relief, either equitable or legal.-Roland Park Co. of Baltimore City v. Hull, 48 Atl. 366, 92 Md. 301.

(Minn.) Where a common right or a community of interest in the subjectmatter of a controversy, or a common title, from which all of the defendants' separate claims, and all questions at issue between the parties plaintiff and defendants, have arisen, can be shown at the trial, an equitable action will lie to restrain and enjoin the several defendants from prosecuting separate actions at law against the plaintiffs.-City of Albert Lea v. Nielsen, 86 N. W. 83, 83 Minn. 246.

(Miss.) Where complainant had several defenses, legal and equitable, to defendant's suit in ejectment, complainant was entitled to maintain a bill to restrain the prosecution of the ejectment suit, where such relief would operate to avoid a multiplicity of suits at law and would enable the court to adjudicate all matters in controversy, under Const. 1890, § 160, authorizing the chancery court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant relief, though the legal remedy may not have been exhausted or the legal title established by a suit at law. Butler v. Scottish-American Mortg. Co., 46 South. 829.

(N. Y.) Plaintiff sued under Code Civ. Proc. § 1638, to compel the determination of hostile claims to ten pieces of real property, nine of which were in New York City, and one in Westchester county. Defendants brought ten actions of ejectment against plaintiff to establish their title to the property. Held, that the plaintiff in the first suit was entitled to an injunction restraining defendants from proceeding with nine of their ejectment suits upon the ground of multiplicity of suits, and that there was no inconsistency in allowing the other action to proceed to trial.-Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 60 Hun, 577, 14 N. Y. Supp. 385, 20 Civ. Proc. R. 391, affirming 60 Hun, 577, 14 N. Y. Supp. 62.

(N.Y.) The maintenance of several actions in ejectment against several defendants will not be enjoined to avoid a multiplicity of suits.-Prospect Park & C. I. R. Co. v. Morey, 140 N. Y. Supp. 380, 155 App. Div. 347.

(N. C.) It clearly appearing from the record that all matters in dispute between the parties could be settled in the pending action, and that plaintiff would not be injured by the issuing of the injunction, defendants having given a bond to secure them for the rents and damages, the injunction was properly granted.-Featherstone v. Carr, 44 S. E. 592, 132 N. C. 800.

(N. C.) A married woman leased certain premises for two years, with privilege of renewal for three years more, her husband joining in the lease, but failing to acknowledge it. She sued an assignee of the lease for defaulted rent, alleging an agreement by him to pay an increased rental, which he controverted. She secured judgment, from which the assignee appealed, giving, under Code, § 1772, a bond to secure one year's rental, etc., and afterwards a sufficient additional bond. The landlady then began monthly suits for each installment of rent as it fell duc, recovering judgments and issuing executions, until this litigation was enjoined as vexatious, the injunction being affirmed by the Supreme Court. When the two-year term expired, she began suit to recover the premises, relying on Code, § 1834, which provides that a married woman's lease for more than three years shall not be valid unless executed by her and her husband, and proved and acknowledged by them, as required with deeds. Held, that an order restraining execution on the landlady's judgment in this latter action was not within the rule authorizing the former injunction, and was erroneous.-Featherston v. Carr, 46 S. E. 15, 134 N. C. 66.

(Tenn.) Where a bill alleged that 21 owners of real estate adjoining plaintiff's sulphur works had entered into champertous agreements with certain attorneys to prosecute separate suits against defendant for injuries to their land, on the ground that defendant's plant was a nuisance, there was no such community of interest in the subject-matter or common right or title involved as would authorize an injunction to prevent a multiplicity of suits.Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Fain, 70 S. W. 813, 109 Tenn. 56. (Tex.) In an action against purchasers from a vendee under an executory contract to convey, brought by the landowner to enjoin the purchasers and such vendee from maintaining suits against plaintiff, based upon sales to 137 C.C.A.-9

such purchasers, circumstances held not to authorize the suit on the ground of multiplicity of suits; the fact that numerous independent persons hold separate instruments upon which separate suits could be brought not authorizing injunctive relief, at the suit of the one claimed to be liable, to restrain such suits, though the validity of the instruments could be attacked upon a common ground.-Hamner v. Garrett, 133 S. W. 1058.

III. ATTACHMENT, GARNISHMENT, AND REPLEVIN SUITS.

(Ark.) Since the statute allows the issuance of writs of garnishment, an injunction will not lie to restrain the prosecution of garnishment suits; the debtor's remedy being a suit for damages for malicious abuse of process where his creditor wrongfully employs process legally issued for a purpose it was not intended by law to effect, such as to annoy the debtor and to cause him to file claims of exempt property.-Baxley v. Laster, 101 S. W. 755, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 983.

(Ill.) If the bill of complaint shows that an accounting with respect to the subject-matter is essential and that a multiplicity of suits will be avoided by equity taking jurisdiction, an injunction restraining an attachment suit will be sustained; and the fact that the attachment creditor, through his diligence, may be entitled to preference over other creditors interested in the subjectmatter of the litigation, is immaterial, as equity follows the law and can preserve to such creditor the advantage of his diligence if he is entitled thereto.-Wilcox v. Jennings, 153 Ill. App. 437.

(Neb.) A suit in equity may be maintained to enjoin a judgment creditor from prosecuting a multiplicity of proceedings in garnishment to subject the wages of laborers, mechanics, and clerks, which are absolutely exempt by law from attachment, execution, and garnishment process to the payment of his judgment.-Siever v. Union Pac. R. Co., 93 N. W. 943, 68 Neb. 91, 61 L. R. A. 319, 110 Am. St. Rep. 393.

(N. J.) Complainant's agent, C., bought of defendant certain machinery, for which complainant gave his three notes. Unknown to complainant, C. and defendant agreed that the former should receive the last one of the notes to become due for effecting the sale. The first two notes not being paid, an attachment was levied on complainant's property, and he filed a bill to enjoin the prosecution of the attachment suit, on the ground that the secret agreement between C. and defendant was a breach of the former's duty, and a fraud on complainant. Held, that equity had jurisdiction on the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of suits.-Maher v. Mutual Electric Mfg. Co., 17 Atl. 968.

(N. J.) Complainant and defendant were domestic corporations. Defendant had a claim against the complainant which it could prosecute by attachment on property of complainant in Pennsylvania. The claim could be prosecuted and defended in either New Jersey or Pennsylvania. Defendant simultaneously commenced attachment in three several suits in Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin, wherein credits to an amount of $20,000 were attached for a claim less than $4,000. Held an abuse of process with the obvious effect to harass and oppress the defendant in such action.-Standard Roller Bearing Co. v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 63 Atl. 546.

(N. Y.) After a creditor of an insolvent firm of wholesale clothiers had attached their entire stock, other persons claiming to be creditors for goods sold assumed to rescind the sales, as having been induced by fraud, and replevied the goods, which they took from the possession of the sheriff. There were more than 50 of these actions, some claiming cloth, some linings, and others trimmings; so that entire garments were replevied by persons who had merely furnished the buttons thereon, and others were sought to be taken by several different creditors. The fraud complained of consisted of false representations as to the solvency of the firm, made to the different creditors as part of the same general purpose to defraud. Held, that the attaching creditor might maintain a suit to restrain further proceedings in replevin, to have a receiver appointed, and to compel the litigation of all the adverse claims in one suit.-National Park Bank v. Goddard, 62 Hun, 31, 16 N. Y. Supp. 343; Id., 131 N. Y. 494, 30 N. E. 566.

(W. Va.) The fact that a person is garnished by different persons on separate demands having no connection, or the fact that the same question of law may arise in all the cases, does not give equity jurisdiction to enjoin the suits, to avoid multiplicity of suits.-National Tube Co. v. Smith, 50 S. E. 717, 57 W. Va. 210, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 195, 110 Am. St. Rep. 771.

IV. BILLS OF PEACE.

(Ala.) In general, a bill of peace cannot be sustained until the complainant has ascertained his rights at law.-Gunn v. Harrison, 7 Ala. 585.

(Ala.) A bill of peace lies only when the right claimed affects many persons. If the right is disputed between two persons, not for themselves and all others in interest, but for themselves alone, the bill will be dismissed.Moses v. City of Mobile, 52 Ala. 198.

(Miss.) Where several suits were brought against a carrier for injuries to passengers in the same wreck, equity had no jurisdiction of a bill of peace filed by the carrier to restrain the prosecution of the suits at law and for the determination of the rights of all the parties in chancery.-Newell v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 63 South, 351.

(N. Y.) A bill of peace is not restricted to actions at law, but applies to equitable actions as well.-Allegany & K. R. Co. v. Weidenfeld (Sup.) 5 Misc. Rep. 43, 25 N. Y. Supp. 71.

V. ACTIONS FOR INJURIES FROM FLOWAGE AND OBSTRUCTION OF WATERS. (N. J.) Where several plaintiffs brought different suits at law against one defendant, some for diminishing their supply of water, and another for backing water on his mill wheel, held, that no ground for interference to prevent multiplicity of suits was shown, although the alleged injuries were done in the use by the defendant of one stream.-Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. McFarlan, 30 N. J. Eq. (3 Stew.) 135.

(N. J.) Where defendant had instituted three actions at law for damages against different municipalities for decreasing the flow of a river, it was no ground for enjoining such suits and transferring the controversy to equity to avoid a multiplicity of suits that the actions at law would determine nothing but the amount of damages suffered by defendant for the past six years, and that there would or might be other similar actions brought in the future; the municipalities being able to prevent such actions by instituting proceedings to condemn.-City of Newark v. Chestnut Hill Land Co., 75 Atl. 644.

(N. J.) An injunction could not be granted to restrain the prosecution of separate suits at law, brought by millowners against a water company, to recover damages for the wrongful abstraction of water from a stream, none of which suits had any connection with any of the others.-City of Newark v. National Silk Dyeing Co., 91 Atl. 877.

(N. Y.) Where A., pending a suit at law in the supreme court against B. for an obstruction of a water course, commenced a new suit before a justice of the peace every week for the continuance of the obstruction, it was held that B., not having established his title at law, was not entitled, on a bill of peace, to an injunction upon A. to prevent litigation.-Eldridge v. Hill, 2 Johns. Ch. 281.

VI. ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS.

(D. C.) A contractor failed to finish buildings within the time agreed on, and the owner notified him that the contract was at an end, and finished the building, employing defendants to furnish work and material. The owner paid large amounts to subcontractors, and subsequently numerous contractors and subcontractors filed liens on the property and commenced action for their enforcement. Held, that an injunction would lie at the instance of the owner to enjoin the proceedings at law and to combine the actions in one suit in chancery.-Painter v. Drane, 2 MacArthur, 163.

(Mich.) Where several liens on logs are asserted, none of which conflicted with the rights of third persons, the only question in common being the validi

ty of the law under which they are claimed, the rights of the claimants cannot be litigated in one suit upon a bill in equity to restrain defendants from suing to enforce the liens, to remove the logs, and from interfering with complainants' possession; the bill being neither a bill of peace nor a bill to prevent multiplicity of suits.-Southern Michigan Cedar & Lumber Co. v. McDonald, 57 Mich. 292, 24 N. W. 87.

VII. ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST ADMINISTRATORS, OR AFFECTING INSOLVENT ESTATES.

(U. S.) An insolvent corporation cannot maintain a bill to restrain creditors from prosecuting actions on their respective claims, on the ground of preventing a multiplicity of suits, when such creditors are seeking to reach equitable assets of the corporation, to do which it is necessary that they should obtain judgments on their claims.-French v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 92 Fed. 28.

(Ga.) Where the administrators of A. filed a bill, praying for an injunction, upon the ground that more money was due on a previous judgment revived in their favor against the defendants than was due on the judgment for which the plaintiffs were then pressed for payment, it was held that courts of equity would not interpose by injunction to prevent circuity of action, the remedy being peculiarly a common-law remedy.-Clay v. Sheftall, T. U. P. Charlt.

263.

(Mass.)

A bill in equity cannot be maintained to restrain the creditors of an insolvent debtor from proving their claims against him in the court of insolvency, by proof that numerous creditors have presented their several debts for proof, which have not been passed upon by the judge of the court of insolvency, and that they are all controlled by one of the defendants.-Fellows v. Spaulding, 141 Mass. 89, 6 N. E. 548.

(N. Y.) An action by a creditor of an insolvent corporation to enforce the liabilities of the stockholders and to restrain separate actions at law begun by individual creditors against different stockholders to recover on their liability is maintainable.-Pfohl v. Simpson, 74 N. Y. 137.

(N. Y.) A complaint by the receiver of a national bank and the bank, against an insolvent savings bank and 146 persons, alleged, in substance, that each of such persons had a claim as a depositor against the national bank, based on a pass book issued by the savings bank in the name of the national bank; that the deposits were made in the savings bank; that the savings bank had no authority to bind the national bank by the issue of such pass books; that seven of such persons, at the instance of the savings bank, had begun suits on their claims, and the others threatened to bring suits; and that separate litigation would work irreparable injury to the creditors of the national bank, and persons interested in the trust funds. Held, that the facts stated entitled plaintiffs to injunction. Kellogg v. Chenango Valley Sav. Bank, 42 N. Y. Supp. 379, 11 App. Div. 458.

(Ohio) Injunction lies to prevent the bringing of six actions by the same plaintiff as administrator of as many estates against the same defendant of which the court has no jurisdiction, in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits and vexatious litigation.-Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Copenhaver, 31 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 515.

(S. C.) Where the creditors of an insolvent estate are numerous, the executor may file a bill to enjoin them from proceeding at law and to have the estate administered in equity.-Thomson v. Palmer, 2 Rich. Eq. 32.

(Va.) A son was possessed of slaves for life, with a limitation to his mother in case of his death without issue living at the time of his death. The mother died first, leaving him her only heir, and he died without such issue. The administrator of the mother brought detinue for the slaves against one of the heirs and distributees of the son, and also one of his administrators, but not declared as such, and recovered judgment on a case agreed by which the parties left the decision upon certain specified points of law, to wit, whether the limitation to the mother was legal and valid, and whether the slaves, on the death of the son, became vested in her administrator. Held,

that in a suit in equity filed in favor of the son's administrators the judgment should be perpetually enjoined, on the ground that they, as representing him, are entitled to the slaves, and, being in possession, should not be compelled to relinquish that possession and afterwards be put to the circuity of another action to recover them back.-Royall v. Royall, 5 Munf. 82.

VIII. ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST RAILROADS OR CARRIERS.

(U. S.) A railroad company may restrain a shipper by injunction from bringing separate suits under the Texas law before a justice of the peace for every car load as to which he alleges an overcharge.-Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Kuteman, 54 Fed. 547, 4 C. C. A. 503, 13 U. S. App. 99.

(U. S.) Complainant's predecessor contracted to maintain its division point and railroad shops at M., and, after this had been done for 16 years, complainant found that it was inconvenient to longer maintain them there and impossible to so maintain them and operate the road so as to comply with the hours of labor act of Congress (Act March 4, 1907, c. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1170]), and, having been threatened with suits to enforce such contract and to recover damages for its breach, filed a bill of equity to restrain such actions. Held, that the bill was not maintainable to avoid a multiplicity of suits either in equity or at law.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Quigley, 181 Fed. 190.

(U. S.) Where an order of a state railroad commission requires a railroad company to make reparation by the payment of specified sums to 19 separate shippers, and the commission and the shippers intend to bring but one suit, the company was not entitled to injunctive relief against the enforcement of the order of reparation.-(D. C.) Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky Railroad Commission, 214 Fed. 465, order affirmed State v. Finn, 35 Sup. Ct. 146, 235 U. S. 601, 59 L. Ed. 379.

(Cal.) Where, in an action to restrain defendants from prosecuting actions under Civ. Code, § 490, providing that every railroad corporation must furnish every person desiring a passage on their passenger cars a ticket entitling the holder to ride to his destination or any intermediate station, or from any intermediate station to his destination, within six months, and making the company refusing such ticket, or the passage therein called for, liable to the person refused in the sum of $200, and the complaint alleged that defendants composed a confederacy of individuals formed to create and prosecute about 3,000 causes of action for penalties against plaintiff, equity has jurisdiction of the case, and can consolidate the actions, and dispose of it in its entirety.— Southern Pac. Co. v. Robinson, 64 Pac. 572, 132 Cal. 408.

(Ga.) A city having granted permission to a railroad company to operate on a street, and several of the abutting property owners having sued at law for damages against the company, a bill was filed by the company to bring all the parties into equity, praying an injunction against them on the ground that they had no right of action, and alleging that it was in the exercise of its legal rights. Held, that equity had jurisdiction as of a bill of peace.-South Carolina R. Co. v. Steiner, 44 Ga. 546.

(Ga.) A railroad company, authorized by a city council to run a branch line through the city's streets, brought a bill to restrain a multiplicity of suits by property owners damaged along the line of the road by the cuts and embankments and the soot and cinders from the engines. Held, that a court of equity had jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.-Guess v. Stone Mountain G. & Ry. Co., 67 Ga. 215.

(Miss.) Where A. sued a railroad company for damages from the burying of a horse on the right of way so near his place that his well was polluted, his family sickened, and the place rendered worthless as a home, and on the same day his daughter sued for illness, and his wife sued for the death of another daughter, there is no such community of interest in the several plaintiffs as warrants enjoining a multiplicity of suits.-Gulf & Ship Island R. Co. V. Walker, 60 South. 1014.

(Tex.) Seventeen different suits against initial carrier for injuries to 17 different shipments of fruit shipped from different points to different consign