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County Courts Amendment Bill.-Examination Distinctions of Articled Clerks.

honourable profession to compel its members, in order to entitle themselves to a fair remuneration for their services, to make a bargain beforehand for the sum to be paid, and to demand from their clients an agreement in writing to pay such sum.

46. Fees.-The Commissioners of her Majesty's | ture to represent that it would be derogatory to an Treasury may direct what reasonable fees shall be from time to time paid in respect of the revision and enrolment, as by this act provided, of any such deed of enfranchisement or conveyance of any land to be so purchased, and such fees shall be deemed to be part of the expenses of the enfranchisement or purchase, as the case may be, and shall be paid or be recoverable accordingly.

47. Joint tenancy with Crown.-Any manor vested in her Majesty in right of her Crown in possession, remainder, or reversion, in joint tenancy or coparceny with any subject, may, so far as regards the rights and interests of such subject and of the tenant of such manor, be dealt with under the copyhold acts, and the provision of this act in regard to enfranchisements in manors vested in her Majesty in right of her Crown in remainder or reversion expectant on an estate of inheritance shall apply to manors so vested in her Majesty in joint tenancy or coparceny with any subject, so far as respects the share or interest in any such manor to which her Majesty may be so entitled.

COUNTY COURTS AMENDMENT BILL.

PETITION OF HULL LAW SOCIETY.

MR. HADFIELD presented a petition from members of the Hull Law Society and other attorneys practising in Hull, stating that, while the petitioners acknowledge the great advantages conferred on the community by the establishment of the county courts, and regard with satisfaction all measures calculated to promote their further efficiency and usefulness, they are of opinion that the County Court Acts Amendment Bill now before the House requires further consideration and amendment before it is passed into law.

They then state that society at large has a direct and vital interest in the character and respectability of the profession to which the petitioners belong, and that they cannot but feel that some of the provisions of the bill are calculated to injure and humiliate that profession.

With regard to clause five of the bill, the petitioners deprecate the exclusion, by positive enactment, of attorneys and solicitors from the possibility of being appointed to the office of deputy judge of the county courts, an office for which many attorneys and solicitors are by education, legal acquirements, and position well fitted, and their exclusion from which is but one out of many recent instances in which offices of trust and importance formerly open to them have been sedulously closed against them.

Considering the great and increasing importance of the county courts jurisdiction, it would be unjust to the suitors in such courts to pass any measure which would have a tendency either virtually to deprive them of the benefit of professional assistance in the conduct of their causes, or to throw the county courts practice almost exclusively into the hands of the lower grades of the profession.

The thirty-second and thirty-third clauses of the bill would have such tendency, inasmuch as in the majority of cases in which professional assistance is sought and needed, the fees mentioned in the ninetyfirst section of the act of 9 & 10 Vict., c. 95, are altogether inadequate for preparing a case for trial and conducting it in court; and the petitioners ven

The provisions of clause twenty-five of the bill for obtaining judgment by default unless notice of an intention to defend be given where the demand exceeds £20 might be advantageously extended to cases of demands not exceeding £20.

The petitioners occasionally find themselves inconvenienced and their clients (suitors in the county courts) prejudiced by the provisions of the tenth section of the act 15 & 16 Vict., c. 54, which prohibits, under any circumstances, an attorney other than the attorney acting generally in the action from appearing and acting in court on behalf of a suitor; and the petitioners recommend the insertion in the bill of a clause enabling one attorney to appear and act for another in the court where the attorney of the party is ill, absent from home, resides at a distance, or other special circumstances exist sufficient to satisfy the judge that it is fit and proper that another attorney should so appear and act.

The petitioners also recommend the insertion in the bill of a clause extending the provisions of the sixtieth section of the 9 & 10 Vict., c. 95 (as to summoning parties out of the district by leave of the court), so as to enable the registrar when the court is not sitting to grant such leave on such proof as is now by law required to be given in court.

EXAMINATION DISTINCTIONS OF ARTICLED CLERKS.

WE understand it is highly probable that in the next, or an early Term, in order to encourage the careful study of the law, the Examiners will select the names of three candidates, not exceeding the age of twenty-five years, who, in passing their examination, may deserve distinction, with a view to enabling the Council of the Incorporated Law Society to present to such candidates a prize of books or other testimonial which may be deemed fit.

We believe that the Masters who preside at these examinations have approved of the proposition, and we thus give the earliest intimation of it; for although this important improvement may not be carried into effect in Michaelmas Term, we are assured that it will not be long delayed; and the additional study which the candidates may be disposed to undergo during the Long Vacation will not be thrown away, even if they should not receive the proposed honorary rewards.

We hope to speak more positively on the subject next week. Parliamentary and other urgent matters, affecting the profession, have, we believe, somewhat delayed a decision on the subject. The details relating to the mode of carrying the suggestion into effect of course require careful consideration, so that the distinctions may be conferred according to certain settled regulations.

Imprisonment for Debt Bill.

IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT BILL.

A BILL to amend the law of imprisonment for debt has been bronght in by Mr. Pellatt and Mr. Hadfield, proposing to abolish arrest on executions, and to discharge all now in custody.

The proposed enactments are as follow:

1. The act to come into operation on the seventh day after the passing of the same.

2. No writ of capias ad satisfaciendum, or other writ, process, or warrant to arrest the body of any defendant in any action or suit (actions for malicious prosecution, or for deceit, libel, slander, criminal conversation, seduction, or breach of promise of marriage only excepted), shall be issued, founded on any judgment, decree, or order of any of the superior courts of law or equity or any inferior court in England, nor shall any writ, process, or warrant to arrest the body of any plaintiff, defendant, or other person in any action or suit be issued, founded on any judgment, decree, or order of any court of law or equity, or any ecclesiastical or other court, for the recovery of costs, or for the payment of money, whether consisting wholly or partly of costs, or otherwise.

3. In case any such writ, process or warrant to arrest the person (save in any of the cases excepted) have issued before the commencement of this act, founded on any such judgment, decree, or order as aforesaid, and have not been executed before the day of the commencement of this act, such writ, process, or warrant shall not on or after the said day be executed against the person of the party against whom the same was issued.

4. In any case where on the day of the commencement of this act any person is in custody under or by virtue of any such writ, process, or warrant, founded on any such judgment, decree, or order as aforesaid (save in any of the excepted cases), it shall be lawful for the sheriff, gaoler, or officer in whose custody such person is detained, and he is hereby, on the application of such person, required to discharge him forthwith out of custody as to such execution, writ, decree, or order respectively, without prejudice, nevertheless, to any other right to detain such person in custody for any cause for which he may lawfully be so detained; but, notwithstanding such discharge, the judgment, decree, or order whereupon the debtor or party was taken or charged in execution or arrested shall nevertheless remain and continue in force, to the intent that the judgment creditor or person obtaining such degree or order may have and take remedy and execution upon every such judgment, decree, or order against the property and effects of such debtor or party, in the same manner and form as the creditor or person obtaining the decree or order otherwise might have done in case such debtor or party had never been so taken or charged in execution or arrested.

5. In every case of a judgment, decree, or order, under or by virtue of which a defendant or party might, if this act had not been passed, be charged in execution or arrested; and in every case where any defendant or party is discharged from custody as to any such execution, decree, or order, under or by virtue of this act, if the plaintiff or person who has obtained such execution, decree or order have not recovered his demand out of the goods, chattels, or property of such defendant or party, if in any such case the sum due or to be paid under such judgment, decree, or order, inclusive of costs, does not exceed £300, such plaintiff or person may apply to the

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county court of the district in which such defendant or party resides for a summons requiring such defendant or party personally to appear at such county court, and to show cause why execution or process of arrest or a commital should not issue against his person in respect of such judgment, decree, or order, as the case may be; and the said county court shall have power to hear and determine the matter; and the service of such summons, and the proceedings in the matter, and the costs of or relating to the same, shall be subject to the like proceedings and regulations, so far as the same are applicable, as any plaint in case of debt or assumpsit, save as herein otherwise provided.

6. Property to be administered under the insolvent acts. At the hearing of such matter, if such plaintiff or other person, or such defendant or party, or either of them, appear, the court may cause him to be examined on oath, and shall upon such examination, or upon such other evidence as is offered, investigate the amount of the debts or demands due or owing by or claimable against the defendant or party, and the nature and amount and circumstances of any property, of whatsoever kind, he, or any one in trust for him, is, was, or may be possessed of or entitled to, and the manner and circumstances under which the debt due to the plaintiff or other liability was incurred, and the means and expectation of payment thereof; and if it appear that the said defendant or party, or any one in trust for him, is possessed of or entitled to property of any kind, which, regard being had to the nature, amount, and circumstances of such property, and to the several debts and demands due by and claimable against such defendant or party, and to the security of his several creditors, ought, in the opinion of the court, to be administered under the provisions of the acts relating to insolvent debtors, then and in such case such court may make an order that the property of such defendant or party be vested in the assignee for the time being of the estates and effects of insolvent debtors in England; and may order such defendant or party to be committed, with stay of execution for such time, whether more or less than forty days, to be by such order limited, as to such court may seem fit, and under such order such defendant or party may be arrested and detained in custody accordingly, as in other cases of committal under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding; and a copy of such examination, and of every such order, shall be transmitted to the Court of Insolvent Debtors, and such order for vesting the property of such defendant or party shall operate, and have the same effect, as if the same were made by the Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors; and thereupon the assignee of the said Court of Insolvent Debtors shall take possession of the estate and effects of such defendant or party, in like manner as if the same had been vested in him by an order of the said Court of Insolvent Debtors; and the said Court of Insolvent Debtors shall proceed in the case in like manner as if such defendant or party were a prisoner within the walls of a prison, and as if he had petitioned to be discharged from prison, and shall proceed upon such examination as if the same were the schedule of the said defendant or party, filed upon his petition to be discharged under the authority of the court; but it shall nevertheless be lawful for such defendant or party to file a schedule, and to amend the same, under the provisions of the acts for the relief of insolvent debtors.

7. But if such defendant or party do not attend,

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as required by such summons, or do not allege a sufficent excuse for not attending, or if he attend and refuse to be sworn, or to disclose any of the things aforesaid, or if he do not make answer touching the same to the satisfaction of the court, such court may order such defendant or party to be committed to the common gaol or house of correction of the county, district, or place in which he is resident, for any period not exceeding two calendar months, unless he sooner submit himself to be examined, or to the authority of the court,

8. And if at any such hearing it appear to the court, either by the examination of such defendant or party, or by any other evidence, that there is not property of such defendant or party which ought, in the opinion of such court, to be administered under the said acts relating to insolvent debtors, or that such defendant or party is not of sufficient ability to discharge the debt or demand, but that in incurring the debt or other liability, he has obtained credit under false pretences, or by means of fraud or breach of trust, or has wilfully contracted such debt or liability without having had, at the same time, a reasonable expectation of being able to pay or discharge the same, or that he has made, or caused to be made, any gift, delivery, or transfer of any property, or has charged, removed, or concealed the same, with intent to defraud his creditors or any of them, then and in any such case, such court may order such defendant or party to be committed to the common gaol or house of correction of the county, district, or place in which he is resident, for any period not exceeding six calendar months, unless the demand be sooner paid, without prejudice to the remedies for the recovery of the demand out of the property or effects of the said defendant or party.

9. When the demand exceeds £300, the original court to have jurisdiction under this act.

10. In any action in any court, in any case where the power of arrest would otherwise be taken away by this act, if the plaintiff cause a written or printed notice to be annexed to, or endorsed on, the summons or other process by which such action is commenced, stating that he will proceed in such action under the provisions of this act, inserting the title thereof, in such case the court, at the original hearing of the cause, if the judgment be against the defendant, shall have the same power and authority to examine the defendant and plaintiff, or either of them, or other persons, and of making orders for vesting the property of the defendant in the assignee of the estates and effects of insolvent debtors, and for committing such defendant to prison, as is hereinbefore provided for the case where a judgment has been already given.

11. Defendant about to quit England.—In any action in any court, or in any case in which a judgment, decree, or order of any court has been had or obtained, where the defendant or party against whom such action is brought, or such judgment, decree, or order is had or obtained, might, if this act had not been passed, be or have been charged in execution or arrested, if the plaintiff or person bringing such action, or obtaining such judgment, decree, or order, shew, by the affidavit of himself or of some other person, or by other proof, to the satisfaction of such court, that there is probable cause for believing that such defendant or party, or any one of any such defendants or parties, is about to quit England, unless he be forthwith arrested or charged in execution, it shall be lawful for such court, upon the hearing of the case, to grant an execution, order, or decree, as

the case may be, against the person of the defendant, or (in the case of an execution, decree, or order having been theretofore had or obtained) by a special order to direct that such defendant or party shall be arrested or charged in execution under such judgment, decree, or order as aforesaid; and thereupon it shall be lawful for the plaintiff or person obtaining such judgment, decree, or order to arrest or charge in execution the said defendant or party against whom the same was obtained, in like manner as such defendant or party might have been arrested or charged in execution if this act had not been passed; but in the case of any such special order for arrest in execution, as last aforesaid, obtained in respect of a judgment, degree, or order theretofore obtained, it shall be lawful for the person so arrested or charged in execution to apply, at any time after such arrest, to the court for a rule or order on the plaintiff or person obtaining such judgment, decree, or order, to show cause why the party arrested under such special order as aforesaid should not be discharged out of custody; and it shall be lawful for such court thereupon, and upon consideration of any further affidavits produced by or on behalf of either of the parties, or upon examination of the parties, or either of them, or of witnesses, to make such other order thereon as to such court may seem fit, or to direct the costs of such application to be paid by either party; but if thereupon the party arrested be discharged, such discharge shall be without prejudice to any remedies for the recovery of the plaintiff's or party's demand out of the property or effects of the defendant or person so discharged, and the execution, writ, decree, or process against the person may be changed to an execution, writ, decree, or process against such property or effects.

12. Act not to extend to proceedings relating to

revenue.

LAW OF COSTS.

SECURITY FOR, BY PAUPER NEXT FRIEND OF
MARRIED WOMAN.

THIS was a motion by some of the defendants to stay the proceedings in a suit by a married woman suing by her next friend, who was a poor man, until a substantial person should be appointed her next friend, and until the costs of a former suit, which had been dismissed with costs for want of prosecution, had been paid. It appeared that the former bill had been filed for the same purpose as the present, and that the then next friend had died a pauper in a workhouse before the order to dismiss was made.

The Vice-Chancellor Wood said: "I think, if I had to rely only on the particular circumstances of this case, there is enough to justify my decision; but I would rather decide the case upon the broader ground, and follow the authority of Sir J. Leach in Pennington v. Alvin, 1 S. and S. 264, which has been confirmed by Lord St. Leonards and the present Lord Chancellor. I find, in this case, that the parties have been harrassed in a former suit, by this plaintiff sing by a person as a next friend, who afterwards died a pauper in a workhouse. Her prosecuting that suit under such circumstances seems to me sufficiet, if any special circumstances were necessary, to athorise me to grant this motion.

"But in Pennington v. Alvin, Sir John Leach,

Law of Attorneys and Solicitors.

though he remarked that it was a gross case, rested his decision simply on the ground that the case of a married woman presented circumstances very different to that of an infant, and that her next friend should be a person of substance. That decision was followed in Drinan v. Mannix, 3 Dru. and W. 154, by Lord St. Leonards, in a case where there was fraud on the part of the married woman, in suing without her husband. And I find that the present Lord Chancellor, in Stevens v. Williams, 1 Sim. N. S. 545, adopted those decisions, without relying on any special circumstances.

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"It has been urged, why should the rule be different from that which prevails in the case of a plaintiff who is sui juris, who is never called upon to give security for costs on account of his poverty? Bnt the answer is, that in such a case the defendant has, at least, the security of the plaintiff's person; for the plaintiff may be attached and imprisoned, if he does not pay costs when ordered to do so. That cannot be done in the case of a feme covert; and the consequence is, that if the feme covert, who has the power of selecting her next friend, is allowed to sue by a next friend, who is not a person of substance, the defendant may be harrassed by an improper suit, without the power of staying it, as in the case where an infant is plaintiff, or of availing himself of the remedy to recover his costs by attachment and imprisonment of the person of the plaintiff, as where the plaintiff is sui juris. Now, that it has been decided that a married woman may sue alone in formâ pauperis, there is very little inconvenience; for, if she has no property under her control, and is unable to procure her next friend, she can sue in formâ pauperis; and if she has separate property to the amount of £100, she will be able to get some one to act as her next friend; or, upon giving security, she may make a special application, to which the Court would be willing to listen, and the only possible case of grievance would be that of a married woman who possessed property of a value something between £5 and £100, and who could not find any one to act as her next friend. On the other hand, there is the greater grievance of the possibility of persons being harrassed improperly by the suit of a married woman suing by a pauper next friend; and balancing these inconveniences, I accede to the decision of Sir John Leach on this subject, followed by Lord St. Leonards and Lord Cranworth, and shall make an order on this motion to stay proceedings, in the form used in Wilton v. Hill, 2 De G. McN. and G. 807, and Stevens v. Williams, until further order.

"On the other hand, there is the authority of Lord Langdale, in the case of Dowden v. Hook, 8 Beav. 399, passing by Squirrel v. Squirrel, 1 Ves. J. 409; 2 P. Wms. 297 n.; because, in that case, though it turns out to have been a case in which a married woman was concerned, no distinction was taken between the cases of married women and infants, and that was so held in old cases in Atkyns and Moseley. I do not find that Lord Thurlow's attention was directed in Squirrel v. Squirrel, to the distinction between the cases of a feme covert aud an infant. I therefore prefer to follow the later autnorities, which I have mentioned. I have found a report of the decision of the Lord Justice Knight Bruce, then Vice-Chancellor, in Jones v. Fawcett, 11 Jur. 529, and he is there made to say, after having heard the case of Dowden v. Hook, ‘Suppose a married woman has a clear right, and cannot obtain any person to be her next friend, what is she to do? I have been much struck by those observations of Lord Langdale. In this case, there is an adjudication that the woman is at least entitled to an inquiry.' That was because a decree for inquiry as to the plaintiff's claim had previously been made. He, therefore, directed security to be given for the costs incurred, which would be a matter of course; but he would not inquire as to the solvency of the next friend, with a view to security for the future costs. Lord Cottenham, on appeal, reversed that decision, but declined to give his opinion on the point of discrepancy between the authorities, saying only that the defendant had a right to object to the substitution of a new next friend for the existing next friend. Therefore, there is a decision of Lord Langdale, and the view taken by the Lord Justice Knight Bruce, in opposi- J. 458. tion to the other authorities on this subject. But the recent decision, that a married woman may sue in forma pauperis, without a next friend, introduces a new consideration. In Dowden v. Hook, Lord Langdale remarked that, by the practice of the Court, as it then existed, a married woman sueing by her next friend, had been permitted to sue in formâ pauperis, and said that it was, therefore, too much to contend that the next friend must necessarily, in all cases, be a person able to answer any claim against him for costs.

"The circumstances which make a difficulty between the cases of feme covert and an infant are, not only that a feme covert selected her own next friend, but also that this Court is always anxious that cases in which infants are concerned should be brought to its notice, and it has a jurisdiction over suits by infants which it has not in the case of suits by married women, to stay such suits, if not for the infant's benefit, and can, for that purpose, avail itself of any impropriety on the part of the next friend in bringing the suit. But it is not so in the case of a married woman. Her suit must go on, however impossible it may be for the defendant to have any remedy for costs, in case they should be ordered to be paid to him.

"As to the other part of the motion, I find no case which has gone so far, and I therefore cannot grant that part of the motion.

"The order need not mention the costs of this motion, and the costs of the successful party will be costs in the cause. Hind v. Whitmore, 2 Kay and

LAW OF ATTORNEYS AND
SOLICITORS.

STRIKING OFF ROLLS OF OTHER COURTS.

THIS was motion that John Collins, an attorney of the Court of Common Pleas, might be struck off the roll of that court.

H. J. Hodgson, for the Incorporated Law Society, in support produced a rule striking the attorney off the roll of the Court of Queen's Bench for misconduct.

Jervis, C. J., said "Out of deference to that court, we do not inquire into the circumstances upon which it acted. The rule may go."

In re John Collins, 18 Com. B. 272.

The following is an abstract of the previous decisions on this subject, for which we are indebted to Mr. Maugham's Attorney's Handbook (p. 155) :

:

If an attorney be struck off the roll of the Court of King's Bench for misconduct, the Court of Common Pleas will make a like order on motion, founded on a copy of the original report of the matter in the

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Professional Lists.-Notes of the Week.

King's Bench (In re Smith, 4 J. B. Moore, 319; 1 B. & B. 522). But in exparte Hague (3 Brod. & B. 257; 7 J. B. Moore, 64), the Court refused the application, unless the contents of the affidavits on which the Court of Queen's Bench acted, were stated to them, and proof was produced that the attorney had been struck off for a misdemeanor.

If an attorney be struck off the roll of the King's Bench for misconduct, the Court of Common Pleas will make a like order, on an affidavit stating that fact (In re Cope, 4 Law Journ., C. P., 50).

A rule to prohibit an attorney from practising in the Court of Common Pleas was granted on reading a rule to the like effect of the Court of Queen's Bench (In re Whytehead, 4 Man. and G., 768; 5 Scott, N. R., 239).

An application, on the last day of Term, to strike an attorney off the rolls of the Court, for alleged misconduct, was refused upon the mere production of a similar rule obtained in the Common Pleas. The Court said there must be an affidavit that he was the same person as the one against whom the Court of Common Pleas had granted a rule, and that the motion should have been made so as to give him an opportunity of denying he was the same person (In re 1 Exch. R. 452).

A rule to strike an attorney off the roll of this Court (Exch.), on affidavit that he had been convicted in the Queen's Bench of a conspiracy, and sentenced to be imprisoned, and to have his name struck off the roll of that Court, and that his name had been struck off accordingly, is a rule nisi, which makes itself absolute, unless cause be shewn within the time prescribed (In re Charles Wright, 1 Exch. R. 658; 5 D. & L. 394).

In bankruptcy the order is only nisi, although the rule of another Court, for striking an attorney off the roll, be produced (In re Mark, 4 Deac. and C. 482).

PROFESSIONAL LISTS.

PERPETUAL COMMISSIONERS.

Appointed under the Fines and Recoveries' Act, with dates when Gazetted.

Pidcock, Charles, Worcester, in and for the city of Worcester, also in and for the county of Worcester.-July 8. Tanner, George Nelson, Speenhamland, in and for the county of Berks. -July 4.

DISSOLUTIONS OF PROFESSIONAL PARTNERSHIPS. From June 24th to July 18th 1856, both inclusive, with dates when Gazetted.

Cutts, John, jun., and Henry Druce, 10, South-square, Gray's-inn, attorneys, solicitors, and conveyancers. July 18.

Hanslip, Charles, and Job Conworth, 12 Hatton-garden, attorneys, solicitors, conveyancers, and parliamentary agents.-July 1.

NOTES OF THE WEEK.

REGISTRATION OF TITLE DEEDS.

On Monday last Lord Lyndhurst said that two or three years ago a bill was introduced by the Lord Chancellor for the registration of title deeds. It was referred to a select committee, and afterwards came down to their lordship's house, where it was passed by a large majority, and then sent down to the other house, but there it was not passed. It appeared that a commission was appointed to inquire into the subject; and the questions he wished to ask were-1st, whether that commission had made a report; 2nd, if not, what was the reason of the delay; and 3rd,

whether there was any probability of a report being made? His lordship added, that he could not sit down without expressing his regret that various important measures which had been introduced into the other House of Parliament, and various other important measures which had been sent down from that house had, during the present session, been either lost or abandoned. He never recollected in any session so wholesale a destruction of measures.

The Lord Chancellor said the answer to the first question was that the commissioners had not made a report. That commission was appointed under the following circumstances. The Registration of Titles Bill passed that house with very general, though not universal, concurrence, but it did not get a very favourable reception in the other House, and it was referred to a select committee, who reported against it, but thought a different plan for the registration of titles would be expedient, and recommended that a royal commission should be appointed to consider how far such scheme was practicable. The consequence was, that in the following year-1854-a commission was appointed to look into the subject, and, as he had already stated, they had not yet made their report.

With regard to the probability of their reporting, he might state that he had communicated with the Solicitor-General and others who were on the commission, and they assured him that the commissioners were looking very attentively into the subject, but that they found, as he confessed he had anticipated, a great deal more difficulty in devising some tangible plan than they at first imagined. believed, however, that they would make a report, and he understood also that they had embodied the plans which they recommended in the shape of a bill, which would be laid on the table of the house.

He

He had himself prepared the heads of a bill for a very modified registration, but he was stopped at an early period of the session from introducing it, by the intimation that a report suggesting a more extended scheme would shortly be laid before Parliament; and unless he got that report during the recess he should unquestionably introduce the smaller measure.

With regard to the remark of the noble and learned lord respecting the withdrawal of bills, he shared in the regret he had expressed as to the abandonment of several important measures, but at the same time he was prepared to show that a considerable number of very useful ones had been passed.

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