The Aesthetic Experience: Its Nature and Function in Epistemology

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Review Publishing Company, 1908 - 155 pages
 

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Page 24 - ... they all unchanging and the same always, or quite the reverse? May they not rather be described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with one another? The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of change. And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind - they are invisible and are not seen?
Page 50 - By the name God, I understand a substance infinite, [eternal, immutable], independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing that exists, if any such there be, were created.
Page 85 - ... it hath never been explained, nor can it be explained, how external bodies, figures, and motions, should produce an appearance in the mind. These principles, therefore, do not solve, if by solving is meant assigning the real, either efficient or final, cause of appearances; but only reduce them to general rules.
Page 26 - the faculty of knowing objects outside ourselves,'1 while sensation is a 'modification of the soul,'2 or is perception 'by means of the bodily organs.'3 His main argument, quoted by Norris,4 for the validity of this distinction is that intellect and sensation must be different faculties because it is possible for God to have the 'Knowledge of Pain without having the Sentiment.' "THEODORE: Think you that God feels the pain which we suffer? ARISTE: No, without doubt, for the Sentiment of Pain makes...
Page 23 - I say, liable at times to some degree of change? or are they each of them always what they are, having the same simple, self-existent and unchanging forms, and not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or at any time? They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes. And what would you say of the many beautiful — whether men or horses or garments or any other things which may be called equal or beautiful — are they all unchanging and the same always, or quite the reverse? May they...
Page 152 - In seeking its object, any idea whatever seeks absolutely nothing but its own explicit, and, in the end, complete, determination as this conscious purpose, embodied in this one way. The complete content of the idea's own purpose is the only object of which the idea can ever take note. This alone is the Other that is sought.
Page 24 - We behold, then, by the sight of the mind, in that eternal truth from which all things temporal are made, the form according to which we are, and according to which we do anything by true and right reason, either in ourselves, or in things corporeal; and we have the true knowledge of things, thence conceived, as it were as a word within us, and by speaking we beget it from within; nor by being born does it depart from us.
Page 67 - Whether in sound of the swallowing sea — As is the world on the banks, So is the mind of the man. Vainly does each, as he glides, Fable and dream...
Page 69 - And the existence of other individual souls is manifest to us, from their effects upon their respective bodies, their motions, actions, and discourse. Wherefore since the Atheists cannot deny the existence of soul or mind in men, though no such thing fall under external sense, they have as little reason to deny the existence of a perfect mind, presiding over the universe, without which it cannot be conceived whence our imperfect ones should be derived.
Page 28 - And having been created in this way, the world has been framed in the likeness of that which is apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and must therefore of necessity, if this is admitted, be a copy of something.