with a knowledge that they had been thus stolen-Held, that the prisoners were rightly tried for and convicted of such receiving at the Central Criminal Court, inasmuch as the larceny took place within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England.

Larceny from British Ship-River within Foreign Territory-Admiralty Jurisdiction-Central Criminal Court.

Certain bonds were stolen from a British ocean-going merchant ship whilst she was lying afloat and moored to the quay, in the ordinary course of her trading, in the river Maas at Rotterdam in Holland. The place where the ship lay at the time of the said theft was below the bridges, where the tide ebbs and flows and where great ships go. It did not appear who the thief was or under what circumstances he was

on board the ship. The bonds were afterwards received in England by the prisoners

*Coram Lord Coleridge, C.J.; Pollock, B.; Lopes, J.; Stephen, J., and Williams, J.

CASE reserved by North, J.

The prisoners were tried before me at the Central Criminal Court for felony in respect of twenty-five bonds (207. each) of Egyptian Preference Stock, two bonds of 1,000 dollars (ten shares) and 500 dollars (five shares) respectively of the Illinois Railway, and thirty other bonds of Egyptian Unified Stock.

The first count charged the prisoners with stealing these securities upon the high seas within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England. The second count charged that they being British subjects within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England upon the British ship Avalon, then being in a certain foreign port, to wit the port of Rotterdam, stole the same securities. The third count charged them with larceny of those securities within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court. The fourth count charged them with receiving the same securities within the jurisdiction of that Court well knowing them to have been stolen. And the fifth and sixth counts respectively charged them with having been accessories after the fact to the theft, and the receiving respectively of the same securities by persons unknown.

The material facts proved were as follows:

1. On the 12th of July last the abovementioned Egyptian Preference Stock and Illinois bonds were made up by Messrs. Kelker & Co., bankers at Amsterdam, into a parcel which was marked outside "value 50l.," and was addressed to Messrs. Mercia, Backhouse & Co. in London. The Unified Stock was made up into another parcel similar to the first, except that it was These marked outside as value 1007. parcels were of a class known as "valued parcels." They were traced clearly from Amsterdam to Rotterdam, to the office of Messrs. Pieters & Co., the agents there of the Great Eastern Railway Company, on whose behalf they were received.

The Queen v. Carr, C.C.R.

2. There was evidence that these two parcels were (with two others) taken. from Pieters & Co.'s office by a man employed by them for that purpose, and placed by him on board the steamship Avalon about half-past five p.m. on the same 12th of July.

3. The Avalon is a British vessel, registered at Harwich, and sailing under the British flag. She is about 240 feet in length, with a gross tonnage of 670 tons, and draws about 10 feet 6 inches of water when loaded. She is the property of the Great Eastern Railway Company, and is regularly employed by them in their trade between Harwich and Rotterdam. On the evening in question she was lying on the river Maas at Rotterdam, about 20 or 30 feet (the captain also described it as about the breadth of the Court) from the quay, and against a "dolphin," a structure of piles for the use of the company's ships, only projecting from the quay for the purpose of keeping the vessels off the quay. She was moored to the quay in the usual

manner.

4. The place where the Avalon was lying was in the open river, sixteen or eighteen miles from the sea. There is not any bridge across the river between that point and the sea. The tide ebbs and flows there, and for many miles further up the river. The place where the Avalon was lying at the dolphin is never dry, and that vessel would not touch the ground there at low water. The Admiralty chart, shewing the river Maas from Rotterdam to the sea, was put in evidence at the suggestion of the counsel for the prisoners, and was proved by the captain of the Avalon to be correct.

5. While the Avalon was lying at the dolphin as above described persons were allowed to pass backwards and forwards between her and the shore without hindrance.

6. The Avalon sailed for England the same evening about six o'clock, and arrived at Harwich the following morning. Upon her arrival the two valued parcels abovementioned (and one of the other parcels) were at once missed, and upon enquiry it was found that they had been stolen. The parcel containing the Unified Stock and the third parcel have never since been

traced; but the parcel containing the Egyptian Preference Stock and the Illinois bonds was found in the prisoners' possession on the 1st of August.

7. The prisoners are British subjects.

8. It was contended for the prisoners that there was no evidence upon which the jury could find them guilty upon the counts charging them with stealing the securities. I was of that opinion, and so directed the jury: and the prisoners were accordingly acquitted upon those counts.

9. It was also contended for the prisoners that unless the jury found that the securities had been stolen from on board the Avalon the prisoners must be acquitted, as, if they had been stolen after leaving Pieters & Co's. office and before reaching the ship, the offence of stealing them was one which this Court had not jurisdiction to try, and therefore the prisoners could not be tried here for receiving. According to the case of The Queen v. John Carr (one of these prisoners), reported in vol. lxxxvii. p. 46 of the Sessions Papers at the Central Criminal Court, and the cases there cited, I took this view, and directed the jury that unless they were satisfied that the securities had been taken from the Avalon they must acquit the prisoners. They found both the prisoners guilty.

10. I was not asked to leave, and did not leave, any question to the jury whether the securities were stolen before or after the Avalon commenced her voyage from Rotterdam. There was no evidence upon which the jury could have found that the theft occurred after the voyage began: the evidence rather pointed to its having occurred before she sailed.

11. It was further argued on the prisoners' behalf that even if the securities had been stolen from the Avalon there was nothing to shew that they had been taken by a British subject, and therefore the case did not come within the Acts 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104. s. 267; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 91. s. 21; or 30 & 31 Vict. c. 124. s. 11; and the thief was amenable to the law in Holland only; and further, that the case of The Queen v. Anderson (1) was no authority to the contrary, inasmuch as the prisoner in that case, though a (1) 38 Law J. Rep. M.C. 12; Law Rep. 1 C. C.R. 161.

The Queen v. Carr, C.C.R. foreigner, was one of the crew of a British vessel, and therefore owed allegiance to the law of England, and upon that ground could be tried here. The counsel of the Crown did not dispute that the offender might be tried in Holland, but insisted that he might be tried here also.

12. I expressed my opinion that if the Avalon had, at the time when the securities were stolen, been sailing up or down the river Maas, the person who took them, whether an Englishman or a foreigner, could clearly have been tried here, upon the authority of The Queen v. Anderson (1); that the law is the same, whether the ship be anchored or sailing, as appears from the cases of The King v. Jemot (2) and The King v. Allen (3), where the vessels were lying in port, and which cases are referred to by Lord Blackburn with approval in The Queen v. Anderson (1); and that it could not make any legal difference whether the vessel was made fast to the bottom of the river by anchor and cable, or to the side of the river by ropes from the quay. I also expressed my opinion that although the fact that the prisoner in The Queen v. Anderson (1) was one of the crew was referred to more than once in the judgment of Chief Justice Bovill, it was not mentioned by any of the other Judges, and was not the ground of the decision, and that it made no difference in the present case whether the securities stolen from the Avalon were taken by one of the crew or passengers, or by a stranger from the shore.

13. I directed the jury accordingly, telling them that if they came to the conclusion that the securities were taken from the ship, the taking them was an offence which could be tried here; and that if so, the prisoners could now be tried here for receiving, and could be found guilty of that offence if the jury thought the facts proved warranted such a finding. I stated at the same time that I should, if necessary, reserve the point for the consideration of this Court.

14. With respect to the receiving no difficulty of law arose and no point was reserved.

(2) Russell on Crimes, 5th ed. vol. i. p. 11 in

note.

(3) 7 Car. & P. 664; 1 Moo. C.C. 494.

15. The jury found both prisoners guilty upon the fourth count.

The question for the opinion of this Court was whether under these circumstances there was any jurisdiction to try the prisoners at the Old Bailey for the offence of which they have been found guilty.

Sir H. Giffard, Q.C. (Gorst, Q.C., and Tickell with him), for the prisoner Carr.The question is, whether the stealing is a felony triable here. If the stealing is not within the jurisdiction, the receivers are not triable here. The prisoners cannot legally be tried here for the offence of receiving the bonds, because it appears that the theft was in Holland whilst the ship was moored to the quay at Rotterdam. The thief was probably a Dutchman, and the ship was at the time in a Dutch highway. It is not a case of larceny by a person on board a British ship on the high seas. The ship ceased, when moored to the quay, to have the character of a floating island separated from any country; it became part of Holland, and was no longer sailing under the British flag. In The Queen v. Anderson (1) the offence was committed by one of the crew of a British ship—one who by contract brought himself under English law. In The King v. Allen (3)

the basis of the decision was the fact that the prisoner was one of the crew of the Aurora, of London.

E. Clarke, Q.C. (Grain with him), for the prisoner Wilson, referred to the judgment of Lindley, J., in The Queen v. Anderson (1).

Poland (Goodrich with him), for the prosecution. When the ship came to Rotterdam it was within Dutch jurisdiction; but it never ceased to be subject to and to be within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England. The ship

was in the course of its trade afloat within the ebb and flow of the tide. Anyone, including the thief, who came on board that ship was under the protection of English law, and therefore was under the jurisdiction of English law. The stealing, therefore, was within the jurisdiction, and a fortiori the receiving. In The King v. Allen (3) membership of the crew not the ground of the decision. In The

was

The Queen v. Carr, C.C.R. Queen v. Keyn (4) the case of The Queen v. Anderson (1) is cited, but without any suggestion that it was decided upon the ground that the prisoner was one of the

crew.

LORD COLERIDGE, C.J.-There were certain bonds on board a British ship, which lay in the river Maas, moored to the quay, at a dolphin. The ship was thus attached to the land of the country of Holland, but was at a place within the ebb and flow of the tide where she could and did lie afloat. There was no actual proof of who stole the bonds; but the evidence pointed to the stealing having taken place whilst the vessel was so moored and before she left her moorings to proceed upon her homeward voyage. How the bonds came to this country we know not, nor is it for our present purpose material. It is enough to know that they were here received under circumstances which, apart from the question now to be considered, clearly warranted a conviction of the receivers. The conviction is for the offence of feloniously receiving these bonds knowing them to have been stolen. Now it is obvious that the prisoner cannot be convicted here unless the stealing took place within the jurisdiction of our Courts. The question has therefore to be considered whether the ship was, when the bonds were stolen, within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, so that the thief if he had been caught could have been tried at the Old Bailey.

The exact point has never yet, it would seem, been decided. None of the cases cited absolutely cover the precise question now before us. There are, indeed, two questions before us first, was the ship within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, so that the stealing took place locally within the jurisdiction of the Court which tried the prisoners? and secondly, was the person who stole the bonds a person subject to the jurisdiction of that Court? The first a question of place, the second a question of person. The place is clearly within the ebb and flow of the tide, where great ships are accustomed to go. The ship was accustomed to go there in its trading, and

(4) 46 Law J. Rep. M.C. 17; Law Rep. 2 Ex. D. 63.

was there in the course of trading. There is enough to make it clear that the place is within the jurisdiction.

Without saying that in all the cases the reports are full or exact enough to enable us to say that this case is governed by any of them, yet it appears from the report of The King v. Allen (3) and The King v. Jemot (2) that those cases were such that to draw any tangible and sensible distinction between them and the case now before the Court would be difficult. Again, in The Queen v. Anderson (1) the ship was some forty or fifty miles up the Garonne, yet it was held that our Courts had jurisdiction. I cannot distinguish that case from the present as to the first point.

With regard to the second point, is there anything in the personality of the thief who thus stole from a place within the jurisdiction to render him not triable here? It is true that in The Queen v. Anderson (1) some of the Judges place great reliance upon the fact that the prisoner was one of the crew of the vessel, though the Law Reports differs in this respect from the report in the Law Journal. In the report of that case in the Law Journal, which is fuller than the report in the Law Reports, I find Mr. Justice Blackburn reported as insisting on the right of this country to legislate for persons who come on board its ships. The fact that the prisoner was one of the crew is prominently noticed; but not one of the Judges says that had it been otherwise their judgment would have been other than it was. The true principle appears to me to be this, that any person who comes on board a British ship where English law is reigning places himself under the protection of the British flag; and, as a correlative proposition, if he thus becomes entitled to our law's protection, he becomes amenable to its jurisdiction, and liable to the punishments it inflicts upon those who there infringe its requirements. I can draw no distinction between those who form part of the crew, those who come to work in or on the ship, those who are present involuntarily or those who come voluntarily as passengers. It is said that these bonds may have been stolen by a Dutch subject, who came, perhaps with

The Queen v. Carr, C.C.R.

out a right, on board for a short time, and who then went back with his plunder to Rotterdam, and forwarded it by post to the prisoners. If the ship had sailed for this country before he got ashore with the bonds thus stolen, instead of after, and brought him to this country, I say he could have been tried and convicted here. This conviction is right, and must be affirmed.

POLLOCK, B.-I also think this conviction should be affirmed. The broad question is, whether upon this trial of an indictment for receiving, it was proved that the property was so stolen as to give the Court trying it jurisdiction over the thief and theft. Does the rule apply enuntiated by Mr. Justice Blackburn in The Queen v. Anderson (1):-" All persons on board of a ship may be considered as within the jurisdiction of that nation whose flag is flying on the ship, and in the same manner as if they were within the territory of that nation." It is admitted that if the theft had been on the high seas, in mid-ocean, the conviction would have been proper. It is said that lying alongside the town the English jurisdiction ceased. I think the distinction is not one of substance. If the crew had been discharged and the ship had been under repair the circumstances would have been different, and there might have been a distinction, but here there was a large British ship taking or discharging its cargo and passengers in its ordinary course within tidal waters "where great ships do go." To draw distinctions such as we have been invited to do would be to fritter away the sound law on this subject as laid down in the cases cited.

LOPES, J.-This conviction should be affirmed. The position of the ship was within the jurisdiction, she was on the high seas" where great ships do go." It is said the thief may not have been a member of the crew. I think it matters not whether he was or not. The true test is, was he at the time on an English ship, protected by and amenable to English law?

STEPHEN, J.-I am of the same opinion. The whole question is, was the theft within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England? Ever since the time of Ric. 2

this jurisdiction has been defined to extend to places "where great ships do go." Many statutes regulate the procedure for applying that jurisdiction, but the extent of the jurisdiction has remained, so far as I can learn, unnarrowed. Of the cases cited The King v. Jemot (2) bears out that jurisdiction, and shews it is not limited to waters outside ports and harbours. The King v. Allen (3) is to a similar effect. But The Queen v. Anderson (1) goes further, it affects both place and person, for in that case it was a foreigner who was tried-although the case is less important in its bearing on the present case, because the foreigner was one of the ship's crew; whilst here we have to decide, following these authorities, whether jurisdiction extends to an English ship placed where great ships usually go as part of their voyage for the purposes of its trading, and to all persons who happen to be on board such ship so as to be entitled to the protection of English law. I see no reason founded on expediency or authority to induce us to say that a ship at anchor is within the jurisdiction, and that a ship moored to the land is not, or to introduce intricacies as to the mode of attachment of the ship to the land, or to enquire when the flag is lowered or when hoisted. Such rules would be to make law without meaning, and to narrow well-founded and beneficial jurisdiction. I prefer the obvious and wholesome principle that jurisdiction and protection in these cases are co-extensive.

WILLIAMS, J., concurred.

Conviction affirmed.

Solicitors-The Solicitor to the Treasury, for the prosecution; Goldberg & Langdon, for pri

soners.