Peace, may, in that character, proceed for the penalties which, by the City Charter, are made recoverable before the Mayor. (a)

Under Con.Stats., L. C., c. 6, the convicting Magistrate has a discretionary power of giving any one of the three judgments mentioned in s. 32, ss. 38 and 39, and s. 40. (b) An appeal lies to the General Quarter Sessions of the Peace from a conviction rendered by a Judge of the Sessions of the Peace in and for the City of Montreal, under s. 50 of this Statute. (c) Under the same Statute, the convicting Magistrate has the right to grant costs, either upon conviction or dismissal of the prosecution, and this even to attorneys. (d)

In Ontario, the 32 Vic., c. 32, professes to amend and consolidate the several enactments relating to tavern and shop licenses. The Con. Stat. Can., c. 103, has been repealed by 32 & 33 Vic., c. 36; but it is apprehended that c. 31 of this Statute, as amended by 33 Vic., c. 27, will apply to prosecutions for selling liquor without license, in the same manner as the former Statute.

Compounding Offences.-Compounding felony is where the party robbed not only knows the felon, but also takes his goods again, or other amends, upon agreement not to prosecute. (e) It is a misdemeanor at common law, punishable by fine and imprisonment. (ƒ)

A prosecution is not the property of those who institute it, to deal with it as they please. The public have a higher interest in having redress rendered, and wrong punished, to deter others from offending in like manner; (g) and in general, a prosecution can only be compromised by leave

(a) Reg. v. Allen, 2 Allen, 435.

(b) Ex parte Moley 7, L. C. J. 1.

(e) Ex parte Thompson, 7 L. C. J. 10.

(d) Ex parte Moley, 7 L. C. J. 1.

(e) Russ. Cr. 194-5

(ƒ) Arch. Cr. Pldg. 837.

(g) Reg. v. Hammond, 9 Solr. Jour. 216, per Bramwell, B.

of the Court. A prosecution for selling liquor without license cannot be compromised without the leave of the Court. (a) Leave has been granted to compound a qui tam action on the 32 Hy. 8, c. 9, for buying a pretended title, on paying the King's share into Court. (b)

It is equally illegal to stipulate for the compromise of a charge amounting only to a misdemeanor, if the offence is one which is injurious to the community generally, and not confined in its consequences to the prosecutor himself, as it is to compromise a charge of felony. (c)

The 18 Eliz. c. 5, contains provisions against compounding informations on penal Statutes. But this Statute does not extend to penalties which are only recoverable by information before Justices. (d)

The defendant was indicted for compounding a penal prosecution, instituted by him against one F., under 29 & 30 Vic., c. 51, s. 256. It appeared that F. had been convicted, under that Act, on the information of defendant, by the Police Magistrate of H., and a fine of $50 imposed upon him, and that, on an appeal therefrom, defendant, for $10, agreed with F. not to prosecute this appeal, but consented that the conviction should be quashed, which was accordingly done :-Held that as, in this case, the offence charged in the indictment was the compounding a penal action or prosecution that had been instituted, and as this was no offence at common law, at least as to that part of the penalty going to the informer, and as the 18 Eliz., c. 5, did not apply to the case, (e) the indictment would not lie either at common

(a) Re Fraser, 1 U. C. L. J. N. S. 326, per A. Wilson, J.

(b) May q. t. v. Dettrick, 5 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 77. As to stifling a prosecution for felony, and the distinction between it and compounding felony, see Williams v. Bayley, L. R. 1 E. & I. App. 200.

(c) Dwight v. Ellsworth, 9 U. C. Q. B. 540, per Robinson, C. J.

(d) Reg. v. Mason, 17 U. C. C. P. 534; Rex v. Crisp, 1 B. & Ald. 282. (e) Rex v. Crisp, supra.

law or under the Statute, and the conviction of the defendant was therefore ordered to be annulled. (a)

Offences by Persons in Office.-An indictment lies against a person who wilfully neglects or refuses to execute the duties of a public office. (b) An indictment may be maintained against a deputy returning officer at an election for refusing, on the requisition of the agent of one of the candidates, to administer the oath to certain parties tendering themselves as voters. (c) But the omission of the name of the agent from such indictment will vitiate it. (d)

An indictment charging a misdemeanor against a registrar and his deputy jointly, is good, if the facts establish a joint offence. A deputy is liable to be indicted, while the principal legally holds the office, and even after the deputy himself has been dismissed from. the office. (e)

Extortion signifies the unlawful taking by any officer, by colour of his office, of any money or thing of value that is not due to him, or more than his due, or before it is due. (f) This offence is of the degree of misdemeanor and all persons concerned therein, if guilty at all, are principals. (g) Two or more persons may be jointly convicted of extortion where they act together and concur in the demand. Where two persons sat together as magistrates, and one of them exacted a sum of money from a person charged before them with a felony, the other not dissenting, it was held that they might be jointly

(a) Reg. v. Mason, 17 U. C. C. P. 534; see also R. v. Stone, 4 C. & P. 379; R. v. Gotley, R. & R. 84; R. v. Best, 2 Mood. C. C. 125; Arch. Cr. Pldg. 837; Macfarlane v. Dewey, 15 L. C. J. 85; 32 & 33 Vic., c. 21, s. 115.

(b) Reg. v. Bennet, 21 U. C. C. P. 238, per Galt, J.

(g) Reg. v. Tisdale, 20 U. C. Q. B. 273, per Robinson, C. J.

convicted. (a) It is not necessary that the indictment should charge the defendants with having acted corruptly. (b)

The courts do not quash indictments for extortion, but leave the defendants to demur. (c)

The Stat. of West. 3 Ed. 1, c. 26, would seem to apply here. (d).

As to the fees which may be legally exacted by public officers in different cases, it is a general rule that when a duty is cast upon any one by Act of Parliament, and no remuneration is provided for doing it, the party is to perform the duty without remuneration. (e) A clerk of the peace is an officer serving the Crown, and appointed to discharge public duties, and he cannot charge fees for any service for the remuneration of which no provision is made by Statute or otherwise expressly assigned to him by law; (f) for it is a maxim of law that no fee can be demanded for services rendered in the administration of justice, except such as can be shown to have a clear legal origin, either as being specifically allowed in some Act of Parliament, or as being sanctioned by some court or officer that has been permitted by ancient usage to award a fee for the service. (g)

All new offices erected with new fees, or old offices with new fees, are within the Stat. 34 Ed. 1, for that is tallage upon the subject, which cannot be done without common assent by Act of Parliament. (h) A clerk of the peace is not entitled to any fee from the parties to a

(a) Reg. v. Tisdale, 20 U. C. Q. B. 273, per Robinson, C. J.

(b, Ib.

(c) Ib. 272, per Robinson, C. J.; and see Rex v. Wadsworth, 5 Mod. 13.

(d) See Askin v. London District Council. 1 U. C. Q. B. 292.

(e) Ib. 295, per Robinson, C. J.; Graham v. Grill, 2 M. & S. 295.

(f) Askin v. London Dis. Council, 1 U. C. Q. B. 292.

(g) Hooker v. Gurnett, 16 U. C. Q. B. 183, per Robinson, C. J.; Price v. Perceval, S. L. C. A. 189; the London S. V. Á. R. 140.

(h) The London S. V. A. R. 140.

cause for striking a special Jury. (a) The table of fees established and promulgated by the Courts, contains all the services for which clerks of the peace are entitled to charge, except that they are entitled to fees in all cases where such fees are authorized by Act of Parlia ment; but no local tariff or user in particular counties can give any additional right. (b)

In Re Barnhart v. Justices' Home District (c), a man damus was moved for to compel the justices of the peace to make an order upon their treasurer to pay to Barnhart, the late gaoler, several sums of money which he claimed, first, for the expense of a guard provided by him to prevent the escape of prisoners, rendered necessary, as he said, by the insufficiency of the gaol; second, for expenses defrayed by him in retaking prisoners who had escaped from the gaol. The mandamus was refused, as a mandamus never issues except to admit or restore a person to an ascertained right, and the law makes no provision for these charges, but they rest in the discretion of the justices.

It would be illegal, as manifestly contrary to duty, as well as public policy, in a judge to take from the party in whose favour he purposes to decide an undertaking, to indemnify him against all the consequences of his decision. (d) A conviction against a bailiff for exacting more than his legal fees was quashed, on the ground that the magistrate permitted an amendment in the information, and because no precise date of the offence was given. (e) The fees of office and taxes payable to the

(a) Hooker v. Gurnett, 16 U. C. Q. B. 180.

(b) Re Dartnell, 26_Ú. C. Q. B. 430. See as to auditing accounts of the Clerk of the Peace, Re Poussett and Corporation, Lambton, 22 U. C. Q. B. 80. (c) 5 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 507.

(d) Ballard v. Pope, 3 U. C. Q. B. 320, per Robinson, C. J.

(e) Ex parte Smith, 6 L. C. R. 488.

J