Candidates who passed the Examination.

CANDIDATES WHO PASSED THE EXAMINATION.

Law of Attorneys and Solicitors.-Selections from Correspondence.

187

Richd. Baverstock Browne Cobbett; Josiah Towne
William Edmund Tugwell; Alexander Meek

William Bromley

Richard Bowes

Jonathan Weymouth

William Wilton Woodward

Charles Kitson

LAW OF ATTORNEYS AND SOLI- estate is chargeable; and if so, that section puts

CITORS.

EMPLOYMENT OF SOLICITOR BY MARRIED
WOMAN.-"PARTY CHARGEABLE."-LIEN
ON SEPARATE ESTATE.

A MARRIED Woman, upon requesting the
plaintiffs to act as her solicitors in certain mat-
ters, had given the following memorandum:
"And in consideration of your so acting as
my solicitors, I hereby charge upon and will
pay from my separate estate, your former and
future bills of costs, and the bills of costs of
Mr. Waugh alone against me, in respect of
these and other causes and matters, together
with interest at 57. per cent. per annum on
those already incurred from this date, and upon
those which may be incurred, from the end of
every year, in which the business charged for
may be performed." She afterwards obtained
the common order for the delivery and taxation
of the plaintiffs' bills of costs, on a petition
presented without a next friend, together with
an order that no proceedings at law or other-
wise be commenced against her in respect of
such bill pending the reference. The plaintiffs,
after delivery of their bills, but on which no
taxation had taken place, filed a claim to en-
force their lien under the memorandum.

an end to the whole matter, for it prohibits the solicitor from commencing any action or suit till one month after delivery of the bill; and after it has been delivered and referred for taxation, it restrains him from taking proceedings pending the reference. At first, I thought this lien for their costs, as against the separate was a claim simply to establish the plaintiffs' estate; and, regarding it in that light, I might have directed it to stand over until after the taxation had been completed and the sum due to the plaintiffs had been ascertained, but I am of opinion that the claim goes further, and ought not therefore to have been filed at all. It must consequently be dismissed with costs, but without prejudice to any proceeding which the amount of their bill of costs shall have been plaintiffs may be advised to institute, after the ascertained on taxation." Waugh v. Waddell,

16 Beav. 521.

SELECTIONS FROM CORRE-
SPONDENCE.

PRIVILEGES OF THE PROFESSION.

AN attempt was recently made by the Barber's Company of the city of London to compel a gentleman, who was a liveryman of the Barber's Company, to act as one of the assistants on the court of master wardens and court of assistants of that company. He was threatened to be fined whether he thought fit point out to their worships the absurdity of to accept the office or not. It was in vain to fining a man for accepting office, such they alleged was the custom. At length the gentle, man pleaded that he was a chief clerk in Chancery, and the exemption was allowed.

CIVIS.

The Master of the Rolls said, "I am of opinion that the 38th section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, does not apply to this case, but to a case in which the person making the application for an order to tax, is not himself the person employing the solicitor. Nor has the 39th section any bearing on the present case. As to the 37th section, it does not indeed apply to a married woman personally, because she is not a' party chargeable' in that sense; but it does COPYHOLD.-FORFEITURE FOR NON-REPAIR. apply to her, when, as in this case, she has, A. holds a copyhold house, which is suffered given an undertaking to pay the costs out of to go out of repair. The fact is presented at a her separate estate, and her separate estate is bailiff is ordered to seize the tenement for the Customary Court by the homage, and the therefore chargeable. This is laid down in lord. Is such seizure lawful, or is it incumMurray v. Barlee, 2 Myl. & K. 209; 7 Sim. bent on the lord to commence an ejectment 194. I think, therefore, that the 37th section for the forfeiture?

does apply to a married woman, whose separate

·A COPYHOLDER.

188 Order in Chan.-London Commissioners.—Bankruptcy Bill.-Norwich Borough Court.

have become payable during the closing of the bankruptcy is extended from 21 days to two

Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor.-Rolls.

189

both inclusive, 173 and 175 and except such | year, shall apply to the Court of Record of the parts of the said Act as relate to special juries, city of Norwich and county of the said city, terms, and pleadings between the 10th day of called the Guildhall Court.-From the London August and the 24th day of October in any Gazette of 4th July.

RECENT DECISIONS IN THE SUPERIOR COURTS.

Lord Chancellor.

Morritt v. Walton. July 1, 1854.

ENTERING

APPEARANCE WHERE MORE

THAN THREE DEFENDANTS.
TORS' COSTS.

SOLICI

Held, that the 5th Order of October 23, 1853, which directs that solicitors are entitled to charge and be allowed 6s. 8d. for entering an appearance for every additional number of defendants not exceeding three, where there are more than three defendants, applies to suits originating by bill as well as by summons at Chambers.

By the 5th Order of October 23, 1853, under the Masters' Abolition Act, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 80, "Solicitors are entitled to charge and be allowed for entering the appearance for one or more defendants, if not exceeding three, 68. 8d.," and "if exceeding three, for every additional number not exceeding three an additional sum of 6s. 8d." It appeared that in this supplemental bill there were sixteen defendants, and that the solicitor had entered one appearance for the whole, and that on the taxation of costs the Taxing Master refused to allow more than 6s. 8d. on the ground that the orders only referred to proceedings originating by summons in Chambers.

Smythe now applied for the direction of the Court on the question.

The Lord Chancellor said, that 6s. 8d. ought to be allowed for every three appearances in the same manner as on claims.

of being an accomplice in certain bank forgeries.

R. Palmer, Welford, and Roxburgh in support. Selwyn, on behalf of the Incorporated Law Society, took a preliminary objection, on the ground that almost all the points raised by the petition had been before the Court of Queen's Bench on two separate occasions,' when the whole question was fully gone into and argued, and that if there were any new facts or fresh evidence adduced, the application should be made to the Court of Queen's Bench, citing exparte Wetherell, 2 De G. M'N. & G. 359.

The Master of the Rolls said, that the objection was an insuperable one which could not be got over, and which he felt when he first read the petition. The practice of this Court had always been to require, upon the application to be restored to the roll of solicitors that the application should be made first to one of the Common Law Courts; and no instance was to be found of a person who had been restored to the roll of solicitors without having previously been restored to the roll of one of the Common Law Courts. The Court was now asked to depart from this rule which it had adopted, and in a case where two applications had been made to the Court of Queen's Bench, and been refused by that Court. The words of the Lord Chief Justice saying, "This is our final decision," could not certainly be understood to mean that this was a case in which, under no circumstances could the matter be brought again before that Court for their consideration. If those words were so treated, it was clear that, assuming the judgment of this Court to be in favour of Mr. Barber, the same observation dered. It was attempted to be brought before would apply upon new matter to be considence of a very material and important characthis Court, upon the allegation of fresh eviter, which was not before the Court of Queen's Bench. The judgment upon that evidence might or might not have any force or weight with the Court of Queen's Bench, but it was obvious that it ought not to have any weight THIS was a petition under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. with that Court otherwise than they should 73, s. 25, on behalf of Mr. William Henry think the evidence was fairly entitled to proBarber for an order that the Registrar of Attor- duce. There was not the slightest doubt that neys and Solicitors should grant a certificate both the Court of Queen's Bench and the that Mr. Barber was a solicitor of this Court, other Courts in Westminster Hall would reand entitled to take out from the Commis- consider the case of Mr. Barber, if it were sioners of Inland Revenue a stamped certifi- brought before them upon evidence which was cate authorising him to practise as a solicitor not before them upon the occasion of the preof this Court. It appeared that Mr. Barber vious decisions. The present application was was admitted on the roll in Easter Term, 1836,

Master of the Rolls.

In re William Henry Barber. July 1, 1854.
SOLICITOR.—PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RE-

NEW CERTIFICATE.-JURISDICTION.

The application of an attorney for leave to renew his certificate had been refused by the Court of Queen's Bench: Held, that the Master of the Rolls will not entertain a similar application on the merits, although upon fresh evidence.

and had taken out his certificate of practice

1

July 6, 1850 (reported ante, vol. 40, p. until December, 1843, when he ceased to renew 218), and June 4, 1851 (reported ante, vol. 42, the same upon his apprehension on a charge p. 101).

190

Superior Courts: Rolls.-V. C. Kindersley.

Roupell, Lloyd, R. Palmer, Smythe, Fleming, Shee, Hanson, Roche, appeared for the several parties.

The Master of the Rolls said, that the codicil could not be held to confirm the bequests in the will, which were invalid, and that there was therefore an intestacy as to the portion not included in the power of appointment.

Vice-Chancellor Kindersley.

Jenkyns v. Robertson. June 10, 1854.1 PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.--EFFECT OF DECREE IN CREDITORS' SUIT AGAINST

to rehear the case which was before the Court | appoint, in trust for her daughters. In Nov., of Queen's Bench. It was not an appeal, be- 1829, and after her husband's death, she made cause it was not upon the same evidence; but a codicil, whereby she confirmed all wills she to rehear it would produce very serious incon-had theretofore made. It appeared that in the veniences; and the observations which Mr. will made during her coverture was included Selwyn read from the judgment of Lord Cran- certain property to which the power of apworth applied to cases of this description. It pointment did not extend, and the question would be a very serious inconvenience that now raised was, whether it passed under the one Court should be allowed to decide upon a codicil. matter which had been tried before another Court, or that when one Court had pronounced its decision that the same case should be brought again before another Court upon either the same or additional materials, in order to try to get a different decision upon the subject. It was true this existed in the case of a writ of habeas corpus, but the inconveniences which might arise in that case had been very obvious in various instances, although it must be admitted that the liberty of the subject afforded some exception. But even in Chancery the great inconveniences, arising from attempts to get the decision of one Court at variance with the decision of another Court, had been expe. rienced. His Honour said he had felt from the first an inclination to view this case as favourably and as leniently as he could, and had been impressed with the circumstance of a free pardon having been granted by the Crown to this gentleman, but it was not possible for this Court, even if the case had not been heard before any Court at all, and the application had been made here in the first instance, to have interfered, unless an application had been made to one of the Common Law Courts, to allow him to take out his certificate-that in substance being perfectly analogous to the case of restoring him to the roll, because, although the form of application was different, the application and the evidence were of the same character. This applied still more strongly in a case where the application had been previously refused by one of the Common Law Courts, and the objection, therefore, must be allowed to prevail. The petition would accordingly stand over, and Mr. Barber be allowed to make such application as he might think fit.

Du Hourmelin v. Sheldon. July 3, 1854. MARRIED WOMAN.- CODICIL CONFIRMING INOPERATIVE DEVISE IN WILL, EFFECT

OF.

A married woman, by a will, devised property over which she had a power of appointment, and also other property over which the power did not extend: Held, that a codicil, although executed after the death of her husband, and confirming her previous wills, did not give effect to the inoperative devise of the property over which the testalrix had no power of appointment.

THE testatrix, Mrs. Elizabeth Sheldon, by her will, dated in 1824, in pursuance of a testamentary power of appointment, devised certain leasehold and copyhold lands, held under the dean and canons of Worcester, and also all other hereditaments she had any power to

SURETY.-DISCHARGE.

The decree against the estate of the surety to a bond included as a specialty creditor, G. N., who after such decree sued the principal debtor, and arranged to take a judgment for payment by instalments, but without the knowledge of the surety: Held, that the estate of the surety was nevertheless not discharged.

In this creditors' suit it appeared that the decree included Mr. George Nicholson as a specialty creditor against the estate of the testator Mr. James Robertson as surety in a bond, and that after such decree Mr. Nicholson had brought an action against the principal debtor, and had arranged to take a judgment for payment of the debt by instalments, but without the knowledge of the surety. The question was raised whether this did not discharge the

surety.

Speed and Greene appeared for the several parties.

The Vice-Chancellor said, that the creditor had by the decree established his right against the estate of the surety, who was no longer liable as surety but under the decree, and the proceedings against the principal debtor was in the nature of executing such decree, and would not operate to discharge the surety.

Welch v. Cole. June 30, 1854.
TRUSTEES' EXTENSION ACT, 1852.—VEST-

ING ORDER. SALE under DECREE.
BARRING DOWER.

An order was made under the 15 & 16 Vict.
c. 55, s. 1, vesting the legal estate in cer-
tain property sold under a decree in the
purchasers where the defendants (the ven
dors) had passively refused to carry out
the decree by executing a conveyance, but
held that the order could not be made so
as to bar dower.

THIS was a petition under the 15 & 16