ftability cannot be fubjects of icience of intellectual knowledge. 336. By Parmenides, Timæus, an ftinction was made, as hath been observ tween genitum and ens. The former generating or in fieri (e), but never it never continues the fame, being change, ever perishing and producing. understand things remote from sense, in tellectual, which never changing are and may therefore be faid truly to exif is generally tranflated fubftance, but effence, was not thought to belong to and corporeal, which have no ftability intellectual ideas, tho' discerned with n and making lefs impreffion on a min immersed in animal life, than grofs ob tinually befet and follicit our fenfes. 337. The most refined humane intel its utmost reach can only feize fome im fes (f) of the divine ideas, abstracted corporeal, fenfible, and imaginable. thagoras and Plato treated them in a m ner, concealing rather than expofing t eyes; fo far were they from thinking, ftract things, altho' the moft real, we influence common minds, or become knowledge, not to fay duty and virtu rality of mankind. 338. Ariftotle and his followers monftrous reprefentation of the Plato fome of Plato's own fchool have faid v concerning them. But if that philofop not read only, but ftudied alfo with d his own interpreter, I believe the prej lies against him would foon wear off (c) 264, 266, 297. (e) 304, 306. (f) 313, 330 converted into a high esteem for those exalted notion and fine hints, that sparkle and fhine throughout his writings; which feem to contain not only the most valuable learning of Athens and Greece, but also a treasure of the most remote traditions and early clence of the east. 339. In the Timæus of Plato mention is made of ancient perfons, authors of traditions, and the offfpring of the gods. It is very remarkable, that in the account of the creation contained in the fame piece, it is faid that God was pleafed with his work, and that the night is placed before the day. The more we think, the more difficult fhall we find it to conceive, how mere man, grown up in the vulgar habits of life, and weighed down by fenfuality, should ever be able to arrive at fcience, without fome tradition (b) or teaching, which might either fow the feeds of knowledge, or call forth and excite thofe latent feeds that were originally fown in the foul. 340. Humane fouls in this low fituation, bordering on mere animal life, bear the weight and fee through the dufk of a grofs atmosphere, gathered from wrong judgments daily paffed, falfe opinions daily learned, and early habits of an older date than either judgment or opinion. Through such a medium the sharpeft eye cannot fee clearly (k). And if by fome extraordinary effort the mind fhould furmount this dufky region, and fnatch a glympfe of pure light, she is foon drawn backward and depreffed by the heaviness of the animal nature, to which the is chained. And if again the chanceth, amidst the agitation of wild fancies and ftrong affections, to fpring upwards, a fecond relapse speedily fucceeds into this region of darkness and dreams. 341. Nevertheless, as the mind gathers ftrength by repeated acts, we should not defpond, but con tinue to exert the prime and flower of our faculties (b) 298, 301, 302.(k) 292, 293, 294. X 2 ftill ftill recovering, and reaching on, and the upper region, whereby our natura blindness may be in fome degree re taste attained of truth and intellectu the constant prevailing opinion of the antiquity, that there is both an univer of life and motion, and an univerfal n ing and ordering all things, it was a among them, that there is alfo to v which they looked on as the fons de hypoftafis in the divinity. ΤΟ ΤΟ 342. The one or tò èv, being immuta ble, always the fame and entire, was th to exift truly and originally, and othe far as they are one and the fame, by p the Tov. This gives unity,ftability, real Plato defcribes God, as Mofes, from cording to both, God is he who tru Change and divifion were esteemed Evil fcatters, dividės, deftroys: Go trary, produceth concord and union, bines, perfects, and preferves entire, ings which compofe the universe are p fyftem, they combine to carry on on fect one whole. And this aptnefs a thereunto furnishes the partial particu in the diftinct creatures. Hence it m to pafs, that rayatoy and To v were and the fame. 343. Light and fight (faith Pla book of his Republic) are not the fun and knowledge are not the good it approach thereunto. And again, w a vifible place with refpect to fight a that fame is Tayadov or good in an in with refpect to understanding and th ggling inte eaknefs and died, and a Life. Befide eateft men offpirit author and enlighteneceived tenet - ταγαθὸν (α), atis, the fir e and indivifi efore thought things only to ticipation of y to things is being. Ac - is, dowsin fects or bad. od, on the con fembles, comThe feveral be arts of the fame e end, and per and concurrence alar idea of good night have come e regarded as ot lato in the fixth un; even fo truth itfelf, altho' they what the fun is at and things feen, intelligible place things underfood Therefore the good or one is not the light thrat enlightens, but the fource of that light. 344. Every moment produceth fome change in the parts of this vifible creation. Something is added or diminished, or altered in effence, quantity, quality, or habitude. Wherefore all generated beings were faid by the ancients to be in a perpetual flux (c). And that which, on a confused and general view, feems one fingle conftant being, fhall upon a nearer inspection appear a continued feries of different beings., But God remains for ever one and the fame. Therefore God alone exifts. This was the doctrine of Heraclitus, Plato, and other ancients. 345. It is the opinion of Plato and his followers, that in the foul of man, prior and fuperior to intellect, there is fomewhat of an higher nature, by virtue of which we are one; and that by means of our one or unit, we are moft clofely joined to the deity. And, as by our intellect we touch the divine intellect, even fo by our Toy or unit the very flower of our effence, as Proclus expreffeth it, we touch the first one. 346. According to the Platonic philofophy, ens and unum are the fame. And confequently our minds participate fo far of existence as they do of unity. But it fhould feem that perfonality is the indivifible center of the foul or mind, which is a monad fo far forth as fhe is a perfon. Therefore perfon is really that which exifts, inasmuch as it participates of the divine unity. In man the monad or indivifible is the avrò To avrò the felf fame self or very felf, a thing, in the opinion of Socrates, much and narrowly to be inquired into and difcuffed, to the end that, knowing ourselves, we may know what belongs to us and our happiness. 347. Upon mature reflexion the perfon or mind of all created beings feemeth alone indivifible, and to partake moft of unity. But fenfible things are rather confidered as one than truly fo, they being in a perpe(c) 304, 336. tual tual flux or fucceffion, ever differing an vertheless, all things together may be one univerfe (d), one by the conne and order of it's parts, which is the w whofe unit is by Platonic, fuppofed a of the first to Ev. 348. Socrates, in the Theatetus of P of two parties of philofophers, the pio ὅλου ςασιώται, the lowing philofophers things to be in a perpetual flux, alwa and never exifting; and thofe others w the universe to be fixed and immoveable rence feems to have been this, that He tagoras, Empedocles, and in general t mer fect, confidered things fenfible whereas Parmenides, and his party conf not as the fenfible but as the intelligi abstracted from all fenfible things. 349. In effect if we mean by things t jects, thefe, it is evident, are always if we mean things purely intelligible, say on the other hand, with equal truth immoveable and unchangeable. So th thought the whole or to av to be ev permanent one, feem to have understo of real beings, which, in their sense, intellectual world, not allowing reality things not permanent. 8 350. The difpleafure of fome reader be incurred, by surprising them into cer and inquiries for which they have no c perhaps fome others may be pleased, fubject varied by digreffions, traced th inferences, and carried into ancient time maxims (f) fcattered in this effay are n principles, but barely as hints to awake the inquifitive reader, on points not b (4) 287, 288. (e) 293, 294, 295. (f) |