Page images
PDF
EPUB

Correspondence.-Renewal of Certificates.-Notes of the Week.

SELECTIONS FROM CORRE

SPONDENCE.

FUSION OF LAW AND EQUITY.

Our learned Correspondent "A Barrister," appears to be shocked that we do not go as fast and far as some of our contemporaries in the march of Law Reform, and particularly in the "fusion of Law and Equity." We will endeavour at an early opportunity to discuss this matter; and in the meantime think "A Barrister" should be satisfied at the progress which has been recently made, by enabling a Court of Law to extract the evidence required without the expensive aid of a bill of discovery in Chancery; and imposing the duty on Courts of Equity to decide a question of law without the delay of sending a case to the other side of Westminster Hall.

CHARGE FOR COPIES.

A client requires of a solicitor a plain copy of a deed for use, not being an attested copy. Is the solicitor entitled to 4d. or 6d. per folio? A CLERK.

[It is clear that the proper charge is 4d. per folio.-ED.]

RENEWAL OF CERTIFICATES.

Queen's Bench.
On the 3rd of June.

Preston, John, Kirkby, Lonsdale.

On the 16th day of June. Beaumont, Henry Barber, Putney. Burrell, Edward Montague, Compton Road, Canonbury.

Cook, George, 17, Allen Street, Lambeth. Corbett, John Fletcher, Worcester. Cowley, George Molini, Nottingham. Elworthy Henry John Rice, of 22, Roxburgh Terrace, Haverstock Hill, and Hampshire Terrace.

Gregory, F. Maze, 16, Grove End Road, St. John's Wood; and Ramsgate.

Jackson, Francis, 16, Fludyer Street, Westminster; and Grenada.

Johnson, Ed.,jun., North Runcton, nr. Lynn. Johnson, Marcus Henry, Wallington. Jones, William, Manchester; Pantydkin; and Wrexham.

Looker, John, Oxford.

Monckton, Wm. Charles, 13, Crawley St.; Thavies Inn; Buckingham St.; and Portsea. Partridge, Joseph Arthur, Mount Vernon, near Stroud.

Padmore, H., 21, Pomona Place, Ellbrook; St. Helier's; and Eaton Cottages. Robertson, William, Liverpool.

Rice, Henry Edridge, 24, Notting Hill Sq. Richardson, Henry Francis, 6, Westbourne Park Place, Bayswater.

Rolls Court.

14th June.

Barber, Wm. Hen., 25, Surrey St., Strand (postponed from Easter Term last).

RE-ADMISSION.

83

[blocks in formation]

TRINITY TERM EXAMINATION.

We understand that the Examiners for this Term are Sir Fortunatus Dwarris, Mr. E. S. Bailey, Mr. W. Strickland Cookson, Mr. E. Lawford, and Mr. W. Sharpe. Notices of examination were given by 115 Candidates, but 94 only have completed their testimonials. Tuesday next, the 6th instant, is the day fixed for the examination, and we hope the applicants are well prepared for the ordeal.

In Trinity Term, last year, no less than 23 were rejected, and a similar number in Hilary Term, this year. It seems generally admitted that, although some of the questions are occasionally difficult, the majority of them ought to be satisfactorily answered by any one entitled to act as an attorney or solicitor. In the only case in which an appeal was argued before the three Judges under the Rule of Court, it seems that not the slightest intimation was given by the Judges that the examination was conducted too strictly. On the contrary, if whatever leniency might be proper some years we are not mistaken, the Judges expect that ago, the time has arrived when a considerable amount of knowledge in the principles of the Law and the practice of the Courts should be shown by the examination_in_order to entitle the party to admission on the Roll.

It is proved every Term, by the papers of many of the candidates, that ten or twelve of the fifteen questions in the departments of Common Law, Equity, and Conveyancing, most of the instances of failure must be can be satisfactorily answered; and therefore owing, to sheer idleness and inattention to the business and duties of the attorney's office. It may be that in some cases the want of success has been occasioned by illness, but these we conceive are few in number. Let it be remembered, that in the due preparation for these examinations, the student will acquire a solid amount of knowledge that I will be of the greatest importance in his future

career.

84

Notes of the Week.-Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor.-Lords Justices.

NISI PRIUS SITTINGS, QUEEN'S BENCH.

Mr. Justice Wightman gave notice, that the Queen's Bench Sittings at Nisi Prius during the present term, would be held in the Lord Chancellor's Court.

EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.

LAW APPOINTMENTS.

Thomas Emerson Headlam, Esq., M. P., has been appointed Chancellor of the Diocese of Ripon, in the room of the Venerable Archdeacon Headlam, deceased.

The Queen has been pleased to appoint,

The Court will hear errors from the Exche- Alan Ker, Esq., to be Chief Justice for the quer the day after Term. Island of Nevis.-From the London Gazette of 30th May.

RECENT DECISIONS IN THE SUPERIOR COURTS.

Lord Chancellor.

Gann v. Gregory. May 3, 25, 1854.

WILL. ERASURES AND ALTERATIONS. PROBATE WITH FACSIMILE.-WILLS' ACT. Probate was granted by the Ecclesiastical Court with a facsimile will containing certain erasures, alterations, interlineations, and obliterations in respect of legacies, &c., therein contained: Held, that their decision was conclusive as to the correctness of the probate, and that the testator must be concluded to have, prior to the execution, have drawn his pen through the gift of such legacies, &c., and an appeal was allowed from Vice-Chancellor Stuart and exceptions allowed to the Master's report in cluding such legacies.

THIS was an appeal from Vice-Chancellor Stuart. It appeared that the testator had left a will written on three pages of paper, and that on the second page there were some alterations, erasures, and interlineations, and obliterations, which were set out in the facsimile of the will annexed to the administration granted by the Ecclesiastical Court to the defendant, Mrs. Gregory. A reference had been directed, in this suit by the legatees, to the Master for an account of the legacies and annuities, and by his report a schedule was given thereof including certain which were struck through. Exceptions were taken to this report, but were overruled by the Vice-Chancellor Stuart upon the authority of Cooper v. Bockett, 4 Moore, P. C. 419, and the 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 21.

Bacon and W. P. Murray in support of the appeal, citing Mence v. Mence, 18 Ves. 348; Wigram and Berkeley, contrà.

The Lord Chancellor said, that although the case of Cooper v. Bockett established that if it were not shown an erasure was prior to the execution of the will it must be presumed to have been made afterwards, and the will be proved without the crasure, yet here the Ecclesiastical Court had granted probate with all the erasures, &c., in the will, and their decision was conclusive as to the correctness of the probate. The testator must therefore be concluded to have originally intended to give certain legacies, but to have, prior to the execution of the will, drawn his pen through the gift of such legacies, and to have not intended to bequeath the same. The appeal would therefore be allowed.

[blocks in formation]

An order was made on petition in the lunacy and under the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, for the appointment of a new trustee in the stead of one of unsound mind, although not so found by commission, and also of another who had died-on the affidavit of two of the cestuis que trustent approving of the petition and that the others were in India. the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, for the appointment THIS was a petition in the lunacy and under of a new trustee of a marriage settlement in the place of one of unsound mind, although not so found by commission, and also in the place of another who had died. Two of the cestuis que trustent who were in this country filed an affidavit approving of the petition, and the others were in India.

A. Gordon in support.

The Lords Justices made the order as prayed.

Wheatley v. Barstow. May 29, 1854.

EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES UNDER NEW PRACTICE.-ORDER WHERE WITNESS IN

DANGEROUS HEALTH.

An order was made to take the evidence orally according to the new practice in a suit instituted before the new Chancery Acts came into operation, with the exception of one of the witnesses and a defendant, who was subject to a disease of the brain, and whose life might be endangered by the excitement consequent on an examination by counsel, and he was directed to be examined on interrogatories, but without prejudice to the right of either party to examine orally at the hearing.

In this suit, which had been instituted before the new Chancery Acts came into operation, the Vice-Chancellor Stuart had refused a motion to take the evidence orally under the new practice instead of by interrogatories.

Goldsmith in support of the appeal; Speed, for the other side, did not oppose, except as to one of the witnesses, who was a defendant, and had answered the original and the amended bill, but was subject to a disease of the brain, and whose life might be endangered by the excitement consequent on an examination by counsel.

Superior Courts: Lords Justices.—Rolls.-V. C. Kindersley.—V. C. Stuart.

The Lords Justices, in making the order for the examination of the witnesses, except the one in question, according to the new practice, directed that the examination and any crossexamination of such witness according to the old practice should be without prejudice to the right of either party at the hearing to apply for his oral examination and cross-examination by the Court.

Master of the Ralls.

Freer v. Freer and another; Shield v. Same. May 29, 1854.

ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS.-CREDITOR AND

HEIR-AT-LAW.-COSTS.

Separate claims were filed for the administration of the estate of an intestate by his heir and by a creditor: an order was made for an administration on the two claims, the heir to have the conduct of the proceedings. The defendants, who were the administrators, had appeared by separate counsel, held that one set of costs could only be allowed. THESE were administration claims filed by the infant heir and by a creditor of Mr. Wm. Freer, who had died intestate. It appeared that a claim was necessary, as there were real estates subject to mortgages, and that an application at Chambers for the usual administration order by the heir had been unsuccessful. The defendants, who had taken out letters of administration, appeared by separate counsel. Berkeley, Baggallay, and F. Webb for the several parties.

The Master of the Rolls said, that the order would be made on the two claims, but that the heir would have the conduct of the proceedings-the administrators to have only one set

of costs.

Vice-Chancellor Kindersley.

In re Alexander's Trust. May 26, 1854. TRUSTEES' ACT, 1850.-JURISDICTION OVER JUDICIAL FACTOR IN SCOTLAND. — INSURANCE POLICIES.

The judicial factor, appointed in Scotland to a testator upon the refusal of his executors to act, held not within the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, s. 27, and the Court refused to declare him a trustee for the assignees of certain policies of insurance in this country, or to appoint a trustee to assign; but an order for payment of the dividends to the assignees was made-the insurance office entering the assignees' names in their books. THIS was a petition under the Trustee Act, 1850, s. 27, for the appointment of a trustee to assign certain policies of insurance in the Amicable Insurance Office, which had been assigned by the testator, upon the refusal of his executors to act, and of the judicial factor, who had been thereupon appointed in Scotland, to complete the assignment. It appeared that the insurance office had recognised the assignees in their books.

Cankrien in support; Anderson for other parties.

85

The Vice-Chancellor said, that the Court had no power to declare the judicial factor a trustee within the Act, but as the dividends were within the power of the parties, an order for payment of the dividends would be made if the insurance office entered the petitioners' names in their books.

Wynch v. Grant. May 29, 1854.

BREACH OF TRUST.

DEED OF APPOINTMENT OF NEW TRUSTEES.-SIMPLE CONTRACT DEBT.

A breach of trust was committed in dealing with the trust moneys under a marriage seitlement: Held, that the trustees, who were appointed by deed, under hand and seal, of assignment of the trust property, but without any words of covenant, were simple contract and not specialty debtors. IT appeared that a sum of 7,400l. was settled on the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Wynch, on certain trusts, and that a breach of trust had been committed in dealing therewith, and the question now arose, whether the trustees were specialty or simple contract debtors. deed whereby they were appointed contained an assignment of the property to them on the trusts of the settlement, and gave them power to act as if originally appointed thereby, but there were no words of covenant in the deed, which was made under their hands and seals.

The

[blocks in formation]

A testator by will devised real estates to his eldest son for 99 years, if he should so long live, and subject to the term to trustees for his life to preserve contingent remainders, and from and after the determination of the said estates, subject as aforesaid to the heirs of the body of the eldest son. There

was a devise over in default of issue in the same terms to the second son, and in default of his issue to the heirs of the testator's body, &c. By a codicil he confirmed the will, and devised all his freehold and copyhold estates to trustees to the use of them in fee, upon trust immediately after his death to convey to the trustees of his marriage articles a certain part to make up his wife's jointure. The son executed u disentailing deed, and devised the estates to the defendant, but it appeared that there was a daughter of such son who had married, and the plaintiff was her eldest son: Held, that the plaintiff took as equitable tenant in tail under the will.

86

Superior Courts: V. C. Stuart.-Queen's Bench.

sult by implication to one to whom an express estate was given for a term of years: Fearne's Conting. Rem. (10th ed.), vol. 1, p. 42; Adams v. Savage, 2 Salk. 679; Rawley v. Holland, Vin. v. 22, p. 189, pl. 11; Tippin v. Cosin, 4 Mod. 380; Carth. 272; Else v. Osborn, 1 P. Wms. 387. But the present case was not embarrassed with these difficulties, as no part of the equitable freehold could result by operation of law, except so far as the limitations failed to exhaust the whole beneficial interest; and as the testator had disposed of the whole fee simple, legal and equitable, by a series of valid limitations, which enhausted the whole and left no part of the freehold or beneficial interest undisposed of for any period. As the whole of the defendant's case depended on the notion of an equitable freehold resulting by implication to the eldest son, and there was no ground for that implication, the defendant's case must fail, and a declaration made in the plaintiff's favour as equitable tenant in tail.

MR. GEORGE ARNOLD, by his will, devised certain real estates to his eldest son for 99 years, if he should so long live, and subject to the term to trustees for his life to preserve contingent remainders, and from and after the determination of the said estates, subject as aforesaid to the heirs of the body of such eldest son; and in default of issue subject as aforesaid to his second son for 99 years, if he should so long live, and subject to such term to trustees for his life to preserve contingent remainders, and from and after the determination of such estates to the heirs of the body of the second son, and in default of issue to the heirs of his own (the testator's) body, and in default thereof to his wife during widowhood, and after her death or marriage to such persons and for such estates as his eldest son should by deed or will appoint, with similar powers of appointment to the second son and the widow, and with the ultimate remainder as therein mentioned. By a codicil, the testator, after confirming his will, devised all his freehold and copyhold estates to trustees to the use of them in fee, upon trust immediately after Taylor v. Dove; Taylor v. Nesfield. May 25, his death to convey to the trustees of his marriage articles such part thereof as his trustees should in their discretion think fit, and as would, with the estates comprised in the articles, make up his wife's jointure to 1,2001. per annum, and he empowered his trustees to sell and exchange or mortgage any part of his estates, and that their receipts should be sufficient discharges. The testator's eldest son had a daughter who married Mr. James Cope, and the plaintiff was their eldest son and now claimed as equitable tenant in tail. It appeared that the testator's son had executed a disentailing deed, and had by his will devised the estates to the defendant.

Wigram, Malins, Toller, Rogers, C. Chapman Barber, and Boyle for the several parties. Cur. ad. vult.

The Vice-Chancellor said, it had been argued that the effect of the codicil being to vest the whole fee simple of the legal estates in trustees, and to make the limitations in the will effective only as giving equitable estates, the devise to the heirs of the body of the eldest son coalesced with the equitable estate, said to have resulted to him for his life, according to the rule in Shelley's case, 1 Rep. 104 a; and it was said that, as the legal estate during his life was given to the trustees, the freehold resulted to him as an equitable estate, and uniting with the equitable devise to the heirs of his body made him equitable tenant in tail. Unless it could be shown that an equitable estate of freehold resulted, the case of the defendant must fail. But there was an express devise of the beneficial interest for 99 years, and if an equitable freehold resulted by operation of law, either the term must be merged in the freehold, or there must have been two equitable estates coexisting one for the term of years and the other the freehold by operation of law. There were difficulties in holding, however, consistently with decided cases, that the freehold could re

Court of Queen's Bench.

29, 1854.

ACTION FOR ASSAULT AND MALICIOUS PRO

SECUTION.-MISDIRECTION.-NOTICE

ACTION.

OF

The defendant, a constable, was called on by the chairman of a public meeting to remove the plaintiff on his attempting to interrupt the proceedings, and in doing so an assault was committed, for which the plaintiff was indicted, but the grand jury threw out the bill: Held, in an action against the constable to recover damages for the assault and for maliciously and without probable cause causing the plaintiff to be indicted, that the question of there being reasonable and probable cause should have been left to the jury, and a new trial was ordered, the jury being directed to find for the plaintiff, as the defendant was bound to prove he had legal authority.

In an action against the chairman, who justified under the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, the notice of action omitted the word "maliciously." A rule was discharged for a new trial upon the defendant having thereupon obtained a verdict.

A RULE nisi had been obtained on April 20 last, to set aside the verdict for the plaintiff and for a new trial in this first action, which was brought to recover damages for an assault, and for maliciously and without probable cause causing the plaintiff to be indicted for an assault upon the defendant in the execution of his duty as constable at Bakewell. It appeared that the constable had been called upon by the chairman of a public meeting (the defendant in the second action), to remove the plaintiff on his interrupting the proceedings, when assault in question was committed. The grand jury had thrown out the bill on the indictment of the plaintiff for an assault. On the trial at the last Derby assizes, before Jervis, L. C. J.,

Superior Courts: Queen's

the plaintiff obtained a verdict against the constable under the direction of the learned Judge that the defendant was bound to prove he had legal authority to turn the plaintiff out, but failed in the action against the chairman, who justified under the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, on the ground of insufficient notice of action, whereupon cross-rules had been obtained.

Macaulay and Brewer for the plaintiff; Mellor and Hayes for the defendants.

The Court said, that the rule would be made absolute for a new trial of the first action on the ground of misdirection, the question of there being reasonable and probable cause not being left to the jury, but the rule would be discharged in the second action, the notice of action having omitted the word "maliciously," which was necessary.

Regina (exparte Harding and others) v. Vicar,

&c., of Bourn. May 29, 1854.

SMALL TENEMENTS' RATING ACT.-RIGHT OF OCCUPIERS TO VOTE AT ELECTION OF

CHURCHWARDENS.-MANDAMUS.

A mandamus was refused on the vicar and churchwardens of a parish, in which the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 99 had been adopted, to convene a vestry and proceed to the election of churchwardens for the remainder of the current year, although the officers elected had been elected by the owners, and the votes of the occupiers had been excluded. THIS was a motion for a rule nisi for a mandamus on the defendants to convene a vestry and to proceed to the election of churchwardens for the remainder of the current year. It appeared that the parish had adopted the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 99, in the year 1850, but that on the election for churchwardens the votes of the owners only and not of the occupiers had been admitted at the vestry held for such purpose.

Lush in support, on behalf of the occupiers who claimed to vote, referred to ss. 1, 6, and 7 of the Act, and cited Rex v. Rector, &c., of Birmingham, 7 A. & E. 254.

The Court said, that in the case cited the previous election was void, which was not the case here, merely because certain persons claimed to vote and were not allowed, and the rule would therefore be refused.

Ridgway v. Cannon. May, 29, 1854. COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT.—LEAVE TO PROCEED AS IF PERSONAL SERVICE ON

LUNATIC.

Application had been made to the proprietor of the lunatic asylum, in which the defendant, to an action on a bill of exchange, was confined, to see the defendant, but he had refused without the consent of the friends, whose residence, however, he refused to give. Attempts had failed to discover them, and the copy writ had been left with the proprietor of the asylum, and also with the attorney who had formerly acted for the lunatic: A motion was refused under 15 &

[blocks in formation]

16 Vict. c. 76, s. 17, for leave to proceed as if personal service had been effected, and the proprietor of the asylum was directed to be applied to produce the defendant, and in default a habeas corpus.

THIS was a motion for a rule nisi, under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 17, for leave to proceed as if personal service had been effected in this action, which was brought on a bill of exchange, against a lunatic confined in an asylum. It appeared that application had been made to Dr. Bush, the proprietor of the asylum to see the defendant, but that he refused, except on the order of his friends, whom, however, he refused to state; and upon failing to discover them, a copy of the writ had been left with Dr. Bush and on the attorney, who had formerly

acted for the lunatic.

Paterson in support.

The Court said, that the application must be refused, but that the course would be to inform Dr. Bush he ought to produce the lunatic, in order to his being served, if it could be done without injury to his health, as otherwise there would have to be a habeas corpus for the purpose. Court of Common Pleas.

Hopkins v. Tanqueray. May 26, 1854. ACTION ON WARRANTY.-SALE OF HORSE

BY AUCTION.-REPRESENTATIONS.

It appeared that the plaintiff was examining on the previous day the defendant's horse, which was for sale by auction, but on the defendant saying, "You have nothing to look for, he is perfectly sound in every respect," the plaintiff replied, "If you say so, I am satisfied," and purchased at the auction the next day when the horse was put up without warranty: Held, making absolute a rule to set aside the verdict for the plaintiff and enter a nonsuit, that the words merely amounted to a representation, and not to a warranty.

THIS was a rule nisi to set aside the verdict for the plaintiff and to enter a nonsuit in this action, which was brought on the warranty of a horse sold to the plaintiff by auction. It appeared on the trial before Talfourd, J., that the plaintiff was examining the horse on the day before the sale, and that the defendant had

Which enacts, that "the service of the writ of summons, wherever it may be practicable, shall, as heretofore, be personal; but it shall be lawful for the plaintiff to apply from time to time, on affidavit, to the Court out af which the writ of summons issued, or to a Judge; and in case it shall appear to such Court or Judge that reasonable efforts have been made to effect personal service, and either that the writ has come to the knowledge of the defendant, or that he wilfully evades service of the same, and has not appeared thereto, it shall be lawful for such Court or Judge to order that the plaintiff be at liberty to proceed as if personal service had been effected, subject to such conditions as to the Court or Judge may seem fit."

[ocr errors]
« EelmineJätka »