ing to the conviction that his mind arrived at on the case submitted to him. We have not heard that any one has ever said that Judge Loring's decision was a corrupt one; that he was influenced in the least degree by fear, favor, affection, or hope of reward. If the accusation has been made, we venture to say that not a man in this Commonwealth, in his sober senses, believes it.

The most, then, that can be said is, that he committed an error of judgment, and came to a wrong conclusion.

It is not necessary at this day, in Massachusetts, to argue that this is no cause for the impeachment or degradation of a judge. If it were so, every overruled case would afford cause for attacking the court or judge who made the first decision, or the old barbarous doctrine of attaint as applied to jurors, (3 Bl. Com. 401, ch. 25,) might be extended to bring within its danger every judge who delivered an unpopular opinion. Even supposing that Judge Loring's opinion was wrong, he was bound to adhere to and act upon it; if it were the honest conviction that the case led him to, he would be more justified in maintaining such an erroneous opinion than in holding the truth in unrighteousness by adopting a correct opinion contrary to his own conviction, merely because it happened to be a popular one. We presume that never man in this Commonwealth had such an opportunity for winning popular applause as was offered to Judge Loring when the judgment in the Burns case was yet locked up in his own breast. An argument might have been made in favor of the fugitive, which would have been plausible, and in accordance with the popular feeling, and we are not prepared to say that it would not have been correct on the law and the facts of the case. honor, then, we say, to the judge who could resist such influences, and who could follow his own convictions when every consideration of personal interest and comfort, and all the feelings of a humane heart, drew him the other way.

All

If an attack upon a judge for an erroneous opinion is ever to be justified, it can only be when the opinion is so palpably wrong as to lead to the conclusion, or at least to the strong suspicion, of either incapacity or corruption.

But can any candid man entertain such an opinion with regard to Judge Loring's decision? Mr. Dana, while expressing his own opinion that the decision was erroneous, entirely acquits Judge Loring of everything but error in opinion. We do not intend to argue this question, but we

may be allowed to say, that it appears to us that the balance was nearly even, and that a judge deciding either way could not have been liable to a charge of incapacity, or have been convicted of corruption before any tribunal but that of Him who knoweth the secrets of the heart. But we are not certain that if the general opinion throughout New England of men unaffected by the political or moral bias by which the consideration of abstract questions in this case has been disturbed, could be ascertained, it would not be found that what our Quaker friends would call "the solid sense" of the profession would sustain Judge Loring's conclusion from the evidence before him. How dangerous then to attack a judicial officer under the pressure of popular excitement, for a decision of such a character as this!

The limits which are prescribed to us prevent our full examination of the minute and captious details which this rambling report sets forth. They are of little moment. But we will comment upon a few points touching the personal conduct of Judge Loring. As to the alleged violations of law, and the erroneous rulings and decision of the commissioner, we cannot enter upon their discussion, because, as we have endeavored to show, such allegations, even if true, ought not to affect a proceeding like this before the legislature. In a nicely balanced case, any judge may be wrong upon the law. The opinions of Judge Loring are, as we believe, generally sustained by the profession, and there is not the shadow of evidence that he acted, from beginning to end, from any other motive than from a high sense of duty.

1. Judge Loring is charged, upon the evidence of Mr. Phillips, as to a conversation between them, of having formed his opinion in the case before it had been fully heard. We are informed on good authority that such a conversation is explicitly denied by Judge Loring, and that Mr. Phillips must have misunderstood him, owing, probably, to the preoccupation of his mind. That the charge cannot possibly be correct may, we think, be shown. If Judge Loring made this remark, which he is accused of making, it could only have been because his opinion was formed upon Brent's testimony as to the identity of Burns. But, in point of fact, Judge Loring's decision was not predicated upon that testimony. On the contrary, he expressly declared that it was balanced in his mind by the evidence of an alibi offered for

the defence, and that his opinion as to the identity was formed upon the evidence of Burns' admissons in his conversation with Suttle.

2. The fact, that on Saturday night Judge Loring drew the bill of sale which Suttle had promised to sign, is brought up against him. We think it very probable that this is true. And what could be more natural and proper than that Judge Loring, a lawyer, placed in a distressing position with regard to this man, should be ready and willing to assist in contributing his aid towards carrying out an agreement made entirely between other parties, but the effect of which would be to relieve all parties from the uncomfortable situation in which they found themselves. Suppose Judge Loring had refused to draw this bill of sale, and the fatal 12 o'clock on Saturday night had arrived, and the negotiation had been arrested because the papers could not be completed in time. Would not the very partisans who now make this an article of charge against him, have taken another ground, and denounced him because he had been unwilling to expedite this arrangement, and preferred to sit in judgment and to send the man back by his decree? It appears to us that such a charge would have been much more tenable than the one now urged, and that, if he had refused to draw such a paper, he might well have been accused of throwing obstacles in the way of Burns's liberation. The objection that the drawing up of this bill of sale implies a decision in Judge Loring's mind that Burns was the claimant's slave is merely puerile. The respondent's case had not been then heard, but the claimant's evidence was in. It was enough that Judge Loring knew that the case was doubtful. Without having made up any opinion, he might well argue that the respondent's evidence might fail to be sufficient, and thus, with his mind completely in doubt, he might be willing to promote an arrangement by which Burns's friends were striving to change uncertainties into certainties. Nay, was not the proposal to purchase Burns an intimation that his friends (who must have been presumed to have the best knowledge) had not much confidence in the case they could make out, and was not Judge Loring imperatively called upon to respond to their request, and aid in placing Burns in a sitnation of absolute safety? If this charge is to be regarded, it is evident that the mere fact of a negotiation for the purchase of Burns, places Judge Loring in a dilemma from one alternative of which he cannot escape.

rescue.

3. The objection to the display of an armed force during these proceedings is utterly unjust. Judge Loring had nothing to do with it, and could not help it. Burns was in his keeping. The statute of 1850 had made the marshal liable in damages for his escape. There was great danger of a The streets were heaving with an excited population. The court house had been attacked by a mob, and an assistant of the marshal had been murdered. Every consideration of interest and duty urged the marshal to keep Burns in safety, and he knew by experience that by the display of force alone could he do so. If the commissioner had ordered him to dismiss his guard, the marshal would have said, "This is my business and my risk. I must protect myself, and will not leave myself defenceless." The commissioner must have submitted to the refusal. Why, then, is he to be censured for a state of things in which he had no interest, and which was entirely beyond his control. The court house at the time was occupied by the United States courts, as well as by those of the State, and the former had all the rights of tenants in their own parts of the building, and the passages leading to them, and all their other appurtenances. We wish to speak distinctly on the fact that the commissioner had absolutely no control and no voice as to the keeping of the prisoner; that was a matter entirely and directly between the marshal and the government, the statute of 1850, in this particular, acting directly upon the marshal, without the intervention of any other authority.

4. As to the objection that Judge Loring allowed his action as commissioner to interfere with the duties of his office as judge of probate. This is mere assertion. Judge Loring held his court on Monday, May 29th, and we have not heard from any quarter that any probate business was neglected, or any suitor denied a hearing on that day. The committee do not offer a particle of proof that any one sought and failed to obtain a hearing.

5. A vague attempt is made in this report to show that Judge Loring manifested a disposition to act hastily and to prejudge the case, and to send Burns back without a fair hearing. This is attempted to be proved in part by the evidence of Mr. Phillips as to his conversation with Judge Loring. We have already spoken on this point, showing that the conversation, as testified to by Mr. Phillips, is positively denied by Judge Loring; and showing, also, that

the progress of the case sufficiently shows that he did not, at the time of the interview, entertain the views which would have elicited the remark testified to by Mr. Phillips; and that, in fact, the only evidence on which he could have founded such a remark, was ultimately thrown out by him, and the case actually decided upon other evidence.

But the complete answer to this charge is to be found in Mr. Dana's speech before the committee, p. 15, et seq. Mr. Dana appeared before this committee to oppose Judge Loring's removal, not out of any particular sentiment of personal regard for the judge, (for, as he states, they had only a professional acquaintance,) but in the discharge of what he thought a public duty. He had no motive to palliate the conduct of Judge Loring, and, certainly, had he thought him obnoxious to a charge so grave and so injurious to his own client, he would never have attempted to screen him.. Every manly and professional feeling would have induced him to aid in the exposure of such baseness, and forbearance in such a case would have been dishonest and uncandid weakness. We will, then, take Mr. Dana's testimony as that of an absolutely fair witness. Now this testimony goes fully and unequivocally to exonerate Judge Loring from this or any other charge of judicial misconduct during the hearing in the case of Burns. Mr. Dana's evidence shows, on the contrary, that Judge Loring's conduct towards the prisoner evinced throughout the most considerate humanity, and a kindness of which those who are acquainted with Judge Loring know to be characteristic of the man. That he was unwilling to urge Burns to a defence against his will, and against his own idea of his own interests, is admitted, and in this Mr. Dana shows that both he and Mr. Phillips agreed with him. This speech clearly shows, that it was the opinion of Mr. Dina, at the time when his feelings were all warm and glowing with the great issue that was intrusted to him, that Judge Loring, resisting all the open and whispered arguments that were addressed to him against it, carried through from the first to the last his determination that Burns should have a fair hearing; and, more than that, that it was chiefly owing to his instrumentality that the hearing was secured at all.

We have now gone over the principal have been made in the report before us.

points which That we may