PART III. NUISANCE. TITLE I. General Principles. TITLE I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES. SECTION 1571. Definition. 1572. Public nuisances. 1573. Private nuisances. 1574. Successive owners. 1575. Abatement does not preclude action. § 1571. That is a nuisance which wrongfully causes loss, Definition. harm, annoyance, or great apprehension of danger, by 1. Creating public alarm; 2. Disturbing public order; 3. Endangering the public health; 4. Offending public decency; 5. Obstructing a right of way; 6. Disgusting the senses; 7. Or in any way rendering life, or the use of property uncomfortable. nuisances. § 1572. A public nuisance is one which affects equally Public the rights of the whole community or neighborhood, although the extent of the damage may be unequal. § 1573. Every other nuisance is private. Private nuisances. Successive owners. Abatement does not preclude action. § 1574. Every successive owner of a continuing nuisance is liable therefor in the same manner as the one who first created it. Brown v. Cayuga & Susq. R. R. Co., 12 N. Y., 486. 1575. Abatement affects merely the present and future, and does not prejudice the right to compensation in damages for what is past. Pierce v. Dart, 7 Cow., 609. Lapse of time. Remedies for public nuisance. Action. TITLE II. PUBLIC NUISANCES. SECTION 1576. Lapse of time does not legalize. 1577. Remedies for public nuisance. 1578. Action. 1579. Abatement. 1576. No lapse of time can legalize a public nuisance,' [which amounts to an actual obstruction of public right,] for every continuance thereof is a fresh nuisance.' 1 Mills v. Hall, 9 Wend., 315; Renwick v. Morris, 7 Hill, 375; 3 id., 621; Dygert v. Schenck, 23 Wend., 446; People v. Cunningham, 1 Den., 524; Peckham v. Henderson, 27 Barb., 207. * Brown v. Cayuga & Susquehanna R. R. Co., 12 N. Y., 486. § 1577. The remedies against a public nuisance are: 1. Indictment; 2. Action; 3. Abatement. The remedy by indictment is regulated by the PENAL CODE and the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. § 1578. An individual may maintain an action for a public nuisance if it is specially injurious to himself,' but not otherwise." 'Pierce v. Dart, 7 Cow., 609. 2 Davis v. Mayor, &c., 14 N. Y., 506; Dougherty v. Bunting, 1 Sandf., 1; Myers v. Malcolm, 6 Hill, 292; see Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow., 146; 4 Wend., 9; Fir t Baptist Church v. Schenectady & Troy R. R. Co., 5 Barb., 79; Same v. Utica & Schenectady R. R. Co., 6 id., 313; Pierce v. Dart, 7 Cow., 609. § 1579. Any person may abate a public nuisance' which Abatement. is specially injurious to him,' by removing, or, if necessary, destroying the thing, which constitutes the same, not committing a breach of the peace or doing wanton injury. 12 Bouv. Inst., 575; Hart v. Mayor, &c., of Albany, 9 Wend., 571; 3 Paige, 213; Wetmore v. Tracy, 14 Wend., * Brown v. Perkins, 12 Law Rep. (N. S.), 98. TITLE III. PRIVATE NUISANCE. SECTION 1580. Remedies for private nuisance. 1581. Abatement. 1582. When notice is required. § 1580. The remedies for a private nuisance are: 1. Action; and 2. Abatement. § 1581. A person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or, if necessary, destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, not committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury. Remedies for private nuisance. Abatement. notice is § 1582. Where a nuisance results from a mere omission When of the wrong-doer, and cannot be abated without entering required. upon his land,' reasonable notice must be given to him before entering to abate it." 1 As in the case of overhanging branches. 2 See 3 Sharsw. Blackst., 5, and note 5. PART IV. MAXIMS OF JURISPRUDENCE. § 1583. The maxims of jurisprudence hereinafter set forth are intended not to alter any of the preceding provisions of this Code, but to serve as aids in their just exposition. The maxims given in the text of this title, are not meant to be mere translations of the Latin originals mentioned in the notes; but such an explanation of them as is supposed to be most just and consonant with our legal system. § 1584. Equity is to be regarded in all things, but chiefly in the administration of the law "In omnibus quidem, maxime tamen in jure, æquitas spectanda est. (Dig., 50, 17, 90, Paulus, Quæst., 15, 90.) Placuit in omnibus rebus præcissuam esse justitiæ æquitatis que quam stricti juris rationem. (Cod., 3, 1, 8).” § 1585. Reason is the life of the law, and when the reason of a law ceases, so should the law itself. "Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex." Co. Litt., 70 h. The rule of the English law that a legacy from a parent to a child is presumed to be satisfied by a subsequent gift from the parent is one, says Judge DUER, which sprang from and was sustained by the peculiar policy of the English law of real property and succession, and is plainly inconsistent with the spirit of the American law upon those subjects. "The reasons of the doctrine with us have ceased to exist, and if there is any truth or obligatory force in the maxim cessante ratione cessat ipsa lex, the doctrine has perished with them." Langdon v. Astor's Exec'rs, 3 Duer, 557. Again, the rule that the opinion of witnesses is not ad missible, is "based upon the presumption that the tribunal before which the evidence is given is as capable of forming a judgment on the facts as the witness. When circumstances rebut this presumption, the rule |