1794. Feb. 18. [94] K. B. (AT NISI PRIUS) HILARY TERM. DOE, EX DEM. PARRY, v. HAZELL. Where a letting is by the month, a month's notice is sufficient to determine the tenancy. EJECTMENT for an house.-The defendant had taken the house by the month; and a month's notice to quit had been given. It was agreed that the notice had reference in all cases to the letting; and that a month's notice was sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover. Marryat for the plaintiff. Lawes for the defendant. 1794. March 2 [109] NAYLOR . MANGLES ET AL. (1 Espinasse, 109–110.) A wharfinger has a lien on goods brought to his wharf for the balance of a general account. ASSUMPSIT for money had and received. The plaintiff had purchased from one Boyne twenty-five hogsheads of sugar then lying in the warehouses of the defendant, who was a wharfinger. Boyne was in debt to the defendant to the amount of 1671. part of which only was for the charges of these twenty-five hogsheads of sugar; the remainder was for the balance of a general account, for which the defendant claimed a lien, and refused to deliver them to the plaintiff till the whole sum was paid. The plaintiff paid him the whole money, and then brought this action to recover it back. The whole question turned upon the point, Whether a wharfinger had a lien for the balance of a general account upon the goods in his possession? The counsel for the defendant said, that it had been decided in three different cases that they had; and called witnesses to prove it; with which the jury seemed completely satisfied. Lord KENYON said, liens were either by common law, usage, or agreement. Liens by common law were given where a party was obliged by law to receive goods, &c. in which case, as the law imposed the burthen, it also gave him the power of retaining for his indemnity. This was the case of inn-keepers who had by law such a lien. That a lien from usage was matter of evidence. The usage in the present case had been proved so often, he said it should be considered as a settled point, that wharfingers had the lien contended for.t Bearcroft, Shepherd and Park for the plaintiff. Erskine for the defendant. NAYLOR v. MANGLES. [ 110 j K. B. (AT NISI PRIUS) EASTER TERM. RUFF v. WEBB. (1 Espinasse, 129-131.) A draft in these words, "Mr. N. will much oblige Mr. W. by paying to J. R. or order 217. on his account," is a bill of exchange, and cannot be given in evidence without a stamp. Neither is such draft, though taken without objection by the party at the time, any discharge of a subsisting debt. ASSUMPSIT for work and labour, with the common counts. The action was brought to recover the amount of wages due by the defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had been servant to the defendant, and on his discharging him from his service, had given him a draft for the amount of his wages on an unstamped slip of paper, in the following words : This ruling is referred to as having settled the law, by Lord ELDON, in Spears v. Hartley, 3 Esp. 81.-R. C. This seems to hold good with reference to the definition in the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 3. See Chalmers, p. 9.-R. Q. 1794. May 24. At Guildhall. [129] "Mr. Nelson will much oblige Mr. Webb, by paying to J. Ruff, or order, twenty guineas on his account." This draft the plaintiff had taken, but it did not appear that he had ever demanded payment of it from Mr. Nelson, to whom it was addressed. It was given in evidence on the part of the defendant, that he lived in the country, and kept cash with Mr. Nelson in London, and that he paid all his bills in that manner, by drafts on Nelson that the plaintiff knew that circumstance, and took the draft without any objection; and that if he had applied to Nelson, that it would have been paid. This evidence was relied on as a discharge, and bar to the action. Shepherd for the plaintiff contended, that the only mode by which this could operate as a bar to the action, was by taking the draft in question as a bill of exchange; in which case, under stat. 3 & 4 Ann. c 9, s. 7, it is declared, that if any person shall accept a bill of exchange, in satisfaction of a debt, that the same shall be deemed a full and sufficient discharge, if the person so accepting such bill for his debt, shall not take his due course, by endeavouring to get the same accepted and paid, and making his protest for non-acceptance or non-payment; but he contended that in point of substance it was not a bill of exchange, but a mere request to pay money, not accepted by Nelson, or such as could put the plaintiff into any better situation with respect to his demand. But if it was taken as a bill of exchange, that it could not be given in evidence at all, as it was not stamped. It was answered by the defendant's counsel, that the plaintiff's having accepted the draft as payment, was a waiver of every objection to it, and that he was therefore bound by it, and could not recur to the demand for wages. Lord KENYON said, he was of opinion, that the paper offered in evidence was a bill of exchange; that it was an order by one person to another to pay money to the plaintiff or his order, which was in point of form a bill of exchange; that as such it could not be given in evidence, without being legally stamped; and as the only mode in which it could operate as a discharge of the plaintiff's demand was, as stated by the plaintiff's counsel, that the plaintiff in point of law was therefore entitled to recover. Shepherd for the plaintiff. Erskine and Baldwin for the defendant. EMERSON v. BLONDEN. (1 Espinasse, 142-143.) Where a husband permits his wife to act for him in any department or business, her admissions or acknowledgments are evidence to charge the husband.† ASSUMPSIT for the use and occupation of certain rooms in the plaintiff's house, which had been let to the defendant. The defendant and his wife had taken the apartments at a certain rent; the wife had made the bargain, and had agreed to give three months' notice of quitting. Having quitted without notice, the action was brought to recover the three months' rent. A witness for the plaintiff proved a demand of the rent from the defendant's wife, and that she had acknowledged the sum claimed to be due, and had promised payment. Mingay for the defendant, objected to this evidence, as it was admitting the declarations of the wife, and her acknowledgment of debt to charge the husband. It was answered by the plaintiff's counsel, that the defendant having in the present instance permitted his wife to act for him in making the agreement, and settling the terms upon which the lodgings were taken, that he had thereby constituted her his agent for that purpose, and should therefore be bound by her acts and admissions. Lord KENYON said that the rule of law had been correctly + O'Connor v. Marjoribanks, 4 M. & G. 435. 1794. June 7. [ 142 ] EMERSON v. BLONDEN. [ *143] stated by the plaintiff's counsel, that where a wife acts for her husband in any business or department, by his authority and with his assent, that he thereby adopts her acts, and must be bound by any admission or acknowledgment made by her respecting that business, in which by his authority she has acted for him; and that therefore in the present case, her admission of the debt due to the plaintiff, on account of the lodging, was competent and admissible evidence to charge the husband. The plaintiff had a verdict. Erskine and Baldwin for the plaintiff. Mingay for the defendant. 1794. June 10. [144] [146] REX . BANKS. (1 Espinasse, 144-147.) In an information under the statutes (9 & 10 W. & M. c. 41 and 17 Geo. II. c. 40, s. 10) relating to the embezzlement of public stores, the defendant is not bound to produce a Navy Board certificate of the purchase of stores, but may prove by other evidence that he became legally possessed of them.† THIS was an information against the defendant under the stats. 9 & 10 W. III. c. 41, and 17 G. II. c. 40, s. 10, for having naval stores in his possession. It was admitted on both sides, that the old and damaged stores belonging to the several yards of Woolwich, Chatham, &c. were at certain times sold by public auction, in different lots, by authority of the Navy Board; but at those sales, the buyer always received a certificate from the Navy Board that such stores mentioned in the certificate had been sold by them, and that he was the purchaser. Upon this evidence, it was contended by the counsel for the prosecution, that the Acts of Parliament having made possession of naval stores, marked with the King's mark, complete evidence of guilt, that the only mode by which the defendant in an in †This point of the case is referred to in the judgment of WILLS, J. in principle of mens rea, as applied to a case of bigamy under the statute 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 57.-R. C. |