of treason, murder, or offences of the like description, in company with, or by coercion of, her husband, she is punishable equally as if she were sole. (a) So a married woman may be indicted jointly with her husband for keeping a bawdy house, (b) or gaming house, (c) for these are offences connected with the government of the house in which the wife has a principal share. (d) According to the prevailing opinion, it seems the wife may be indicted with her husband in all misdemeanors. (e) If a married woman incite her husband to the commission of a felony, she is accessory before the fact. (f) But she cannot be treated as an accessory for receiving her husband, knowing that he has committed a felony, nor for concealing a felony jointly with her husband, (g) nor for receiving from her husband goods stolen by him. (h) And she will not be answerable for her husband's breach of duty, however fatal, though she may be privy to his misconduct, if no duty be cast upon her, and she is merely passive. (i)

Ignorance.

The laws can only be administered upon the principle that they are known, because all persons are bound to know and obey them. (j) A mistake, or ignorance of law, is no defence for a party charged with a criminal act; (k) but it may be ground for an application to the merciful consideration of the Govern ment.(1) But ignorance, or mistake of fact, may, in some

(a) Ib. 23; see Reg. v. Cruse, 8 C. & P., 541, 2 Mood. C. C. 53; Reg. v. Manning, 2 C. & K. 903 n.

(b) Reg. v. Williams, 10 Mod. 63, 1 Salk. 384

(c) Reg v. Dixon, 10 Mod. 335.

(d) Arch. Cr. Pldg. 23.

(e) Ib. 23; Reg. v. Ingram, 1 Salk. 384; but see Reg. v. Price, 8 C. & P. 19. (f) Reg. v. Manning, 2 C & K. 903 n.

(g) Arch. Cr. Pldg. 23.

(h) Reg. v. Brooks, Dears C. C. 184; see Rev. v. Archer, 1 Mood. C. C. 143.

(i) Reg. v. Squires, 1 Russ. 16; Arch. Cr. Pldg. 23.

(Reg. v. Moodie, 20 U. C. Q. B. 399, per Robinson, C. J.

(k) Ib. Unwin & Clark, L. R. 1 Q. B. 417; Reg. v. Mayor Tewkesbury, L. R.

Q. B. 635, per Blackburn, J.

(1) Reg. v. Madden, 10 L. C. J. 344, per Johnson, J.

cases, be a defence; (a) as, for instance, if a man intending to kill a thief in his own house, kill one of his own family, he will be guilty of no offence. (b) But this rule proceeds upon a supposition that the original intention was lawful; for if an unforeseen consequence ensue from an act which was in itself unlawful, and its original nature wrong and mischievous, the actor is criminally responsible for whatever consequences may ensue. (c)

Principals in the First and Second Degrees.-The general definition of a principal in the first degree is one who is the actor or actual perpetrator of the fact. (d) Principals in the second degree are those who are present aiding and abetting at the commission of the fact. (e) To prove a person an aider or abettor, it must be shewn either that he was actuaily present aiding and in some way assisting in the commission of the offence, or constructively present for the same purpose-that is, in such a convenient situation as readily to come to the assistance of the others, and with the intention of doing so, should occasion require. (f) But there must be some participation, for the fact that a person is actually present at the commission of a crime does not necessarily make him an aider or abettor. If one sees a felony is about to be com mitted, and in no manner interferes to prevent it, he does not thereby participate in the felony committed, so as to render him liable as a principal in the second degree. It should be proved that he did or said something shewing his consent to the felonious purpose, and contributing to its execution. (g)

(a) Unwin & Clark, supra, 424, per Blackburn, J.; Rider v. Wood, 29 L. M. 1. (b) Reg. v. Levett, Cro. Car. 538.

(e) Arch. Cr. Pldg. 24.

(d) Arch. Cr. Pldg. 7.

(e) Ib. 8.

(f) Ashley v. Dundas, 5 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 753, per Sherwood, J.; Reg. v. Curtley, 27 U. C. Q. B. 617, per Morrison, J.

(g) Reg. v. Curtley, 27 U. C. Q. B. 619, per Morrison, J.

If a fact amounting to murder should be committed in prosecution of some unlawful purpose, though it were but a bare trespass, all persons who had gone in order to give assistance, if necessary, for carrying such unlawful purpose into execution, would be guilty of murder. But this applies only to a case where the murder is committed in prosecution of some unlawful purpose-some common design, in which the combining parties were united, and for the effecting whereof they had assembled. (a) For when the act of homicide is not done with the concurrence of all those present, there must be evidence of a precedent common purpose to prosecute the unlawful enterprise, even to the extent of extreme and deadly violence. (b) Even in case of felony, there must either be a previous or present concurrence in the act by all to render them liable, (c) otherwise none but the party actually committing the act will be liable. (d)

In Curtley's case, the prisoner C. was indicted for aiding and abetting one M. in a murder, of which M. was convicted. It appeared that, about six in the evening, the deceased was with R. and his wife on the river bank at Amherstburg, standing near a pile of wood. R.'s wife saw M. standing behind the pile, who, on deceased going up to him, struck deceased with a stick, of which he died. Some time afterwards, deceased ran, when two other men sprang out, and followed him; but in a few seconds two of them returned, and assaulted her and her husband. She could not identify the prisoner. Two other wit nesses saw deceased running from the direction of the wood pile, and across the road, when he fell over a stick

(a) Reg. v. Curtley, 27 U. C. Q. B. 617, per Morrison, J.

(b) Ib. 617, per Morrison, J.; Rex v. Collison, 4 C. & P. 565; Reg. v. Howell, 9 C. & P. 450.

(c) Ib. 617, per Morrison, J.; Reg. v. Franz, 2 F. & F. 580.

(d) Ib. 617, per Morrison, J.; Reg. v. Skeet, 4 F. & F. 931; Reg. v. Price, 8 Cox C. C. 96.

of timber. They saw a man, at the same time, come running from the wood pile, and, as deceased got up, he struck him with a stick, knocking him down, and again struck him on the head, and then the man ran off to the north. One of them identified this man as M., but the other did not know him. One witness, B., swore that, about six on that evening, deceased left his office with R. and his wife, and that, about twenty minutes after, he saw the prisoner, with M. and another, go into the vacant lot where the wood pile was, M. having a stick in his hand, and heard M. say to the others, "Let us go for him." It was also proved by others that, before the affray, the three were together near the wood pile in question, and were also in a saloon together about nine o'clock afterwards. The prisoner was convicted on this evidence, and a rule nisi was obtained for a new trial on his behalf, on the ground that there was no evidence to go to the jury sufficient to justify his conviction. The rule was made absolute, for there was no direct proof that the prisoner was present when the blows were struck, or when the affray began, and no evidence whatever that he and the others were together with any common unlawful purpose, and the expression used by M. "Let us go for him," in the absence of evidence that M. was alluding to the deceased, or that the prisoner and M. were aware that the deceased was at the wood pile, was unimportant per se, as indicating the intention of the parties, and was obviously susceptible of different applications. (x)

Whenever a joint participation in an act is shewn, or there is a general resolution against all opposers, each person is liable for every act of the others, in furtherance of the common design. (y) And if a number of persons are

(x) Reg. v. Curtley, 27 U. C. Q. B. 613.

(y) Reg. v. Slavin, 17 U. C. C. P. 205; Russ. Cr. 56,

confederated for an unlawful purpose, and in pursuit of their object commit felony, any person present in any character, aiding and abetting, or encouraging the prosecution of the unlawful design, is involved in a share of the common guilt. (a)

But this doctrine will apply only to cases where the act intended to be accomplished is unlawful in itself. For if the original purpose is lawful and prosecuted by lawful means, if one of the party commit a felonious act, the others will not be involved in his guilt, unless they actu ally aided or abetted him in the fact. (b) In other words, a felonious act committed by one person in prosecution of a common unlawful purpose is the act of all, but if the purpose is lawful, the person committing the act will alone be liable. By an unlawful purpose is meant such as is either felonious, or if it be to commit a misdemeanor, then there must be evidence to shew that the parties engaged intended to carry it out at all hazards. (c) The act must also be committed in prosecution of the unlawful purpose, and be the result of the confederacy. (d)

A prisoner was convicted of unlawfully attempting to steal the goods of one J. G. It appeared that he had gone with one A. from Toronto to Cooksville, and examined J. G.'s store, with a view of robbing it; and that afterwards A. and three others having arranged the scheme with the prisoner, started from Toronto, and made the attempt, but were disturbed, after one had gone into the store through a panel taken out by them: the prisoner saw them off from Toronto, but did not go himself: Held that as those actually engaged were

(a) Reg. v. Lynch, 26 U. C. Q. B. 208; see also Reg. v. McMahon, 26 U. C. Q. B. 195.

(b) Russ. Cr. 56.

(o) Reg. v. Skeet, 4 F. & F. 931; see also Reg. v, Luck, 3 F. & F. 483; Reg. Fraw, 8 Cox 335.

Cox Cg. v. White, R. & R., 99; Arch. Cr. Pldg., 950.