In our opinion the defendant is entitled to the judgment of the court upon this demurrer. The issues of fact raised in the foregoing case afterwards came on for trial at the sittings in Middlesex after Easter Term, 1861, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court on a case stated. This set forth in substance, that the plaintiff was the duly registered author and proprietor of a play entitled "Gold," and of the copyright therein. Subsequently he turned the play into a novel called "Never too late to Mend," of which he registered himself the author and proprietor. The novel contained in substance the same incidents, characters, and language as his play upon which it was founded. The defendant's son dramatized the novel, calling his work "Never too late to Mend," and in so doing took many of the characters and incidents, and much of the dialogue of the plaintiff's novel. The consequence was, that many parts of the drama, "Never too late to Mend," were the same as the corresponding parts of the plaintiff's drama, "Gold;" but he so composed his drama from the plaintiff's novel without having seen or otherwise known of his drama "Gold;" consequently he took nothing directly there from. The drama thus composed by the plaintiff's son, the defendant represented at his theatre. It was held that as the defendant's son had used, and the defendant had represented, whether knowingly or not, a considerable portion of the plaintiff's play, the defendant was liable for an infringement on the plaintiff's stage copyright in the latter: Reade v. Conquest, 5 Law T. N. S. 677. Whether the defendant's son, if he published his drama, would Judgment for the defendant. infringe the book copyright in his novel or drama, was not decided; though it was said to be "clear that he could not in that case defend himself on the ground that he was the author of the parts he copied;" if he could be excused it would be "under some of the rules relating to literary property, and the power of abridging or taking extracts therefrom, and so:" Id. 680. The case of Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Peters 591 (see Bartlett v. Callender, 5 McLean 32), must be taken to have settled that there is now no copyright in the United States, as to published works, except under the statute. This being so, the course of the English decisions has been substantially followed. It is admitted or decided that a bonâ fide abridgment, by which is meant a "substantial condensation of materials and intellectual labour therein, not merely a selection, or a new arrangement," is not an infringement: Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story 100; Story's Executors v. Holcombe, 4 McLean 306; Gray v. Russell, 1 Story 11; Stowe v. Thomas, 2 Wall. Jr., 547. See, however, the observations in an article on this subject in 3 Am. Law Reg. 129. And in Stowe v. Thomas, ut supra, it was expressly held that a prose translation into another language of a novel, of which the author had herself caused to be made and copyrighted a translation into that language, was nevertheless no breach of the copyright in the original. See a very exhaustive discussion on the subject of copyright in dramatic compositions, in the opinion of Judge Cadwalader in Keene v. Wheatley, 9 Am. L. Reg. 33. ALFRED CHAPMAN v. CALLIS. Feb. 8. On the 4th of June, the plaintiff wrote to one T. C. as follows.-"I agree to take over the quarter of the ship Conrad on account of your debt to me, it being understood between us that I take delivery from the discharge of the cargo she has now on board after her arrival at S., all liabilities, &c., after being discharged to belong to me." T. C. subsequently made an arrangement with his creditors, which was embodied in the following memorandum,-" July 14, 1858. We the undersigned agree to purchase the ships in the annexed statement, at the prices there put down, in the proportions set down opposite to our names, it being understood as part of this agreement that the debts owing by you to us as annexed be taken to their full amount in payment or part payment of the said purchases." This memorandum was signed by the plaintiff as purchaser of sixteen sixty-fourths of the Conrad for 7711. on account of his debt of 8107. T. C. executed a bill of sale of the shares to the plaintiff on the 14th of September, which was registered on the 18th. On the 30th of September, the defendant entered into the following contract with the plaintiff, "I have this day bought from you sixteen sixty-fourth shares of the barque Conrad, now registered in your name at the custom-house, for the sum of 7001. and all liabilities or profits on the said shares from the time of your purchase from Mr. T. C. for which you are liable as owner in any way, or entitled to if there be any profits or balance in your favour. It is understood and agreed that the said liabilities, if any, are to be assumed and paid by me over and above the aforesaid sum of 7007.; and if, on the other hand, there is any balance or profits coming to you on the said shares, the same is to belong to me, and I am to receive the same for my own private benefit." The terms of this agreement were afterwards embodied in a bill of sale, which was registered on the 15th of November. The ship's husband having incurred certain debts for necessaries supplied to the ship between the 31st of July and the 8th of August, the plaintiff paid the amount, and sued the defendant, who it appeared had notice of the memorandum of the 14th of July, but not of the letter of the 4th of June:-Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, inasmuch as there was no evidence to show that he had incurred any legal liability to T. C. in respect of the goods so supplied. Whether the plaintiff was precluded by the 55th section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, from suing upon the agreement of the 30th of September,quære? THE first count of the declaration stated that the plaintiff sold to the defendant, and the defendant bought from the plaintiff, sixteen sixtyfourth parts or shares of the barque Conrad, at or for the price *770] or sum of 700l., payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for the same at the time and in the manner then agreed upon by and between them, and upon the terms, among other things, that the defendants should be entitled to all the profits, if any, and should bear and pay all the liabilities, on and in respect of the said parts or shares to which the plaintiff was or should be entitled or liable as owner thereof, from the time when the plaintiff had purchased the said parts or shares from Thomas Chapman, and that the said liabilities, if any, should be assumed and paid by the defendant over and above the sum of 7007. : Averment, that certain liabilities of the plaintiff of and in respect of the said parts or shares within the true intent and meaning of the said agreement, amounting to a large sum of money, arose and accrued before suit; and that, although all conditions precedent were fulfilled, and everything happened, and all times elapsed, necessary to entitle the plaintiff to have the said liabilities assumed and paid by the defendant, and to maintain this action for the breach of the said agreement by the defendant thereinafter mentioned, yet the defendant had not assumed or paid the said liabilities, or any part thereof; and that, by reason thereof, the plaintiff had been obliged to pay and discharge, and had paid and discharged them, to a large amount, to wit, 397. 148. 11d. There was also a count for money paid, and a count for money found due upon accounts stated. The defendant pleaded,-first, to the first count, a traverse of the sale to him of the shares in the said barque upon the terms in that count alleged, secondly, to the first count, that no such liabilities of the plaintiff on and in respect of the said shares arose or accrued from the time when the plaintiff had *purchased the said shares from the said Thomas Chapman,-thirdly, to the first count, a denial of [*771 the breach of the agreement,-fourthly, to the residue of the declaration, never indebted: whereupon issue was joined. The cause was tried before Martin, B., at the Liverpool Summer Assizes, 1860, when the following facts appeared in evidence :-One Thomas Chapman being possessed of thirty-two sixty-fourth shares of a vessel called the Conrad, an arrangement was in June, 1858, entered into between him and the plaintiff for the purchase by the latter of sixteen sixty-fourth shares, on account of a debt owing to the plaintiff from Thomas Chapman. The terms of this arrangement were embodied in a letter addressed by the plaintiff to Thomas Chapman, as follows:-, "June 4th, 1858. "My dear Sir,-I agree to take over the quarter of the ship Conrad on account of your debt to me, it being understood between us, that, as the ship will soon be off her present voyage, I take delivery from the discharge of the cargo she has now on board after her arrival at Swansea, as she may stand clear of all debts and assets; all liabilities, debits, or assets after being discharged, to belong to me. I am sorry to hear that you think she will lose money on her present voyage. "ALFRED CHAPMAN." A general arrangement shortly afterwards took place between Thomas Chapman and his creditors, who all signed a document to the following effect: "Mr. Thomas Chapman. "Liverpool, July 14th, 1858. "Sir,-We the undersigned agree to purchase the ships in the annexed statement at the prices there put down, in the proportions [*772 set down opposite to our names: it being understood as part of this agreement, that the debts owing by you to us as annexed be taken to their full amount in payment or part payment of the said purchases." The plaintiff signed the above memorandum as one of the creditors: and by the statement annexed it appeared that he signed as agreeing to purchase sixteen sixty-fourths of the Conrad, at 91. per ton, equal to 774l., his debt being stated at 8107. The bill of sale of such sixteen sixty-fourths of the Conrad from Thomas Chapman to the plaintiff was executed on the 14th of September, 1858, and registered on the 18th. On the 30th of September, 1858, the defendant agreed to purchase the plaintiff's interest in the Conrad; the terms of that agreement are contained in the following memorandum :— "To Mr. Alfred Chapman. 66 "Liverpool, September 30, 1858. "Sir,—I have this day bought from you sixteen sixty-fourth shares of the barque Conrad, 328, now registered in your name at the CustomHouse, for the sum of 7001. and all liabilities or profits on the said shares from the time of your purchase from Mr. Thomas Chapman, for which you are liable as owner in any way, or entitled to if there be any profits or balance in your favour. It is understood and agreed that the said liabilities, if any, are to be assumed and paid by me over and above the aforesaid sum of 7001. and if, on the other hand, there is any balance or profits coming to you on the said shares, the same is to belong to me, and I am to receive the same for my own private benefit. Payment by my acceptance of your draft at six months' date, the same to be renewed if I require it for a further term of six months, adding interest at the rate of 51. per cent. per annum on the renewal, and, *if required, a further renewal of one-half (say 3507.) for six *773] months. The bill of sale to be held by Mr. Thomas Chapman as security until my acceptance is paid. "CHARLES CALLIS." The plaintiff at the same time executed a bill of sale of these sixteen sixty-fourth shares to the defendant, in the ordinary form, and sent it to Thomas Chapman. This bill of sale was registered on the 15th of November, 1859. The Conrad discharged her cargo at Swansea on the 30th of July, 1858. The liabilities in respect of which this action was brought, were for stores supplied to the ship between the 31st of July, 1858, and the 9th of August, the plaintiff having paid to the executrix of Thomas Chapman (who had died in the mean time) 397. 148. 11d., the proportion due upon the sixteen sixty-fourths. The defendant was aware of the memorandum of agreement signed by the creditors of Thomas Chapman on the 14th of July, 1858; but there was no evidence that he had any knowledge of the plaintiff's letter of the 4th of June, 1858. On the part of the defendant it was objected that the memorandum of the 30th of September, 1858, was inadmissible in evidence and invalid in law, for that the whole terms of the contract must be looked for in the subsequent bill of sale; and that, at all events, the defendant was entitled to a verdict on the second issue. The learned judge, without expressing any opinion, directed a verdict to be entered for the plaintiff for the sum claimed, reserving leave to the defendant to move. Brett, accordingly, in Michaelmas Term last, obtained a rule nisi to enter a verdict for the defendant, *or a nonsuit, on the grounds, *774] -"first, that there was no evidence to support the first plea, inasmuch as the evidence relied on for that purpose was improperly admitted, or, if properly admitted, was void by reason of the enactments of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104,— secondly, because the second issue ought to have been entered for the defendant, inasmuch as either there was no legal evidence of any purchase, or the true date of the purchase by the plaintiff from Thomas Chapman was according to law on the 14th of September, 1858, at the earliest, and because no liability was shown to have fallen on the plaintiff after the purchase by him of the shares in the ship Conrad from Thomas Chapman." He referred to Duncan v. Tindall, 13 C. B. 258, and The Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner, 6 Jurist, N. S. 935, 29 Law J., Ch. 827. C. A. Russell now showed cause. The memorandum of the 30th of September, 1858, was clearly admissible in evidence upon the principle acted upon in Harris v. Rickett, 4 Hurlst & N. 1. There, a trader obtained from the defendant an advance of 2007. for which he verbally agreed to give a bill of sale of all his property, if called upon to do so. On receiving the money, he gave to the defendant a promissory note for 2007., a memorandum of agreement to assign some property expectant on the death of his wife's father, together with a policy of insurance, and also another memorandum of agreement to pay 107. yearly as bonus. At a later period, on being requested, he executed a bill of sale of all his property to the defendant. The trader having become bankrupt, his assignees brought trover for the goods which the defendant had seized under the bill of sale; and it was held that evidence of the original verbal agreement was admissible, inasmuch *as the subsequent written agreement did not contain, and was [*775 not intended to contain, the whole agreement between the parties. [WILLES, J.-In Myers v. Willis, 17 C. B. 77 (E. C. L. R. vol. 84), where it was sought to charge a party whose name appeared on the register as owner of the ship for contracts entered into on behalf of the ship by the master, a contemporaneous letter from the grantor of the bill of sale showing that it was only given as a collateral security for a loan, was received as evidence.] Then it is said that the memorandum was void by reason of the enactments of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104; and the cases of Duncan v. Tindall and The Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner were relied upon. Duncan v. Tindall,-where it was held that an action will not lie for the breach of an executory contract for the sale or transfer of a ship, unless the contract contains a recital of the certificate of registry, was decided upon the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 89, s. 34, the language of which differs essentially from that of the 55th section of the statute now in force, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104. And The Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner merely decides that a court of equity will not give effect to an unregistered contract to assign a ship. This is the case of a collateral contract. In Duncan v. Tindall, Maule, J., says,-13 C. B. 270 (E. C. L. R. vol. 76),-"Before the passing of this act (the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 89), there had been a statute of 34 G. 3, c. 68, in force, the 14th section of which contained words expressly including executory contracts, and providing that they should be void to all intents and purposes, unless made in the prescribed form. Such language as that might naturally lead to a doubt, or an opinion, that, whatever else besides the transfer of the property in a ship might be contemplated by the contract, the want of a recital of the certificate of registry would render the whole contract void, even for a collateral purpose, such as *the mortgage of the ship, or a covenant to pay [*776 money. This difficulty is avoided by the subsequent and the existing acts. The provision now in force has all the effect of the 34 G. 3, c. 68, s. 14, as to avoiding executory agreements for the transfer of a ship; and we may engraft the exception I have mentioned, as regards their validity for collateral purposes, without limiting that effect so far as the present action is concerned: and, although the former statutes were not interpreted as invalidating every stipulation of a collateral nature contained in an instrument invalid as a transfer of a ship, yet the literal meaning of the words of the 34 G. 3, c. 68, s. 14, which |