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Superior Courts: Queen's Bench.-Common Pleas.—Exchequer.

Byles, S. L., in support.

The Court granted the application.

The Court said, that the Attorney-General property to which she was entitled, without the ought to appear officially on the part of the concurrence of her husband, whom, it apCrown, and not for the defendants. The peared, she had left in Jamaica in the year ground for the rule was, that the Attorney-1829, and had not heard from since 1840. General, on whose fiat the writ had issued, had been imposed upon. Though there was, according to our criminal jurisprudence, no public prosecutor whose duty it was to appear in all cases on behalf of the Crown, in such a case as the present the Attorney-General ought ex necessitate rei to appear in his official capacity. It was to be regretted that the defendants should be deprived of the highest assistance at the Bar, but in a case like the present it was essentially necessary for the Attorney-General to attend, not in his private] capacity as an advocate, but to assist the Court in the administration of justice and to see that justice was done. As counsel, however, for the defendants, it would be the duty of the Attorney-General, although it might be not per fas et nefas, to use his utmost exertions to obtain the decision of the Court in their favour. He had also the power to enter a nolle prosequi, and his predecessor in office had been consulted on this very proceeding.

The Attorney-General said, that under these circumstances he would retire, and the case accordingly stood over to allow the parties an opportunity of retaining other counsel.

Edwin James and Hawkins appeared for the

other side.

Plowden v. Campbell. June 15, 1854.

PLAINTIFF IN SERVICE OF EAST INDIA
COMPANY.-SECURITY FOR COSTS.

Held, that the plaintiff in an action, who was
in the civil service of the East India Com-
pany, and resided in Bengal as a civil and
sessions Judge, was liable to give security
for costs.

THIS was a motion for a rule nisi to rescind an order made by Crompton, J., at Chambers, on the plaintiff, to give security for costs in this action. It appeared that he was in the civil service of the East India Company, and resided in Bengal as a civil and sessions Judge.

Hawkins in support, on the ground that the plaintiff was engaged in the public service.

The Court said, that as in the present case the domicile was changed, and there was only a remote prospect of the plaintiff's return to this country, he must give security for costs, and the rule would accordingly be refused.

Court of Common Pleas.
In re Delany. June 14, 1854.
FINES AND RECOVERIES' ACT.- MARRIED
WOMAN.-CONVEYANCE BY.

An application was granted for leave to a married woman to execute a conveyance without the concurrence of her husband, from whom she has not heard since 1840. THIS was an application under the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 74, for leave to Mrs. Delany, a married woman, to execute a conveyance of certain

Court of Exchequer. Clayton v. Percy. June 6, 1854. INFRINGEMENT OF PATENT.-ATTACHMENT. The plaintiff had recovered a verdict in an action for the infringement of a patent, and a Judge's order in the nature of an injunc-” tion had been obtained and made a rule of Court and personally served on the defend." ant: Upon his continuing the infringement, a rule was made absolute for an attachment. THIS was a rule nisi granted on May 27 last, for an attachment against the defendant, against whom the plaintiff had recovered a verdict in an action for the infringement of a patent. It appeared that an order in the nature of an injunction had been granted by Platt, B., and had been made a rule of this Court and served personally on the defendant, but that he continued the infringement of the patent at his manufactory in Manchester.

Chance now moved on an affidavit of the service of the rule nisi to make the rule abso

lute, upon the defendant not appearing to

show cause.

The Court made the rule absolute accordingly.'

Vasing v. Watson. June 12, 1854. ACTION FOR PREFERRING INDICTMENT.

REASONABLE CAUSE.-MALICE.

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Held, making absolute a rule for the new trial
of an action for maliciously and without
reasonable cause preferring a charge of
felony against the plaintiff, that although
the total want of reasonable cause is evi-
dence from which a jury may infer malice,
yet it must be an absolute absence to justify
them in finding malice; and that all which
is necessary to justify a charge of felony
is a reasonable ground of suspicion, and not
such an amount of cause for suspicion as o
would insure a reasonable belief there would
be a conviction.

A RULE nisi had been granted for a new trial of this action, which was brought against the defendant for maliciously and without reasonable cause preferring a charge of felony against the plaintiff. It appeared on the trial, before Coleridge, J., at the last Northampton Assizes, that the plaintiff was a groom in the stables of the Globe Inn, and had been charged by the defendant with stealing two ducks, which were in an adjoining stable, but were af terwards found near the canal in a bag tied to a brick resembling some in the Globe Inn stables It also appeared that there were burnt poultry

The attachment was on June 15 discharg ed on payment of costs.

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Superior Courts: Court of Exchequer.

bones in the fire used by the plaintiff. The magistrate had dismissed the charge which the defendant preferred on the advice of a policeman, whereupon this action was brought. The learned Judge directed the jury that there was a want of reasonable and probable cause, and left the question of malice to the jury, who found for the plaintiff, with 207. damages. Miller, S. L., and O'Brien showed cause against the rule.

The Court (without calling on Macaulay and Field in support) said, that although the total want of reasonable cause was evidence from which a jury might infer malice, yet it must be an absolute absence to justify them in finding malice. All which was necessary to justify a charge of felony was a reasonable ground of suspicion, and not such an amount of cause of suspicion as would insure a reasonable belief there would be a conviction. In the present case there seemed to have been reasonable cause, and the fding of the jury had been grounded on the want of such justification, and the rule would therefore be made absolute.

Theobald v. Railway Passengers' Insurance
Company. June 2, 13, 1854.

INSURANCE AGAINST RAILWAY ACCIDENTS.

-ACTION ON POLICY OF.

151

railway, as he would not be disconnected until he was safely landed on the platform upon arriving at his destination. The rule, therefore, so far as sought to have the verdict entered for: the defendants on the ground that the accident was not a railway accident, would be discharged. As to the other ground, it must be made absolute to reduce the damages, as the plaintiff could not recover under the policy either for loss of time or profit. It was only incumbent on the defendants, in cases of accident short of death, to compensate the assured to the extent of his expenses, as well as for the injury.

Sauville v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue.
June 10, 13, 1854.

STAMP ACT. —AD VALOREM DUTY ON PO

LICY IN MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT.

Held, that the amount of a policy of insurance on the settlor's own life is not chargeable with the ad valorem duty of 5s. per cent. under the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 97.

By a marriage settlement the plaintiff transferred to trustees a policy of insurance for 4,000l. which he had effected on his own life with the United Kingdom Life Assurance Office. The defendants had held that an ad valorem duty of 5s. per cent was payable under the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 97, to that amount, whereupon this case was stated for the opinion of the Court.

The plaintiff, whilst stepping out of a train on a railway for the purpose of continuing his journey by another train, missed his footing, and was injured: Held, that this The Schedule, tit. "Settlement," renders was a railway accident within the meaning chargeable to an ad valorem duty of 58. per of an insurance by the defendants against cent. any deed or instrument, whether vorailway accidents. luntary or gratuitous, or upon any good or vaHeld, also, that the plaintiff could not re- luable consideration other than a bona fide pecover under the policy either for loss of cuniary consideration, whereby any definite and time or profit, but only in respect of his certain principal sum or sums of money (wheexpenses and compensation for the injury. ther charged or chargeable on lands or other THIS was an action on a policy of insurance hereditaments or heritable subjects, or not, or effected by the plaintiff with the defendants, for to be laid out in the purchase of lands or other the payment of 1,000l. in case of death, and a hereditaments or heritable subjects or not), or proportionate sum for injuries while travelling any definite and certain share or shares in any by railway. The defendants pleaded, that the of the government or parliamentary stocks or accident, with which it appeared the plaintiff funds, or in the stocks and funds of the gohad met by missing his footing while stepping vernor and company of the Bank of England, out of a train for the purpose of continuing or of the Bank of Ireland, or of the East India his journey by another train, was not a railway accident within the meaning of their insurance ticket. On the trial before Pollock, L. C. B., at the Guildhall Sittings, the plaintiff obtained a verdiet for 841. in respect of the accident, and 100%. for loss of time, subject to leave reserved to enter the verdict for the defendants, or to reduce the damages on the question, whether the accident was one for which the defendants were liable, and whether, if they were, their liability extended to the loss of time consequent on the accident. A rule had been accordingly obtained on April 24 last.

Bramwell and Phipson showed cause against the rule, which was supported by Sir F. Thesiger and Davison.

Cur, ad. vult. The Court said, that the accident had taken place while the plaintiff was a traveller on the

Company, or of the South Sea Company, or of any other company or corporation, shall be settled or agreed to be settled upon or for the benefit of any person or persons, either in possession or reversion, either absolutely, or for life or other partial interest, or in any other manner whatsoever."

P. Francis for the plaintiff; Pigott for the defendants.

The Court said, that no duty was payable under the words in the schedule, and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment.

Beavan v. M'Donnell and another. June 12,

13, 1854.

ACTION TO RECOVER FORFEITED DEPOSIT
BY LUNATIC.—EVIDENCE.

On the trial of an action for money had and

152

Superior Courts: Court of Exchequer.

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received, and to which the defendants plead- before any person having by law or by consent ed that the same was paid as a deposit on of parties authority to hear, receive, and exaa contract for the purchase of an estate mine evidence, the parties thereto and the perand had been forfeited, evidence was ad- sons in whose behalf any such suit, action, or mitted of acts by the plaintiff before and other proceeding may be brought or defended after the contract, showing that his lunacy shall, except as hereinafter excepted, be comwas of such a nature as to have been mani-petent and compellable to give evidence, either fest when the contract was made. The vivá voce or by deposition, according to the plaintiff obtained a verdict. A rule for a practice of the Court, on behalf of either or any new trial on the ground of the reception of of the parties to the said suit, action, or other such evidence was discharged. proceeding;" but by s. 3, nothing herein To this action for money had and received, contained shall render any person who in any the defendants pleaded that the money was criminal proceeding is charged with the compaid as a deposit on a contract for the purchase mission of any indictable offence or any offence of an estate, and had been forfeited. The plain- punishable on summary conviction, competent tiff replied that he was a lunatic at the time of or compellable to give evidence for or against entering into the contract, to which the defend- himself or herself." ants rejoined that they had entered into the contract fairly and in good faith, and did not know at the time of its being made that the plaintiff was a lunatic. On the trial before Wightman, J., at the last Hereford assizes, evidence was admitted of acts by the plaintiff, before and after the contract, showing that his lunacy was of such a nature as to have been manifest when the contract was made. The plaintiff obtained a verdict, and this rule had been granted on April 24 last for a new trial. Skinner showed cause against the rule, which was supported by Whateley, Gray, and Phipson.

The Court discharged the rule.

Attorney-General v. Radloff. June 14, 1854.

INFORMATION.-EXAMINATION OF DEFEND

ANT ON HIS OWN BEHALF.

Quære, whether the defendant to an information to recover treble value of tobacco of which he had become possessed without payment of duty, is entitled to be examined as a witness on his own behalf.

THIS was a rule nisi granted on April 20 last, for a new trial of this information to recover treble value of tobacco of which the defendant became possessed without payment of duty. On the trial before Pollock, L. C. B., the defendant tendered himself as a witness on his own behalf, but had been rejected on the ground the proceeding was of a criminal nature.

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Watson and J. P. Wilde showed cause
against the rule, which was supported by Shee,
S. L., Best, and M'Mahon.
Cur. ad. vult.

The Court (per Pollock, L. C. B., and Parke, B., dissentientibus Platt and Martin, BB.) held, that the present was a criminal proceeding within the proviso to the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, and that the defendant was not a competent witness.

The rule would therefore fall to the ground; but Alderson, B., who had not heard the arguments, suggested the point should be re-argued before the 15 Judges.

In re Stamp Duty on Potter's Deed. May 8;
June 14, 1854.

STAMP ACT.-DUTY PAYABLE ON SALE OF
GOODWILL OF BUSINESS.

On the retirement from a firm of one of the
partners, the others covenanted to pur-
chase the stock-in-trade for 19,000l. and
the good-will for 20,000l.: Held, that the
Commissioners of Inland Revenue had
rightly charged 2s. 6d. per cent. on the
19,000l., and 10s. per cent. on 20,000l.,
under the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 97.

IT appeared that on the retirement from a firm of one of the partners, the others had covenanted to purchase the stock-in-trade for 19,000l. and the good-will for 20,000l. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue claimed under the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 97, a duty of 28. 6d. per cent. on the 19,000l., and 108. on the 20,000l., and this case was stated under s. 15, on the question, whether the value of the good-will in a business was "property" with

in the Act.

Phinn for the Crown, cited Caldwell v. Dawson, 5 Exch. R. 1.

By the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85, s. 1, "No person offered as a witness shall hereafter be excluded by reason of incapacity from crime or interest from giving evidence, either in person or by deposition according to the practice of the Court on the trial of any issue joined, or of any matter or question, or on any inquiry arising in any suit, action, or proceeding, civil or Hindmarch and Webster for the parties, criminal, in any Court, or before any judge, jury, sheriff, coroner, magistrate, or officer contrà, referred to Lyburn v. Warrington, 1 having by law or by consent of parties autho- Stark. N. P. C. 162; Warren v. Howe, 2 B. rity to hear, receive, and examine evidence," & C. 281; Belcher v. Sikes, 6 B. & E. 234; with the exception of the actual parties; and Blandy v. Herbert, 9 B & C, 396. by the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 2, "On the trial of any issue joined, or of any matter or question, or on any inquiry arising in any suit, or other proceeding in any Court of Justice, or

Cur, ad. vult. The Court held that the duty claimed by the Commissioners was payable.

The Legal Observer,

AND

SOLICITORS' JOURNAL.

SATURDAY, JULY 1, 1854.

INNS OF COURT AND CHANCERY present state of their respective Inns. We

INQUIRY.

may also anticipate that the like inquiry will be made of the larger Inns.

THE important Commission issued by According to the terms of the Commisher Majesty for inquiring into the arrange- sion, the object is to secure a sound educaments in the Inns of Court and Inns of tion to the students of the law, and the Chancery, for promoting the study of the Inns of Chancery will not fail to point out Law and Jurisprudence, and securing a that their members are for the most part sound education to the students" was noti- Attorneys and Solicitors of the Superior fied in the Gazette of the 5th May. The Courts, and,-whatever amendments or imCommissioners are Vice-Chancellor Sir Wm.provements are proposed to be effected in Page Wood, Mr. Justice Coleridge, the regard to students for the Bar,―to urge that Right Hon. Mr. Napier, the Attorney-due provision should be made for the stuGeneral, the Solicitor-General, Sir T. Ers-dents of the other branch of the Profession: kine Perry, Mr. Lefevre, Mr. Keating, Now, it is important to observe, that Q. C., Mr. Greenwood, Mr. James Stewart, long before the recent "revival of learning" and Mr. Germain Lavie. (so to speak) in the Inns of Court, -before

It appears that the Commissioners lost they appointed a Council of Education and no time in writing to the five Inns of Chan-instituted Lectures and Examinations,—the cery, requesting their assistance in the in-attorneys and solicitors, many of them bequiry by communicating a statement of the longing to the Inns of Chancery, founded existing arrangements for promoting the an institution in the centre of the five Inns study of the Law, so far as the several Inns of Chancery, namely, between Bernard's of Chancery had made or concurred in any such arrangements. Connected with this branch of their inquiry, the Commissioners particularly requested information as to the Lectures or Examinations provided in those Inns, the existence or non-existence of a Library, and the regulations in respect of admission to such Lectures or Library.

Inn, Staple Inn, and Clifford's Inn on the east of Chancery Lane, and New Inn and Clement's Inn on the west of that locality. There, nearly 100,000l. has been laid out on land, buildings, books, &c.; and there for upwards of 20 years Lectures have been delivered and Examinations taken place. In fact, more than half of the 10,000 attorneys and solicitors now practising in England and Wales, have been examined at the Hall

It is probably well known to all our readers that there are no Lectures, nor Examinations, nor Libraries in any of the in Chancery Lane. Inns of Chancery, and we presume that It cannot, therefore, be said, that arthough the Commissioners were also fully rangements for the study of the law and aware of the fact, they required an official securing a sound education have been negstatement of it from the heads of those lected in the second branch of the Profesancient houses. No doubt, the proper an- sion. It may be admitted, that the large swers have been returned, and we under- expenditure which has taken place, came stand that the Commissioners have recently not from the coffers of the Inns of Chanrequested the attendance of some of the cery; but from the pockets of the indiPrincipals to give explanations on the vidual members of those societies and their VOL. XLVIII. No. 1,373.

K

154 Inns of Court and Chancery Inquiry.—Divorce and Matrimonial Causes' Bill.

brethren. It is manifest, however, that a large and substantial house has just been more extensive Library, more efficient erected, comprising many sets of chambers. courses of Lectures, and a better Examina- So in Clement's Inn there are several new tion, have been secured by those united exertions in the Incorporated Law Society than could have been effected in the separate Halls of the Inns of Chancery.

In considering this subject, it should be borne in mind that formerly the attorneys and solicitors were required to belong either to an Inn of Court or an Inn of Chancery, but that for many years past they have been excluded from the larger Inns. It is therefore highly to their credit that by their personal exertions, and out of their own funds, they have formed an association for the better acquisition of legal knowledge and the general improvement of their Profes

sion.

buildings, and extensive repairs have been effected in others. In both the latter Inns, new gateways and carriage-ways have been constructed, and various other alterations made. In Clifford's Inn, a few years ago, one of the largest houses was rebuilt, and it is probable that further, buildings or costly repairs will soon be required.

We are not aware, therefore, that any expectation can be entertained of the grant of any surplus funds from the Inns of Chancery for the purpose of legal Education; but if there were any, we can readily conjecture a legitimate mode of applying such surplus, by increasing the number of Lectures at the Incorporated Law Society, or otherwise contributing to the improvement of the Profession. At all events, we feel assured, that due attention will be paid to the claims of the attorneys and solicitors.

DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL
CAUSES' BILL.

THIS Bill proposes to enact as follows:
That from and after a day to be named by

The members of the Inus of Chancery, practical and judicious men as they are, will have regard to the general welfare of their body, and will not only protect the interests of their respective Societies, but make inquiry into the three quasi defunct Societies,-Furnival's Inn, Thavies' Inn, and Lyon's Inn. If we are not misinformed, the ground-rent of Furnival's Inn, amounting to several hundreds a year, is received by Lincoln's Inn,-no doubt in sacred trust to be applied for the behoof of her Majesty by order in Council, not sooner that section of the legal community to which the old Inn belonged. Moreover, we have heard that whilst the immediate ground-rent-say 500l. a year-is thus received, the builder's lease will expire in less than 40 years, and the whole improved rent will then devolve on Lincoln's Inn upon trusts, which will of course be duly inquired into.

any

Of Thavies Inn and Lyon's Inn we have not at present received similar information; but we take it for granted that the Commissioners, whose powers are equally extensive over both classes of Inns, will call the proper parties before them and ascertain the authority on which leases have been granted, the duration of the term, and such other particulars as they may be warranted in requiring.

Taking a walk round these "old Hostels," we observe that several of them are still in a dilapidated state and require extensive repairs or rebuilding. Many parts of them have indeed of late years been rebuilt, and many alterations and improvements effected. Thus in Staple Inn several thousand pounds must have been laid out on the handsome edifice occupied by the Taxing Masters of the Court of Chancery. In New Inn a

than Jan. 1, 1855, all jurisdiction now vested in any Ecclesiastical Court in respect of divorces a mensa et thoro, suits of nullity of marof conjugal rights, and all jurisdiction in matriage, of jactitation of marriage, for restitution ters matrimonial, shall cease; (s. 1).

After such day the Court of Chancery shall have power to determine matters matrimonial, and to make decrees of nullity of marriage, of divorce a mensá et thoro, for alimony, and for restitution of conjugal rights; but no suit shall be entertained for jactitation of marriage; (s. 2).

In suits for obtaining such decrees, the Court of Chancery shall proceed on principles and rules, as nearly as may be, conformable to those on which the Ecclesiastical Courts have acted; (8.3).

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Proceedings under this Act may be instituted either by bill or claim, in the same manner as other proceedings in the Court of Chancery, subject to any orders; provided that, with of marriage or of divorce a mensá et thoro, the every bill or claim seeking a decree of nullity plaintiff shall file an affidavit, stating his or her belief as to the truth of the facts alleged, and denying collusion with the defendant; (s. 4).

Decrees and orders to be made by the Court of Chancery shall be enforced in the same manner as other orders and decrees of the Court; (85). 16 - gust dietë

Wherever before such day any decree or order of any Ecclesiastical Court shall have

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