validity of his ministrations. Is there not something horribly defective in this state of things? We have come to this by throwing away some of the principles of the Platform, without adopting others suited to the changes we have made. According to the Platform the minister that was dismissed, was ipso facto deposed.* But we very properly acknowledge dismissed ministers to be ministers still. The officers of our University and Divinity College, our missionaries, and others without a charge, who have been ordained, are still recognized as ministers. To this I am far from objecting; I only plead that if the Platform is abandoned, we ought to adopt something else in its room. The Platform was consistent with itself; but that will not render us consistent if we throw away a part and retain another part that cannot stand alone.

But the defect of our present system is still more apparent in the case of heresy. Here a minister is absolutely invulnerable. Possessed of every advantage, (especially after he espouses error,) to mould the opinions of his congregation, holding in his hands, almost exclusively, the power of deciding who shall be admitted to his church, he will find it the easiest thing in the world, if he does not unlade his errors too fast, to shape his church in a few years exactly to his mind. In this respect he has a great advantage over or thodox ministers, as it is much easier to form a church of here

Cambridge Platform, ch. 9. art.

6 & 7.

tics than of Christians. Thus modelled, instead of being his tribunal or his accuser, his church becomes his sanctuary. Who then can touch him? Or if the church should chance to be dissatisfied, (which is not likely to happen except in the case of too rapid a disclosure of his tenets,) it is only for him to consent to a dismission without a council, or without one empowered to examine his opinions. And even should he choose to submit the points in dispute, one half of the council must be chosen by himself, and if he is not most unskilful in the selection, will come together only to defend his sentiments. To obtain sentence against him under these circumstances, is a downright impossibility. Who ever heard such a thing in any of our churches?

In short, the pastor's responsibility to the Christian Church, (I speak it seriously,) scarcely transcends that of the sexton, who is always liable to lose his place if he does not give satisfaction. Nor is this owing to any casual laxness in the administration of our ecclesiastical government, but to a radical defect in the form.

A defect it is indeed; for why should not ministers be as accountable to the church of Christ as private Christians? What are they that they should claim this immunity? Are they immaculate? are they impeccable? Or are their sins and errors more harmless than those of others? In what other kingdom, not enslaved, in what other corporation or society was it ever known that the officers were less accountable than the rest? What

ty for mistake. To a good heart that consults the Great Interpreter, revelation is sufficiently plain. "If our Gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost, in whom the God of this world hath blinded the minds of them that believe not." But this knot is cut at a stroke. Latitudinarian principles allow every man a right to interpret scripture for himself, and (if the right is good for anything,) to regulate his duties by that interpretation. Now, one plain duty, is, to "reject" "a man that is a heretic." In performing this duty then, every author ized tribunal has a right to its own interpretation of Scripture, and must judge for itself what heresy is.

It appears then that there is no tribunal in our churches competent to try an offending min ister; but that he ought to be effectually responsible to the Christian Church, as well for his leading opinions, as for his practice. A solemn question, interesting to every man that has a part to act for God, is then brought before us: Ought not such a tribunal to be erected with out delay?

To render this tribunal competent, three things are essentially necessary.

1. It must have power to carry , discipline through by deposing from office, and therefore must possess the right of ordination. It is equally the doctrine of the Platform as of common sense, that "to constitute in office, and remove from office, are acts be longing to the same power."* That authority only which invests can divest. The creating is the

Platform, ch. 8, art. 7.

annihilating power. The prac tice of our churches, whatever may be their theory, sanctions the same principle. No minister is formally tried but by a council of pastors and delegates possessing the power of ordina→ tion.

This principle being admitted, it is obvious that ministers alone, according to the usage of our churches, and the general opinion of antiepiscopalians, cannot constitute that tribunal; for as without the churches they cannot ordain, so without churches they cannot depose. Our associations then will not answer the purpose.

the

Neither can a church, made up of lay members compose that tribunal. The moment you give a church this power, you revive in its full extent the exploded and disorganizing principle of lay-ordination. If a church cannot ordain, it cannot depose; for "to constitute in office, and remove from office, are acts belonging to the same power." If it cannot depose, it cannot excommunicate its pastor; for excommunication necessarily involves deposition, since no one can remain an officer, after he ceases to be a member, of the Christian Church. If it cannot excommunicate its pastor, it can exercise no efficient discipline over him, and his responsibility to that body is nothing but a name.

I deny a pastor's responsibili. ty to his church, not on account of any lordly superiority which he sustains, but for this simple reason, The church cannot ordain him, and therefore cannot depose him. This responsibility must stand or fall with lay ordi

nation. It grew naturally out of that principle, it is inseparably joined with it in the Platform, and ought to have sunk with it; but it is nominally retained by the force of custom after that principle is given up. The framers of the Platform never dreamed of separating the deposing from the ordaining power, nor of making pastors accountable to a body not possessed of both. They supported the broad principle of lay ordination, giving to the brethren, where elders were wanting, full power to ordain and depose. By appointing Ruling Elders they also aimed to establish what they considered a Presbytery in every church, with the most ample powers of ordination and deposition. This done, they very consistently made the pastor amenable to that Presbytery, and in default of elders, to the lay brethren.* Nor did they want very respectable examples drawn from the first ages of Christianity to countenance congregational presbytery. How far they imitated the copy, I will not decide. But we have laid aside Ruling Elders, we no longer possess the appearance of a Presbytery in each church, we have also exploded the principle of lay ordination, and yet most inconsistently retain the notion of a pastor's accountableness to his church, a thing which with these concomitants never was thought of in the Church before. Perceiving however the inconsistency of giving to a body not invested with the power of ordination efficient jurisdiction over a pastor, we have practically dis

*Platform, Ch. 7, 8, 9 and 19.

a

owned the principle, and by the silent and continued application of good sense, have reduced his responsibility to a mere name. But the name has served to hide from our view the want of the thing, and has kept wise and venerable men easy without any real responsibility of ministers except to God. We have come to this by insensibly separating principles which in the Platform were joined together, by retaining through the force of custom, without examination, one part after relinquishing every thing which rendered that part consistent. Had Cambridge

Platform lived, things would not have come to this, but it is dead, and wi. it are buried some principles which can never be revived.

Let it never be put out of view that our present government, whatever it is, is not the result of deliberation or explicit agreement, but a motley of materials taken from the ruins of an ancient Constitution, and casually and loosely combined by usage. Neither we nor any past generation would have purposely formed such a thing out of new materials. And what has it done? It has brought us to anarchy and left us on the brink of ruin. Is it not time to pause and look around us? to break the fetters of custom that has crept in and fastened its chains by stealth, and by the application of design, wise and independent, to form a system capable of bearing examination?

2. This tribunal must be a body having actual and permanent existence. Not a creature of him who is to answer before it, not an ephemeral being called into ex

istence by his will and then annihilated, not a mutual council. What watch and care can be exercised from year to year by a body which does not exist? How can it vigorously call one to account when it depends for creation on his act? or continually, when it ceases to exist tomorrow? The minister who is held bound to answer only to such a body, sustains no stated and permanent responsibility, unless he can be accountable to a nonentity.

All this evil you say is provided against. The church is the body that watches over the pastor. It watches over him, and holds him bound by implicit agreement to submit every difficulty to a mutual council. But suppose he refuses to fulfil that agreement, who shall compel him? Of what avail for the church to watch over him if it cannot bring him to justice? Take stronger ground then, and say that the church in such a case may resort to an ex parte council. This is the only ground on which the present system can be plausibly defended. Let me display the argument in all its force. "Take the church and council together, and we have a competent, standing tribunal. Though the church wants the power of deposition, it can command a council for its arm, and in that arm lies the deposing power. To the watch and discipline of this body, with such an arm, the pastor by explicit covenant has very properly subjected himself. In virtue of this subjection the church, if he refuses a mutual council, can erect an ex parte council into a tribunal to try him." But by what authority is all this said? Where do

If

you get this feeble body with a potent arm? No such complicated principle is found in the Platform. That instrument gives the church, (with or without the advice of other churches indifferently,) full power to ordain, depose, and excommunicate its pastor.* No such complicated principle has been since adopted by any specific agreement between the churches, nor sanctioned, I believe, by general usage. No such complicated principle can be found in all the records of antiquity, none such in the Bible. Nor does the pastor's promised subjection to the church, (the only explicit covenant that he makes,) empower them to carry him to an ex parte council for trial. I promise subjection to A, it gives A authority over me, but not B and C to whom & has transferred the claim without my consent. I go further. If my subjection to A is real and not nominal, he has no need of B and C as auxiliaries to help out his authority; if it is only nominal, why do I sport with truth by promising what amounts to nothing? If the promise gives A's will no power over me except to turn me over to the disposal of B and C, it is nothing better than a sham. A's power to bring me before the tribunal of B and C implies no subjection to him. Any of my neighbors have a right if I injure them to bring me before a civil court; but am I therefore subject to them? Whence then does the church derive its power to carry a pastor for trial to an ex parte council? From a virtual contract ratified at his ordination? Here the pastor comes forward

* Platform Ch. ix, Art. 3 and 4: Ch. x, Art. 6.