[1870.] PHILLIPS V. EYRE. made, the accessory right of action is, in like manner, discharged and avoided. Cases may possibly arise in which distinct and independent rights or liabilities or defences are created by positive and specific laws of this country in respect of foreign transactions, but there is no such law, applicable to the present case, unless it be the Colonial Governors Act, 11 & 12 W. 3. c. 12., already discussed and disposed of. It may be proper to remark before quitting this part of the subject, that the colonial Act could not be overruled upon either of these two latter grounds of objection without laying down that no foreign legislation could avail to take away civil liability here in respect of acts done abroad, so that, for instance, if a foreign country after a revolution or civil war were to pass a general Act of oblivion or indemnity burying in one grave all legal memory alike of the hostilities and of the private retaliations which are the sure results of anarchy and violence, it would, if the argument for the plaintiff prevailed, be competent for a municipal Court of any other country to condemn and disregard as naturally unjust or technically ineffectual the law of a sovereign state disposing, upon the same constitutional principles as have actuated our own Legislature, of matters arising within its territory; a course the adoption of which would be an unprecedented and mischievous disregard of the comity of nations. We have thus discussed the validity of the defence upon the question argued by counsel touching the effect of the colonial Act, but we are not to be understood as thereby intimating any opinion that the plea might not be sustained upon more general grounds as shewing that the acts complained of were incident to the enforce ment of martial law (a). It is however unnecessary to discuss this further question, because we are of opinion with the Court below that the colonial Act of indemnity, even upon the assumption that the acts complained of were originally actionable, furnishes an answer to the action. The judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for the defendant was right, and is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. (a) On this difficult subject the reporters have been favoured by Mr. Justice Willes with the following note referring to authorities and illustrations which will be useful if the question as to matters hastily done in civil war or putting down rebellion being out of ordinary jurisdiction should ever come to be considered judicially. "As to the exercise of martial law (distinct from statute military law) as part of the prerogative, see Lord Bacon's argument in The Case of the Post-nati of Scotland, Bacon's works by Basil Montagu, vol. 5, pp. 106. 145-6, and his Essay on Plantations, Id. vol. 1, pp. 115. 117; Co. Litt. 11 b. 7.; The Case of the Governor of Derry, 2 Ventr. 314; Commons Debates, vol. 2, (1689), pp. 349. 355. 383; Sir Thomas Hislop's Case, (1820), 62 Annual Register, 180; Elphinstone and another, appts., Bedreechund, and another, respts., 1 Knapp 316; Stats. 43 G. 3. c. 117; 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 4. As to the jurisdiction of one of the American States to authorize the executive government to declare martial law, Luther v. Borden, 7 Howard 1, and the argument of Daniel Webster in 6 Webster's Works, 217. 240, 7th ed., where the effect of martial law is considered. The distinction between martial law and military law in an international sense is also clearly laid down in the elaborate work of Calvo, vol. 1, Derecho Internacional, pp. 475, 476. (s. 379, la ley marcial y la ley militar; s. 380, la ley marcial en los estados Europeos) and the authorities referred to." [1870.] PHILLIPS V. EYRE. END OF MICHAELMAS VACATION. 1. Where a defendant appears in person to a writ of summons under The Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76. s. 30., the memorandum required by sect. 31 need not be delivered by him in person or by an Notice of. See Metropolis Management attorney for him. ADJOURNMENT. 2. A writ having been issued against the defendant under The Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67., which by See Beerhouse. Commissioners, Parlia- sect 1 incorporates The Common Law mentary. ADMINISTRATOR. See Pleading, II. AMENDMENT. Procedure Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76. ss. 30, 31., and a copy of it having been left at his house, he, on Monday, November 1, obtained leave to appear. On Wednesday, November 3rd, the plaintiffs, not being aware of that fact, obtained the usual order for leave to proceed in three days as if personal service had been See Bankruptcy Act, III. Lessor and effected. The time for entering an apLessee, II. ANIMALS. See Highway, I. pearance expired on Saturday the 6th. On Monday morning the 8th a memorandum of the appearance of the defendant was handed in to the office. The plaintiffs afterwards signed judgment on the same day, and the defendant was arrested on a ca. sa. The Court set aside the judgment, but, as the defendSee Insurance, Marine, I. Limitation, III. ant did not give the plaintiffs notice that APPEAL. he had obtained leave to appear, and also entered his appearance without notice to them, imposed the terms that there should be no costs, and that no action should be brought against the sheriff. Oake and another v. Moorecroft, 848. ARBITRATOR. See Award. ARREST IN ENGLAND. See Bankruptcy Act, I. ARTICLE. See Factory, I. ASSIGNEE. Of bankrupt. See Costs, I. ASSIGNMENT. the recognized rules of boat racing, the decision of the referee to be final. The stakes were deposited with the defendant. In sculling races between professional watermen it is the custom for the competitors to start themselves, but if either should make default in starting, and any question should in consequence arise, it would be in the power of the referee to determine that question. The plaintiff and K. attempted unsuccessfully to start, and K. rowed to the referee, who ordered him to tell the plaintiff that if he would not start K. must start without him. K. rowed over the course without the plaintiff, and the referee awarded the race and the stakes to him, without hearing any evidence or taking any steps to ascertain if his order had been communicated to the plaintiff, and without having any means of acquiring the knowledge of the fact. In an action by the plaintiff to recover his deposit, the jury found that the order of the referee was not communicated to the plaintiff, and that he had not a fair op By act of law. See Lessor and Lessee, portunity of starting. Held by the Ex I. Deed. See Bankruptcy Act, II. ASSIGNS. See Lessor and Lessee, I. ATTACHMENT. See Rule of Court. ATTORNEY. See Rule of Court. ATTORNEY'S BILL. See Limitation, III. AUDITOR. See Poor Law Auditor. AWARD. I. 1. The plaintiff and K., watermen on the river Thames, agreed to row a right away sculler's race according to chequer Chamber, affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench, that the jurisdiction of the referee never attached, and therefore his decision was not final, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover. 2. Per Willes J., and semble, per Kelly C. B. and Hannen J. If the referee had decided that his order was communicated to the plaintiff his decision of that fact would have been final. 3. Per Kelly C. B. Quære, whether a Court of equity has jurisdiction to relieve against the award of an arbitrator, except upon the ground that there is no award? Sadler v. Smith, 17. II. 1. Where an arbitrator has by agreement of the parties authority to determine disputes which may arise as to certain specified matters, and they mistaking the extent of his authority submit to him for his determination other matters, it is no objection to his award that he determines concerning them. And 2. The nonrecital in his award of any submission beyond that in the original agreement to refer does not invalidate the award. The Thames Iron Works |