and betray'd Harkness, but he Pythagore are are perpetually producing and perishing, appearing and difappearing, never refting in one ftate, but always in motion and change; and therefore in effect, not one being but a fucceffion of beings: while to v is understood to be fomewhat of an abstract or fpiritual nature, and the proper object of intellectual knowledge. Therefore as there can be no knowledge of things flowing and inftable, the opinion of Protagoras and Theæterus, that fenfe was fcience, is abfurd. And indeed nothing is more evident, than that the apparent fizes and fhapes, for inftance, of things are in a conftant flux, ever differing as they are view'd at different distances, or with glaffes more or less accurate. As for those abfolute magnitudes and figures, which certain Cartefians and other moderns fuppofe to be in things, that muft feem a vain fuppofition, to whoever confiders, it is fupported by no argument of reason, and no experiment of sense. 305. As understanding perceiveth not, that is, doth not hear or fee or feel, fo fenfe knoweth not: And although the mind may use both fenfe and phancy, as means whereby to arrive at knowledge yet fenfe or foul, fo far forth as fenfitive, knoweth nothing. For, as it is rightly obferved in the Theætetus of Plato, fcience confifts not in the paffive preceptions, but in the reasoning upon them, τῷ πεὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ. 306. In the ancient philofophy of Plato and Pythagoras, we find diftinguifhed three forts of objects: In the first place a form or fpecies that is neither generated nor deftroyed, unchangeable, invifible, and altogether imperceptible to fenfe, being only understood by the intellect. A fecond fort there is ever fluent and changing (g), generating and perishing, appearing and vanishing. This 263, 264. (g) 292, 293. T 2 is is comprehended by fenfe and opinion kind is matter which, as Plato tea neither an object of understanding is hardly to be made out by a certain of reafoning λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ μόγις το Timæus. The fame doctrine is co Pythagoric treatife De anima mund tinguishing ideas, fenfible things, an keth the first to be apprehended by fecond by fenfe, and the laft, to λογισμῷ νόθῳ· whereof Themiftius th affigns the reason. For, faith he, t esteemed fpurious, whofe object hath tive, being only a mere privation, darkness, And fuch he accounteth 307. Ariftotle maketh a threefold objects according to the three fpecu Phyfics he fuppofeth to be converfa things as have a principle of motion mathematics about things permane ftracted; and theology about being immoveable; which diftinction may ninth book of his Metaphyfics. ftracted, xwessor, he underftands f corporeal beings and fenfible qualiti 308. That philofopher held tha man was a tabula rafa, and that innate ideas. Plato, on the contrary ideas in the mind, that is, notion were or can be in the fenfe, fuch as goodness, likeness, parity. Some think the truth to be this: That th ly no ideas or paffive objects in t what were derived from fense: but also befides thefe her own acts or op are notions. 309. It is a maxim of the Plato he third - being of fenfe, ous way See his d in the hich dif tter, ma ellect, the , matter, Terripatetic act is to be thing polifilence or cter. ftinction of ive sciences, about fuch themfelves; but not aboftracted and be feen in the here by ab parable from the mind of ere were no held original which never eing, beauty, perhaps may cre are proper he mind, bur that there are perations; fuch that the foul of man was originally furnished with 310. And albeit Ariftotle confidered the foul this 7 this in fact is Ariftotle's own doctri book De anima, where he alfo affert that actual knowledge and the thing one: τὸ αὐτὸ δέ ἐσιν ἡ κατ ̓ ἐνέργει πράγματι. egypal. Whence it follows that where the knowledge is, that is to fa Or, as it is otherwife expreffed, t all things. More might be faid to exp notion, but it would lead too far. 311. As to an abfolute actual e fenfible or corporeal things, it do have been admitted either by Plat In the Theætetus we are told, t faith a thing is or is made, he m for what, or of what, or in refpect or is made; for, that any thing fh felf or abfolutely, is abfurd. Agre doctrine it is alfo farther affirmed it is impoffible a thing fhould be f to no body. It muft neverthelefs regard to Ariftotle, that, even in there are some expreffions which f the abfolute existence of corporea inftance, in the eleventh book fpe poreal fenfible things, What wond they never appear to us the fame, to fick men, fince we are always never remain the fame our. felves? faith, Senfible things, although t change in themselves, do neverthel fons produce different fenfations an Thefe paffages would feem to impl abfolute existence of the objects of f 312. But it must be observed, diftinguifheth a twofold exiftence, actual. It will not, therefore, f (b) 264, 292, 294. is third Plato, n are all ings are the mind. e foul is Ariftotle's nce (b) of t feem to Ariftotle. if any one vithal fay, what, it is exift in it ly to which Plato, that , and fweet owned with Metaphyfics things. For ing of corfaith he, if o more than hanging, and and again, he y receive no s in fick per not the fame. a diftinct and fe. that Ariftotle potential and low that, ac cording m to favour [ 151 ] cording to Ariftotle, because a thing is, it must actually exift. This is evident from the eighth book of his Metaphyfics, where he animadverts on the Megaric philofophers, as not admitting a poffible existence diftinct from the actual: from whence, faith he, it must follow, that there is nothing cold or hot or fweet or any fenfible thing at all, where there is no perception. He adds, that in confequence of that Megaric doctrine, we can have no fenfe but while we actually exert it: we are blind when we do not fee, and therefore both blind and deaf feveral times in a day. 313. The ἐντελέχειαι πρῶται of the Peripatetics, that is, the fciences, arts, and habits, were by them diftinguished from the acts or éxas Sriga, and fuppofed to exift in the mind, though not exerted or put into act. This feems to illuftrate the manner in which Socrates, Plato, and their followers conceived innate (c) notions to be in the foul of man. In was the Platonic doctrine, that humane fouls or minds defcended from above, and were fowed in generation, that they were ftunned, ftupified, and intoxicated by this defcent and immersion into animal nature. And that the foul, in this overges or flumber, forgets her original notions, which are fmothered and oppreffed by many falfe tenets and prejudices of fenfe. Infomuch that Proclus compares the foul, in her defcent invested with growing prejudices, to Glaucus diving to the bottom of the fea, and there contracting divers coats of fea-weed, coral, and fhells, which stick close to him and conceal his true shape. 314. Hence, according to this philofophy, the mind of man is fo reftlefs to fhake off that flumber, to difengage and emancipate herfelf from those prejudices and falfe opinions, that fo ftraicly |